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FROM

Rev. Theodore Parker

THE

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MASSACHUSETTS QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NO. I.—DECEMBER, 1847.

TO THE PUBLIC.

THE American people are fast opening their own destiny. Their material basis is of such extent that no folly of man can quite subvert it; for the territory is a considerable fraction of the planet, and the population neither loath nor inexpert to use their advantages. Add, that this energetic race derive an unprecedented material power from the new arts, from the expansions effected by public schools, cheap postage, and a cheap press, from the telescope, the telegraph, the railroad, steamship, steamferry, steammill, from domestic architecture, chemical agriculture, from ventilation, from ice, ether, caoutchouc, and innumerable inventions and manufactures.

A scholar who has been reading of the fabulous magnificence of Assyria and Persia, of Rome and Constantinople, leaves his library, and takes his seat in a rail-car, where he is importuned by newsboys with journals still wet from Liverpool and Havre, with telegraphic despatches not yet fifty minutes old from Buffalo and Cincinnati. At the screams of the steam-whistle, the train quits city and suburbs, darts away into the interior, — drops every man at his estate as it whirls along, and shows our traveller what tens of thousands of powerful and weaponed men, science-armed and society-armed, sit at large in this ample region, obscure from their numbers and the extent of the domain. He reflects on the power

which each of these plain republicans can employ; how far these chains of intercourse and travel reach, interlock, and ramify; what levers, what pumps, what exhaustive analyses are applied to nature for the benefit of masses of men. Then he exclaims, What a negro-fine royalty is that of Jamschid and Solomon! What a substantial sovereignty does my townsman possess! A man who has a hundred dollars to dispose of, — a hundred dollars over his bread, — is rich beyond the dreams of the Cæsars.

Keep our eyes as long as we can on this picture, we cannot stave off the ulterior question, — the famous question of Cineas to Pyrrhus, — the WHEREFORE of all this power and population, these surveys and inventions, this taxing and tabulating, mill-privilege, roads, and mines. The aspect this country presents is a certain maniacal activity, an immense apparatus of cunning machinery which turns out, at last, some Nuremberg toys. Has it generated, as great interests do, any intellectual power? Where are the works of the imagination — the surest test of a national genius? At least as far as the purpose and genius of America is yet reported in any book, it is a sterility, and no genius.

One would say, there is nothing colossal in the country but its geography and its material activities; that the moral and intellectual effects are not on the same scale with the trade and production. There is no speech heard but that of auctioneers, newsboys, and the caucus. Where is the great breath of the New World, the voice of aboriginal nations opening new eras with hymns of lofty cheer? Our books and fine arts are imitations; there is a fatal incuriosity and disinclination in our educated men to new studies, and the interrogation of nature. We have taste, critical talent, good professors, good commentators, but a lack of male energy.

What more serious calamity can befall a people than a constitutional dulness and limitation? The moral influence of the intellect is wanting. We hearken in vain for any profound

voice speaking to the American heart, cheering timid good men, animating the youth, consoling the defeated, and intelligently announcing duties which clothe life with joy, and endear the face of land and sea to men. It is a poor consideration that the country wit is precocious, and, as we say, practical; that political interests on so broad a scale as ours are administered by little men with some saucy village talent, by deft partisans, good cipherers, strict economists, quite empty of all superstition.

Conceding these unfavorable appearances, it would yet be a poor pedantry to read the fates of this country from these narrow data. On the contrary, we are persuaded that moral and material values are always commensurate. Every material organization exists to a moral end, which makes the reason of its existence. Here are no books, but who can see the continent with its inland and surrounding waters, its temperate climates, its west-wind breathing vigor through all the year, its confluence of races so favorable to the highest energy, and the infinite glut of their production, without putting new queries to Destiny, as to the purpose for which this muster of nations and this sudden creation of enormous values is made.

This is equally the view of science and of patriotism. We hesitate to employ a word so much abused as *patriotism*, whose true sense is almost the reverse of its popular sense. We have no sympathy with that boyish egotism hoarse with cheering for our side, for our State, for our town; the right patriotism consists in the delight which springs from contributing our peculiar and legitimate advantages to the benefit of humanity. Every foot of soil has its proper quality; the grape on two sides of the same fence has new flavors; and so every acre on the globe, every family of men, every point of climate, has its distinguishing virtues. Certainly, then, this country does not lie here in the sun causeless; and though it may not be easy to define its influence, men feel already its emancipating quality in the careless self-reliance of the manners, in the

freedom of thought, in the direct roads by which grievances are reached and redressed, and even in the reckless and sinister politics, not less than in purer expressions. Bad as it is, this freedom leads onward and upward — to a Columbia of thought and art, which is the last and endless end of Columbus's adventure.

Lovers of our country, but not always approvers of the public counsels, we should certainly be glad to give good advice in politics. We have not been able to escape our national and endemic habit, and to be liberated from interest in the elections and in public affairs. Nor have we cared to disfranchise ourselves. We are more solicitous than others to make our politics clear and healthful, as we believe politics to be nowise accidental or exceptional, but subject to the same laws with trees, earths, and acids.

We see that reckless and destructive fury which characterizes the lower classes of American society, and which is pampered by hundreds of profligate presses. The young intriguers who drive in bar-rooms and town-meetings the trade of politics, sagacious only to seize the victorious side, have put the country into the position of an overgrown bully, and Massachusetts finds no heart or head to give weight and efficacy to her contrary judgment. In hours when it seemed only to need one just word from a man of honor to have vindicated the rights of millions, and to have given a true direction to the first steps of a nation, we have seen the best understandings of New England, the trusted leaders of her counsels constituting a snivelling and despised opposition, clapped on the back by comfortable capitalists from all sections, and persuaded to say, We are too old to stand for what is called a New England sentiment any longer. Rely on us for commercial representatives, but for questions of ethics — who knows what markets may be opened? We are not well, we are not in our seats, when justice and humanity are to be spoken for.

We have a bad war, many victories — each of which converts

the country into an immense chanticleer; — and a very insincere political opposition. The country needs to be extricated from its delirium at once. Public affairs are chained in the same law with private; the retributions of armed states are not less sure and signal than those which come to private felons. The facility of majorities is no protection from the natural sequence of their own acts. Men reason badly, but nature and destiny are logical.

But whilst we should think our pains well bestowed if we could cure the infatuation of statesmen, and should be sincerely pleased if we could give a direction to the federal politics, we are far from believing politics the primal interest of men. On the contrary, we hold that laws and governors cannot possess a commanding interest for any but vacant or fanatical people: for the reason that this is simply a formal and superficial interest; and men of a solid genius are only interested in substantial things.

The state, like the individual, should rest on an ideal basis. Not only man but nature is injured by the imputation that man exists only to be fattened with bread; but he lives in such connection with Thought and Fact, that his bread is surely involved as one element thereof, but is not its end and aim. So the insight which commands the laws and conditions of the true polity, precludes forever all interest in the squabbles of parties. As soon as men have tasted the enjoyments of learning, friendship, and virtue, for which the state exists, the prizes of office appear polluted, and their followers, outcasts.

A journal that would meet the real wants of this time must have a courage and power sufficient to solve the problems which the great groping society around us, stupid with perplexity, is dumbly exploring. Let it not show its astuteness, by dodging each difficult question, and arguing diffusely every point on which men are long ago unanimous. Can it front this matter of Socialism, to which the names of Owen and Fourier have attached, and dispose of that question? Will it

cope with the allied questions of Government, Nonresistance, and all that belongs under that category? Will it measure itself with the chapter of Slavery, in some sort the special enigma of the time, as it has provoked against it a sort of inspiration and enthusiasm singular in modern history? There are literary and philosophical reputations to settle. The name of Swedenborg has in this very time acquired new honors, and the current year has witnessed the appearance, in their first English translation, of his manuscripts. Here is an unsettled account in the book of Fame; a nebula to dim eyes, but which great telescopes may yet resolve into a magnificent system. Here is the standing problem of Natural Science, and the merits of her great interpreters, to be determined; the encyclopedical Humboldt, and the intrepid generalizations collected by the author of the "Vestiges of Creation." Here is the balance to be adjusted between the exact French school of Cuvier, and the genial catholic theorists, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Goethe, Davy, and Agassiz. Will it venture into the thin and difficult air of that school where the secrets of structure are discussed under the topics of mesmerism and the twilights of demonology?

What will easily seem to many a far higher question than any other is that which respects the embodying of the Conscience of the Period. Is the age we live in unfriendly to the highest powers; to that blending of the affections with the poetic faculty which has distinguished the Religious Ages? We have a better opinion of the economy of nature than to fear that those varying phases which humanity presents, ever leave out any of the grand springs of human action. Mankind for the moment seem to be in search of a religion. The Jewish *cultus* is declining; the Divine, or, as some will say, the truly Human, hovers, now seen, now unseen, before us. This period of peace, this hour when the jangle of contending churches is hushing or hushed, will seem only the more propitious to those who believe that man need not fear the want of religion, be-

cause they know his religious constitution,—that he must rest on the moral and religious sentiments, as the motion of bodies rests on geometry. In the rapid decay of what was called religion, timid and unthinking people fancy a decay of the hope of man. But the moral and religious sentiments meet us everywhere, alike in markets as in churches. A God starts up behind cotton bales also. The conscience of man is regenerated as is the atmosphere, so that society cannot be debauched. That health which we call Virtue is an equipoise which easily redresses itself, and resembles those rocking-stones which a child's finger can move, and a weight of many hundred tons cannot overthrow.

With these convictions, a few friends of good letters have thought fit to associate themselves for the conduct of a new journal. We have obeyed the custom and convenience of the time in adopting this form of a Review, as a mould into which all metal most easily runs. But the form shall not be suffered to be an impediment. The name might convey the impression of a book of criticism, and that nothing is to be found here which was not written expressly for the Review; but good readers know that inspired pages are not written to fill a space, but for inevitable utterance; and to such our journal is freely and solicitously open, even though every thing else be excluded. We entreat the aid of every lover of truth and right, and let these principles entreat for us. We rely on the talents and industry of good men known to us, but much more on the magnetism of truth, which is multiplying and educating advocates for itself and friends for us. We rely on the truth for and against ourselves.

ART. I. — *Message from the President of the United States to the two Houses of Congress, at the commencement of the Second Session of the Twenty-ninth Congress, Dec. 8th,* 1846. Washington. 1846.

THERE is a period in history when war is thought to be the natural state of mankind; when, certainly, it is the common state, and peace an exception to the general rule. Labor is hated, and war honored. In such a time, no reason need be given for going to war; rather perhaps is a reason required for ceasing from battle and plunder. In the early period of Rome, the senate now and then made a truce, but never a peace. Peace was only an armistice for a limited period. Says Homer, "It is the business of a man to fight; of a slave to till the ground." He represented the general opinion of the "Heroic Age." But now things are somewhat changed. War is the exception; public opinion is against it. Merchants and mechanics dislike it, for it interferes with their productive operations; thinking men abhor it as unreasonable; and good men look on it as wicked. In all European countries, the thinking men demand of their rulers a good reason for disturbing their relations of peace. The old talk about national honor has diminished not a little amongst intelligent men, who think the national honor which is gained or lost by a battle is of no great value. Indeed, so far have matters gone, that many men hold the opinion, and some have even a sober and settled conviction, that war between nations is no more reputable and manly, no more likely to establish justice, than trial by battle in courts of law; no better than duelling between "men of honor," or a bout with fists between two Irish beggars partially drunken. They think that war is nothing but murder, murder in the first degree, with malice aforethought, and what is wrong for one man is equally wrong for twenty millions — that injustice is not the less so for being a great injustice. Then again there are some religious men who think that Christianity actually forbids war. It is true the various churches of the world have taken little pains to say so, but a good deal of pains to say the opposite. We never yet have seen the creed, the litany, or the catechism, which gave us the smallest hint that Christianity and war were incompatible. Still there are religious men who think the religion of which

God planted the germs in human nature, is thoroughly hostile to all war.

All of these men united may be few in number — Theorists, Philanthropists, Philosophers, and the like. Still they are not idle nor ineffective; they have already produced a change in public opinion; and in this city and its neighbourhood, a very great change within a few years. Then, too, there are sound, sober, practical men, who look little at first principles, it may be, and the nature of things, but much at modes of operation, and effects. They see that war is costly; that it costs money; that it costs men; that it is not productive. In short, they see that all which a nation consumes in its army and navy is a bad investment, stock which does not pay. Still further: there are humane men, aboriginal democrats, who think that Man is of more account than the Accidents of a man — customs, institutions, property, and the like; they think that all government should be designed for the good of all men, and therefore that it must accord with the principles of absolute justice, which God has written on the heart of mankind. They see that war tramples all these principles under foot, and therefore, and in the name of the people, they obstinately refuse to promote, to favor, or even to tolerate a war.

Now, by means of these small parties of original thinkers, the Theorists, Philosophers, the Economists, and the Philanthropists, it has come to pass that war is getting sadly out of favor. True there are men, and enough of them, in the name of Religion, of Philosophy, Economy, and Democracy, who defend the old usage. They think that war now and then is a good thing; "it invigorates the people" — "it kills off the rabble, and, for the latter purpose, is better than the jail and gallows, as well as swifter." These men have a great many newspapers at their command, and sometimes occupy seats deemed more sacred than an editor's chair. Doubtless they retard the progress of true ideas, and so add to the misery of mankind. Yet they no longer govern public opinion; their influence yearly becomes less, for man naturally loves justice, and is a human being, not a brute, nor a fool. It has now come to pass, that in all civilized countries the mass of men look on war as a terrible evil, and one not to be lightly incurred by the government of the nation.

It surprises no one when two savage tribes quarrel; the cause is seldom inquired after, for it is known that in such a stage of progress war is to be looked for and expected. But

when a civilized nation pauses in its career of productive exertions, and, turning its art, its science, its strength of hand and head, its natural activity, from their creative work, seeks to destroy the property of its sister State, to burn her towns, to butcher her men, and with the soldier's invading foot pollute her soil — it is a serious and a dreadful thing. Sober men look for the cause of such madness. The physical evil is monstrous — the waste of property, the havoc of life. But this is the smallest part of the mischief. The savage spirit excited in the soldier, which he carries home to his village; the hunger after booty, the thirst of blood, which successful war wakens in the conqueror's throat; the desire of revenge which defeat kindles in the heart of the discomfited, — these long retard the progress of mankind. Take the foremost of civilized nations: the mass of men have not yet forgotten the savage; the thin garment of civilization is easily torn asunder and stripped off; you break the skin of the gentleman and behold a cannibal; the peasant of England or France becomes the fierce Saxon, or the savage Gaul, whose deeds you shudder to think of.

Every war in this age retards the progress of mankind. The United States, having outgrown their mother, refused her burthens, resisted her stripes, and at last separated from her, after a long and hearty quarrel. The effects of that quarrel still survive, and centuries of peace will hardly remove the jealousy and hatred felt by the most ignorant men of both nations, as well as by their political leaders. If two countries are united by a war, as Poland and Russia, the spirit of intense and national hatred remains yet longer, and is still more violent.

It is a great wrong for a powerful and civilized people to attack a nation that is barbarous and feeble. The indignation of honest statesmen is justly aroused against France for her conduct towards Algiers. Doubtless she had her provocations, but between the Weak and the Strong every body knows where the provocation commonly begins. The old fable of the wolf and the lamb is not likely to be forgotten. The conduct of England towards the various nations in India, towards China, towards Ireland — fills the world with indignation. The history of her achievements in Asia is the history of her shame. Honest men in England know it as well as we. Austria is powerful and Rome is weak; the emperor is of the middle ages, while the new pope is a son of the nineteenth century,

and of course a reformer. He loves his church, loves his people, loves mankind; founds institutions which the Austrian despot cannot relish, or even tolerate; which endanger the "peculiar institutions" of that despotic monarch. The middle ages and the nineteenth century are mutually hostile. Institutions which ought to be separated by hundreds of years quarrel at first touch. If Ferdinand should therefore invade the States of the Church, attempting to re-annex the March of Ancona to his possessions in Lombardy — the advance from Ferrara to Bologna would raise a cry of shame in every country of Europe, and find a manly echo even in America. Justice takes sides with the party most in the right; Humanity against the strong oppressor.

The present war against Mexico is entitled to a serious examination. The Mexicans are few, poor, weak, half-civilized; they lack the elements which give a people strength. They have no national unity of action. Imitating the example of the United States, they separated from the mother country, and tried the experiment of a liberal constitution. They have been in a quarrel among themselves ever since, and have perhaps shown themselves unfit for a republican government. The people cannot go alone; they are weak, distracted, inefficient, but possessed of a wide and rich territory, valuable and attractive. The Americans are numerous, patriotic, enterprising, hardy, united, and of course powerful, — the most energetic and executive nation ever developed on the earth. Besides this, they have established a form of government which harmoniously balances individual freedom with national unity of action; a government which of all others is the best fitted to develop energy, hardihood, and enterprise; one most powerful of all to direct and animate a conquering army. We know this is not the common opinion, but the military man who is also a statesman, and familiar with the history of States — if such a military man can be found amongst us — will see the truth of this judgment.

The strong nation is at war with the weak. America has the example of France and England to sustain her, and other examples not quite so reputable, but which shall presently be cited. No doubt the English nation — we mean the portion thereof who trade in politics, on the one extreme, and, on the other, the brute portion of the people — would justify the American invasion of Mexico; would think more highly of

us for the undertaking, and the success of it. It is plainly following the example of England herself — a copy of her treatment of the Irishman and the East Indian. Here, too, the men who trade in politics and the brute portion of the people like the war. It matters not which party they belong to; they call it patriotic; they go for the country however bounded, and the country right or wrong. Before such men we lay our finger on our lips, and say nothing. Let Time teach them.

But there is another body of men in all lands, and powerful in this — Philosophers, Economists, Philanthropists, who are not satisfied with a war merely because they are engaged in it; who think it no better because waged against a miserable opponent, or because it is fought by their own country; who know that successful wrong is no better than when defeated. To such men it is necessary to offer a reason for disturbing the peace of the continent. The President of the United States, in his message at the opening of the second session of the last Congress, has himself undertaken to justify the war. In his statement there is a certain doubleness of purpose quite apparent. He makes a special plea, with a compound issue, thus: — The Mexicans began the war, and we acted only on the defensive; but then there were a great many reasons why we might ourselves have begun the war, without waiting for the Mexicans to take the initiative. Thus is he doubly armed. If the major weapon of argument fail — and it is shown that the Mexicans did not commence the war — then he holds fast by the minor, that we had a just reason for beginning it ourselves. But let us examine this matter more nicely. We extract from Mr. Polk's message of Dec. 8th, 1846. The italics are our own.

"Such has been our scrupulous adherence to the dictates of justice, in all our foreign intercourse, that we have given no just cause of complaint to any nation, and have enjoyed the blessings of peace for more than thirty years. *From a policy so sacred to humanity we should never be induced voluntarily to depart.*" But "*Mexico commenced hostilities, and forced the war upon us.*" — p. 3.

But even if it were not so, "long before the advance of our army to the left bank of the Rio Grande, we had ample cause of war against Mexico." But some, he adds, have represented the war "as unjust and unnecessary, and as one of aggression on our part upon a weak and injured enemy. Such erroneous views,

though entertained by but few, have been widely and extensively circulated, not only at home, but have been spread throughout Mexico and the whole world. *A more effectual means could not have been devised to encourage the enemy and protract the war, than to advocate and adhere to their cause, and thus give them 'aid and comfort.'*" — p. 4.

This reminds us of what George III. said to the lord mayor of London, in 1775. "It is with the utmost astonishment that I find any of my subjects capable of encouraging the rebellious disposition that unhappily exists in some of my colonies in North America." Some of the subjects, however, did continue to advocate and adhere to the cause of the rebels, affording them aid and comfort. The king thought it was moral treason, a protracting of the war. They had truth and justice on their side, and against them — King George the Third.

Mr. Polk proceeds to state the case of America against Mexico. The Americans had suffered many grievances from the Mexicans. "The wrongs we have suffered from Mexico, almost ever since she became an independent power, and the patient endurance with which we have borne them, are without a parallel in the history of modern civilized nations." Soon after her independence, she commenced "a system of insult and spoliation;" "our citizens employed in lawful commerce were imprisoned, their vessels seized, our flag insulted in her ports." Change of rulers brought no change in this system, continues the President; the American government made repeated reclamations, which were followed only by new outrages; promises of redress were postponed or evaded. The commercial treaty of 1831 produced no change. In 1837, General Jackson declared that such conduct "would justify in all nations immediate war." Yet he thought we should give Mexico one more opportunity to atone for the past before we resorted to war. Accordingly, negotiations were entered into in 1837, and the Mexican government promised to do all which reason or justice required. This was in July, but in December the promise had not been fulfilled. Mr. Polk distinctly declares, "*had the United States at that time adopted compulsory measures and taken redress into their own hands, all our difficulties with Mexico would probably have been long since adjusted, and the existing war have been avoided.*" — p. 7.

This is a plain statement. But if the *Mexicans began the war in* 1846, because the Americans annexed Texas, we can-

not see how any one act of the Americans in 1837 could have prevented it, unless indeed Mexico had been so weakened as to be unable to wage a war! But the President does not see that he is tacitly admitting that the Mexicans did *not* begin this war, all of whose causes we are to seek previous to 1837. A compound issue is a difficult one to plead. We beg the reader to notice that the President admits that the causes of the Mexican war — the seizure of American property and men, insults to our flag — are all anterior to the year 1837, and might have been disposed of then, if we had then sought redress in the usual way — by war. Of course all that has occurred since can be but accessory after the fact!

But a new negotiation was begun; the convention of April 12th, 1839, took place — this was the first convention. In August, 1840, a Board of Commissioners, with powers limited to eighteen months, was organized to adjust the claims of American citizens against Mexico. An umpire, appointed by the king of Prussia, came to assist in the work.* The Board allowed American claims to the amount of $2,026,139.68; the American commissioners allowed also $928,627.88, which the Mexican commissioners had not time to examine. Thus there was a total of $2,954,767.56, which the American commissioners demanded of Mexico. Other claims, amounting to $3,336,837.05, were also presented, which the American commissioners had not decided upon when their period of service came to an end. Mexico acknowledged her obligation to pay the $2,026,139.68, but, unable to pay immediately, asked for more time.

A second convention took place January 30th, 1843, and an agreement was made that the interest due on the acknowledged claims should be paid on the 30th of the next April, and the residue of principal and interest in twenty instalments, one payable each three months. The interest was paid and three of the instalments, as they severally became due, though we are told, such was the poverty of the Mexican government, that some of the money could only be raised by forced loans.

On the 20th of November, 1843, a third convention was concluded upon by the Mexican government, for the purpose of ascertaining and settling all other claims not previously

* The character of these claims and the gross imposture of many of the claimants were well exposed by Mr. J. S. Pendleton, a member from Virginia, in a speech, Feb. 22, 1847.

adjusted by the first convention, in 1839. The American authorities offered some amendments to the Mexican scheme, which it seems the Mexican government did not accede to, and so the convention never took place.*

In brief, then, letting alone the insults offered to our flag — and we know not how they can be shaken out of its folds — this is the sum of actual and tangible grievances. Mexico owes us about $2,000,000, and does not pay. The President thinks war ought to have been declared long ago.

"In so long suffering Mexico to violate her most solemn treaty obligations, plunder our citizens of their property, and imprison their persons without affording them any redress, we have failed to perform one of the first and highest duties which every government owes to its citizens. *We had ample cause of war against Mexico long before the breaking out of hostilities. But even then* [it is doubtful to what time *then* refers] *we forbore to take redress into our own hands, until Mexico herself became the aggressor, by invading our soil in hostile array and shedding the blood of our citizens. Such are the grave causes of complaint against Mexico.*" — *Message of* 1846, p. 9.

We do not by any means approve of the whole conduct of Mexico in her dealings with America, but there were many circumstances which palliated that conduct. She did not pay the money, for she had no money to pay with, and no credit to borrow with. In 1845, Mr. Slidell wrote to the American government that her "finances are in a condition utterly desperate. The amount of public debt does not fall much short of $150,000,000," and interest was paid on but a small part of it. Is it a thing unheard of for one State to delay paying the claims of another — unheard of to wait a long time before such a payment? The government of Bavaria has a large claim on the government of France — a very just claim too, as it seems to us — pending at this moment. The King of the French can pay it, but does not. How long did America wait for the payment of her French claims, and her Neapolitan claims? Nay, how long has the State of Massachusetts waited for the payment of her claims against this

* For official accounts of these matters, see Mr. Polk's message of Dec. 2d, 1845; of December 8, 1846; Mr. C. J. Ingersoll's report on the war with Mexico, June 24, 1846, with Mr. Howard's report, July 7th, 1838, and the minority report of Mr. Cushing, of the same date. — Doc. No. 752. Ho. of Rep., 29th Congress, 1st Session. See the usual commentaries in the speeches of the times.

very American government, which in 1837 *ought* to have taken her Mexican sister by the throat, and sold all that she had, that payment might be made, and promptly too? The President is not very desirous to pay the claims which American citizens had against France prior to 1800, though the American government itself owes the money to her own citizens. Mr. Polk himself, by his veto, forbade the payment, after Congress had appropriated the funds. If Mexico had been able and would not pay, the case would have been quite different.

We have seen now "the grave causes of complaint" — "the ample causes of war" — "the wrongs which we have suffered" — "without a parallel in the history of modern civilized nations." Let us now come to the smaller matters, the minor grievances. We must go a little into the history of the times. In 1845, the formalities were completed for the annexation of Texas to the United States. The causes of annexation are well known, — the South did not wish a non-slaveholding State on the southwestern frontier. The economical, the moral, the political effect of such a State was clearly foreseen. The Institution of Slavery was in danger. It seems to be thought by some, that while Slavery stands, the South will stand, when Slavery falls, the South will fall, and then the North, the Union, Freedom, and the Rights of Man. The method by which annexation was brought about is also pretty well known, — the machinations of the great southern politicians, the tameness, the servility, the stupidity of many of the northern members of Congress. All this is well known, but getting better known. The recent letters of Mr. Houston, Mr. Tyler, and Mr. Spencer, shed some light on the matter. When the political excitement of our day has passed by, and some future historian of Democracy in America studies the subject afresh, and with impartial eyes, he will write in sadness a dark chapter. We know not which he will blame most bitterly, the Democrats or the Whigs; but perhaps the latter, as apparently acting against their convictions and without faith. The effects of that annexation will appear in due time, and may be a little different from what the annexers intended.

Mexico claimed Texas, but offered to recognize her independence and abandon her claim, on condition that Texas would not annex herself to America. There was a nominal war between Texas and Mexico, not a war *de facto*, but *de jure*.

The accident follows the substance; when America took Texas it was for better or worse. She took her war along with her — the war *de jure*, though not at that time *de facto*. Mexico protested against annexation as an "act of aggression the most unjust which can be found recorded in the annals of modern history, — despoiling a friendly nation of a considerable portion of her territory," and on the 6th of March, 1845, her minister demanded his passports, and all regular diplomatic intercourse came abruptly and formally to an end.

Now in 1836, General Jackson thought it a delicate matter to recognize the independence of Texas, and said in his message —

"The acknowledgment of a new State as independent *is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility;* but more especially so when such a State has forcibly separated itself from another, which still claims dominion over it. *A premature recognition* under these circumstances, *if not looked upon as justifiable cause of war, is always liable to be looked upon as proof of an unfriendly spirit to one of the contending parties.*" But in all former cases, "so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action of our government, that we have under the most critical circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those against whom we have by force of evidence been compelled to decide." "The uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and constantly to recognize the authority of the prevailing party, *without reference to our particular interests and views*, or to the merits of the original controversy." He considers the power of recognizing the independence of a new State as "*equivalent under some circumstances to a declaration of war.* It will always be considered most . . . safe that it should be exercised, when probably leading to war, with the previous understanding of that body by whom war can alone be declared." — *Jackson's Message*, Dec. 21st, 1836.

When France acknowledged the independence of the United States in 1778, the English government considered the acknowledgment an unjustifiable aggression. No publicist, we think, would doubt, that if France had then annexed the United States to herself, the annexation offered a just ground for the declaration of war on the part of England. But Mexico did not declare war against America, in 1845; she made no preparations for war. She only protested, and de-

clined further diplomatic intercourse. Had Mexico been as powerful as England, the affair of annexation would not have been disposed of so easily. But Mexico was distracted and weak.

Another alleged offence committed on the part of Mexico, is her refusal to receive the American plenipotentiary, Mr. Slidell. Here are the facts in the case, as the President states them: On the 15th of September, 1845, the American consul at the city of Mexico was instructed by his government "to ascertain from the Mexican government whether they would receive an envoy from the United States intrusted with full power to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two governments." On the 15th of October, the Mexican government assented. The assent was made known to the American government on the 9th of November, and the next day Mr. Slidell was appointed "envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, with full powers to adjust and definitely settle, all pending differences between the two countries, including those of boundary between Mexico and the State of Texas."*

He reached Vera Cruz on the 29th of November, and Mexico on the 6th of December, 1845. But the government of President Herrera — who had seemed desirous of settling the difficulties by peaceful negotiation — was tottering. General Paredes, a military man, had thrown the country into confusion, and declared against receiving a minister of peace from the United States. The Mexican government was alarmed, and refused to receive Mr. Slidell, on the ground that America had not sent the envoy on "a special mission confined to the question of Texas alone," but had given him the general powers already mentioned. The 30th of December, Paredes himself came into power, "a military usurper, who was known to be bitterly hostile to the United States." On the 1st of March, 1846, Mr. Slidell presented his credentials to the new government, desiring to be accredited in the regular manner; on the 12th, the request was finally rejected, and he soon returned home.

"Thus," says the President, "was the extraordinary spectacle presented to the civilized world, of a government in violation of its own express agreement, having twice rejected a minister of

* Mr. Polk's first Message, p. 8.

peace, invested with full powers to adjust all the existing differences between the two countries, in a manner just and honorable to both. I am not aware that modern history presents a parallel case, in which, in time of peace, one nation has refused even to hear propositions from another for terminating existing difficulties between them."— p. 19.

Mr. Polk must be a forgetful politician not to remember that the court of France rejected Mr. Pinckney in 1797, and actually expelled him from their territory. Yet Mr. Pinckney was not altogether like "one of the most illustrious citizens of Louisiana," but a man well known for his public services; "A character," says Mr. Adams, once his rival, "whose integrity, talents, and services placed him in the rank of the most esteemed and respected in the nation."* The insult then offered to America by the French "Executive Directory," in the most public and official manner, is certainly no "parallel" to the conduct of Mexico. To make that insult yet keener, the Directory informed Mr. Monroe — the former minister, who had been recalled, but was still residing at Paris — that they "will not receive another minister plenipotentiary from the United States until the grievances of which France has complained have been redressed." "The Executive Directory know of no minister plenipotentiary from the United States," said they. Yet the burthen of grievances had been created by France. America had endured most astonishing outrages, as well as insults,† which nothing but a remembrance of her timely aid in '78 and her continued help in the remaining portion of the war of our revolution, enabled the nation to endure.

But what said the Republican party? Did they maintain that the dignity of the nation was insulted? did they insist that we must go to war to wipe off the stain, because the French did not pay our just demands, and because a minister had been ignominiously expelled from the French soil? We are sorry to recall old animosities — and will pass over the matter with all possible briefness and delicacy. The conduct of that party is well known; their apology for the conduct of

* Message to 5th Congress — Special Session — May 16th, 1797.

† See the Reports of Messrs. Randolph and Pickering on the French depredations upon American commerce, in American State Papers, Class I. Foreign Relations, Vol. I. p. 424, et seq., p. 748, et seq., and Vol. II. p. 28, et seq., p. 116, et seq.; et al. The whole history of these troubles has now become interesting once more. See Vol. II. p. 5 - 244.

the Directory. But America did not declare war. It was proposed by the party hostile to the administration, that an extraordinary minister suiting "the solemnity of the occasion," should be sent to represent the "temper and sensibilities of the country." Messrs. Pinckney, Gerry, and Marshall were appointed commissioners, and instructed "*to terminate our differences in such manner, as . . . might be the best calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good understanding.*" Their treatment was a disgrace to the French nation. Two of them demanded their passports and returned home. Mr. Gerry remained till officially and peremptorily recalled. Still there was no war. America was put in a state of defence — not in a state of offence. The opposition then made to even these measures is well known. Some were desirous of war; still pacific counsels prevailed. The reason was — the American government desired to keep the peace. Yet the depredations committed on the property and persons of American citizens were enormous. "Occasion," says Mr. Marshall, "was repeatedly taken to insult the American government; open war was continued to be waged by the cruisers of France on American commerce; and the flag of the United States was a sufficient justification for the capture and condemnation of any vessel over which it waved." More than three hundred American vessels had been taken by the French, and the amount of their depredations was estimated at over $15,000,000. Still, President Adams said —

"In demonstrating . . . that we do not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. . . . It is peace that we have uniformly and perseveringly cultivated, and *harmony between us and France may be restored at her option.*" *

We are surprised that Mr. Polk should lay any stress on the refusal of Mexico to receive Mr. Slidell. To receive a minister is a duty of imperfect obligation, as the Publicists would have told him. Any State may refuse to receive a particular person as minister, without violating the comity of nations, if she objects to the personal character of the man, or to the diplomatic character of the minister. This is so

* Adams's Second Annual Address, Dec. 8th, 1798. See too the "Address in Reply," by the House of Representatives.

well understood that it is useless to refer to authorities.* The refusal to receive Mr. Slidell — for the reasons given — was a matter of no great magnitude or importance. Mexico had never agreed to receive a minister with full powers, to reside near her government as a permanent representative of the nation, only a commissioner to treat in reference to the Texan difficulties. But take the President's statement of the case; admit that it was foolish on the part of Mexico, under such circumstances, to reject Mr. Slidell, because America had committed a breach of diplomatic etiquette; suppose it was weak and silly — it was certainly no ground for war. It is quite plain that Mr. Slidell was a very unsuitable person to send on a mission of peace to an offended nation. His correspondence proves this. He may be a very illustrious citizen of Louisiana; but few men in America, we think, out of that State, ever heard much good of him before his appointment to this mission. His conduct while there reflects no honor on America. We cannot think he was sent there with the serious intention of settling the difficulties in a just and honorable manner. Indeed, some of his instructions seem given him quite as much with a view to influence public opinion in America, as to have an effect on the Mexican government. This will appear by the following extract from Mr. Buchanan's letter to him, under date of March 12th, 1846:

"On your return to the United States, *energetic measures against Mexico would at once be recommended by the President; and these might fail to obtain the support of Congress, if it could be asserted that the existing government* [that of Paredes, the military president, who succeeded Herrera,] *had not refused to receive our minister.*"

This was written nearly two months *after* General Taylor had been ordered to move to the Rio Grande. The "energetic measures" were already commenced, though without the knowledge of Congress. America was invading territory which Mexico claimed, and at the same time instructing her minister to present his credentials with a view to adjust the difficulties in a pacific way! This, we confess, is extraordinary. The President did not know the minister would be rejected by Paredes when he ordered General Taylor to advance into Tamaulipas, and he was not rejected till two months

* Any one may see the authorities in Wheaton's *Law of Nations*, Part III. ch. 1.

after that order. But we must return to this mission of Mr. Slidell in another page.

The man who could logically adduce the above grievances in order to justify America, would do it with the tacit admission that she began the war; else why undertake to justify it? If Mexico began the war, that was her business. She is to justify it if she can. America may have a thousand reasons for making a war, but if she has not made it, she has no reason for undertaking to justify a war which she did not begin. The President may state other grievances, but not in such a connection, or for such a purpose as the present. But now he abandons that part of the argument; the issue is changed. It is Mexico that began the war. But how? By invading our territory. The Mexican general, says Mr. Polk, "had collected a large army on the opposite [the west] shore of the Rio Grande," "invaded our territory, and commenced hostilities by attacking our forces." Thus Mexico "*consummated her long course of outrages by commencing an offensive war, and shedding the blood of our citizens on our own soil.*"

It is true that on the 4th of April, 1846, General Paredes did order the commander on the Texan frontier to attack the enemy "by every means which war permits," and on the 18th of April, to the same person, adds, "I suppose you .... either fighting already or preparing for the operations of a campaign." "It is indispensable that hostilities be commenced, yourself taking the initiative." But where was the enemy to be attacked; was he to take the initiative by making an invasion or repelling one?

To answer this question, we are to show what was the western boundary of Texas. Was it the Rio Grande, the Nueces, or some line between them, or elsewhere? Mr. Polk claims to the Rio Grande. These are the arguments which he adduces.

1. "Texas as ceded by France in 1803 has been always claimed as extending west to the Rio Grande," and accordingly the United States asserted and maintained their territorial rights to this extent till 1819, when it was ceded to Spain. It is on the strength of this claim that annexation is a re-annexation.

2. The republic of Texas always claimed this river — from the mouth to the source — as her western boundary, and it was recognized as such by Santa Anna himself, in 1836.

3. For more than nine years Texas "exercised many acts

of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants west of the Nueces."

4. Congress understood that the Rio Grande, from source to mouth, was the boundary of Texas in 1845, when the act of annexation was passed. "This was the Texas which . . . was admitted as one of the States of our Union."

All this is specious — at least to one who knows nothing of the facts; very plausible to one who is more a subject of Authority than a subject of Reason. But certainly Mexico had never admitted the Rio Grande from source to mouth as her boundary on this side. We think there is no controversy about the limits of Texas, except as it borders on the Mexican territory. Yet uncertainty of limits is recognized by America in the very act of annexation. The "joint resolutions" say: "1. Congress doth consent that the territory *properly included within and rightfully belonging to the republic of Texas* may be erected into a new State." And "2. Said State to be formed *subject to the adjustment of the government of all questions of boundary that may arise with other governments.*" Here the limits are admitted to be doubtful, and are to be adjusted by the government.

Suppose this were all, that the boundary was simply doubtful — what was the just and proper course to pursue? to send an army to the extreme and doubtful limit of the territory which we claimed? If so, then Mexico — who thought at least her claim equally good — had the same right. What if that course had been pursued with England in settling the question of the "northeastern boundary," or the boundary of the Oregon territory; what if England had acted by the same rule, and the two nations, without a single attempt to settle the matter by negotiation, had sent an "army of occupation" to take military possession, each power up to the extent of its own claims? Why it would have been — like what we have seen in Texas.

But why did not the American government resort to negotiation? Because the Mexican government would not receive a special commissioner appointed for that work? Not at all: she rejected Mr. Slidell because he was *not* such a special commissioner. "The sword," says somebody, "ends all popular evils, but cures none." It certainly begins a great many. The reason why the American government sent the sword before the negotiator will appear in due time.

It is by no means clear that the Americans had a good and

clear title to the Rio Grande, from end to end. A claim is one thing, a clear title is a little different. Did the American government claim the Rio Grande as the boundary of Louisiana, as ceded by France in 1803? So we claimed western Florida as a part of the same Louisiana. Mr. Jefferson, in 1805, said its limits were "the Perdito on the east, and the Brazo [the Rio Grande] on the west." It turned out to be a mistake. The claim was purely diplomatic, the claim of much in order to get all that could be had. Such are the morals of pedlers in politics as of pedlers in other wares. America had a claim to the whole of Oregon, from San Francisco to the Russian settlements. Mr. Polk himself claimed up to 54. 40, and with "the settled conviction that the *British pretensions of title could not be maintained to any portion of the Oregon territory.*" He asserted "our title to the whole Oregon territory," and thought it was "maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments." The legislature of one of the New England States, we are told, went further, and declared our right up to 54. 49. But, somehow, in the thaw of a negotiation, the claim gradually melted away, and reached no further than the 49th parallel of latitude.

It would be easy to show, whatsoever was the true western boundary of Texas, that it was not the Rio Grande. However, we do not intend at present entering upon that discussion. The reader will find much valuable information in the speech of Mr. Senator Benton, and in the two able and learned speeches of Mr. Severance, of Maine, delivered the one in the House of Representatives at Washington, Feb. 4th, 1847, and the other in the Legislature of Maine, July 27th, 1847. We shall for the present confine ourselves to the correspondence between Mr. A. J. Donelson and Mr. Buchanan, only premising that Mr. Donelson was sent by the American government in March, 1845, to Texas, to complete the work of annexation.* We shall show from this correspondence—

1. That it was well known that Texas had no just claim to the Rio Grande as her western boundary.

2. That war was expected as the consequence of the annexation of Texas.

3. That there was a concerted scheme to throw the blame of the war upon Mexico, by provoking her to commence hostilities.

* The correspondence is published in Doc. No. 2, 29th Congress, 1st Session.

I. IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT TEXAS HAD NO JUST CLAIM TO THE RIO GRANDE.

"It is believed that Mexico is concentrating troops on the Rio Grande, where *Texas has, as yet, established no posts.*" —p. 53.

Mr. Jones, President of the republic of Texas, issued a proclamation on the 4th of June, 1845, at the end of which he says, "I do hereby *declare and proclaim a cessation of hostilities by land and sea against the republic of Mexico.*" — p. 63. But the Mexican forces were still east of the Rio Grande, though west of the Nueces. The chargé saw the effect which this proclamation, issued under such circumstances, would have upon the claim to the Rio Grande; — this will appear in the sequel.

June 23d, 1845, he writes to Mr. Buchanan, "It is the policy of those who are on the side of Mexico, . . . to throw upon the United States the *responsibility of a war for the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. That territory, you are aware, has been in the possession of both parties.* Texas has held in peace Corpus Christi; *Mexico has held Santiago. Both parties have had occasional possession of Loredo, and other higher points.*" — p. 74.

June 22d, he writes to Commodore Stockton in relation to the prospects of a war, and adds, "It is to be hoped, however, that Mexico . . . will yet prefer to settle by treaty the points in dispute," that is, the question of limits. — p. 78.

Again, July 2d, he writes to Mr. Buchanan, "My position is that we can hold [because we have a good title] Corpus Christi and all other points up the Nueces. *If attacked,* [while in territory which the Mexicans acknowledge as part of Texas] *the right of defence will authorize us to expel the Mexicans as far as the Rio Grande.*" — p. 78.

"The government [of Texas] *left for treaty arrangement the boundary question* in the propositions for a treaty of definite peace." — p. 79. This refers to "the preliminary articles of the negotiation" offered by President Jones to the Mexican government. The 3d article is as follows: "*Limits* and other subjects of mutual interest *to be settled by negotiation.*" —p. 55.

June 28th, he writes to General Taylor, advising him where to station his troops. "*Corpus Christi* is said to be as healthy as Pensacola, a convenient place for supplies, and *is the most western point now occupied by Texas.*" — p. 83. Yet Corpus

Christi is on the west bank of the Nueces. "The occupation of the *country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande is a disputed question.*" — p. 83.

July 11th, he thus writes to Mr. Buchanan:

"You will have observed that in my correspondence with this government [of Texas] there has been no discussion of the question of limits between Mexico and Texas. The joint resolutions of our Congress left the question an open one, and the preliminary proposition made by this [the Texan] government [namely, the third article quoted on the last page] . . . left the question in the same state, and although this [the Texan] government has since indicated a point on the Rio Grande for the [future] occupation of our troops, I did not consider this circumstance as varying the question, since the President, but a few weeks before, issued a proclamation suspending hostilities between Texas and Mexico, the practical effect of which was to leave the question precisely as it stood when our joint resolutions passed, — Mexico in possession of one portion of the territory, [between the Nueces and the Rio Grande] and Texas of another. If the President of Texas, instead of giving that proclamation the scope he did, [by making an entire suspension of hostilities while the Mexican army was on the east of the Rio Grande,] had made it conditional upon the withdrawal of all Mexican authority to the west bank of the Rio Grande, or in failure thereof, [of withdrawing the forces beyond that river] had notified Mexico that forcible means would have been continued, to maintain the jurisdiction of Texas as far as that river, *the case would have been different, and our rights and duties* consequent upon an invasion of Texas, [an invasion by Mexico of the territory between the Rio Grande and Nueces,] after her [the Mexican] acceptance of our proposals, *would have been accordingly changed.*" That is, Mexico would have acknowledged that our claims to that territory had a respectable foundation. But the Texan President had little confidence in that claim, and never offered such a condition! "Hence you will have perceived, that in my reply to Mr. Allen's [the Texan Secretary of State] note of the 26th ult., I *omitted an allusion to his suggestion of a point on the Rio Grande for the occupation of our troops.*"

The reason doubtless was because Mr. Donelson knew the occupation of a point on the Rio Grande was an act of war against Mexico, and did not himself wish to take the initiative by commencing hostilities.

"*The proclamation of a truce between the two nations,* founded on propositions mutually acceptable to them, *leaving* the question

of boundary not only an open one, but *Mexico in possession of the east bank of the Rio Grande, seemed to me inconsistent with the expedition that* in defence of the claim of Texas, *our troops should march immediately to that river. What the Executive of Texas had determined not to fight for, but to settle by negotiation,* to say the least of it, *could as well be left to the United States on the same conditions.*"

Mr. Donelson took this course because he did not wish to have a public altercation with the Texan President "in regard to an important measure of his administration." Still he thinks the Texan "claim" to the Rio Grande ought to be maintained. The only question was,

"Whether, under the circumstances, *we should take a position to make war for this claim, in the face of an acknowledgment on the part of this* [the Texan] *government that it could be settled by negotiation.* I at once decided that we should take no such position, but should regard only as within the limits of our protection that portion of territory actually possessed by Texas, and which she did not consider as subject to negotiation. The Congress of Texas . . . would have passed a resolution . . . affirming the claim to the Rio Grande . . . if they had deemed it expedient in this matter to manifest their disapprobation of the treaty preferred by President Jones, or to oppose the inference which might be drawn from his proclamation, that Texas admitted the right of Mexico to keep an armed force this side of the Rio Grande." — p. 89.

Mr. Donelson thought it inexpedient "for Texas to attempt a forcible possession of the Rio Grande," because

"Leaving out of view the difficulty of conducting such an enterprise against the consent of the [Texan] Executive, the influence on the . . . Mexican population [the entire population] bordering the Rio Grande would have been unfavorable to the United States. These people, long harassed by the military exactions of their own government, [the Mexican government, though Mr. Polk insists that Texas for more than nine years has exercised sovereignty here,] seek for nothing so ardently as escape from violence. . . . They have been often visited by the Texans, who in revenge of their slaughtered comrades, and of the faithless conduct of Santa Anna, have not been disposed to mitigate the blows of retaliation." On the other hand, "Texas, by remaining passive, . . . is gradually strengthening her ability to introduce, by peaceful means, her authority as far up the Rio Grande as she may please." — p. 90.

Mr. Donelson then states the grounds on which the claim to the Rio Grande would be defensible.

1. "The revolutionary right of the people of Texas to resist oppression and enforce such a political organization as they deemed necessary."

2. "The acknowledgment of Santa Anna in 1836, . . . *by which Texas was prevented from following up the advantages of victory, among which was the opportunity of establishing herself on the Rio Grande.*"

3. "The *capacity of Texas*, if not now, at least in a short period, to *establish by force her claim to this boundary.* This capacity is *fairly inferrible from the offer of Mexico to recognize her independence, and is self-evident to all who have any knowledge of the relative power and position of Mexico and Texas.*"

4. "The United States, . . . in addition to the foregoing grounds, will have the older one, founded on the Louisiana claim."

5. "But . . . all these considerations are *but subsidiary to the necessity which exists for the establishment of the Rio Grande as the boundary between the two nations.*" "Texas has at pleasure taken possession of her [the Mexican] posts there, and has only suspended jurisdiction because it was inconvenient to maintain it. . . . On such grounds it cannot be doubted that Mexico already considers the whole of the territory between the Rio Grande and the Nueces as lost to her."

"There is a disposition in some members to resort to some action, the expectation of Texas that the Rio Grande will be maintained as the boundary, but no provision making this a *sine qua non* in our action hereafter will be adopted." — pp. 91, 92.

Let us take a word of comment from another source. In 1836, General Jackson sent Mr. Morfit to Texas, to learn the state of things. Mr. Morfit thus writes, in August, 1836:

"It was the intention of this [the Texan] government, immediately after the battle of San Jacinto, to *have claimed from the Rio Grande along the river to the thirtieth degree of latitude, and thence due west to the Pacific.* It was found, however, that this would not strike a convenient point in California, . . . and that *the territory now determined on would be sufficient for a new republic.*" "The political limits of Texas proper were the Nueces

River on the west," &c. "The additional territory claimed by Texas since the declaration of independence, . . will increase her population at least 15,000." — *Doc. of Ho. of Rep.*, 2d Sess., 24th Cong, No. 35.

Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, in his speech on the 3d of March, 1845, said,

"The . . deserts between the Nueces and the Bravo [the Rio Grande] are the natural boundaries. . . . There ends the Valley of the West. There Mexico begins. While peace is cherished that boundary will be respected. *Not till the spirit of conquest rages will the people on either side molest or mix with each other.*"

II. WAR WAS EXPECTED AS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ANNEXATION.

In his letter of June 4th, 1845, to Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Donelson says,

"If Mexico takes possession of the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and comes still further east within the Texan territory, . . . are the United States to stand still? . . . Mexico has about seven thousand troops on the Rio Grande." "I look upon war as inevitable, — a war . . intended . . to deprive both Texas and the United States of all claim to the *country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande.*" — p. 54.

June 22d, writing to Mr. Buchanan, he says, "The British minister — who has been recently to Mexico — informed President Jones that he thought war would be the consequence of the determination of Texas to accept the terms of annexation." — p. 55.

Again, in writing to Mr. Allen, June 11th, 1845, he says,

"Mr. Allen remarks 'that a new invasion of Texas may be reasonably apprehended, if the proposals [of annexation] lately received from the United States . . . should be accepted.' . . . . 'Such a war would be hastened and occasioned by the acts and aimed at the interests, no less of the United States than of Texas.' . . . The undersigned is authorized to say that a force consisting of three thousand men, . . . will be prepared to act without a moment's delay," &c. — p. 57.

Again to the same, June 13th —

"Such an invasion, occasioned by the acts of the United States, . . . it will of course be the duty of the President of the United States to repel." — p. 69.

June 22d, 1845, he writes to Captain Stockton, "The prospect of a Mexican war is so immediate as to justify your remaining on the lookout for the worst. It is openly threatened by Mexico." — p. 78.

June 26th, he writes to Mr. Buchanan,

"The very preference manifested by . . . Texas for annexation . . . must be mortifying to the pride of Mexico, and may very probably induce her to commence against this country sudden and active hostilities." — p. 80.

June 28th, he thus writes to General Taylor: . . . "An invasion of Texas may be confidently anticipated." — p. 93.

July 24th, 1845, he writes to Mr. Buchanan,

"The common opinion of the citizens best acquainted with the Mexican population is, that the [Mexican] government will be obliged to declare war." — p. 96.

III. THERE WAS A SCHEME TO THROW THE BLAME OF THE WAR UPON MEXICO.

June 11th, 1845, he writes to Mr. Buchanan, "Care will be taken to *throw the responsibility of aggressive measures on the government of Mexico.*" — p. 56.

Again to the same, June 23d,

"If she undertakes such an expedition, she of course puts upon the hazard of war the whole claim, and *gives us the right of going not only to the Rio Grande, but wherever else we may please.*" — p. 74.

July 2d:

"It is better for us to await the attack than incur the risk of embarrassing the question of annexation with the consequences of immediate possession of the territory to the Rio Grande. *You will find that I have guarded every point.*" "It appeared to me wiser to look for some advantage from the assailing movement threatened by Mexico, than to resist the passage [by the Texan Congress] of . . . a law . . . putting the Texan forces under the Major-General, the effect of which would have been the immediate expulsion of all Mexican soldiers found on the east bank of the Rio Grande. If by such a law the whole of the Texan claim, in respect to limits, could have been taken out of dispute, *its passage would have been insisted upon; but as there would have remained all the Santa Fe region, it occurred to me well enough that the subject is left as it is by this Congress.*" — p. 79.

June 28th, he writes to General Taylor,

"I would by no means be understood as advising you to take an offensive attitude in regard to Mexico. . . . The probability is, if Mexico undertakes the invasion, that she will attempt to drive you from the points suggested for your occupation [Corpus Christi and a point between that and San Antonio]. In that event, *your right of defence will* of course *authorize you to cripple and destroy the Mexican army in the best way you can.* You can safely hold possession of Corpus Christi and all other points up the Nueces, and if Mexico attempts to dislodge you, *drive her beyond the Rio Grande.*" — pp. 93, 94.

Mr. Slidell, the pacific Envoy of the United States — who does not seem to understand the policy of his superiors — on the 27th of December, 1845, thus writes to Mr. Buchanan:

"The desire of our government to have peace will be taken for timidity; the most extravagant pretensions will be made and insisted upon, [by Mexico] until the Mexican people shall be convinced by hostile demonstrations that our differences must be settled promptly, either by negotiation or the sword."

We cannot forbear giving the opinion of some other men, and very eminent too, not only in the estimation of the democratic party, to which they belong, but in that of the country at large. The first is from a speech of the late Hon. Silas Wright, a man richly entitled to a distinguished place among the politicians of the day. In his address, delivered at Watertown, New York, in the summer of 1844, he says,

"I felt it my duty to vote as a Senator, and did vote against the . . . treaty for the annexation [of Texas]. I believed that *the treaty . . embraced a country to which Texas had no claim,* over which she had never asserted jurisdiction, and which she had no right to cede. . . . The treaty ceded Texas by name, [but] without an effort to describe a boundary. The Congress of Texas had passed an act declaring . . . what was Texas. . . . We must take the country as Texas had ceded it to us, and in doing that . . . we must do injustice to Mexico, and take a large portion of New Mexico, the people of which have never been under the jurisdiction of Texas. This to me was an insurmountable barrier. I could not place the country in that position."

The authority of Col. Benton is confessedly great in all matters relating to our western boundaries. He merits the gratitude of the nation for his able discussion of our claims to

"the whole of Oregon." His motives may have been what his opponents alleged; we have nothing to do with that matter, only with his discussion, his facts, and his arguments. His speech in the Senate, on the 16th, 17th, and 20th of May, 1844, is well known. We give the resolutions offered by that distinguished member of the democratic party, on the 13th of May, while the treaty was still pending.

"*Resolved*, That the ratification of the treaty for the annexation of Texas to the United States would be an adoption of the Texian war with Mexico by the United States, and would devolve its conduct and conclusion upon the United States.

"*Resolved*, That the treaty-making power does not extend to the right of making war, and that the President and Senate have no right to make war, either by declaration or adoption."

In his speech, after reciting the rights already claimed by Texas, he goes on to prove that this territory includes towns and villages and custom-houses in the peaceful possession of Mexico.

"First, there is the department . . of New Mexico. . . . This department is studded with towns and villages, is populated, well cultivated, and covered with flocks and herds. On its left bank, (and I only speak of the part which we propose to *re*-annex,) is first the frontier village, Taos, 3000 souls, where the custom-house is kept, at which our Missouri caravans enter their goods. Then comes Santa Fe, the capital, 4000 souls; then Albuquerque, 6000 souls; thence some scores of other towns and villages, all more or less populated, and surrounded by flocks and fields. Then come the departments of Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas, without settlements on the left bank of the river, but occupying the right bank, and commanding the left. All this — being parts of four departments — now under Mexican governors, or governments, is permanently re-annexed to this Union, if this treaty is ratified, and is actually re-annexed for the moment by the signature of the treaty, according to the President's last message, to remain so until the acquisition is rejected by rejecting the treaty."

"The President in his special message . . informs us that we have acquired a title to the ceded territories by his signature to the treaty, wanting only the action of the Senate to perfect it; and that in the mean time he will protect it from invasion, and for that purpose has detached all the disposable parts of the army and navy to the scene of action. This is a caper about equal to the mad freaks with which the unfortunate Emperor Paul, of Russia, was accustomed to astonish Europe, about forty years ago. By this declaration, the thirty thousand Mexicans on the left half

of the Valley of the Rio del Norte are our citizens, and standing — in the language of the President's message — in a hostile attitude towards us, and subject to be repulsed as invaders. Taos, the seat of the custom-house, where our traders enter their goods, is ours; Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico, is ours; Governor Armijo is our governor, and subject to be tried for treason if he does not submit to us; twenty Mexican towns and villages are ours; and their peaceful inhabitants, cultivating their fields and tending their flocks, are suddenly converted, by a stroke of the President's pen, into American citizens, or American rebels! This is too bad; and *instead of making themselves party to its enormities*, as the President invites them to do, *I think rather that it is the duty of the Senate to wash its hands of all this part of the transaction by a special disapprobation.* . . . I therefore propose as an additional resolution,

"*Resolved, That the incorporation of the left bank of the Rio del Norte into the American Union*, by virtue of a treaty with Texas, comprehending, as the said incorporation would do, a part of the Mexican departments of New Mexico, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas, *would be an act of direct aggression on Mexico, for all the consequences of which the United States would stand responsible.*"

In the remainder of his speech, Mr. Benton made four points; namely,

1. "That the ratification of the treaty would be, of itself, war between the United States and Mexico."
2. "That it would be unjust war."
3. "That it would be war unconstitutionally made."
4. "That it would be war upon a weak and groundless pretext."*

In his speech delivered in the secret session, and of course not published, he declared that if America claimed to the Rio Grande, "if there were but one man of Spanish blood in all Mexico, and he no bigger than Tom Thumb, he would fight."

Yet further, Senator Ashley, of Arkansas, in his speech, said — though not in the *corrected* copy, — "I will here add, that *the present boundaries* [of Texas] I have from Judge

* The whole speech of Mr. Benton is worthy an attentive reading at this time. It may be found in the "Globe" of that period. In connection with the third point, we would quote the letter of Chancellor Kent, dated May 21st, 1844. ". . I think there can be no doubt, that the enormous abuses and stretch of power by President Tyler afford ample materials for the exercise of the power of impeachment, and it is an imperative duty on the House of Representatives to put it in practice."

Ellis — the president of the convention that formed the constitution of Texas, and also a member of the first legislature under that constitution — *were fixed as they now are* [to the Rio Grande] *solely and professedly with a view of having a large margin in the negotiation with Mexico, and we had no expectation of retaining them as they now exist on our statute book.*"

We will now return to the mission of Mr. Slidell, and state the facts so far as we can gather them. We shall rely wholly on official documents accompanying the President's special message of May 11th, 1846, "relative to an invasion and commencement of hostilities by Mexico."* It contains the correspondence of the American consul at Mexico, and Mr. Slidell, with the previous Mexican authorities. This correspondence, however, is but imperfectly published. The frequent asterisks show how much is still concealed from the public eye, no doubt for very good reasons. The instructions of the American government to Mr. Slidell are not in this document, nor do we remember ever to have seen them in print. What adds to the difficulty is this: the documents of the Mexican authorities are not published in their original language, but in a translation, on which we cannot always place entire confidence. Indeed, one very important phrase is made to receive two very different translations, as we shall presently show.

On the 17th of September, 1845, Mr. Buchanan, at the command of Mr. Polk, desired Mr. Black, the American consul at Mexico, "to ascertain from the Mexican government whether they would receive an envoy from the United States, intrusted with full power to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two governments." — p. 8. Mr. Black made the inquiry, and Mr. Peña y Peña, the "minister of foreign relations and government," thus replied, Oct. 25th, 1845:

"In answer, I have to say to you, that although the Mexican nation is deeply injured by the United States, through the acts committed by them in the department of Texas, which belongs to this nation, my government is disposed to receive the *commissioner of the United States* who may come to this capital, *with full powers* from his government *to settle the present dispute in a peaceful, reasonable, and honorable* manner; thus giving a new

* Doc. No. 196, 29th Congress, 1st Sess., Ho. of Rep.

proof, that even in the midst of its injuries and of its firm decision to exact adequate reparation for them, it does not repel with contumely the measure of reason and peace, to which it is invited by its adversary.

"As my government believes this invitation to be made in good faith, . . . it also hopes that the commissioner will be a person endowed with the qualities proper for the attainment of this end; that his dignity, prudence, and moderation, and the discreetness and reasonableness of his proposals will contribute to calm, as much as possible, the just irritation of the Mexicans, and in fine, that the conduct of the commissioner on all points may be such as to persuade them that they may obtain satisfaction for their injuries, through the means of reason and peace, and without being obliged to resort to those of arms and force." — p. 12.

Mr. Polk asked if Mexico would receive an envoy "with full power to adjust *all the questions in dispute.*" Mexico offers to receive one with full powers to settle *the present dispute* in a peaceful, reasonable, and honorable manner. She does not offer to receive a *resident* minister, nor a special minister to settle "all the questions in dispute," but only the "present dispute," namely, the *difficulties growing out of the matter of Texas.* Not a word is said in the correspondence of the parties about a minister "to reside near the Mexican government," as a permanent representative. Perhaps Mr. Peña y Peña ought to have distinctly stated that Mexico would not receive such a minister. He only told what Mexico *would* receive; not what she would not. Still further, it seems there was a "council of government," whom Mr. Peña y Peña did not consult before answering Mr. Black's note, and offering to receive a special commissioner.

Mr. Slidell was sent, furnished with a "letter of credence" from President Polk, authorizing him "*to reside near the government of the Mexican republic, in the quality of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States.*" — p. 22. It is quite plain Mr. Slidell was not such a commissioner as Mexico had offered to receive. The difference between *an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary*, sent "to reside near the government," and *a special commissioner sent to adjust a single dispute*, is as obvious as the difference between an egg and an apple.

After various preliminaries, Dec. 8th, Mr. Slidell asked to be accredited as "envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary," "to reside near the government of the Mexican

republic. As no formal answer came, he renewed the request on the 15th. The next day (Dec. 16th), the Mexican minister answers, that

The delay has "arisen solely from certain difficulties occasioned by the nature of these credentials as compared with the proposition made by the United States, through their consul, to treat peacefully upon *the affairs of Texas*. . . It has been found necessary to submit the said credentials to the council of government, for its opinion with regard to them." — p. 25.

Dec. 20th, Mr. Slidell was officially informed by Senor Peña y Peña,

That the supreme government "does not conceive that, in order to fulfil the object proposed by the said consul in the name of the American government and accepted by the undersigned [Peña y Peña], it should admit his excellency Mr. Slidell in the character with which he is invested."

"This proposition, as well as its acceptance, rested upon the precise and definite understanding that a commissioner should be *ad hoc* — that is to say, *commissioned to settle*, in a peaceful and honorable manner, *the questions relative to Texas*. . . Mr. Slidell does not come invested with that character, . . . although it is true, that in the credential letter brought by his excellency Mr. Slidell, it is stated that he is informed of the desire of the President of the United States to *restore*, cultivate, and strengthen friendship and good correspondence between the two countries. It is also no less true that in this clause the single word *restore* is by no means sufficient to give to Mr. Slidell the special character of commissioner, or plenipotentiary *ad hoc* — to make propositions as to the affairs of Texas, calculated to establish peace firmly and to avert the evils of war by adequate agreement." "The admission of such a minister ['an absolute and general minister, an ordinary plenipotentiary, to reside near the Mexican government,'] should be . . . *preceded by the agreement*, which the United States propose to enter into, *for the establishment of peace and good correspondence with Mexico*, interrupted by the occurrences of Texas, — this point being, from its very nature, necessary to be attained before any other; and until it shall have been entirely and peacefully settled, not even an *appointment* should be made of a resident minister, by either of the two governments."

"The supreme government of Mexico, therefore, cannot admit his excellency Mr. Slidell to the exercise of the functions of the mission conferred on him by the United States government. But as the sentiments expressed by the undersigned . . . are in no wise changed, he now repeats them, adding that he will have the

utmost pleasure in treating with Mr. Slidell, as soon as he shall have presented credentials authorizing him expressly and exclusively to settle the questions which have disturbed the harmony and good understanding between the two republics, and which will bring on war between them unless such settlement be effected in a satisfactory manner, to which the proposition of the government of the United States related, and under the express understanding of which the proposition was accepted by the Mexican government." — pp. 41, 42. See also p. 44.

To this Mr. Slidell angrily replies, on the 24th of December, and makes a remarkable mistake on referring to the letter of the Mexican government offering to accept a commissioner. Mr. Slidell says, "The Mexican government declared 'itself disposed to receive the commissioner of the United States, who might come to their capital with full powers to settle *these disputes* in a peaceful, reasonable, and honorable manner.'" — p. 35. Whereas the Mexican minister only expressed a readiness to receive a commissioner with full power "to settle the *present dispute*." — p. 32. Comment is needless.

There was evidently a mistake — or a blunder — on the part of the American government. The Mexican government gave America a chance to rectify the error, by recalling Mr. Slidell and sending a special commissioner in his place, with such powers as the occasion demanded, or sending such powers to Mr. Slidell. We think the government of France, of England, or even of Austria, would have done so. We have before shown what was done by President Adams when Mr. Pinckney was rejected. But March 21st, 1846, Mr. Buchanan thus writes to Mr. Slidell: —

"Should the Mexican government, by finally refusing to receive you, consummate the act of folly and bad faith of which they have afforded such strong indications, nothing will then remain for this government but to take the redress of the wrongs of its citizens into its own hands. In the event of such a refusal, . . . you ought . . . so to conduct yourself as to *throw the whole odium of the failure of the negotiation upon the Mexican government.*" "The desire of the President is, that you should conduct yourself with such wisdom and firmness at the crisis that the voice of the American people shall be unanimous in favor of redressing the wrongs of our much injured and long suffering claimants." "*In the meantime, the President, in anticipation of the final refusal of the Mexican government to receive you, has ordered the army of Texas to advance and take position on the left bank of the Rio Grande; and has directed that a strong fleet shall be assembled*

in the Gulf of Mexico. He will thus be prepared to act with vigor and promptitude the moment that Congress shall give him authority." — p. 45.

On the first of March, Mr Slidell writes to Senor Castillo y Lanzas, successor of Peña y Peña, and says,

"The President is unwilling to take a course which would inevitably result in war [!] without making another effort to avert so great a calamity. He wishes, by exhausting every honorable means of conciliation, to demonstrate to the civilized world, *that if its peace shall be disturbed, the responsibility must fall on Mexico alone.* He is sincerely desirous to preserve that peace; but the state of quasi hostility which now exists on the part of Mexico [by her declining to receive Mr. Slidell] is one which is incompatible with the dignity and interests of the United States; and it is for the Mexican government to decide whether it shall give place to friendly negotiation, or lead to an open rupture." — p. 54.

To this, Senor Castillo y Lanzas replied, on the 12th,

"That the Mexican government cannot receive him [Mr. Slidell] as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to reside near it. . . . It is true, that the warlike display with which the American Union presents herself — by sea, with her squadrons on both coasts; by land, with her invading forces advancing by the northern frontiers; [where the President had ordered them two months before, without waiting till Congress gave him authority,] at the same time that by her minister plenipotentiary propositions are made for conciliation and accommodation — would be a sufficiently powerful reason for not listening to them, so long as all threatening shall not be withdrawn, even to the slightest appearance of hostility. But even this is waived by the government of the republic, in order that it may in all frankness and loyalty enter into the discussion, relying solely upon reason and facts. . . . The vehement desire of the government of the United States to extend its already immense territory at the expense of that of Mexico, has been manifest for many years; and it is beyond all doubt that, in regard to Texas at least, this has been their firm and constant determination; for it has been so declared categorically and officially by an authorized representative of the Union, whose assertion, strange and injurious as was its frankness, has nevertheless not been belied by the United States.*

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* Even Mr. Van Buren, writing to Mr. Hammett, said, (April 20th, 1844,) "Nothing is either more true or more extensively known, than that *Texas was wrested from Mexico, and her independence established through the instrumentality of citizens of the United States.*"

"Considering the time as having come for carrying into effect the annexation of Texas, the United States, in union and by agreement with their natural allies and adherents in that territory, enacted the means for the purpose. The project was introduced into the American Congress. It was, at first, frustrated, thanks to the prudential consideration, the circumspection, and the wisdom, with which the Senate of the United States then proceeded. Nevertheless, the project was reproduced in the following session, and was then approved and sanctioned in the form and terms known to the whole world.

"A fact such as this, or to speak with greater exactness, so notable an act of usurpation, created an imperious necessity that Mexico . . . should repel it with proper firmness and dignity. The supreme government had beforehand declared that it would look upon such an act as a *casus belli*; and as a consequence of this declaration, negotiation was by its very nature at an end, and war was the only recourse of the Mexican government.

"But before it proceeded to recover its outraged rights, propositions were addressed to it from the so called President of Texas, which had for their object to enter into an amicable accommodation upon the basis of her independence; and the government agreed to hear them, and consented to name the commissioners who, with this view, were sent to it from Texas.

"Moments so precious were not thrown away by the agents of the United States in Texas. Availing themselves of the *statu quo* of Mexico, they so prepared matters and directed affairs, that the already enacted annexation to the American Union should follow almost immediately.*

"Thus this incorporation of a territory which had constituted an integral part of that of Mexico during the long period of the Spanish dominion, and after her emancipation, for so long a time, without any interruption whatever, and which measure had been recognized and sanctioned by the treaty of limits between the Mexican republic and the United States of America — was effected by the reprobated means of violence and fraud.

"Civilized nations have beheld with amazement, at this enlightened and refined epoch, a powerful and well consolidated State, availing itself of the internal dissensions of a neighbouring nation, putting its vigilance to sleep by protestations of friendship, setting in action all manner of springs and artifices, alternately plying intrigue and violence, and seizing a moment to despoil her of a precious part of her territory, regardless of the

* The recent letter of Mr. Tyler in the Washington (weekly) Union, of Aug. 12th, is a good commentary on this part of the letter.

incontrovertible rights of the most unquestionable ownership and the most uninterrupted possession.

"Here, then, is the true position of the Mexican republic; despoiled, outraged, contemned, it is now attempted to subject her to a humiliating degradation." — pp. 57–59.

"It is manifest that it was the firm intention of the Mexican government to admit only a plenipotentiary from the United States clothed with powers *ad hoc* — that is to say, special powers to treat upon the question of Texas, and upon this alone, as preliminary to the renewal of friendly relations between the two countries, if the result should be such as to admit of their restoration, and then, but not before, of an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary near the same government.

"Nor could the government of the republic on that occasion extend its engagement beyond this; for to admit any person sent by the United States in the character simply of the ordinary agents between friendly nations, whilst the grave question of Texas was still pending, . . . would be equivalent to an acknowledgment that the question was at an end, thus prejudging it without even touching it, and to a recognition that the relations of friendship and harmony between the two nations, were from that moment in fact reëstablished.

"In the actual state of things, to say that Mexico maintains a position of quasi hostility with respect to the United States, is to add a new offence to her previous injuries. Her attitude is one of defence, because she has herself been unjustly attacked; because a portion of her territory is occupied by the forces of a nation, intent, without any right whatever, to possess itself of it; because her ports are threatened by the squadrons of the same power.

"*It is then not upon Mexico*, seeing her present state, *that it devolves to decide if the issue shall be a friendly negotiation or an open rupture.* It is long since her interests have made this necessary, and her dignity has demanded it; but in the hope of an accommodation at once honorable and specific, she has silenced the claims of those imperious exigencies.

"It follows, that if war should finally become inevitable, and if in consequence of this war, the peace of the civilized world should be disturbed, *the responsibility will not fall upon Mexico.* It will all rest upon the United States; to them will the whole of it belong. Not upon Mexico, — who, with a generosity unequalled, admitted the American citizens who wished to colonize in Texas, — but upon the United States, who, bent upon possessing themselves, early or late, of that territory, encouraged emigration thither with that view, in order that in due time, its inhabitants, converting themselves from colonists into its masters, should claim the country as their own, for the purpose of transferring it to the United

States; not upon Mexico, who, having in due season protested against so enormous a transgression, wished to remove all cause for controversy and hostilities, but upon the United States, who, to the scandal of the world, and in violation of treaties, gave protection and aid to those guilty of a violation so iniquitous. Not upon Mexico, who, in the midst even of injuries so great and so repeated, has shown herself disposed to admit propositions for conciliation, but upon the United States, who, pretending sincerely to desire a friendly and honorable accommodation, have belied by their acts the sincerity of their words. Finally, not upon Mexico, who, putting out of view her ever dearest interests, through her desire for peace, has entertained as long as was wished the propositions which, with this view, might be made to her, but upon the United States, who, by frivolous pretexts, made the conclusion of such an arrangement, *proposing peace at the very moment when they are causing their squadrons and their troops to advance upon the ports and frontiers of Mexico, exacting a humiliation impossible to be submitted to, in order to find a pretext, if no reason can be found, which may occasion the breaking out of hostilities.*"

"It is therefore upon the United States, and not upon Mexico, that it devolves to determine in the alternative presented by Mr. Slidell — that is, between a friendly negotiation and an open rupture." — pp. 59 – 61.

Mr. Slidell, who all along had given so many indications of ignorance and folly — wrote such a letter as might have been looked for, demanded his passports, and returned home.

Attempts had been made to throw the responsibility and the odium of war upon Mexico, but Mexico would not take the initiative and declare war, nor commence an invasion without declaring it. What was to be done; shall the President ask Congress to declare war? The success of that would be hopeless. Shall he himself take the responsibility, and commence hostilities without the advice of Congress? There were yet other tricks to be tried — which were parallel in time with Mr. Slidell's mission to Mexico. We shall expose this matter by some quotations from the correspondence between the War Department and General Taylor. It is contained in the same document (No. 196) with the letters of Mr. Slidell. July 8th, 1845, Mr. Marcy — then Secretary of War — thus wrote to General Taylor:

"Mexico has some military establishments on the east side of the Rio Grande, which are . . . in the actual occupancy of her

troops. . . . The Mexican forces at the posts in their possession . . . will not be disturbed so long as the relations of peace . . . continue."

July 30th, he adds,

"The Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary, . . . and up *to this you are to extend your position*, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof, which are in the actual occupancy of Mexican forces, or Mexican settlements over which Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annexation, *or shortly before that event*. It is expected that . . . *you will approach as near the boundary line* — the Rio Grande — *as prudence will dictate*. . . . The President desires that your position . . . should be *near the river Nueces*." — pp. 70, 71.

Here a snare is laid for the American general. *He* is to take the initiative and bear the responsibility, if Mexico will not. He is to decide what places were in the possession of Texas at the time of annexation, "or shortly before it." Let it be remarked, besides, that Texas exercised no more jurisdiction on the Rio Grande than she did on the Danube. Should General Taylor advance, should Mexico regard herself invaded, and Congress refuse to sanction that invasion — the President can say: General Taylor exceeded his instructions, went nearer than "prudence will dictate," entered places over which Texas did not "exercise any jurisdiction."

Again, Aug. 23d, Mr. Marcy writes,

"There is reason to believe that Mexico is making efforts to assemble a large army on the frontier of Texas, for the purpose of entering its territory. . . . Should Mexico assemble a *large* body of troops on the Rio Grande, and cross it with a *considerable force*, such a moment must be regarded as an invasion of the United States and the commencement of hostilities." — p. 72.

And again, in the letter of Aug. 30th, p. 76, he is authorized, in case of need, to call for volunteers from Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. — pp. 74, 75, et al. Here is the same trick repeated: — what is a *large* body of troops; what a *considerable* force?

General Taylor took position at Corpus Christi, "the most western point in the possession of Texas," as Mr. Donelson has often told us, though the General says, "I would have *preferred a position on the left bank of the river*." He could

not find any *considerable* force on the Rio Grande at all, still less, any thought of invasion.

Again, Mr. Marcy writes, "*There may be other acts on the part of Mexico which would put an end to the relations of peace.*" — p. 76. In such a case he is told that he may "cross the Rio Grande," and "take and hold possession of Metamoras."

General Taylor did not fall into the snare thus adroitly laid for him. He kept within the Texan limits. He writes that he does not want any volunteers, and hopes no more will be sent till called for; "that the consul is of opinion there will be no declaration of war" by Mexico; "the mass of the people is opposed to war with us." "I must express the hope that no militia force will be ordered to join me without my requisition." "I cannot believe that it will become necessary to employ volunteers from the United States."

After Marcy had finished his trap, set it, baited it with such instructions for General Taylor on the 30th of August, he waited till the 16th of October, as it appears from the published correspondence. Perhaps he was making arrangements for the mission to Mexico to negotiate a peace. Be that as it may, a month after Mr. Buchanan had written to Mexico, desiring that "all existing difficulties should be terminated amicably by negotiation and not by the sword," stating, also, that the President "is anxious to preserve peace," and while the American government was expecting pacific overtures from Mexico — he writes again to urge the General into the toils laid for him.

"Previous instructions will have put you in possession of the *views of the government* of the United States, *not only as to the extent of its territorial claims, but of its determination to assert them.* In carrying out these instructions, *you will be left very much to your own judgment.*" "You will approach as near the western boundary of Texas (the Rio Grande) as circumstances will permit. . . . Ought your present position [at Corpus Christi, 'the most western point in the possession of Texas,'] *to be changed? . . . You need not . . . wait for directions from Washington to carry out what you may deem proper to be done.*" — pp. 76, 77.

Then he speaks of "*the contingency of your selecting or being directed to take a position on the banks of the Rio Grande.*" — p. 77.

General Taylor, however, continued at Corpus Christi.

Perhaps he saw the snare; perhaps he thought it was not his business to take the responsibility of beginning a war with Mexico; at any rate, Nov. 7th, he writes,

"The position now occupied by the troops may, perhaps, be the best while negotiations are pending, or at any rate until a disposition shall be manifested by Mexico to protract them unreasonably. Under the supposition that such may be the view of the department, [he had not then received the note of Oct. 16th,] *I shall make no movement* from this point . . . *until further instructions are received.*" — p. 97.

After the receipt of this letter, it became plain that General Taylor was not thus to be caught with chaff. But the American government had yet other advices. On the 23d of September, Mr. Marks, a short time before American consul at Metamoras, wrote a letter to General Taylor — which of course was forwarded to the American government, from which we make the following extract: —

"General Arista, . . . [the Mexican commander,] assured me that there will be no declaration of war on the part of Mexico. . . . General Arista pledged his honor to me that no large body of Mexican troops should cross the left bank of the Rio Grande; that only small parties, not to exceed two hundred men, should be permitted to go as far as the Arroyo Colorado, twenty leagues from the Rio Grande, and that they should be strictly ordered only to prevent Indian depredations and illicit trade. I then had no hesitation in assuring *him that you* [General Taylor] *would not commit any aggressive act against Mexico*, or her citizens, and that *you would solely maintain the position* you at present occupy, *at or near the Nueces river. I trust*, in having made this assurance to him, . . . *it will meet with your approbation and be adhered to, as in a great measure peace depends on your prudent movements in this particular.*"

For very obvious reasons, the American government never published this letter. But what must be done?

True, Mr. Slidell was in Mexico, pretending to negotiate a settlement of all our difficulties with Mexico. He had not been refused by the actual government of Mexico. True, Congress was in session, and might have been consulted, as in the settlement of the Oregon question. Shall the government wait for the result of Mr. Slidell's mission? — No, that was "anticipated," as well it might have been. Shall Congress

be assembled? Quite as little. On the 13th of January, 1846, Mr. Marcy thus writes to the cautious General: —

"I am directed by the President to instruct you *to advance and occupy with the troops under your command, positions on or near the east bank of the Rio del Norte*, as soon as it can be conveniently done. . . . It is not designed, in our present relations with Mexico, that you should treat her as an enemy; but should she assume that character by a declaration of war, or any open act of hostility towards us, *you will not act merely on the defensive.*" — pp. 77, 78.

On the 11th of March, the American army moved from Corpus Christi, and on the 21st, reached the Rio Grande, and took position on its eastern bank, opposite the town of Metamoras. On the 18th of March, Senor Mejia, commander-in-chief of the forces opposed to the Americans, issued his proclamation. In this he says, "It has been reserved for the United States to practise dissimulation, deceit, and the basest treachery, in order, in the midst of peace, to appropriate to herself the territory of a friendly nation, who had honorably confided in the sincerity of her promises, and in the solemnity of her treaties. . . . What hopes, therefore, can the Mexican republic entertain of treating with an *enemy who, at the very moment he endeavours to lull us into security by opening diplomatic negotiations, proceeds to occupy a territory which never could have been the object of the discussion now pending? The limits of Texas are fixed and well known;* they have never extended beyond the Nueces." — p. 110. The 23d of March, Senor Cardenas sent a letter to General Taylor, protesting against his invasion of the Mexican territory, "without previous declaration of war, and without an explicit announcement of his design." He speaks of this act as "*contrary to the practice of civilized countries and the clearest principles of the law of nations.*"

On the 12th of April, the Mexican general ordered General Taylor to retire within twenty-four hours, or war would follow. On the 24th of April, General Arista, the Mexican commander-in-chief, informed General Taylor that "he considered hostilities commenced, and should prosecute them," and on the same day a slight skirmish took place, though on the Mexican soil.

The remaining history is but too well known already. The message of the President, May 11th, 1846, the vote of Congress, the conduct of the democratic party and the whig party

— all these are well known. The President may declare that "war exists by an act of Mexico," the Congress may vote it to be true; that changes nothing. They cannot create a fact by a vote. It was the American government that made the war; unconstitutionally made a war which is unjust, mean, cowardly, and wicked even amongst wars.

Well said the Mexican commissioners, but a month ago — "We must confess, not without a blush, that we are exhibiting to mankind the scandal of two Christian people, of two republics, in the presence of all the monarchies, mutually doing one another all the harm they can, by disputes about boundaries, when we have an excess of land to people and cultivate on the beautiful hemisphere where Providence caused us to be born."

Which nation should blush? Let Mr. Calhoun answer. He said, in his speech in the Senate, Feb. 12th, 1847,

"If the annexation of Texas had not taken place, there would have been no war with Mexico, but that annexation was not the cause of the war. *The immediate cause of the war was the marching of our troops from Corpus Christi to the Rio del Norte. If General Taylor had remained with his forces where he was, there would have been no invasion, — there would have been no conflict.*"*

For the statements we have made, we have not relied on the speeches of partisan leaders, delivered for the purposes of a party hostile to the administration; we have not depended on the miserable secrets of conversations, private letters, and cabinet discussions, since public and well-known documents furnish the only sure ground on which we can stand. The American Congress, Representatives and Senate, with unanimity almost unexampled, threw the blame of this iniquity upon the innocent, and declared that the war existed by the act of Mexico. Only fourteen in the House, only two in the Senate, voted against the bill which made this declaration, and which turned the treasure, the talent, the energy, and the life of this terrible American nation against the miserable and distracted people of Mexico. What shall we say of that declaration? It was a lie! War existed by an act of the American government; we think no honest man, informed of the facts, can be so simple as to doubt it. The Mexicans say that the

* But see Senator Benton's speech of Feb. 24th, 1847.

conduct of America is unparalleled in the history of modern nations. Mr. Castillo y Lanzas is here mistaken. It is not wholly so. There is one parallel to our course of aggression upon Mexico. That is the — partition of Poland. While reading anew the public documents relative to this matter, the corresponding points in that infamous parallel have forced themselves upon us. "That," says a distinguished writer on public law, was "the most flagrant violation of natural justice and international law which has occurred since Europe first emerged from barbarism." Over Mexico as over Poland, it was only necessary to *stoop*, and you could pick up what you would. There, too, was a territorial claim, a pretence for re-annexation. There as here the spoiler feared the interference of England and France, and employed "dissimulation, deceit, and the basest treachery." The manifestoes of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, setting forth their respective claims, are well known; the writings of suppliant slaves, who, at a tyrant's bidding, contended for their country, however bounded, their country, right or wrong — will not soon be forgot. The language of two of the chief-magistrates of America, solemnly written in their messages and sent to Congress, the nation, and the world — language professing the desire of peace, the love of justice and of right, have brought back to our memory the intense irony, cruel and malicious, of the diplomatists of that period. "The courts," says a diplomatic note dictated by the Spoilers, and sent in September, 1773, to the government of the Polish nation, "the courts [that is, of Russia, Prussia, and Austria] are so deeply interested in preserving the peace of Poland, that while they are busy in getting the treaties ready to be signed and ratified, their ministers think they ought not to lose a moment of that interval so precious for the restoration of the order and tranquillity of that kingdom." We need not point out the parallels in the messages of Presidents Tyler and Polk, or in the speeches and resolutions of their sycophants and their slaves. The democrat has learned of the despot, and American Diplomacy, though but a babe, and inexperienced, already rivals her European parents, long ago cradled at Vienna, Moscow, Rome, or Byzantium, rocked by the tyrants of the earth, and now hoary with centuries of crime — treason against mankind.

Shall we pause now, and pass judgment on the conduct of the two administrations most busy in this crime? We have stated the facts. Shall we declaim against such infamy?

We cannot. Our pen falls to the ground; our lips are silent; eloquence were folly, genius impotence, in such a work. We pass away from that theme.

> "To gild refined gold, to paint the lily,
> To throw a perfume on the violet,
> To smooth the ice, or add another hue
> Unto the rainbow, or with taper-light
> To seek the beauteous eye of heaven to garnish —
> Is wasteful and ridiculous excess."

What has been the conduct of the famous men of America? Great Statesmen are the mountains of the world which earliest show the dawn and latest hold the lingering rays of the departing sun; foremost prophets of the day when morning promises to come; most conservative of light when darkness shrouds the vulgar plains. But great Politicians are but the steeples of America, whose topmost summit bears — a weather-cock. There are, in America, amongst her children, four famous men. We shall not now discuss their general merits, nor attempt to decide whether they are politicians — who interpret the interests of a party, or statesmen that incarnate principles in a nation's life. These four tower far above the vulgar mass that drive a thriving trade in politics; are most conspicuous men — beheld far off at sea. They have been long in public life, and all four may be deemed competitors for the chair of the President. What has been their conduct? Mr. Benton spoke nobly against annexation, and — voted for it. Voted also for the war. Mr. Calhoun, — so often superior to party ties, — is the author of annexation, and voted for the war. These two belong to the party in power, and men might have looked for their allegiance. The two others are hostile to the administration: have they been hostile to the war? Mr. Clay is a private man — and therefore has not been called on to take any official stand in relation to this matter. But in December, 1846, at the celebration of a memorable event in the history of America, he was *toasted* at table, and made a reply, which was thus reported in the newspapers of the time. "Although leading a life of retirement, I am not wholly unobservant of the proceedings relating to the condition, welfare, and prospects of our country. And when I saw around me to-night, Gen. Brooke, and other old friends, *I felt half inclined to ask for some nook or corner in the army, in which I might serve, to avenge the wrongs done to my country. I have thought that I might yet be able to capture or*

slay a Mexican. I shall not be able to do so, however, this year, but hope that success will still crown our gallant arms, and the war terminate in an honorable peace." To add yet more to the shame of America, this speech was delivered at the dinner of the Sons of New England, on the 22d of December, met to celebrate the landing of the Forefathers of New England on Plymouth rock. Poor men! in that puritanic blood of theirs was there no tinge from the heart of the Pilgrims? Could they not, on that day, amid the feasting, the wine, and the revelry, amid the politicians, and the generals, and the "great applause," could they not for a moment think of those outcasts of the world who came in the name of Justice to found a state? Oh, no. How could they think of that? There stood one of the foremost men of America, hoping to "capture or slay a Mexican!" the son of some woman that never injured him — who might go down, heart-broken and refusing to be comforted, in sorrow to her grave. Alas — could he have known it — vain man, how soon is he doomed to weep at the "inscrutable Providence," by which his own son, the dear one, lies slain, in battle — not slain by a great statesman, but by some vulgar bullet of a nameless soldier, who fought for his country, her altars, and her homes, while the American volunteer fell inglorious and disgraced, a willing murderer, in that war so treacherous and so cruel. The father who had hoped to "slay a Mexican," shall find but sad consolation kissing the cold lips of his only son. Is Providence so "inscrutable?" He who would deal death upon the sons of other men — shall he not feel it in his own home?

But the great champion of the north, that man of giant intellect which dwarfs his three competitors to littleness, himself perhaps unequalled among living men in magnificence of understanding — he has stood on Plymouth Rock, and his words which found a footing there have gone as pilgrims to be forefathers of mighty deeds — at least in humbler men! How broke the thunders of that unequalled eloquence, which so oft before had shaken every heart? Did he thunder in the Senate, and lighten all over the land till wondering nations saw it from afar? Let us look at this. He had condemned annexation. "It struck a blow at the influence of our institutions. . . . Thank God I did not slumber over that danger." He had condemned the war; it was "illegal," unconstitutional, unjust; "a war of pretexts," "a presidential war;" the President's action was "an impeachable offence;" the Mexicans were

weak, distracted, the prey of military tyrants. She "has had nothing that deserved to be called a government;" and America is strong and united. In making war, the President had "very much nullified an important provision of the constitution." Yet Mr. Webster could say, at Philadelphia, Dec. 2d, 1846,

"Nevertheless, war is upon us, armies are in the field, navies are upon the sea. We believe that the *government ought immediately, in an honorable and satisfactory manner, to bring the war to a conclusion*, if possible. . . . But while the war lasts, [this unjust and unconstitutional war,] while soldiers are on the land, and seamen on the sea, *upholding the flag of our country, you feel, and I feel, and every American feels, that they must be succoured and sustained.* . . . They have done honor to the country to which they belong. . . . Where can we look for such steadiness, calmness, bravery, and modesty, as in these volunteers! The most distinguished incident in the history of our country — of the good conduct of the militia — of new raised levies from amongst the people, is, perhaps, that of the battle of Bunker Hill. . . . I might go further and say, that *at Bunker Hill the newly raised levies and recruits sheltered themselves behind some temporary defences, but at Monterey the volunteers assailed a fortified city.*"*

Nor was that all; but the day before, addressing a body of volunteers, misguided young men who probably had never considered the justice of the war, nor asked whether they were to fight for slavery or freedom — he could cheer and encourage them to fight in a war which he declared "illegal," and threatened to impeach the President for beginning; could bid them go and uphold the stars of their country's banner!

Such was the conduct of that man on whom nature has lavished so prodigally her gifts — a kingly intellect, a heart of noble make." In the Senate what did he to end the war? — to "impeach" the President? Nothing. So far as opposition to the war is concerned — no mouse in the wall could have lain stiller or more snug. All winter he sat in his seat busy — but with other things. The instigators of the invasion passed by and said: "See, Webster is the friend of the war." Had he not a son invested in that enterprise?

Such is the conduct of the four most eminent men of Amer-

* We have followed the report of this speech in Niles's Register. The language in the Pennsylvania Inquirer is a little more intense.

ica. No one of them opposes the war. Does any one say a good word against it — he is sure to eat that word the next day. The war is thought "glorious," and called "patriotic;" men are bid to fight the war of their country, "right or wrong." How few remember that to fight on the wrong side is to fight *against* the country. The "glory" of the enterprise, what does it amount to? Why, if the United States were to conquer all Mexico, viewed as a military exploit the glory of the deed would be nothing. As well might the Horse-guards at London claim glory because they had chased a crowd of women from Billingsgate, and driven them up Ludgate hill. We make no doubt, that a private company for the conquest of Mexico might be got up in Boston, which in two years' time would conquer the whole of that country, and keep it — perhaps for ever. The glory which twenty millions of "Anglo-Saxons" are likely to get from conquering the miserable population of Mexico is glory in the wrong column, even when looked at merely with the unscrupulous eyes of a soldier. It seems surprising all men cannot see that such a glory is only a shame. One day the people must awaken. Justice will at last hold a stern reckoning with the memories of our famous men.

But what is the real cause which lay at the bottom of the national design, produced annexation, and made and prosecutes the war for the partition of Mexico? There is a power behind the constitution, but greater than the constitution itself, rising above and projecting beyond it; yes, greater than Congress — overshadowing the "unalienable rights" of man; we mean the institution of domestic slavery. Despotic monarchs of the old world are too liberal and enlightened to allow it any longer in their domain. It is cleared off from the soil of western Europe. The Bey of Tunis solemnly says to the world, "It is a very cruel thing, and our heart shrinks from it." "We have abolished men's slavery in all our dominions." "All slaves that shall touch our territory shall become free." Even Mexico, weak, semibarbarous Mexico, will have no slaves on her soil. But in democratic America it has found an asylum, a home. The egg was laid surreptitiously in the nest of the American Eagle, who now loves its ghastly and hideous disclosure better than all her legitimate brood, whose food that young cormorant devours apace, defiling what is not destroyed. The American Eagle broods over this Harpy with fond delight,

caressing it with beak and wing. For that she plunders the living and tears the dead—slain for its insatiate craw.

The constitution of the United States in spirit and letter defends slavery; the laws are on its side. There is not a state in the Union which dares say with that Mohammedan prince—"All slaves that touch our territory shall become free." Neither political party is opposed to it; both favor, both love it—now with open ardor, now with longings in secret. A resolution refusing to extend the area of slavery is consistently hissed down at a convention of political democrats in the heart of Massachusetts. Scarce a prominent man in the whig party is prominently opposed to this. The great politicians who reach to the upper currents of the popular air all point that way; the little politicians whose stature does not exceed the range of gusts and eddies in the street, tell mainly the same tale. Certainly the politicians of America—the large dealers and the little hucksters of politics—are its friends. They oppose it; how could they? With here and there an exception, the American churches are also on its side, and can quote scripture for *their* purpose, defending it in the name of God. "Southern chivalry," with its boasting tone, and the "morality of the north," with its cringing gait, are united in its defence. The press supports it,—the newspapers, with their thin but continuous talk, and the grave, sober literature, an imitation of English models in all besides—is American only in its support of slavery! It is this which annexed Texas, this which began the war.

Slavery is the idol of America. Men of ablest intellect—who differ on most other matters of national concern—agree in defence of this. But its subtlest apology—as of all evil—is in the name of God. "No man," said Mr. Simms, of South Carolina, in his speech in Congress, "No man who reads his Bible and who is a Christian, . . . can denounce slavery as immoral. . . . The very first steps taken by the French encyclopedists for overthrowing the authority of the Bible was to publish to the world . . . *that slavery was wrong in principle, and then that the Bible was the advocate of slavery.*" "It is founded on the laws of God, written in the climate and soil of the country." "It is your inferior clergy," says an able writer, a "northern man with southern citizenship,"* "that are teaching . . . that slavery is contrary

* See letters in the New York Courier and Enquirer to Hon. George P. Marsh, by "a northern man with southern citizenship."

to the laws of God;" "you cannot abolish slavery, for *God is pledged to sustain it.*"

The idol is popular; to refuse its worship is found dangerous; to oppose it is "fanaticism;" but to be on its side, to feed it with money and blood, is "honorable," "patriotic," "popular." Well said the father of his country, in his farewell address: "Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the fanatic, are liable to become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests."

The slaveholders wanted new territory, for slaves were falling in value on the soil of the old states. In 1839, Mr. Upshur said in the Virginia convention, "If it should be our lot to acquire Texas, . . *their price will rise.*" In 1842, Mr. Gholson, of the same state, thought "the *acquisition of Texas would raise their price fifty per cent.*" It was feared, or pretended, that Texas might abolish slavery; so in 1843, Mr. Upshur, then American Secretary of State, wrote officially to our minister in Texas, "the establishment in the very midst of our slaveholding states of an independent government forbidding the existence of slavery, . . . could not fail to produce the most unhappy effects." "There could not be any security for that species of property." Annexation "is absolutely necessary to the salvation of the South." In 1844, he wrote to our minister in England, "If Texas should not be attached to the United States, we cannot maintain that institution [of slavery] ten years, and probably not half that time."

So the South must have Texas, and extend slavery over that soil whence the Mexicans had scourged it out. Could the North prevent it? Most certainly; even little New England could have prevented it. Mr. Webster, who gratuitously thanks God that he "did not slumber over that danger," says, "*New England might have prevented it if she would, but her people* WOULD *not be roused.*"* But, long before, New England learned

> "To crook the pregnant hinges of the knee,
> That thrift may follow fawning."

The most disinterested enthusiasm of this day—long directed against slavery in general, fought against this special act, and a few noble men spoke loud and long, but to reluctant

* Speech in Faneuil Hall, Nov. 6th, 1846.

ears and cold hearts. Had their counsel been followed, we should have had no annexation, no invasion, no war! But a false idea had gone abroad in New England—that southern slavery is profitable to the North. The "chivalry" and the "morality" have one common affection—not the love of their country, nor the love of Right, but the love of gain! So New England assented to annexation, the North assented, a whig Senate annexing Texas, the fatal dower of slavery in her land, with the expectation of a war. The South has its wish, the North its reward. The Nation laments the violation of her constitution, the debasement of her great men,—it was violated by slavery, and to that her sons have bowed the neck; she beholds the betrayal of her honor,—it was betrayed by slavery; she mourns for thousands of her children slain,—they were murdered by slavery—which clamors still for more. Behold the beginning of the end—which is not the end itself.

Art. II.—POWERS' GREEK SLAVE.

The appearance of Mr. Powers' statue among us, and the feeling of earnest admiration with which it has been received, afford us an occasion to say a few words, not so much with reference to the sculptor and his work, as to Art in general; of which it may be said, that there is no one side of human knowledge concerning which the ideas of men are so vague, varying, and inadequate. To explain what it truly is, to place it in its true relations, to make every man feel that it is of importance to him, and that its concurrence is essential to the highest development of mankind, will be the future work of genius through many ages. If we cannot give a reason for the faith that is in us, we can still protest against skepticism and indifference. It will assist us in our endeavour if we classify the views and feelings with which Art is regarded among men.

I. We have the large class who have no thought on the subject, but to whom music, poetry, or any work of art not beyond the range of their sympathies, is a source of the highest gratification.

II. Those in whom a partial or onesided development has injured the natural balance of the faculties. Thus, the man whose life has been devoted to action in the world, is accustomed to view Art as action without a useful end; or else sees in it only a means of pleasure and sensual gratification. The religionist thinks its influence doubtful or dangerous to the interests of religion and morality.

III. Those persons who are not wanting in a due sense of the value of Art, but who see it only in parts and fragments, or are influenced by fashion, or some dominant mind; and are thus incapable of overseeing it as a whole.

IV. Artists.

We could wish there were a fifth class to be added: but in this age of the world, when we are made familiar with the works of all times, without selection, to oversee the whole, and, through the mass of "works" that obscure it, seize the clear image of Art itself, as the Greeks did, must evidently be granted only to genius, industry, and opportunity, combined. There may be individuals, but hardly a class.

We say, and more or less understandingly we believe, that God made man in his image. What are the attributes that we involuntarily attach to the Supreme Being? Are they not Creation, that originates; Action, that sustains; Love, that environs us, and in which we exist? The life of man is passed in the exercise of these same attributes or faculties. We believe that Religion is love to God and Man. To action man is spurred by necessity, from the first moment of his being; when he ceases to act he is dead. Man lives, and worships; he now feels the necessity to *create*. The natural delight in melody, in imitation, first points out the way; he makes a song; he draws a rude outline, and Art already exists.

This threefold nature of man, religious, practical, and artistic, is rarely if ever confided by nature, in full measure, to the same individual; always the one predominates. And thus we have the Priest, the Poet, and the Man of Action; or, in early times, the man of action *par excellence*—the Soldier; and this is the reason for the fascination that the military profession still retains: the soldier has been in all times the visible type of the man of action. The harmonious development of these three attributes is necessary to the harmonious development of the individual man; which explains that wonderful perfection of development that was found in individuals in the earlier ages; so that whilst the progress has still been towards

the improvement of the race, we can point to no more perfect specimens than the Jews and the Greeks possessed.

In all times it has seemed to be the design of Providence to make some peculiar race the depository of the divine fire of a new idea, or at least, the means of its elaboration and interpretation to mankind; and by the steady progress of the idea in such a race an individual development has been attained, that has served as a model to all after times, and which, in its perfection, always suggests a divine inspiration rather than human progress, if the two things can be separated. Such was the progress of a pure religion among the Jews, of a pure art among the Greeks. In their early progress the two were always most intimately united, but after a certain culminating point had been reached, a separation has taken place; Art became a minister to learning; Religion became narrow and bigoted; until in the hands of another race, and under the influence of new ideas, they have been again united for a time.

In those early times Art was grand and ideal, filled with the dignity of its mission. It has been the property and possession of the people, and not of individuals. The poems of Homer, the early Greek dramas, the Parthenon and its friezes, belonged to every Greek as much as to Pericles; but when its mission was fulfilled, when individuals became the patrons of Art, it lost its high ideal character, and this became its chief aim—to please and interest. Whenever, in later times, Art has resumed a high and ideal position, it has been when, under the influence of dominant ideas, it has spoken to the genius of the people, instead of answering to the narrow demands of patrons. Thus the Art of the Middle Ages achieved its greatness by belonging to the Church, at a time when the Church belonged to the People; for one must always concede to the Catholic Church that it was the representative of the people, when the people had no other representative.

It will be seen that we have spoken principally with reference to imitative art; but our idea of Art includes all poetry, though it is one of the most difficult questions in relation to Art, how far, and in what sense, poetry is an art. A great confusion prevails: in the mind of most men, art in poetry suggests the idea of artifice; men are accustomed to say they prefer nature to art, and though one understands what they mean, the mistake is perpetuated.

Poetry is strictly an art; the first and highest of all the

arts; subject to the same laws, yet wearing their chains more loosely, from its ethereal nature.

Poetry has this advantage over the other arts, that its expression is immediate; it speaks out and at once to all the world; it cannot be made a handmaid of luxury; its ideal nature, its inspiration, is the means by which it exists. Imitative art has a body, an appearance, which can give pleasure apart from its soul, or inspiration; but if poetry be not inspired, it is nought. All other arts must be learnt by slow and laborious mechanical means; the body of imitative or musical art has to be mastered, before the soul can be expressed; there must be access to the most eminent masters; but the poet has only to speak, and the world listens.

Now, to a certain extent, the same is true of poetry which we have said of the other arts. The earliest poetry is always religious and ideal in its character, and belongs to the people; but when all things are in a state of decline, the small class of cultivated men become the heirs and depositaries of those treasures of art which were formerly the free property of all. This age, immediately succeeding what may be called the heroic age of Art, is usually fertile in excellent poets and artists of a secondary class. Living immediately in the presence of works of the highest order, with no bad examples as yet to create a false taste, or lower the standard, such men are in a position to reproduce whatever can be reproduced of the merit of ancient works; but instead of speaking to a now corrupted people, they address themselves to a small, but admirably cultivated class. As the audience differs, so do the works. Religious awe and reverence have disappeared, or are artificially reproduced; Poetry becomes more and more artificial; until a new idea, or a new revelation, calls for new bards and singers.

Following in this course, Art gradually becomes degraded; thus we have seen poetry become an amusement for learned men, and all kinds of bad taste perpetuated, in a chase after a superficial novelty.

Without entering at this time more fully into particulars of the various renovations and ideas that have infused, from time to time, new blood into the body of Art, we now come to a phase of Art peculiar to our own time.

An earnest, yet complex and self-conscious age, looking diligently for light and aid in all directions, recognizes in its poets and artists a false aim, a want of true inspiration, a

frigidity and artifice resulting from the worn-out traditions of elder schools. It demands a more earnest aim, a greater faithfulness; in a word, a return to Nature. Now this demand is founded in a partial perception of truth, and leads to an error not the less inveterate that it is respectable. It arises from the belief that high Art is but an imitation and selection from exalted Nature; whereas the soul of Art is, as has been said, "Creation in the beautiful." This error appears very natural so long as we regard the imitative arts only; for their faithful imitation being the most obvious, comes to be regarded as the essential requisite. But turn to Architecture; when this art becomes degraded, what Nature can we return to, save the Idea we have in our own mind of the true and beautiful; we are to return not to Nature, but to Art; and this return it is the province of Genius to accomplish. The same is true of Music. If, then, there are arts in which there is no imitation of nature, it follows that this imitation cannot be the essence, but only the form which Art adopts; for the essence of all arts must be the same.

The development of this idea of a return to Nature has been productive of notable effects, both for good and evil; and has formed the interior history of much of the art and literature of the past half century; there are signs that it has run its course, and is giving place to other, perhaps not more complete, ideas. Its effect upon painting is visible in an infinite number of pleasing works, possessing both good taste and refinement, generally in the class of *portrait landscape;* and the apotheosis of the idea may be found in a very singular, eloquent, and even valuable book, called the "Modern Painters, by a graduate of Oxford." In the midst of pages of vivid description of Nature, and refined criticism of works of art, we are startled with the assertion repeated a thousand times, that in the British school of our day, and chiefly in one member of this school, resides all that is most valuable in landscape. The error is simply this; that in a certain phase of Landscape Art the English have accomplished things never done nor attempted before. That this phase is not the highest, and that the author with a vivid insight into a part, is incapable of a just view of the whole, would seem probable, even to one who did not know what the English school has accomplished.

In the domain of Poetry the consequences of the dominant idea of return to Nature have been still more striking. All

nature has been ransacked. The poet has rushed to field, wood, and waterfall, and sat down before them to muse, with as much set purpose as the painter does to sketch. The vocabulary being once adjusted, and the general tone of thought and sentiment prescribed, making poetry has become so easy that it is done as a matter of course; every body can sit down before a waterfall; every tenth man can put his "Impressions" into verse; every hundredth can get them printed; the general taste becomes corrupted, sentiment mawkish, language exaggerated. And yet the leaders of this school have been great men, and, in spite of a false theory, have done good work in their time.

Another phase in Modern Art has been the reverse of this. Perceiving the religious nature of high Art, certain men of devout mind have taken as their model that period in Art when its aim was purely religious and ideal. Such has been the tendency of the modern German school of Painting. The result has been to reproduce the faults and shortcomings which were excusable in those early masters, from their imperfect knowledge, without reproducing the deep feeling which atones for them.

The consideration of these various stages of perfection, decline, and renovation, more or less successful, suggests the existence of laws by which they are governed, and the more we examine the subject, the more universal we find the application of these laws to be; we are made aware of the dependence of the artist on his time; and we become conscious that through his works the genius of the time speaks to us; more or less perfectly, indeed, according to the perfection of its interpreter. We arrive at the conviction, that where the genius of a people needs an expression, individual genius will never be wanting to give it utterance. We learn that it is with reason, that the works of art produced by a nation are instinctively appealed to, as the finest test of the rank they are entitled to among the nations. We learn, also, or should learn, this — not to expect or demand of artists a work analogous to Greek, or Italian, or any other art, but rather to look and hope for an artistic expression in new directions. Among the Greeks we have seen Poetry, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, all developed and carried to perfection in a single period of time, and among a single people. In modern times, on the contrary, each nation and age have chosen a new and separate direction. The genius of Germany finds at one period an

expression in Gothic architecture, at another in a grand and original music. One might almost believe that an original architecture could only spring up among a simple and devout people, of an unmixed race; but that a perfect expression in music requires the full development of an older people. We may remark, moreover, that as we find the religious, the artistic, and the active principles developed in different individuals, so is it with nations, in an observable degree. The Jews were a religious race, the interpreters of the revelations of God to man; the Greeks artistic. The Romans, the great active race of antiquity, borrowed their Art; the English and French, the great active races among the moderns, have originated very little in Art; save only in Poetry, the art of arts, which is least subject to these laws. May not this continent see a development of the English race in which the three parts of our nature shall not be so widely separated; and a new art spring from a new order of things?

To recur to our classification of admirers and critics of Art; we can perceive that our first great class is the most important to Art. The finished connoisseur may know and appreciate all that is best in what has gone before us in Art, and his province is to interpret it, and spread its refining influence through the world; but when a new Art springs up it has always to educate new and fresh minds to an understanding of itself; and thus we see in all such cases renewed the ancient strife between new and old. Just in proportion as Art springs from and appeals to the genius of a people, it will be high and ideal in its character; whilst Poetry, or works of art that appeal to a cultivated audience, will always be elegant and conventional; though it must be conceded that the period of transition, if it have never produced the greatest, has often given birth to the most exquisite and pleasing, works.

In our age no man is satisfied to admire and be instructed, but all must judge and criticize. This being so, a conscientious mind will still prescribe to itself certain rules;—for human judgment, if once it leaves the region of instinct, can be trusted only by reference to principles.

The first natural question is, how does this please *me?* But we are already in danger, for how do you know that what pleases yourself is good and true? Your taste may be corrupted. Your feeling may demand something false and exaggerated.

The next step is to compare. But still we are in danger.

Things of the same kind may be compared, but an original work of art is different in *kind* from any thing that has gone before. The Venus de Medici and Mr. Powers' statue cannot be compared, except in certain external particulars; for they express ideas as different as possible; ideas different in kind.

Where, then, lies the difficulty? Simply in this; that supposing a work to be a true work, and a new work to us, we approach it in a false position when we come to criticize it. We should come to learn from it, and to admire it. We criticize because we are afraid we shall admire amiss. We are not simple-minded; we are afraid of being taken in to admire something not admirable. Only make it certain to men that they can make no mistake in admiring, and admiration may be had cheap. This hasty criticism is always the fault of the partially cultivated class.

Most artists will in their hearts admit, that contemporary criticism is for the most part worthless in itself, and injurious to the artist who listens to it. He must know better than his audience, or he knows nothing.

We believe that it is a difficult matter to criticize aright. What is left us? To each man his suffrage and nothing more. But let each one remember, in giving that suffrage, that to a clear and instructed eye his opinion shows plainly enough his own range of apprehension and insight; but can show nothing of the relative value of the work, with reference to other works.

In brief, our advice would be, on seeing a new work which you believe to be an important one — take time. Try to *see* it. Do not think it incumbent upon you to think or feel about it. Do not dwell upon it long at a time, for the attention becomes fatigued; but return frequently, and each time you will find that you understand it better since you last saw it. It has been with you in the interval. It has lived with you, and educates you to itself. And when you have learned from it all it can teach you, write down your thought about it, and see how impossible to compass it in words; how paltry and insignificant criticism at sight seems to you!

It is only works which we have thus lived with that we can truly criticize; and such criticism is very different from finding fault. If a work is not worth this, it may be worthy of consideration, but not of criticism.

Can we hold ourselves guiltless, if after this we say a few words concerning the statue which suggested our subject?

What do we demand when an American man, of this century, takes hammer and chisel, and gives us in white marble his idea of a lovely woman? Certainly not a Grecian goddess; but Woman, such as two thousand years, and the Christian religion, have made her since; a modern woman. Not an exquisite generalization of all that is most lovely in the female form, to stand boldly in the public gaze and receive the homage of all worshippers; but rather, an ideal individual. The ancient Venus suggests no need of dress; but we feel that this woman has laid aside her dress and is conscious of it, yet she stands the image of chastity. Her purity awes you like the Lady in Comus. The form is full of individualities, all blending in an exquisite whole, and by the very peculiarities which strike the eye as differing from the Greek ideal, claiming our affection and sympathy.

We learn that this is a slave, exposed for sale in the marketplace; and supposing her a captive, torn from her home, we can imagine few scenes that shall call for so much pity, admiration, and tenderness; all these feelings must be called forth in the highest degree, but yet, pervading all, and beyond all these, the sense of Beauty must everywhere be satisfied. And so it is; and indeed most persons go away with the idea that they have been called upon to see and admire nothing but a beautiful naked female figure. But visit it again and again, and you will find this marble figure steals gradually into your affections. There is no theatrical air, no forcing of the story upon you, no open demand of your sympathies; you see before you only this exquisitely delicate form, self-dependent, armed only with its purity, and needing no other shield than this in the most touching of all situations.

We close with the hope that our artist has ere this received tangible demonstration that he can depend upon the growing taste and love of Art in his own countrymen both for praise and bread.

Art. III. — THE POLITICAL CONDITION AND PROSPECTS OF GREECE.

The independence of Greece is one of the most glorious events in the European history of the nineteenth century. The success of the revolution against Mohammedan domination reflects honor both on the Greek nation and on the human race; but the actual political condition of the Hellenic kingdom is the disgrace of European statesmanship. France, Great Britain, and Russia combined to transform a republic into a monarchy, and their creation commenced in misgovernment, and promises to end in anarchy.

The discordant statements published from time to time concerning the condition of the Greek people, and the adverse opinions offered on the conduct of the Greek government, induce us to believe that we can render some service to our fellow-citizens by presenting them with an impartial description of the new monarchy, freed from the false coloring of French and English diplomacy. To us, the cause of Greece is one of the deepest interest, but, separated as we are from the political intrigues of eastern Europe, we cannot feel any very lively concern about the party contests at the Greek court. This very circumstance may perhaps enable us to establish some landmarks of truth amidst the haze of misrepresentation which hangs over Greek affairs. To us, King Otho, General Colletti, Prince Mavrocordato, Monsieur Piscatory, Pair de France, and Sir Edmund Lyons, Baronet — the five leading political characters in Greece — are only interesting as their actions affect the political and social condition of the Greek people. Pisistratus, Themistocles, Phocion, Æmylius Paulus, and Mummius only occupy a different position in our minds because their reputations cast a wider and brighter light.

It is not our intention to say any thing at present concerning the Greek revolution.* The citizens of the United States

* The best work on the subject of the war with the Turks is the "*History of the Greek Revolution*, by Thomas Gordon, F. R. S." 2 vols. 8vo. Edinburgh. 1832. Mr. Gordon of Cairness was a gentleman of considerable fortune, who had spent much of his youth in the east, and was well acquainted with Turkish as well as Greek literature. He repaired to join the Greeks with a supply of arms and ammunition as soon as the revolution broke out. He died in 1842, at his estate of Cairness in Scotland, holding the rank of Major-General in the Greek service. His work is universally regarded as the best authority on Greek affairs, on account of his freedom from all party feelings.

gave substantial proofs of their good wishes for the cause, by the abundant aid they furnished to Greece in the hour of her greatest peril. Many fought and several perished in her service; and in 1827, the supplies of provisions poured into Greece from America, cargo after cargo, contributed to prolong the desperate struggle until the tardy assistance of European diplomacy terminated the war. Those who witnessed the utter destitution of the people at the period when the American supplies reached the country, can alone form an idea of the dreadful state of misery to which the population was reduced. Thousands of families were saved from starvation,—and we here mean, not from a lingering death brought on by want and its concomitant diseases,—but literally,—from perishing by immediate and absolute starvation. Even in spite of the arrival of these supplies, famine had already made such progress, that the fearful spectacle of death from hunger has been witnessed by more than one of our countrymen who visited the provinces of Greece to distribute these cargoes. Our present task is only to review the state of affairs from the time the three great powers of Europe, France, Great Britain, and Russia, determined to assume the protection of Greece; and to examine in what manner they have executed the trust they assumed. The work of the most celebrated ministers in Europe is a study worthy of profound attention.

The first interference of the three protecting powers was to assume an authority to mediate with Turkey, by a treaty signed at London on the 6th of July, 1827. That treaty was followed by the battle of Navarino, in which the allies destroyed a considerable part of the Turkish fleet, and frightened the British ministry to such a degree, by the damage inflicted on their old friend the Sultan, that the victory was called in a fit of remorse "an untoward event." The dictatorship of Capodistrias, the election of Prince Leopold of Saxe Coburg (now King of Belgium) to be prince sovereign of Greece, his sudden resignation, and the perplexities of a mass of protocols, kept Greece for some years in a state of political disorder as injurious to the population as the war itself.*

* The treaties and protocols, as well as some financial papers and correspondence, have been printed for the British Parliament. This collection of papers on the affairs of Greece, from 1827 to 1844, embraces five folio volumes. The most important documents, from 1827 to 1833, were printed at the Greek Government press. This small but valuable collection is entitled *Recueil des Traités, actes, et pièces concernans la fondation de la Royauté en Grèce.* Nauplie. 1833. 8vo.

In the year 1831, the assassination of Count Capodistrias converted disorder into anarchy. Insurrection spread over the whole country, and the authority of the existing government was confined to the walls of Nauplia. Civil war laid waste the rest of Greece. Each military leader endeavoured to collect round him a band of followers strong enough to retain possession of a province capable of nourishing his troops. The dispossessed united to attack the successful. The sufferings of the agricultural population amidst this scene of anarchy, were dreadful; for the poor peasantry, cheered by the comparative tranquillity of Capodistrias's administration, had recommenced cultivating the soil; and they now saw the relics of their property, after escaping the Turks and Egyptians, destroyed by their own countrymen. While the irregular troops were engaged in destroying the resources of the Greek state, the three protecting powers were searching in all the royal nurseries of Europe to find a king for the Greeks.

It cannot be supposed that the fate of the Greek people was really a matter of indifference to the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia, but still, we may doubt whether three statesmen more indifferent than Prince Talleyrand, Lord Palmerston, and Prince Lieven, to the sufferings of a rude peasantry, ever assembled to decide on the fate of nations. At all events, it is quite certain that they took no direct steps to prevent the civil war in Greece from thinning the population and diminishing the resources of the monarchy they were engaged in founding; though nothing could have been easier.

On the 7th of May, 1832, a convention between the three powers and the king of Bavaria was signed, appointing his second son, Prince Otho, king of Greece. This treaty is a singular document. It gives the king of Bavaria power to nominate a regency of foreigners, to send a corps of foreign troops and a host of foreign officials to Greece. Yet it was notorious that Greece possessed statesmen fit enough for regents, though not for legislators or organizers: Colletti, Mavrocordato, and Metaxas were just as well known then, as now;—and that there were far too many armed men and hungry officials in the country, was attested by the unceasing civil war and incessant intrigues. Every body exclaimed that Greece wanted nothing but order, and the three powers deliberately set to work augmenting the causes of disorder. To guard against the evil effects of the failure of their speculation recoiling upon themselves, France, Great Britain, and Russia

imposed on the Greek people, by the twelfth article of this treaty, (to which it is to be observed that Greece was not directly a party,) a debt of sixty millions of francs, which was to be disposed of by the parties to the convention; and they created in their own favor an hypothecation of the revenues of the new kingdom for the payment of the interest to fall due on this debt. The whole transaction was utterly illegal, according to every principle of public or common law; and it is strange to find the ministers of France and England, in the very act of founding a new monarchy, trampling under foot the most indispensable characteristic of free states; namely, that no financial burdens shall be imposed on the people without their express consent. To increase the illegality of the imposition, the expenditure of these millions was placed at the disposal of Bavarians ignorant both of the wants and resources of Greece; and the Greeks were excluded from any knowledge of the manner in which it was proposed to employ it. We must further observe, that in this treaty founding the Greek kingdom, not one word is said concerning the lives and property of the Greeks, their civil institutions, or political constitution. Greece and the Greeks were placed at the absolute disposal of a despotic regency.

As it was suspected by the protecting powers that the Greek people would make a vigorous protest against this disposal of their lives and fortunes without their consent, instructions were transmitted to the representatives of the allies in Greece, ordering these gentlemen to obtain a ratification of the treaty as quickly as possible from some body of men having the usual characteristics of a government *de facto*. In order to show our readers into what a labyrinth of diplomatic tergiversation the illegal provisions of the convention involved the allies, we must transcribe one article of these instructions verbatim. The residents of France, Great Britain, and Russia, are ordered "to declare that the choice of Prince Otho was made by the three courts in virtue of a *formal* and *unlimited* authorization on the part of the Greek nation; that consequently, the three courts had a right to make that choice, and are all strictly obliged and firmly resolved to maintain it."* The fact, how-

* The instructions will be found in *Protocols of Conferences held in London, relative to the affairs of Greece, presented to both houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty.* 1832. Annex A to the protocol (51) on the conference of the 25th of July, 1832, p. 178.

ever, is, that no such formal and unlimited authorization ever existed; if it had, the three courts would have been eager to quote it, in authentic form, in the convention. The necessity of the case was their real warrant for interfering in Greek affairs, and the idea of converting the Greek republic into a German kingdom originated in their own political sagacity. It would, on the whole, have been wiser and more statesmanlike to have told the plain truth in the official papers, instead of seeking to veil their folly in diplomatic fables.

When the Greeks heard that their country had been transformed into a kingdom, they formed a national assembly, which met at Pronia, the suburb of Nauplia, in July, 1832. The deputies displayed so much respect for the constitutional liberties of their country, that the representatives of the three powers were alarmed at their proceedings. These gentlemen consequently addressed a collective note to the secretary of state for foreign affairs in the *de facto* government, which is preserved in the archives of Greece as a proof of the contempt of France and Great Britain for constitutional liberty.* The activity of Mr. Dawkins, the English minister, and the desertion of their country's cause by the great statesmen of the English party, enabled the members of the provisional government to dissolve the national assembly of Pronia by military violence. When it was found that a majority of the members were determined to defend the liberty of their country with firmness, a band of irregular troops was excited to enter the assembly and eject the deputies. Even after this act of military violence, sixty-two deputies had sufficient courage to assemble in another place and publish a protest against the conduct of the provisional government. This protest represents with great force the danger Greece incurred from the continuance of anarchy, and pointed out with justice that the intrigues of the residents of the allied powers were as much the cause of the existing disorders as the lawless violence of the irregular soldiery.† The deputies had been allowed time to ratify the election of King Otho, but they had neither ratified nor approved of the other articles of the convention.

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* The letter of the residents is printed in the excellent work of Professor Thiersch, of Munich,— *De l'etat actuel de la Grèce, et des moyens d'arriver à sa restauration.* Leipsig. 1838. 2 vols. 8vo.— See Vol. I., p. 407.

† This document, which is of some length, will be found translated in Thiersch, Vol. I., p. 421.

From this moment a struggle for constitutional liberty was commenced by the Greek nation, against the united power of the allied courts and the king of Bavaria. The first act of this great national contest was the desertion of liberal principles by the partisans of British influence, under the guidance of Mr. Dawkins. This party had obtained possession of the principal ministerial offices in the provisional government, and in their eagerness to retain power, its members sacrificed the interests of the Greek people to the intrigues of foreign diplomacy. Their apostasy is boldly announced in an official report signed by Mavrocordato, Tricoupis, Zographos, and Clonares, in which they make their responsibility to a foreign king paramount to their duty to the constitution of their country.* From this period, the faction in Greece called the English party, though consisting of many respectable men, has always been regarded by the constitutionalists with considerable distrust, and indeed, the frequent desertion of their principles for place has prevented them from recovering the reputation they then forfeited. In their defence it has been sometimes urged, that the majority of the national assembly of Pronia consulted private interests in the line of conduct it pursued; this may or may not be true, but it is certain that the partisans of English diplomacy consulted their interests both more openly and more profitably. The real secret of the hostility of Great Britain to constitutional liberty in Greece, at this time, lay, perhaps, less in any decided aversion to liberty, or any very strong attachment to King Otho, than in a pitiful fear that a free election of deputies would give a majority to the Capodistrian party.

In consequence of the intrigues of the allied powers, and the incapacity of the provisional government, Greece remained in a state of anarchy, until the arrival of King Otho and the Bavarian regency, in 1833. Unfortunately for Greece, there was only one member of the regency who was sincerely attached to constitutional liberty; but, fortunately for her, he was the only one who possessed any legislative talents. This man was George Lewis Maurer, and he is now a member of the liberal cabinet lately formed by the king of Bavaria. Almost all the good Greece has derived from the creation of the monarchy, is to be attributed to the legislative and ad-

* The document is printed by Thiersch, Vol. I., p. 412.

ministrative labors of Mr. Maurer. An excellent organization of the courts of justice and an admirable code of civil procedure still attest his merit. The heads of his colleagues were filled with very different ideas. The grand executive act by which Count Armansperg, the president of the regency, announced his arrival in Greece,—the first stroke of his policy,—was to issue a royal ordonnance declaring that two Bavarian lions crowned and rampant,—probably on account of the loan,—were to be the supporters of the arms of the Greek kingdom. The introduction of the paraphernalia of monarchy followed, and, in a short time, the Greeks had exchanged their dirty kilts, or fustinellos, for uniforms, embroidered jackets, lace, ribbons, crosses, and stars. Many absurdities were daily committed, but no absurdity committed in Greece, not even in the expenditure of the loan, was equal to the absurdity of Talleyrand, Palmerston, and Lieven, who put the money at the disposal of the regency before its members were acquainted with the wants of Greece. Mr. Maurer was unable to keep himself free from party connections, and he attached himself, perhaps, too closely to the French party. His enemies availed themselves ably of all his errors, and the king of Bavaria was induced to recall him. He ceased to be a member of the regency on the 31st of July, 1834.*

From August, 1834, to the 14th of February, 1837, Greece was governed by Count Armansperg, an amiable and accomplished diplomatist, who imposed on the Greeks by assuming the air of a *grand seigneur*. His policy, however, was rather directed to maintaining himself in place, by securing a predominant influence to British diplomacy, than either to advancing or retarding the social and political improvement of Greece. It was by this very indifference to principle, that during his administration, the abuses of the Bavarian system

* Mr. Maurer, after his return to Germany, published a work on the state of Greece, which, besides a defence of his administration, contains much valuable information: *Das Griechische Volk in öffentlicher, kirchlicher, und privatrechtlicher Beziehung vor und nach dem Freiheits-Kampfe.* Heidelberg. 1835. 3 vols. 8vo. There is also an English work which throws much light on this period, but it labors under the disadvantage of presenting every thing distorted by a violent fit of Russophobia: "*The Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece, from the year* 1830, by H. H. Parish, Esq., late Secretary of Legation to Greece." London. 1838. 8vo. An account of the state of Greece under Count Armansperg's administration will also be found in a pamphlet, entitled, *The Hellenic Kingdom, and the Greek Nation*, by George Finlay, Author of "Greece under the Romans." London. 1836.

were carried to their greatest height. The number of Bavarians in Greece was never so great as during the period of his supremacy in the regency, and political corruption and jobbing reached their acme in every department, during his administration as chancellor. In order to strengthen his position, many Greeks were admitted to share the profits of his system, so that his administration undoubtedly acquired a certain degree of sinister popularity. The finances of Greece were, however, kept under the control of Bavarians, and the real finance minister could not speak a word of Greek, and hardly two of French. A council of state was also formed. This institution was undoubtedly a step in the right direction, though it was made into the mud; for it must be observed, that this council was composed, not of men capable of being of any use as counsellors, but only of those whom it was of some importance to gain as supporters. Their votes were secured by large salaries, and by the power which the Count retained in his own hands of removing them at pleasure, if they displayed constitutional sympathies. An absolute government can never avoid resorting to intimidation. Attempts were made to restrain the liberty of the press, and a disposition was manifested to commence a persecution of the orthodox, or, as it was called—to render it unpopular—the Russian party. The preacher Germanos, who was editor of a religious newspaper at Athens, was exiled by Count Armansperg to a monastery in Skiathos, and in this way, his newspaper was suppressed. Sir Edmund Lyons, a captain in the British navy, and a man of popular manners, was sent by Lord Palmerston as British minister, with instructions to support the system of the Count to the utmost. Sir Edmund Lyons has continued to represent Great Britain ever since at the court of Athens, and has taken a leading position in Greek politics. His first appearance in diplomacy was as the supporter of the Bavarians and the foreign *camarilla*, and as the staunch opponent of a representative government, on the usual diplomatic pretext, that Greece was not fit for a constitution.*

* There is a curious despatch containing a rather fulsome eulogium of the Count's administration, in the *Parliamentary Papers, presented to Parliament August*, 1836, p. 37. Among a number of inaccurate statements, it is said, "that not one Bavarian has landed in Greece to fill a place under government, since the king's majority." Now, if this were literally correct, there would be no great merit in it, as Count Armansperg had been absolute sovereign of Greece for more than a year previously, as president of the regency, with two ciphers as colleagues, and during that time he had brought a number of his creatures

The lavish expenditure of Count Armansperg brought Greece into financial difficulties, and the king of Bavaria recalled him, as he had done Mr. Maurer. Mr. Rudhardt was sent as his successor, but Rudhardt resigned his office of prime minister, in the month of December, 1837, and his resignation put an end to the open supremacy of the Bavarians in the Greek cabinet.

From the 20th of December, 1837, to the 15th of September, 1843, the cabinet was almost entirely composed of Greeks, though King Otho continued to employ a number of private secretaries, chiefly Bavarians, to control the acts of his ostensible ministers, and thus gave a permanent existence to the *camarilla* established by Count Armansperg. It is not necessary to enter into any details concerning the political conduct of the various cabinets, from the termination of the Bavarian supremacy to the establishment of constitutional liberty, in 1843. During this period, national feelings gained strength so rapidly, that the ministers of the allied powers were in turns compelled to appear as the friends of a representative system. While Bavarian domination received the unqualified support of Great Britain, France whispered a few words in favor of the constitution. When Mr. Chrestides presided over the Greek cabinet, under the auspices of France, Great Britain loudly preached revolutionary doctrines; and when Mavrocordato assumed the direction of affairs, in 1841, on anti-constitutional principles, with the joint support of France and England, Russia stepped forward as the advocate of Grecian liberty.

Let us now pause for a moment from the ungrateful task of recording the tortuous course of diplomatic intrigue, and turn to the more agreeable duty of tracing the progress of the Greek people. The year 1833 found the population of Greece, according to the unexceptionable testimony of Professor Thiersch, in a state of such destitution, that the proprietors and farmers were without cattle to till their lands. The scanty harvest of the year was, in a great part, the produce of manual labor. Every town in Greece was in ruins; Argos, which had been rebuilt under Capodistrias's government, had been

from Bavaria, and, among others, Mr. Frey, who did more injury to the finances of Greece, than any other foreigner. It is true, this was not done "since the king's majority." It would be easy to produce many other facts as contrary to the spirit of the despatch.

again destroyed; the colony of Greek refugees, established by Dr. Howe, at the isthmus of Corinth, was burnt to the ground; Athens, and the whole island of Eubœa, having remained in the hands of the Turks, were almost desolate; the schools established by Capodistrias were dissolved, and the regular army had melted away. The king arrived, and the support of the three powers restored order; immediately, every man sought to rebuild his house, and every agriculturist to procure a pair of oxen; the price of labor rose to the most extravagant pitch, and the interest of money advanced to four per cent. a month. The second volume of the work of Professor Thiersch treats of the measures which the regency was bound to adopt, in order to alleviate, as much as possible, the evils under which Greece was suffering. He discusses the means of improving the condition of the agricultural population, of restoring industry, of reviving commerce, and of ameliorating the moral and intellectual state of the people. The practical experience of the governments of Great Britain and Russia in administering the affairs of thinly peopled and partially organized territories, induced the enlightened men in Greece to suppose that the subject must be one well understood by the ministers of these courts, and it was concluded they would communicate their advice to the regency and King Otho. The work of Professor Thiersch, however, proved useless to his countrymen; and the advice of the ministers of Great Britain and Russia, had they been really competent to give any, would have been rendered of no avail, by their joining the opposition shortly after the arrival of the regency. Indeed, the way in which the affairs of Greece were treated by king, regency, and foreign ministers, affords convincing proof, that practical knowledge of statesmanship is as rare among diplomatists in the nineteenth century, as it was in the seventeenth, when their verbal astuteness and magnificent pretensions drew from the Swedish chancellor, Oxenstiern, the celebrated reply to his son: *Mi fili, parvo mundus regitur intellectu.*

The advances made by the Greeks in social improvement previously to the year 1843, were almost entirely due to their own individual exertions. The little assistance they derived from their own government was unwillingly and ungraciously accorded, and any succour they received from foreigners has been vaunted rather more than it deserves. While King Otho obtained, or, to speak perhaps more correctly, seized a civil list

of two hundred thousand dollars a year, out of a revenue of two millions of dollars, and Count Armansperg allowances to the amount of thirty thousand dollars, and other Bavarians ten thousand dollars each; while orders of knighthood and crosses and stars of silver, gold, and diamonds were lavished on Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Russians; while the interest of money was at eighteen per cent., on the best security, and the consuls of the European powers were accumulating fortunes as usurers,—no step was taken by the Greek government to alleviate the general distress or to improve the social condition of the people. In consequence of this neglect, the population of the kingdom soon suffered a considerable reduction; immense numbers of emigrants from Psara, Chios, Crete, Cyprus, Asia Minor, Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, and Constantinople, were compelled to quit Greece, in which they were unable to settle, as the government refused to sell sites for houses in the towns and villages, and exacted exorbitant rents for the national lands that lay still uncultivated.

All the oppressive regulations of the Turkish system of taxation were retained by the king's government, and their severity was rendered more stringent by farming the tithes under the revenue laws of Europe. Tribunals consisting of government officials were alone competent to decide on cases affecting the taxes, which were withdrawn from the cognizance of the regular courts of law. The farmers of the revenue received unlimited powers to regulate the proceedings of the cultivator during the harvest, so that every proprietor who attempted to introduce an improved system of agriculture was liable to extortion on the ground that he had violated the revenue laws. The consequence was, that almost every improver was ruined or compelled to abandon his attempt. No cultivator, though residing at a distance from any village, could reap a field of corn, thresh out his grain, or house his crop, without a separate permission for each operation from the farmer of the revenue; and, after all, he was compelled to transport the tenth which fell to the share of the farmer a day's journey, to such magazines as the farmer might appoint. The nine tenths belonging to the cultivator of the soil became merely an adjunct of the one tenth claimed by government, and were treated by the Greek government as a fund for insuring it against diminution. The consequence of this system on the agriculture of Greece may be seen from the windows of King Otho's palace at Athens. The land round the royal garden is cultivated

in a ruder and more unprofitable manner than in the wildest province of the Ottoman empire.

The commerce of Greece was treated with as little intelligence as the agriculture. Injudicious navigation laws exposed the Greeks of the Hellenic kingdom to be involved in commercial hostility with the Greek subjects of the Ottoman empire. Absurd sanatory regulations hampered the coasting trade of the kingdom, which is composed almost entirely of coast; the internal navigation was abandoned to Austrian and French steamers; and the sailors of Hydra and Psara were compelled to pass half their time in idleness, or seek employment in Turkey.

The moral, intellectual, and religious culture of the nation was almost as much neglected by the government as the agricultural and commercial interests of the people. It is true, that Mr. Maurer, during his administration, took some steps to organize a complete system of national education, but the subject did not meet with due attention from his successors. Unfortunately, too, Mr. Maurer himself adopted some rash measures with regard to the Greek Church, which arrested the progress of religious education.

The state of things we have described gradually produced a deep-rooted hatred of the Bavarian monarchy. Though the prime minister of Greece was no longer a Bavarian, still, the military service and the court were filled with Bavarians, who held all the best appointments. An occurrence during the visit King Louis of Bavaria paid to his son, King Otho, will afford some idea of the justice of the feelings of the Greeks. At a levee, the king of Bavaria asked a pragmatical colonel in the Greek service, "What rank did you hold in my service, before you came to Greece, Colonel?" The reply was, "Sire, I was a lieutenant." "Good, good, very good," said the Bavarian monarch, and moved on, for the promotion seemed rather too rapid. The king then addressed a fine-looking, tall captain, whose broad visage and light hair spoke his Teutonic descent: "Well, Captain, and what rank did you hold in Bavaria?" "Your majesty, I was a corporal," was the delighted answer, proclaimed in a stentorian voice and accompanied with a self-sufficient smile. The monarch looked rather blank, but turning sharply round to a young captain with an aristocratic name and some ribbons and crosses on his breast, that seemed to speak of service in the field, he again risked the royal stereotyped inquiry, "Well, Baron, what rank did you hold at

Munich?" "Sire, I was then at the military academy," was the modest reply. "Thunder and storms," whispered his majesty to his own aide-de-camp, "it is not safe asking questions here in Greece; but if the Greeks are promoted as rapidly as the Bavarians, no doubt Sir Edmund Lyons is quite right, and every body must be vastly pleased with Count Armansperg's administration, except, perhaps, the parties who may think of paying the loan he is spending."

A short time after the Bavarians were driven from their supremacy in Greece, the Russian party acquired a predominant influence. The discovery of a secret society which embraced many Russian partisans both in Greece and Turkey, was adroitly used by the British minister to exclude them from power, by creating a serious alarm in the mind of King Otho concerning their ulterior projects. This secret association was called the "Philorthodox Society," and it acquired a considerable degree of celebrity from the British cabinet affecting to believe that both the Greek monarchy and the Turkish empire were exposed to imminent danger by its intrigues.

The British minister would in all probability have recovered his influence at the Greek court, after this discovery, had the mind of King Otho not been deeply prejudiced against British policy by a series of the most violent personal attacks that were ever made on the character of a reigning prince. Almost immediately after the recall of Count Armansperg, a number of letters began to appear in the London Morning Chronicle, then generally regarded as the organ through which the foreign office communicated its opinions and prejudices to the public. Though these letters were utterly destitute of the polished and pointed style of the famous invectives of Junius, they displayed in their incorrect and ill-constructed sentences all the fierce and malignant passions of the secret libeller, and the same preference of sarcasm to truth. King Otho was the great object of hostility, and the attacks were rather directed against his person with the intention of wounding his feelings, than against the nature of his despotic power for the purpose of improving the constitution of Greece. The letters appeared as communications from a correspondent at Athens, but it was soon evident in Greece that they originated in diplomatic circles, where many things were known of which the people of Athens had not the smallest idea. As the correspondence was extensively disseminated by the British legation and British consuls in Greece, it soon began to excite great attention.

From one step to another, the correspondence reached its climax, by declaring that King Otho was "an idiot," and that a certificate had been signed by a number of Bavarians about the court, declaring his incapacity, and the names of several persons holding high offices in the king's palace were published as having signed the certificate. The news produced a ferment at Athens, and caused the dismissal of two of the Bavarians accused by the anonymous writer, from their offices at court. Conjectures were risked concerning the real source of the correspondence, but the mystery of the writer has never been revealed. The effects of the attacks on King Otho have, however, been visible ever since, in the uneasy position occupied by the British minister at the Greek court. King Otho, not without justice, considers himself grossly insulted, both by the publication of the correspondence in a ministerial paper, and by the publicity given to the correspondence by the agents of the British government in Greece; and he holds Sir Edmund Lyons and Lord Palmerston responsible, as many of the facts could never have become public without the sanction of one of these ministers.

The effect in Greece was also injurious to the English party. Some of the Greeks, disgusted with the conduct of the court, inferred that the British cabinet had determined to dethrone King Otho, and imprudently embarked in anti-dynastic intrigues. The personal hostility between King Otho and Sir Edmund Lyons became a marked feature in Greek politics. A section of the constitutional party began to plot the dethronement of King Otho, and the royalists demanded the recall of Sir Edmund Lyons. Both parties failed, but the astuteness displayed by the king of Greece in the long diplomatic struggle he has carried on with a minister of the acknowledged talents and great popularity of Sir Edmund Lyons, has afforded the world ample proof of his capacity to reign in the way most unfavorable to British influence.

This unfortunate discord proved very injurious to the progress of Greece. When the cry of the Greek people for constitutional government, as the only means of alleviating the burdens under which they suffered, became so loud as to alarm the court, King Otho, distrusting the projects of Great Britain and Russia, both of whom he seems to have suspected of designs to dethrone him, threw himself into the arms of France, and trusted blindly to its support. A revolution was evidently impending. Great Britain and Russia united in pressing for

explanations concerning the financial position of the Greek government, and the king, in his embarrassment, adopted the most injudicious measures of economy, making extensive retrenchments among the Greeks in order to maintain all the overpaid Bavarian officers, officials, and courtiers about the palace. The consequence was a revolution headed by the Greek military, on the 15th of September, 1843. King Otho was compelled to proclaim the constitution which had been in abeyance since the dispersion of the deputies at Pronia, and convoke a national assembly.

It is generally supposed that both the English and Russian ministers at Athens regarded the dethronement or abdication of King Otho as a certain consequence of the revolution, unless he should throw himself into their arms for protection. That his dethronement was actively sought and openly advocated by many of their partisans, is generally asserted, and the accusation acquires some color from the facts noticed in a pamphlet lately published at Edinburgh by Mr. Edward Masson, the British Philhellenist best acquainted with the political affairs of Greece, and who was present at Athens during the revolution. Mr. Masson says, "It cannot be denied, that an Athens correspondent of the Morning Post, who usually knows very accurately how the wind blows at the British legation, wrote to that journal ten days before the revolution, and stated that the object of the impending movement was positively the forcible expulsion of Otho, and the overthrow of the Bavarian dynasty; and that a constitution would not be accepted at Otho's hands, should he offer it a hundred times. This remarkable letter was printed, with observations of the editor, before the news of the revolution could reach England. *Litera scripta manet.*"*

The opinion that the British and Russian legations directed

* Mr. Edward Masson resided in Greece from 1824 to 1845. He held the highest legal offices in the country, and his eloquence at the bar was the admiration of the Greeks. The pamphlet from which we quote, consists of two letters published in an Edinburgh newspaper, "The Witness;" the one addressed to Mr. Baillie Cochrane, who is also the author of a pamphlet "On the state of Greece," and the second addressed to the Earl of Dundonald, better known as Lord Cochrane. Mr. Masson is also the author of a valuable little work entitled, "*An Apology for the Greek Church; or Hints on the means of promoting the religious improvement of the Greek nation:* by Edward Masson, one of the Judges in the supreme court of Areopagus. Edited by J. S. Howson, M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge. London. 1844." The Morning Post succeeded the Morning Chronicle, as the channel through which the Greek court was attacked at London.

the movement was so general at Athens during the affair, that on the night of the 14th of September, while the troops were marching into the square before the king's palace, the British minister was said to have sent his secretary of legation to the ministry of finance, which is opposite his residence, in order to inquire the cause of the tumult in the city. The sergeant of the guard is said to have turned round very coolly and replied, "*You* ask *me* what's the matter! Well; now that is what I call diplomacy; as if you did not know at the British mission what is going on this night in Athens a great deal better than I do."

The project of dethroning King Otho, whether entertained by the French, the English, or the Russians, (for they accused one another,) failed completely. The Greeks had begun to be disgusted with the constant interference of foreign diplomatic agents in their affairs, and neither the army nor the people could be induced to adopt the cry for an abdication. In vain the *corps diplomatique* was prevented from obtaining an audience of the king; in vain a decree compelling his majesty to confer a decoration on those who had taken up arms against him, was submitted to him for signature. King Otho had tact enough to perceive that though the people were for the constitution, they were not against him, and he was easily persuaded by the members of the council of state who communicated with him to accept all the propositions made to him, and, by keeping possession of the throne, save Greece from anarchy.

It may here be necessary to point out the other causes which prevented the success of his enemies. In such cases, foreign agents naturally pay more attention to guard against the possibility of being personally compromised in case of failure, than to arrange the details of each step in the proceedings necessary to conduct the conspiracy to success. It therefore happened that the English and Russian parties were unprepared with the precise proposals necessary to bring about their ultimate object, and while they were balancing in doubt and indecision, the people adopted the determination to make Otho a constitutional monarch. Great Britain was the first to perceive that the moment for guiding the movement had passed away, and by prudently joining the popular cause and affecting to become a partisan of King Otho's constitutional power, she acquired a predominant influence during the formation of the constitution. Russia, on the other hand, satisfied that the incongruous political position of Greece will yet require another "convention"

for its settlement, has not taken any prominent part in Greek affairs since the revolution of 1843, but has abandoned the field to the rivalry of England and France.

The constitution of Greece, completed in 1844, is not without some serious defects. It was framed by a coalition of the constitutional French and English parties, and is an imitation of European monarchical constitutions, rather than a political system, adapted to the peculiarities of Greece. In imitation of the House of Peers, a senate, consisting of members for life, has been appointed. The selection of these senators is left to the king, but his choice is restricted by numerous regulations, and the consequence is, that the Senate consists of a number of secondary characters, without influence or knowledge, and is utterly useless as a legislative chamber. Indeed, it cannot be denied, even by the warmest friends of Greece, that the national assembly, irritated by foreign domination and diplomatic intrigue, displayed a spirit of political jealousy and official cupidity, which has proved very injurious to the cause of liberty. Every Greek not born within the territory of the microscopic kingdom, or who had not taken up arms during the revolution, was excluded from all appointments under government. In consequence of this *national* decree, many of the ablest public servants were dismissed from employments they had discharged with honor for many years. Two parties were thus created among the Greeks themselves,—the *autochthones*, [citizens by birth,] and the strangers. The ingratitude of the *autochthones* in passing this disgraceful law, merits the severest reprobation; but the error of Mavrocordato and the English party, in countenancing the proceeding, was an act of pitiful weakness or blundering ambition. Their misconduct soon produced bitter fruit. From the hour the decree passed, the popularity of the English party began to decline among the enlightened portion of the nation; it was evident that the advancement of Greece was a secondary object to men who could so basely abandon liberal principles to serve their party views; and henceforth their actions were scrutinized with suspicious and searching eyes.

Immediately after the termination of the national assembly, in 1844, Mavrocordato formed a ministry under the open and avowed protection of Great Britain. With the exception of Mavrocordato himself, this ministry did not contain a single member suitable to the place he occupied. Tricoupis, who

was named minister of foreign affairs, though a man of the most honorable private character, had been unfortunately involved in political differences with Sir Edmund Lyons, which had prevented their holding any intercourse during the meeting of the national assembly; the British minister having publicly proclaimed Tricoupis as a renegade from the cause of the constitution. One consequence of the bad composition of this ministry was the immediate secession of a numerous body of constitutionalists from the English party.

The administration of Mavrocordato lasted only four months, —from the 13th of April to the 16th of August, 1844,— and in that short space of time, the English party contrived to squander away the last relics of their political reputation. The favorable state of public opinion, when Mavrocordato commenced forming his cabinet, is stated by Sir Edmund Lyons, in a despatch to the Earl of Aberdeen, in the following words: "Thus, my lord, the great political change which commenced on the 15th of September, has been consummated, almost without bloodshed, (for the gendarme who lost his life, fell by accident,) and entirely without interruption of commerce or communication by sea or land: not a vessel or a port has been stopped; the taxes have been collected and paid into the treasury, and the tribunals have pursued their ordinary course."* Such was the state of Greece in the month of April; before the month of August the country was involved in civil war,—Grivas was in arms against Mavrocordato, and the capital was on the eve of insurrection.

This change is to be attributed to the injudicious manner in which Mavrocordato and his colleagues selected their officials, and to his open subserviency to foreign influence. The ministry very soon drove both the country and the court into the opposition, and Mavrocordato himself became an object of suspicion to the people, and of aversion to the king. The imprudence of naming a man who had served in the Turkish armies as governor of Missolonghi, and of appointing "a bold but profligate captain," who had been both a rebel and a Turkish partisan, commandant of a district, admits neither of explanation nor apology.† At Athens, the general officer com-

* This document will be found in the Parliamentary Papers — *Correspondence relating to the recent events in Greece;* 1843, 1844. p. 91.

† Sir Edmund Lyons gives the favorite officer of Mavrocordato this character.—*Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan;* 1835, 1836. p. 18.

manding the garrison of the capital was put forward as the ministerial candidate for the house of representatives, in direct violation of an article of the constitution just completed, and at the imminent risk of producing a bloody collision between a disorderly populace and an undisciplined soldiery. At Patras, the minister of justice endeavoured to force the inhabitants to elect him as their deputy, by means of the gendarmerie. A letter of his, ordering the officers to make use of military violence to secure his election, fell into the hands of the opposition, and was laid before the king and communicated to the press. The peal of indignation it created sounded the knell of Mavrocordato's ministry.

From the moment of its formation, this cabinet had been an object of aversion to King Otho, on account of its intimate connection with Sir Edmund Lyons. It was from a knowledge of this insuperable aversion, as well as from an opinion of its utter incapacity, that Colletti refused to take office with such colleagues. In vain M. Piscatory, the French minister, employed his influence to support Mavrocordato, and preserve the appearance of union between the French and English parties. The attempt was impracticable, and the moment Colletti perceived that the English party had shipwrecked its reputation, he stepped forward as its opponent, at the head of a large majority of the constitutionalists, supported by the court, by the strangers dismissed from office by Mavrocordato, and by the *autochthones*, or citizens by birth.

It is not our intention to review the administration of Colletti: it belongs to the domain of party politics, not to history, and the truth is still concealed in the most contradictory statements. That his ministry has been, on the whole, popular in Greece, cannot be reasonably doubted; but, in our opinion, it has carried on the government too much on the cajoling and jobbing principles of Count Armansperg, to receive from us any testimony in its favor. When the British press, however, asserts that Colletti governs Greece entirely by force and corruption, common-sense demonstrates that the thing is impossible. The whole population of Greece is armed; universal suffrage and the vote by ballot exist. Now, Colletti must be a wonderful man, if, with an army of five thousand men, he can intimidate the dispersed and disorderly population of the Greek kingdom; and if, with a net revenue of little more than ten millions of drachmas, he can bribe a majority of the population. If Colletti can really intimidate the Greeks with their

own troops, and bribe them with their own money, he is evidently the very man the protecting powers want, to save them trouble; and they ought to make much of him. The fact is, his administration has derived some popularity from the reductions made in the amount of taxation by the late house of representatives, though really without any merit on his part, for, like most ministers, he would have prevented the reduction had it been in his power.

The unusually long duration of Colletti's ministry has given a victory to French diplomacy, which has excited the bile of Lord Palmerston to such a degree, that he has commenced hostile operations against the Greek state, for submitting to a state of things so anti-Britannic. Taking advantage of the separate guarantee, given by each of the allies, for a third of the loan imposed on Greece by the treaty founding the monarchy, the British Foreign Secretary has compelled Greece to pay the interest due to Great Britain on the third guaranteed by her. In vain have France and Russia declined adopting a step of such severity, and pointed out, that if the measure should be adopted simultaneously by all the three protecting powers, it would cause the dissolution of the monarchy, and compel them to enter into new arrangements for the settlement of Greece. The English government, turning a deaf ear to these arguments, has adopted the resolution of acting independently; and Greece has already commenced paying to Great Britain the interest of a sum of money, of which the British government directed or authorized the expenditure of a larger portion than the government of Greece. The measure appears to us to be not only severe, but absolutely unjust.

We have already mentioned, that this loan was not sought for by the Greeks, but was imposed on them by the allies, for the purpose of tranquillizing the affairs of the East of Europe. The Greeks were not a contracting party to the convention of the 7th of May, 1832, (by the twelfth article of which the loan was created;) and the three protecting powers were as great gainers as Greece by the actual expenditure of the money. The Turkish question, which alarmed both France and England, was arranged with this fund. The Greeks, moreover, were left in complete ignorance of the manner in which the protecting powers had disposed of the loan, until the meeting of the national assembly, in 1843, long after it had been expended.

As Great Britain is now receiving from the Greeks her

share of the interest on this debt, let us examine in what manner she performed her share of the responsibility she assumed of disposing of the funds of the Greeks; a trust not the less sacred, surely, because it was self-arrogated, and assumed in direct violation of every financial principle of the English constitution. If we recollect rightly, the three per cents stood at about eighty-six at London, when this loan was contracted. In that case, Great Britain, by a proper use of her guarantee, might have furnished Greece with a loan at five per cent., without any loss or deduction for commission. Yet we find in the parliamentary papers, "an account of the sums accruing from the two first series of the Loan of sixty millions of francs, up to the 31st of December, 1834,"—which shows that the expenses and losses of negotiating this loan really amounted to more than four millions of francs. We transcribe the account,—it requires no comment:—

	Francs.	Cts.
"The loan being negotiated at ninety-four, occasioned a loss of six per cent., .	2,400,000	
Commission to Messrs. Rothschild, two per cent., ...	800,000	
Commission on payment of three half years' interest and sinking fund, . . .	36,000	
Commission to Mr. S. D'Eichthal, of Munich, for transmission of money, . .	321,690.78	
Couriers to Paris and St. Petersburg, .	13,508.60	
Printing and stamps of certificates, . .	36,540	
Discount to Messrs. Rothschild for prompt payment of the instalments, . . .	513,333.29	
Total of unproductive portion of the loan,	4,121,072.67	

Payments to different Powers, in execution of former treaties.

To Russia, on account of Turkey, to the amount of twenty-two millions of piastres, ...	5,984,235.05	
To Turkey, in discharge of indemnity of forty millions of piastres, ...	5,236,363.63	
To England, on account of £20,000 sterling, advanced upon the loan, . .	341,333.33	

	Francs. Cts.
Total payments to the Powers, .	11,561,932.01
Total unproductive, ...	4,121,072.67
Portion of the loan expended by the Three Powers, ...	15,683,004.68"*

It appears, therefore, from this account laid before the British Parliament, that in realizing the two first series of the loan, or the sum of forty millions, Great Britain authorized an expenditure of 15,683,004.68, for purposes totally unconnected with the improvement of the state of Greece. We may observe, too, that it is singular to find, that while England appears to have advanced money, still a large sum is paid for discount, before the 31st of December, 1834.

We must now quit the Parliamentary Papers, in order to seek for some light concerning the commission paid to a banker at Munich, for the transmission of money. The information concerning the loan, published in Greece, enables us to trace a considerable portion of it to the coffers of Bavaria, before any part reached the Greek treasury:—

	Drachmas.
"Expense of Transporting the King, Regency, and Bavarian Officials, to Greece, ...	422,207.20
Transport of Bavarian Troops, ...	1,656,703.28
Recruiting Volunteers in Bavaria, . . .	3,330,171
Paid to Bavaria for Military Stores, . .	910,607
Expenses of Bavarian Employé's visiting Greece, on special missions, . . .	163,545.20
Expenses of Coining the portion of the Loan remitted to Greece, . . .	459,728.52
Salaries of the Regency, ...	1,409,000
Discounts paid to Bankers at Munich, Insurance, Loss on Foreign Money, &c.	928,984.36
Total received by the Bavarians,	9,280,946.56"

* *Additional Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan*, 1835, 1836, *presented to both houses of Parliament, August*, 1836; p. 2.

These last sums are stated in drachmas,* but as we have omitted noticing a payment made out of the proceeds of the loan, to Mr. Eynard, the banker of Count Capodistrias, and some other items, we are within the mark when we say, that about twenty-five millions of francs were expended by the three powers, and by Bavaria, with the advice and consent of Great Britain, before a single dollar of the loan reached the hands of the Greeks. Besides this, the accounts of the Greek revenue since the establishment of the monarchy prove that the expenses entailed on Greece by the Bavarian troops, volunteers, and civil officials, by the civil list of the king, and by the diplomatic missions which the royal dignity was supposed to require at Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Munich, Madrid, and Constantinople, considerably exceed the sum of fifteen millions of francs. So that Greece, far from receiving any pecuniary advantage from the loan, has been a very serious sufferer. Indeed, it appears that Greece has only received about ten millions of the loan of sixty millions, in order to cover the deficit which has occurred in the budget since the year 1832, and that the remaining fifty millions have been expended, either in the manner we have stated above, or in payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan, as it became due. In the month of June, 1836, Russia proposed "that the funds accruing from the third instalment of the loan should be appropriated exclusively to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan during the next five or six years." This strange proposition to retain Greece in perpetual thraldom, by increasing her debt unnecessarily, was not adopted by the other powers; but Greece has not been a great gainer by the modifications they introduced.

The revenues of Greece average about thirteen millions of drachmas. Of this sum, about two millions are absorbed by the expense of collection, for a worse financial system than that of the Greek monarchy cannot be found, — one million is wasted on the exorbitant civil list of King Otho; so that only ten millions remain to defray the current expenditure of a government which has an army of five thousand men, and a fleet manned by two thousand sailors. Capodistrias governed Greece with a revenue of about four millions, and the increased expenses of the monarchy were imposed on the country by the

* There is a difference of more than ten per cent. between the franc and the drachma; — six drachmas are equal to our dollar.

three powers, and fostered and encouraged by Great Britain, during the lavish expenditure of the English party, in 1835 and 1836. It is, therefore, an act of political iniquity as well as open hostility, for Great Britain to hold Greece responsible for the whole of the loan of sixty millions. No court, either of law or equity, would condemn a private individual standing in the position of Greece towards the protecting powers, to repay more than the sum which these guardians can prove was actually employed for the maintenance of their ward. Now Greece can show, that if those having the power had paid due attention to the Greek finances, ten millions of francs, or even drachmas, would have covered the deficits in the Greek budgets up to the end of 1836, when the allies commenced the issue of the third series of the loan, to pay themselves the interest and sinking fund of two former series spent under their authority.

It is really lamentable to behold France, Great Britain, and Russia, the three great powers of Europe, which so rarely combine to confer any benefit on the human race, uniting in the closest alliance to keep the Greek population in perpetual thraldom by a financial juggle. They reduce the king they have appointed to a worthless pageant, the government to a trembling deputy, and they destroy the future hopes of the nation. That they have all soiled their fingers with the ink of the Greek accounts, is undeniable; but it was reserved for the unquiet spirit and restless hands of Lord Palmerston to daub with this ink the blushing cheeks of Britannia.

The question here suggests itself, why do the great powers exert themselves so determinedly to retain the Greek nation in a state of subserviency? The explanation must be sought in the unsettled state of the East and the critical position of the Ottoman empire. The Sultan still rules over more than three millions of Greek subjects, and each of the allies entertains some hope of making the condition of the Greek population useful to advance its own projects of ambition, should any sudden event cause a revolution in the Ottoman empire. The anti-Greek policy of Great Britain during the administration of Colletti, whether at Athens, Corfu, or Constantinople, has, however, seriously injured the popularity of that power among the whole Greek nation. At a moment when the consolidation of internal order and the advancement of social improvement was the prayer of every Greek, British diplomacy stepped forward to produce financial confusion, in order to drive Collet-

ti from office, at the risk of involving Greece in civil war and anarchy.

In the meantime, Russia, who can hardly be supposed to view the establishment of a free people in the Levant with much favor, has sufficient prudence to leave to England the unpopular task of arresting the progress of Greece. Russia knows well that the feeble and trimming policy of the French government will effectually prevent France from affording Greece the aid necessary to develop her moral resources in such a manner as to open a new destiny to the Greek race; and she already perceives that the hostility of Great Britain will in all probability soon involve Greece in such a state of anarchy as must drive both the people and the king to throw themselves at the feet of Russia, and refer the settlement of their affairs to her arbitration.

We have very little to say concerning the conduct of France. Her policy seems to be confined to keeping Colletti in office and obtaining from the king as many crosses and stars for Frenchmen as his majesty can be induced to part with. For the internal improvement of Greece, France has not done more than her colleagues. No measures have been recommended to check the corruption of the general government, nor to prevent the pillage of the large revenues of the Greek municipalities. Oligarchy is supported in the communes, and all the absurdity of a double election of mayors and aldermen; while universal suffrage exists as regards the legislature. No internal improvements are made; and from what we have seen of Athens, the capital of Greece, we are inclined to think, that, with one of the largest palaces in Europe, it has the filthiest streets and worst police that ever disgraced an overgrown village. Yet Athens has large local revenues, and four deputies in the house of representatives.

The Greek nation, when separated entirely from its rulers, offers to our contemplation a more cheering scene. The revolution owed its success to the mass of the population; their enthusiasm and endurance secured the liberty of Greece. The army and navy were utterly inadequate to encounter the forces of the Sultan in a protracted war, and the government had neither the talents nor the resources required to contend with the Pasha of Egypt; the people alone, by their persevering spirit of resistance, rejected the idea of defeat, and clung to their independence. Nor has the popular energy relaxed since the establishment of the monarchy, though it has now taken a

more peaceful direction. Whatever progress Greece has made in political and social civilization under the government of King Otho, must be attributed to the efforts of the people, striving on the one hand to push forward their listless rulers, and on the other to elude the efforts of the European powers to retard their advance. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if we find the progress of Greece in the career of improvement to be rather eccentric. While towns are rebuilt; while commerce and trade are advancing; while the press is free, and the number of publications daily increasing; while one class, in short, is occupied with trade, commerce, art, and literature, another remains scattered over the greater part of the kingdom, pursuing the labors of agriculture in poverty and ignorance. While the towns of Athens, Syra, Nauplia, and Patras equal any towns of their size in Europe, in social culture, the rural population in their immediate vicinity continues in the most primitive condition. This superiority in the social position of the inhabitants of the towns must be attributed to the influence which public opinion acquires wherever free institutions exist with any density of population, and to the freedom with which knowledge is allowed to circulate. In Greece, not only is the press perfectly free, but even the importation of books, whether in the Greek or any other language, is not subjected to the smallest duty. Education in the towns is therefore more common than either in the south of France, in Spain, Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, or Malta; and books of sterling value are much more common. The booksellers' shops of Athens may be compared with those of Malta, Corfu, and Gibraltar, with great advantage to the Greeks.* Wherever the population is sufficiently compressed to enable it to enjoy the advantages of a rapid communication of ideas, there knowledge has produced unity of action. In the country, on the other hand, the extreme thinness of the agricultural population, and the great physical difficulties in the way of frequent intercommunication, have left the inhabitants of extensive districts in

* Some information on the state of education in Greece, previous to the revolution in 1843, will be found in an article by Monsieur Ampère, of the Académie Française, which appeared in the Revue des deux Mondes, 1er Avril, 1843: "*De l'instruction publique et du mouvement intellectuel en Grèce.*" At present there are two French and sixteen Greek newspapers published in the kingdom. Since 1843, about sixty-three octavo volumes have been printed at Athens alone, on scientific, historical, moral, and religious subjects, besides a much greater number of political pamphlets. There are also presses at Syra, Nauplia, and Patras.

Greece deprived of all the advantages of moral and political culture, as well as of elementary education. To place the independence of Greece on a solid basis, the first step must be to improve the condition of the agricultural classes.

To do this effectually, the assistance of the government is indispensable. The legislature must commence by prohibiting the farming of the tithes, and by repealing all the revenue laws which render the government, in virtue of its claim for one tenth as a tax, the virtual masters of the whole crop. If agriculture is ever to improve in Greece, it cannot be until the cultivator obtains the absolute disposal of all his agricultural arrangements. What can farmers do in the way of improvement, who are compelled to ask permission to commence the harvest and to house the crop? It is true, that Mr. Colletti made an attempt lately to put an end to the system of farming the tithes. The English party, however, succeeded in throwing out his bill, in the expectation of compelling him to resign. Colletti, however, aware of the popularity of his measure, ventured to dissolve the chamber, though the budget had not been passed; and so well had he estimated the popular indignation at the conduct of the opposition, that not one of the members who had sacrificed the advantage of their country to party and diplomatic intrigue succeeded in being reëlected.

Our space will not allow us to enter into any statistical details concerning Greece, for such details must be extremely minute in order to reveal the strange varieties of civilization and the strong social contrasts that exist in the different classes of the population.* As there can be no doubt, however, that the future fate of the Greeks as a nation will depend more on their own personal exertions and individual qualities than on the combinations of the feeble monarchy now existing,—it is of some importance to notice the actual state of education. The general field of religious and moral culture demands a far more extensive and searching investigation than we can bestow. We shall therefore confine our observations to the University of Athens, which has become the living fountain of knowledge to the whole Greek race.

* For statistical information we must refer to "*Greece as a kingdom, or a statistical description of that country, drawn up from official documents and other authentic sources*, by Frederic Strong, Esq., consul at Athens, for their majesties the kings of Bavaria and Hanover. London. 1842. 8vo. This work is unfortunately very imperfect, but the chapters on religion and education may be consulted with profit.

Mr. Maurer was engaged in preparing the charter of the University when he was recalled. Count Armansperg, in his terror of every thing which was really liberal, proposed abandoning the project entertained by Mr. Maurer, and wished to establish four separate schools, namely: of Theology, Law, Medicine, and Philosophy. The difficulty he met with in this illiberal project caused him to delay the establishment of the university until he was aware that his recall had been decided on. He then prepared in haste a confused and imperfect organization for the university, at the commencement of January, 1837. By the exertions of Mr. Brandis, the accomplished professor at Bonn, this organization underwent considerable improvement, and the university was at last established, on the 15th of May, 1837.*

Though the government had been compelled to yield to public opinion so far as to found the university, it still met with many obstacles in its progress. Ample funds had been appropriated for establishing orders of knighthood and other useless concomitants of royal pageantry; an immense palace had been erected to lodge King Otho, but not one cent could be found to construct a building to enable the professors to lecture, or to render the national library available to the public. The teachers were often silent for want of lecture rooms; for Athens then hardly possessed houses sufficient for its inhabitants. The books sent as donations to Greece for the use of the studious, were left to rot, piled volume upon volume, in damp and dilapidated churches. The people now came forward to perform the duties neglected by their rulers; party feelings were laid aside, and in spite of court and diplomatic intrigues and personal antipathies, a public meeting was held at Athens. The Capodistrian party was allowed to take the lead, and it was resolved to raise the sum necessary for erecting an university and public library by private subscriptions. The contributions of the Greeks over all Europe were most liberal. Large sums were sent from London, Vienna, and Hungary, and in a very short time the subscriptions amounted to forty thousand dollars. A handsome building has now been erected. The number of the professors, ordinary and extraordinary, amounts at present to thirty-four, all of whom deliver lectures, though many of them receive only very trifling salaries, from the cir-

* See a pamphlet published at Athens, entitled, Περὶ Πανεπιστημίων ἐν γένει καὶ ἰδιαιτέρως περὶ τοῦ Ὀθωνείου Πανεπιστημίου, ἐν Ἀθήναις, 1845,—p. 26.

cumstance of their holding government appointments connected with the subjects on which they deliver their instructions. The professorships are distributed as follows: Theology, three; Law, nine; Medicine, ten; Philosophy, twelve. The number of students amounts to nearly three hundred, and of these about one hundred and fifty are Greeks from the Turkish dominions and the transdanubian principalities, who repair to Athens to complete their studies. This fact alone is sufficient to prove the immense influence this institution cannot fail to exercise over the ultimate fate of the Ottoman empire.

It must be observed, that besides the Theological faculty at the university, there is a college for priests, founded by a legacy of two brothers named Rizaris. This college has five teachers, (of whom only one is a professor at the university,) and about twenty-five students. The library of the university consists of nearly forty thousand volumes, but its value does not correspond with its extent. As it has been composed almost entirely of donations, every department is extremely imperfect. The kings of Naples and Prussia, and the French government, have been the most liberal foreign benefactors, and they have contributed many valuable works. A very valuable collection of the earliest Greek books, in which we believe every *editio princeps* of the Greek classics will be found, and every edition containing the best text, was purchased by the Greek government from Mr. Postolaka, a Greek who had spent many years at Vienna in forming this inestimable portion of a public library at Athens. The library contains also a few Sanscrit manuscripts and Greek translations from the Sanscrit, left to the university by an Athenian named Galanos, who died in India, where he resided many years and devoted much time to the study of Sanscrit literature. Some of his translations have been lately printed at Athens, edited by Messrs. Typaldos and Apostolides, the librarians of the university.*

* It may be interesting to our readers to see a list of the subjects on which the professors of the Athenian university lecture. Of course they vary a little in the different semesters.

THEOLOGY.—Dogmatic Theology. Ecclesiastical History. Hebrew and Sacred History.

LAW.—Roman Law. Common Law of Greece. French Civil Code. Commercial Jurisprudence. Law of Nations. History of Roman Law. Philosophy of Judicial Institutions.

MEDICINE.—Pathology and Therapeutics. Anatomy. Surgery. Midwifery. Nosology. Ophthalmy. Practice of Medicine. Forensic Medicine. Pharmacy. Physiology.

PHILOSOPHY.—Greek Philology. Latin Philology. Archæology. His-

The future prospects of the Greek nation cannot certainly be considered as destitute of hope, when the people display so much energy, and direct that energy with so much judgment. Still we must not be too sanguine in our expectations. As long as the agricultural classes remain in a stationary condition as to intelligence, wealth, and numbers, the national civilization rests on an uncertain and adventitious basis. The civilization of Greece rests on the democratic power existing in the state; this power excites great jealousy in all the European governments connected with the Levant, and its development is not regulated by an enlightened internal administration. The task of introducing moral discipline into Greek society, and of raising the rude peasantry to the position of orderly and intelligent landed proprietors, is one of no ordinary difficulty. To do this, in the face of an active enemy like Great Britain, and with a feeble ally like France, demands a larger fund of patriotism than is possessed either by Mavrocordato or Colletti. Indeed, unless Greece can be released from the thraldom of the three powers, she can only hope for a permanent improvement of her political condition by some great convulsion in the East.

We own, however, that we are not entirely without hopes that the protecting powers will be induced, by the strength of public opinion in the enlightened portion of European society, to commence repairing some of the injuries they have committed since 1832. France and Russia have almost come to the conclusion, that the loan of sixty millions ought to be regarded as a bad debt; and even Great Britain, in exacting payment of her share, had the frankness to declare, that the British government took the severe step of compelling the Greeks to pay annually the sum of £46,000, as interest and sinking fund of a loan they had not been allowed to spend, "to prevent the administration of Mr. Colletti from carrying on a system of peculation and corruption."* Yet it is impossible not to observe, that if any circumstance should induce France and Russia to adopt the policy of England, then the darling object of the anonymous correspondent of the Morning

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tory. Statistics. Natural History. Metaphysics. Physics. Experimental Philosophy. Mathematics. Chemistry. Botany. Political Economy.

* See an excellent speech of Lord Palmerston, on Greek affairs, in the British Parliament, on the 3rd of May, 1847. It is to be regretted that the conduct of the British government at Athens does not correspond with its language at London.

Chronicle and the Morning Post would be attained, and King Otho would be driven from the throne of Greece. At all events, the Greek kingdom has little chance of enjoying internal tranquillity as long as any one of the three powers can disturb the government and derange the finances of the country, according to party views. The conduct of Great Britain, coming in aid of the errors of Mr. Colletti, has produced no less than three dangerous insurrections, and a considerable loss of life and property in the present year [1847].

If the three powers, or even Great Britain alone, would determine to enforce payment of the interest of the loan, for the purpose of preventing the peculation and corruption of the Greek government, no matter whether Colletti, Mavrocordato, or Metaxas should be prime minister,—and if they would apply the sums extorted from the government, in improving the condition of the people, and in doing those things essential to the independent existence of the nation which have been neglected by the regency, by the king, and by the English, French, and Russian parties, while in power; then, indeed, the three powers might lay claim to be really benefactors to Greece. Let this sum be employed in forming roads, building bridges, establishing steamers and ferry-boats, repairing ports, and facilitating communications; for, strange to say, the only roads at present existing in Greece, are those round the capital, which lead to nothing, and serve principally as drives for the carriages of the court, and of the members of the *corps diplomatique;* and the only steamers are royal yachts, kept to transport foreign princes who happen to visit Greece, from one port to another.

The three powers are certainly the parties most to blame for the actual state of Greece. Who on earth, though bred in the corrupted regions of a court, except Talleyrand, Palmerston, and Lieven, could, in the nineteenth century, have entertained the project of founding a monarchy, before creating the means of enabling the central government to act with celerity, or enabling the people to feel the necessity of national unity? The Greek monarchy, from its geographical configuration, presents singular difficulties to internal communication, and as these difficulties caused the division of the country into a number of independent states, in ancient times, it cannot have been overlooked by such profound classical scholars as the English ministers. The monarchy they established is, moreover, divided into four distinct divisions on the map,—con-

tinental Greece, the Peloponnesus, Eubœa, and the islands of the Archipelago. The continential portion is pierced by gulfs, and intersected by bare and rugged limestone mountains, twelve separate chains of which rise to an elevation of upwards of six thousand feet above the valleys at their base. There are thirty inhabited islands. A journey by land, from one end of the kingdom to another, occupies more time than one from the Penobscot to Pensacola; and a voyage from Scopelo to Santarin generally consumes more time than one from Boston to New Orleans. It cannot be wondered at, therefore, if there exists a constant striving on the part of the population of Greece to destroy the work of the three powers, and break up the monarchy into a number of independent states. The control of the central government is only manifested in compelling the people of the provinces to remit their taxes to Athens; the internal trade is so insignificant, that each village thinks it would be a gainer by refusing to pay its quota of taxation, and by assuming complete independence. The operation of this feeling is not without effect in producing the constant insurrections which disturb the government of Greece.

In order to perpetuate the existence of the monarchy, it is necessary for the three powers to make a new protocol on the affairs of Greece. They must compel King Otho to reduce his civil list to one quarter of its present amount; they must prevent their own ministers from defrauding the Greek custom-house, and sacrificing the honor of European chivalry, by availing themselves of their diplomatic privilege; they must prohibit their consuls from carrying on the trade of usurers. In place of calumniating the Greek court in European newspapers, and exciting the Greek people to rebellion, they must indicate to the government the steps necessary to reform the municipalities and guarantee the impartial administration of justice. If some such line of conduct be not speedily adopted, we fear that the state of Greece will very soon begin to trouble the repose of Europe.

The Turks tell a story not quite inapplicable to present circumstances. They say that a restless English voluptuary once visited the East, whose name may be translated, Lord Cupid Fractious. He purchased a beautiful Circassian slave, named Fatmah, and presented her with a pair of brilliant slippers, richly embroidered with diamonds. The lady walked up and down the room in raptures, surveying both the slippers

and her own pretty feet. Lord Cupid sate on his divan looking at the beauty, but admiring his own present. Fatmah was at last tired, and wished to sit down, but her master exclaimed, "Another turn, Fatmah! another turn!" For a while, female vanity sustained poor Fatmah, who believed Cupid was moved by admiration of her beauty; but Cupid's constant exclamation of "another turn, Fatmah; how beautiful the slippers are!" revealed the sad truth, that his lordship was thinking of nothing but his own magnanimity. The indignant Fatmah could bear the fatigue no longer; so taking off the diamond slippers, she threw them in the face of Lord Cupid Fractious, with such vigor, that he could see neither lady nor slippers for the next fortnight, and exclaimed, as she rushed weeping out of the room: "Keep your gifts, I neither want your generosity nor your tyranny!"

Great Britain ought to meditate on the conduct of her ministers to Greece, and pause for a moment, ere she takes upon herself the responsibility of their acts. Let her not put implicit faith in their talk about the liberty of the Greeks, when she hears that they are accused by foreigners of rank and honor of acting the part of incendiaries at Athens, and of oppressors at Corfu. The conduct of the British government towards Greece has now fixed the attention of the civilized world, and will be recorded in the page of history, whatever may be the regret felt by the friends of England in registering the truth.

The claims of Greece to enter the commonwealth of independent states are undeniable, and depend no longer on the enthusiasm of scholars, or the dreams of poets. Homer, Sophocles, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Plato, Aristotle, Basil, and Chrysostom, are, indeed, names which in future ages will be reverenced, in regions now unpeopled; but such names, as they cast no spell over the minds of trading politicians, do not constitute any claim to national independence. Yet, even European statesmen admit that the constancy of the *palikari* in war, and the activity of the citizen in peace; that the existence of a free press; of the trial by jury; of municipal institutions; of a representative chamber, and of a national system of education, give Greece the fullest right to complete political independence. Though the state of the country be disturbed, the morality of the public men lax, and though both life and property demand additional security, still let the impartial student of political history compare the moral, political, and intellectual condition of Athens under the administra-

tion of Mr. Colletti, with that of Corfu under the more absolute government of the British peer, Lord Seaton, and the comparison will almost persuade him that Greece is an enlightened monarchy and Colletti a great minister. That our opinion is not quite so favorable, the readers of this paper must be fully convinced. We have endeavoured in the preceding pages to give an accurate and impartial sketch of the present miserable position of the Greek kingdom. Greece now stands on the threshold of the assembly of nations. Great Britain threatens to close the gates of that assembly against her,—perhaps for ever. The deed, if accomplished, would go down to the latest posterity as a crime of the blackest dye. Against the perpetration of this crime we attempt to raise a warning voice, moved by feelings of affection and veneration for both parties. If our judgment on the facts we have recorded be correct, (and we can answer that our industry in the search after truth has been persevering,) it seems to us not impossible that even this incomplete statement of a nation's wrongs may awaken some sympathy across the Atlantic, and render Greece some service at the very crisis of her fate.

Art. IV.—THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF AGASSIZ.

The best news for American scholars, lately, is the definitive acceptance by Mr. Agassiz of the Professorship of Zoölogy and Geology, at Cambridge. This must give additional interest to any particulars concerning his life and labors hitherto, and we have accordingly applied ourselves, with what books and documents were at hand, and, above all, with the assistance of friends specially informed on the subject, to compile a sketch of his private history and scientific career.

The Agassiz family is of French origin, and were among those Protestants whom the revocation of the edict of Nantes obliged to leave France.

The immediate ancestors of Mr. Agassiz fled to the Pays de Vaud, which at that time made part of the Canton of Bern. From the time of their establishment in their new residence, their prosperity has been uninterrupted. The branch to which our naturalist belongs has been especially devoted to the min-

istry; the whole line for five generations having been clergymen. The father of Agassiz was pastor at St. Imier (one of the protestant parishes of the ancient bishopric of Basle, which had been just incorporated into the French empire,) when he married the younger daughter of a physician of the Canton de Vaud, Mademoiselle Rose Mayor, a young lady as remarkable for the vivacity of her mind as for her beauty. They had the misfortune to see their first four children die one after the other, and the family seemed in danger of becoming extinct, when there was born a fifth son, who has become the eminent man of whose life and labors we propose to give some account.

Louis Agassiz was born on the 28th of May, 1807; exactly a century after the birth of Linnæus. From his birth he was the object of an unbounded tenderness, and surrounded by all the care which the most watchful solicitude could suggest to parents alarmed by the loss of four children. Fearing the influence of the severe climate of St. Imier, the pastor Agassiz had just left this parish to take charge of one in a village in the canton of Friburg, called Mottier, situated on the peninsula of Vully, between the Lake of Neufchatel and the Lake of Morat. It was here that Agassiz was born. Here, on the borders of the beautiful lake, at the foot of a hill covered with rich vineyards, in full view of the chain of the Alps, he passed his first years, under the vigilant eye of a mother who divined from the first the future that was enfolded in the young and ardent nature of her child.

After having received his first education in his father's house, Agassiz was placed with his younger brother at the gymnasium of Bienne, a small town in the neighbourhood. This establishment was at that time very celebrated throughout the canton. The two brothers passed here several years, devoted almost exclusively to the study of the ancient languages. Their father in the meantime had left the parish of Mottier, and accepted a situation in his own canton, in the little town of Orbe, situated at the foot of the Jura. It was during the vacations which he passed with his parents, that the attention of the young student was turned for the first time toward the Natural Sciences. Those who knew him at that time remember the ardor with which he made his first collections, and the delight he showed when on his return from an excursion he had some new butterfly, or some curious insect, to show to his mother. This taste for Natural History re-

ceived new nourishment, when, in consequence of a second promotion, his father was called to the parish of Concise, a large village situated on the Lake of Neufchatel. The vicinity of the lake, which washes the garden-walls of the parsonage, opened a new field to his insatiable curiosity concerning natural objects. From this moment his attention was especially directed to the Fishes; and as if he had already a presentiment of the great results which he was one day to deduce from the philosophical study of these animals, he not only applied himself to collecting them, but also began to inquire into their habits, their manner of life, and the characters by which they are distinguished. He took part in all fishing-excursions, accompanied the fishermen on all occasions, and often went alone, with his line in hand, to pass whole days in the middle of the lake. When he came afterwards to compare the results which he had obtained with the accounts given in treatises on Natural History, he saw immediately how much remained to be done in this department; and the idea of filling this gap constantly occupied his mind.

He had now finished his studies at school. It was to be expected that, following the example of his ancestors, he would devote himself to the priesthood. But Natural History had gained too much ascendancy. His father wisely left to him the choice of a profession. He chose that of Medicine, as offering the most opportunities for pursuing his beloved studies. He commenced the study of Medicine at the Academy of Zurich, where he was most kindly received by Professor Schinz, who admitted him to an intimate acquaintance, and furnished every facility in his power for the pursuit of his zoölogical researches. From Zurich he went to the University of Heidelberg, where he devoted himself especially to the study of Anatomy, under the direction of the celebrated professor, Tiedemann. His assiduity in study did not prevent him from taking part in all the amusements of the student-life, so that the Swiss *corps* chose him for their president, and long after he had quitted the university he was still spoken of as an accomplished *Bursch*, possessing the rare talent of managing with equal dexterity the rapier and the scalpel.

It was at this time that the Bavarian government, having recently organized the University of Munich, called thither as professors the most eminent men of Germany in all the departments of science. There were brought together at that time, Oken, the celebrated zoölogist; Martius, the botanist, who

had lately returned from his travels in South America, with a rich harvest of scientific materials; Schelling, the great philosopher; and Döllinger, the founder of modern Physiology. Such a corps of teachers could not fail to attract a large body of youth eager to learn. Among others, Agassiz did not hesitate to quit the fashionable University of Heidelberg for the rude capital of Bavaria.

It is here that his scientific career commences. The four years that he passed at the new university may be counted among the most remarkable of his life. Although only a student, his already extensive knowledge of Natural History soon drew the attention of the professors, whose lectures he eagerly attended. Friendships sprung up between him and them, and the intimacy in which he lived with these chosen men resulted in an increased enthusiasm for science, as well as an extension of the field of his researches.

With Martius he studied the organization of plants, and their geographical distribution according to climates and regions of the globe. With Döllinger (in whose house he lived,) he penetrated into the sublime mysteries of the formation of animals, and their development during the embryonic period. With Oken he discussed the principles of Classification according to the intimate affinities of things, based on a profound study of their organization.

Finally, with Schelling he approached those questions of the higher philosophy, which in Germany more than anywhere else have at all times been the study of the greatest minds; namely, the relations that exist between the immaterial essence of beings, and the laws of the physical world—in other words, between Spirit and Matter. The pantheistic theory was embraced at that time by many enlightened men in Germany; and it is not surprising, that, supported by the results of modern science, and professed under a new and attractive form by an eminent man, who, freed from all party considerations, presented it in all its grandeur—it excited the enthusiasm of the young men who crowded round the chair of this celebrated philosopher, already prepared for the doctrine by the writings of Goethe and Schiller. Agassiz, if we are rightly informed, partook also of their opinions. It was not until afterwards, that, (as we shall show directly,) having commenced the study of former creations, he modified his views, and unhesitatingly proclaimed as the result of his investigations, the existence of a personal God, the Author and Ruler of the universe.

Agassiz, as we have already said, though only a student, ranked at this time among the scientific men of Munich. A few young men of like spirit gathered round him, forming a small but select circle who met to discuss scientific subjects. This society soon attracted attention; it was called *the little Academy*; even the professors gladly took part in it; and those of the students who had the good fortune to be members of it remember the lectures read there, as not the least instructive and interesting part of their scientific course.

Martius was then occupied in publishing his great work on the Natural History of Brazil. He confined himself to the part relating to Botany. His companion, Spix, who was to edit the zoölogical portion, had just died, leaving many portions of his work unfinished. That relating to Ichthyology, in particular, was barely sketched out. An able zoölogist was needed to reduce to order the chaos of new species and genera, and to assign to them their true places in the system. Martius cast his eyes upon his young friend Agassiz, to whom he confided the honorable task of elaborating this important part of the work. It appeared in a folio volume in Latin, with numerous plates; making part of the "Travels in Brazil." From the time of its appearance it gained for its author the rank of an eminent naturalist.

Such occupations necessarily resulted in detaching the young naturalist more and more from his medical studies. His parents, who had already often protested against this too exclusive passion of their son for Natural History, now had recourse to an extreme measure; they withdrew the moderate allowance which they had hitherto granted him. This was a terrible blow for the young man, who found himself thus at once deprived of all means of subsistence, and obliged to renounce what was dearer than all to him, his portfolios; for his allowance had not only supplied his daily wants, but had also been applied to paying for the services of a young artist named Dinkel, whom he had remarked among the crowd of draughtsmen who fill the streets of Munich, and who under his guidance became one of the most skilful painters in this department.

But, like other passions, the love of science is ingenious in surmounting difficulties. Full of confidence in himself, he applied to the bookseller Cotta, a man who united with great skill in business the most enlarged views. To him he showed the materials he had collected for a Natural History of the Fresh-

water Fishes of Europe. The beauty of the drawings, the finish of the details, and above all the enthusiasm of the young man, gained the heart of the old bookseller, who advanced him funds to continue and complete his work.

At the same time Agassiz, like a good son, sought to regain the favor of his parents. For this there was but one thing to be done; namely, to return to Medicine. Until now he had divided his time between his medical and his zoölogical studies; but now, we may infer that he applied himself seriously to his profession, since not long after he presented himself as candidate for the degree of Doctor, and passed his examination with distinction. But the title of Doctor of Medicine was not enough for him. In the same year he applied for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, which he received after a public disputation which produced a great sensation in the literary community of Munich.

He undertook to show that woman is superior to man. *Mens feminæ viri animo superior*, was the theme of his disputation. Such a proposition, coming from a young man whose devotion to the fair sex was well known, could not fail to attract attention. It was received with the most various sentiments. The young applauded the irresistible arguments of the youthful candidate; puritanic conservatives, and those belonging to what is called in Germany *the Historical School*, thundered against these ideas, as revolutionary and calculated to subvert the order of society. The sphere of woman, they thought, should not be extended beyond the kitchen and the laundry.

After this double examination, Agassiz received permission from his parents to visit Vienna. The object of this journey was the completion of his medical studies; but on his arrival he devoted himself again to his favorite pursuit, and was oftener to be met with at the Museum than in the hospital. Here he made the acquaintance of many distinguished naturalists, among others of Fitzinger; and applied himself to the special study of Ichthyology.

This study, with him, was not confined to living species. He had extended his researches to the fossil kinds, and the *débris* (often admirably preserved,) found in the fresh-water deposits of Oeningen, in Switzerland, had attracted his particular attention. He found that most of the species said to be identical with those of the present epoch, were different, and therefore had drawings made of a great number; so that when

he returned to Switzerland his portfolio contained almost as many fossil as recent species. What was he to do with all these materials? His parents having already made great sacrifices for him, and seeing no guarantee for the future, were impatient for him to begin his medical career. In this conflict of his tastes and his filial duties, his position was difficult.

But he had not yet seen Paris, and he could not make up his mind to commence practice without having examined the rich collections of that great capital; without having visited the Jardin des Plantes; and above all, without having heard Cuvier, whose renown filled the world.

But how was he to find means to go to Paris? His parents were neither able nor willing to contribute any thing towards it. Fortunately a neighbouring clergyman, a friend of his father, who had always entertained the highest opinion of his talents, having just inherited a small sum of money, thought he could not employ it better than in aiding the project of his young friend.

On his arrival in Paris, Agassiz lost no time in seeking out the two most eminent men of the age, then residing in that city — Cuvier and Humboldt.

Cuvier, in order to assuage his grief for the death of his daughter, had just commenced his great work on Fishes, and received with eagerness every thing concerning fossil species. Agassiz relied upon his portfolio for his introduction to the great naturalist. Cuvier was so much astonished by it, that after a second interview he informed Agassiz that he would give up the projected publication and make over to him all his materials, if he would undertake to describe them. For those who know the value which the materials for a literary work acquire in the eyes of an author, this incident by itself will be sufficient proof that Cuvier's moral character was equal to his intellectual power. From this moment Agassiz continued on intimate terms with Cuvier's family, until the death of that great man, and we have heard him say that the happiest moments of his life were passed in Cuvier's cabinet.

After the death of Cuvier (1832), Agassiz returned to Switzerland, hoping to obtain a professorship in some of the public establishments of the Canton de Vaud. Being disappointed in this, he accepted the invitation of some citizens of Neufchatel to establish himself in that city, where they were preparing to reorganize the college. He was soon after appointed Professor of Natural History, a place which he filled until his departure for the United States.

Alexander von Humboldt,—who has enjoyed the rare privilege of being able to assist so many men of talent,—was from the first the devoted friend of Agassiz, and it was his patronage that enabled our naturalist to commence in 1833, so soon after his arrival in Switzerland, the publication of his great work on Fossil Fishes; which he dedicated to Humboldt, and of which we intend to say a few words, as of all his works this made the greatest sensation, and it is this that obtained for him the eminent rank which he now holds in the scientific world.

This work consists of five volumes, with an atlas of about four hundred folio plates, and comprises descriptions and figures of nearly a thousand species of fossil fishes. All the specimens are represented of the natural size, with the colors of the bed from which they were taken. It was impossible that so many new species should be made known without rendering many alterations necessary in the science of Ichthyology; new types were established, and the affinities of various groups and families to each other more clearly shown. Moreover, Agassiz did not confine himself to establishing a vast number of species, genera, and even families. Beside this he founded an entirely new classification, based principally on the importance of the fossil fishes.

Cuvier makes two general divisions among Fishes; the Osseous and the Cartilaginous fishes. Agassiz also separates the Osseous fishes from the Cartilaginous, of which he makes his first order, that of the Placoïdians; but he divides the Osseous fishes again into three other equally important orders; so that the class of Fishes is divided into four orders; namely, 1. The Placoïdians; 2. The Ganoïdians; 3. The Ctenoïdians; and 4. The Cycloïdians. This classification is not founded on the skeleton, like that of Cuvier, but on the nature of the outward integuments, the scales. Agassiz starts with the principle that the outward covering of fishes is the reflex of their internal organization. With this principle he examines the different families of the class of Fishes, with respect to their scales, and finds in the conformation of the external integument a variety of characters, on which he founds his classification. As to this, it is to be remarked at the outset, that all the Osseous fishes, with the exception of a few genera, are furnished with horny scales; while the skin of the Cartilaginous fishes is covered with plates or spines, of a peculiar form, known under the names of *shagreen*, &c. The scales of the

Osseous fishes are constructed on a totally different plan, and the differences are so marked, that Mr. Agassiz considered them a sufficient foundation for his three orders of Cycloïdians, Ctenoïdians and Ganoïdians. The two former, which comprise almost all the Osseous fishes of the present epoch, both have horny scales; but they differ in this, that the Ctenoïdians have the posterior edge of the scales indented, while in the Cycloïdians this border is entire. He seeks to prove that this distinction, apparently insignificant, is, in truth, founded in nature, being the expression of a fundamental character which reveals itself equally in other parts of the body. Thus, fishes having indented or pectinated scales, have generally prickles on the head, the opercula, and various parts of their body; while the others — the Cycloïdians — are smooth, and without defence. Mr. Agassiz considers the Perch, with the analogous species, as the type of his order of Ctenoïdians; and the family of the Carp, Salmon, Pike, &c., as typical of the Cycloïdians. This division corresponds, therefore, to a certain extent, with Cuvier's division of fishes into Acanthopterygians and Malacopterygians.

The second order, that of the Ganoïdians, seems to have a yet more satisfactory foundation. There have been found in the Nile and in the rivers of North America, two fishes which have always puzzled the ichthyologists; that of the Nile is known under the name of *Bichir* (*Polypterus Bichir*); the other, which is found in America, is called the Gar-pike (*Lepidosteus*), having some resemblance to the Pike. Both these fishes are furnished with scales of very peculiar form and structure. Instead of being arranged in the manner of roof-tiles, — as in most fishes, — they are placed simply side by side, the surface being covered with a coat of enamel, making a very solid cuirass. On examining these fishes in an anatomical point of view, Mr. Agassiz found that the skeleton presented no less striking differences than the scales and the soft parts of the body. Nevertheless, it seemed hazardous to separate them altogether from the other great families; and particularly when the smallness of their number was considered, it seemed contrary to all method to place them in the same rank with the Placoïdians on one side, and the Osseous fishes on the other. But the procedure, though not authorized by the study of the living fishes, was justified by an examination of fossil species. Here is displayed a whole ichthyological fauna, having the characters neither of the Osseous

nor of the Cartilaginous fishes, but altogether analogous to the Bichir and the Lepidosteus. So that these two genera, apparently mere exceptions in the present creation, in reality constitute a type by themselves, which, though not numerous at present, is, nevertheless, the expression of an entire order of things. Associating with these fishes the numerous fossil species whose scales have the same structure, Mr. Agassiz made his division of Ganoïdians, which already contains many hundred species, and promises to become still larger, since it predominates in all the formations anterior to the chalk. Mr. Agassiz recognizes several distinct families of this order; the two principal ones are the Sauroïdians, to which the Lepidosteus and the Bichir belong; and the *Lepidoïdians*, which were inoffensive and probably omnivorous fishes, somewhat resembling the Carp in appearance, but having no representatives in the present creation.

These researches among the fossils had not a geological interest alone. The numerous examinations that Mr. Agassiz was obliged to make, in order to establish in all points the analogy of extinct species with living types, revealed to him anatomical relations of great interest, which had been hitherto passed over. He thus discovered the important fact, not before made known, that there exists a remarkable parallelism between the development of the individual, and the development of the whole class in the series of ages. In the early stages of embryonic life, the vertebral column does not exist. In place of it there is found, in the embryo, a gelatinous mass, called the dorsal cord. Around this cord (which remains for a longer or shorter time in all fishes,) are formed the vertebræ, as bony rings. These rings gradually increase, and encroach more and more upon the dorsal cord, which, in most fishes, at last disappears. In some types, however, for example, in the Sturgeon, it remains during the whole life; so that this fish has no vertebræ, and the apophyses rest immediately on the dorsal cord. Now, Agassiz shows us that this is the case with all the fishes of former epochs. They all have distinct spinous apophyses, often very strong and completely ossified, but they show no trace of separate vertebræ; whence he concludes, that these organs were wanting, and that the dorsal cord continued throughout life, as in the Sturgeon. As to the relative superiority of living types, also, embryology reveals to us a wonderful parallelism. There is no fish, however imperfect, whose organization does not corre-

spond to some phase in the life of more perfect types. Take, for example, the Lamprey, or that still more imperfect fish known under the name of *Amphioxus*, or *Branchiostoma*, which Pallas placed among the Snails, from its great dissimilarity to ordinary fishes. The former has, in place of the cranium, only a cartilage corresponding to the base of the skull; and the latter is deprived even of this, and the dorsal cord extends to the end of the snout. The first has a single fin, more or less divided; in the other, the fin extends along the whole body. Finally, neither has jaws, properly so called. Now, the most perfect of our fishes, such, for example, as the Salmon, are all, at one period of their life, at the same point of development, but with them it is a transient state, a stage of growth; whilst in the others it is the permanent condition.

These views have a high philosophical bearing, particularly in their application to other classes of the animal kingdom. It is in accordance with them that Agassiz determined the rank to be assigned to the various families of fishes, according to their organization.

It is to Geology, nevertheless, that the greatest profit is derived from these discoveries. In comparing together the fishes found in various formations, Agassiz from the first had also thrown new light on the relative age of these formations. Thus, to cite but a single example, he was enabled by the study of the fishes of the slate of Glaris, to demonstrate that this deposit, which had previously been considered as belonging to the most ancient sedimentary rocks, the grauwacké, is much more recent, and forms a part of the cretaceous group. Another and more general result of his labors was the discovery, that not only are all the fossil species different from those now living, but also, that from one formation to another, the species are equally distinct. And this diversity, according to him, is not confined to the larger formations, but exists equally between the various stages of the same formation. Thus he recognizes no species as common to the lias and the upper Jura limestone; to the upper and lower cretaceous deposits; to the ancient and recent strata of the tertiary formations, &c. The necessary deduction is, that the whole creation has been renewed at different epochs, by a direct intervention of the Creator. Agassiz, however, did not stop here, but pushed his conclusions still further. From the fact that certain basins, like certain regions of the earth's surface, are inhabited by species peculiar to them, not found elsewhere

in deposits of the same age, he inferred that each creation was local, that is to say, that species were created in the localities they inhabit, and that to each was assigned a limit, which it does not pass so long as it remains in its natural condition. Man alone, and those few species that are associated with him, are exceptions to this general law. And as the migrations of even these species takes place under the direct influence of man, we may conclude that they were unknown to former epochs.

These considerations, with others not less important, concerning the relation which this localization bears to the temperature and degree of elevation of continents at different epochs, suggested to Agassiz some general reflections, with which he closes his chapter on Classification, and which we transcribe, as showing the spirit in which this work is written. "Such facts," says he, "loudly proclaim principles which science has hitherto left untouched, but which the researches of paleontology urge upon the observer, with an ever increasing force: those, I mean, that respect the relation of the Creator to the universe. We see phenomena closely connected in the order of succession, yet without any sufficient cause within themselves for the connection; an infinite diversity of species, without any material bond of union, so grouped as to present the most admirable progressive development, in which our own species is involved. Have we not here the most incontestable proofs of the existence of a Superior Intelligence, whose power alone has been able to establish such an order of things? The methods of scientific investigation, however, are of such strictness, that what seems to our feelings a matter of course, we cannot admit, unless supported by numerous and well-established facts; on this account, I have delayed expressing my convictions on this subject, until the last moment; not that I have wished to avoid the discussions which the announcement of such results must necessarily excite, but that I have been desirous not to provoke them before establishing for these results a purely scientific foundation, and supporting them by rigid demonstrations, rather than by a profession of faith. An acquaintance with more than fifteen hundred species of fossil fishes, has taught me that species do not pass insensibly into each other, but that they appear and disappear unexpectedly, without showing any immediate connection with those preceding them. For I do not think that any one can seriously affirm that the nu-

merous types of Cycloïdians and Ctenoïdians, which are almost contemporaneous, are descended from the Placoïdians and Ganoïdians. This would be, in fact, to say, that Mammalia, and thus man, are directly descended from the fishes. All these species have a fixed time of appearance and disappearance; indeed, their existence is limited to a definite period. Nevertheless, they present, in their general character, affinities more or less close, and a definite coördination in a given system, intimately connected with the mode of life of each type, and even of each species. More than this, in all ages, an invisible thread runs through this immense diversity, presenting to us, as a definite result, a continual progress in this development, of which man is the end, the four classes of vertebrated animals the intermediate steps, and the invertebrata the constant accessory accompaniment. Have we not here the manifestations of a mind as powerful as prolific?—the acts of an intelligence as sublime as provident?—the marks of goodness as infinite as wise?—the most palpable demonstration of the existence of a personal God, author of all things, ruler of the universe, and dispenser of all good? This at least is what I read in the works of the creation, in contemplating them with a grateful heart. Such feelings, moreover, dispose us better to fathom the truth, and study it for itself; and it is my conviction, that if, in the study of the natural sciences, these questions were less avoided, even in the sphere of direct observation, our progress would be generally more sure and more rapid."

It is not astonishing that such results, accompanied by views so wide, and presented with the irresistible force of a profound conviction, gained for their author the respect of the scientific world. Learned societies vied in showing their sympathy with him; and, (a distinction then unparalleled,) at the age of thirty-four, Agassiz was a member of every scientific academy in Europe.

England was, at that time, in advance of all other nations in the study of Geology. It was here that Agassiz found at once the richest materials and the greatest encouragement. Whole collections were put at his disposal, and he obtained in this manner many precious specimens. Some of his friends recollect with pleasure the impression produced by his visit on the naturalists of the United Kingdom. Several universities were desirous of numbering him among their professors, and the cities of Edinburgh and Dublin, beside conferring on

him the degree of LL. D., enrolled him also among their citizens. We learn that his personal influence induced several persons of high rank to engage in the study of Natural History — among others, Sir Philip Egerton and Lord Enniskillen, whose collections are known to all paleontologists. He became intimate with the most influential persons in the kingdom; he was the welcome guest of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Egerton, and the friend of Buckland, Owen, Murchison, and other distinguished English naturalists.

Having obtained from the study of Fossil Fishes results so important to the history of the development of the whole creation, Agassiz naturally sought to confirm them by the study of other classes of animals, and, accordingly, applied himself to the examination of the Mollusca and the Echinodermata. The latter had been, in general, somewhat neglected by naturalists; the fossil species, in particular, were scarcely known, although, from their great variety, and the complicated structure of their shells, they are of great importance in determining the age of various deposits.

In a short time, he had collected a considerable number of species, belonging to various public and private collections throughout Europe, and in 1836 he published, in the first volume of the *Mémoires de la Société des Sciences Naturelles de Neuchâtel*, a Prodromus of the class of Echinodermata — the principles of which have since been generally adopted. The same volume contains another paper, giving descriptions and figures of the fossil Echini belonging to the Neocomian group* of the Neufchatel Jura. A year afterwards, he published, in another periodical, — (the *Mémoires de la Société Helvétique*,) — descriptions of the fossil Echini peculiar to Switzerland. In the same year appeared the first number of a more extensive work, having the title of "*Monographies d'Echinodermes.*" This number contained the monograph of the *Saleniæ*, small Echini belonging to the chalk. It was followed by three others, treating of the *Scutellæ*, the *Galerites*, and the anatomy of the Echinus, — the last number edited by M. Valentin. To facilitate the study of these curious animals, so important to the history of successive creations, Agassiz made casts in plaster of all the specimens in his possession. This collection comprises casts of nearly five

* A formation belonging to the lower green-sand, near Neufchatel, from the Latin name of which city it derives its name.

hundred species, the counterparts of which are to be found in the great museums in Europe, and has thus become one of the most precious documents we possess concerning this class of animals.

The labors of Mr. Agassiz on Fossil Shells are not less important. A young Swiss geologist, M. Gressly, had made a considerable collection of fossil shells from all the stages of the oolitic and cretaceous formations. Mr. Agassiz commenced the publication of them in a work entitled "*Etudes critiques sur les Mollusques fossiles du Jura et de la Craie.*" Of this, four numbers have appeared, with a hundred quarto plates, comprising the group of the *Trygoniæ* and that of the *Myæ*. At the same time Agassiz published a German translation of Buckland's Geology, with numerous notes and additions, and revised the French and German translations of Sowerby's Mineral Conchology.

But whatever may be any man's ability and energy, Nature has fixed certain limits to what it is possible for him to accomplish, which he cannot pass. Thus, in order to explain the rapid succession, at so short intervals, of the works we have mentioned, and those of which we have yet to speak, we must observe, that about this time, (1837,) Agassiz associated with himself a young naturalist, Mr. Desor,—who has ever since labored with him and under his direction, and who, having accompanied him in all his Alpine excursions, and in his visit to this country, is now living among us. To the information personally furnished by Mr. Desor, as well as to his writings, we are indebted for much of the present sketch, which could not have been written without his assistance.

The united labors of the two friends accomplished what would have been beyond the reach of a single individual, and the fruits of these labors we see in these numerous publications.

The reputation of Mr. Agassiz, and his unwearying energy, transformed the little town of Neufchatel into a nursery of science—to the great astonishment of the peaceful burghers, who, for the most part, could not at all comprehend what was going on around them. But the more enlightened among them soon gathered about him, and thus a Society of Natural History was formed, that soon drew attention by its activity. The Museum, established by the liberality of some of the citizens, increased rapidly. At the recommendation of Mr. Agassiz, a young naturalist, a pupil of his, Mr. Tschudi,—

since known by his work on Peru,—was despatched on a voyage round the world, to collect objects of Natural History.

The influence which Agassiz exercised was not confined to the town where he lived. He succeeded also in reviving the zeal of the "*Société Helvétique des Sciences Naturelles*," of which he was one of the directors. It was in consequence of his exertions that this society resumed with renewed vigor its publications, which had languished for some time for want of nourishment.

His studies of the Fossils did not make Agassiz forget the Fishes, which have always been, and still are, his favorites. He continued to collect materials for his "Natural History of the Fresh-water Fishes of Europe." His portfolios now contained a complete series of drawings, executed with the greatest care by Mr. Dinkel, the skilful draughtsman whom he had educated at Munich. Having formed at Neufchatel a lithographic establishment, in which there were several distinguished artists, he determined to commence the publication of his work. The plates of the magnificent Atlas—which justly ranks among the first works in this department*—were struck off under his eye at Neufchatel. It is on this account only the more to be regretted, that, after having exhausted all his pecuniary resources, to make this publication worthy of its name, the author found it impossible to continue it on the plan projected. Nevertheless, science has been partly indemnified by the publication of the Embryology of the Salmon tribe, which forms the second number of the work.

After the attention which German naturalists had given to the study of this important and interesting branch of science, Agassiz determined that his Fishes also should contribute their share. He therefore employed his friend, Mr. Vogt, (now Professor of Zoölogy at the University of Giessen,) who, under his direction, elaborated this part of the work, which is justly esteemed by all physiologists. A third part of the same work,—the Anatomy of the Salmons,—the fruit of the joint labors of Messrs. Agassiz and Vogt, has since appeared in the third volume of the Memoirs of the Neufchatel Society, with a large number of admirably executed plates.

Mr. Agassiz had finished the publication of the "Fossil

* We may add, that, in the opinion of Mr. Agassiz, the execution of these plates has been surpassed only in one work, the Ichthyology of the United States Exploring Expedition.

Fishes." But though the book was finished, the subject was not exhausted. Numerous contributions poured in from all quarters. The study of the Devonian system, in particular, had made known a whole ichthyological fauna of a peculiar character. Mr. Agassiz was requested by the British Association to publish these interesting remains. This he did in a First Supplement to the "*Poissons Fossiles*"—under the name of the "Fishes of the Devonian System." About the same time he presented to the British Association his Report on the Fishes of the London Clay.

After the publication of the "Fresh-water Fishes," there appeared a work of a different character, and which of itself would be sufficient to establish the reputation of a naturalist. This is the "*Nomenclator Zoölogicus*"—an enumeration of all the genera in the animal kingdom, with an indication of the etymology of their names,—of the author by whom the names were proposed,—the date of their publication,—and the family to which they should be referred.

From the commencement of his career, Agassiz had been struck by the disorder that pervaded zoölogical nomenclature, and the confusion resulting from the application of the same name to totally different animals. To remedy this difficulty, he prepared registers, in which he entered the names of all animals as they occurred to him in his studies. After having continued this practice for more than ten years, he arranged the names methodically, and published the nomenclature of each class separately, after having it revised by the naturalists most distinguished throughout Europe in each special branch. The *Nomenclator Zoölogicus* is preceded by an introduction in Latin, in which the general principles of nomenclature are profoundly discussed, and it has become an authority universally acknowledged. In connection with this work we must mention another publication, more extensive and not less important—the "*Bibliographie générale d'histoire naturelle;*" which grew up in a similar manner by the side of the *Nomenclator*. It contains a list of the authors cited in the former work, with bibliographical notices, and is in course of publication, at the expense of the Ray Society. This work will form several large volumes;—the first numbers, containing a list of the publications of scientific institutions, have recently appeared.

We come now to speak of a series of discoveries which have particularly tended to make the name of Agassiz known to the

public in general, and from which resulted his Glacial theory. This theory is so generally known, that it may be interesting to relate, in a few words, its origin and the different phases in which it has appeared. Although now of so wide application, (extending to the whole northern hemisphere, as far as erratic boulders and polished rocks are found,) its first origin is to be sought in the Alps. It was among the chamois-hunters of the Valais that the idea arose, that masses of rock were transported by glaciers. These men, accustomed to live in the high regions of the Alps, and seeing every year enormous masses of rock transported to a distance from their original position by the glaciers, found no difficulty in supposing that *all* the boulders which are found in the valleys had been transported thither in the same manner; and as they had observed the *oscillation* of the extremities of the glaciers,—that is to say, their advance in one year and their recession in the next,—they concluded, in like manner, that, at the period when the blocks now found at a distance from the glaciers were first detached, the glaciers themselves must have reached further than at present.

These notions, however, had not extended beyond the limits of the Alpine valleys. M. Venetz, an engineer of the Valais, was the first to undertake an application of them, in a treatise on the subject, in which he showed, that at various periods since the end of the last century the glaciers had extended further than at present, and in retiring had left everywhere heaps of stones and large rocks, as marks of their presence. Afterwards, M. de Charpentier conceived the idea of extending the application of these facts beyond the region of the present glaciers. He advanced the hypothesis, that the distribution of the boulders which are scattered over the valley of Switzerland* and on the sides of the Jura, may be accounted for in this way. This opinion, which he expressed in a brief treatise, was received with almost unanimous incredulity; so generally adopted was Saussure's theory, which accounted for these phenomena by the supposition that the Alpine chain had formerly been broken through at various points, allowing vast lakes, before shut up within its walls, to escape with violence.†

* The northern part of Switzerland, between the Bernese Oberland and the Jura, goes by this name.

† For some account of Saussure's theory see Lyell's *Elements of Geology*, American edition, Vol. I., p. 245.

Mr. Agassiz, as we hear, was among the skeptics, and, in 1836, visited M. de Charpentier, with the view of persuading his friend to relinquish an hypothesis which he considered untenable. But the latter, instead of entering into a discussion, conducted Agassiz to the places themselves, on the Mer de Glace, at Chamouni, where his observations had been made. He showed him the glacier actually at work in transporting boulders, and in its passage polishing and rounding the rocks at its sides. A light now burst upon the mind of Mr. Agassiz: not only did he admit that the blocks found in the valley of Switzerland might have been carried thither in this manner, but he saw moreover at a glance the immense bearing of this fact, and the effect it must necessarily have on the science of Geology.

And indeed, in order that the Alpine glaciers should extend to the Jura, so as to deposit these blocks at the elevation of four thousand feet, the valley of Switzerland must have been covered with ice at least two thousand five hundred feet thick. Now such an accumulation of ice could not be the effect of a local cause. The depression of temperature necessary to account for this extension of these glaciers, must have made itself felt elsewhere, and this with an intensity increasing towards the north. Now as the soil of Scandinavia presents the same marks of friction as the sides of the Alps and the Jura, accompanied also by erratic boulders, the conclusion was deduced, that all the north of Europe must have been covered by a vast sheet of ice, in the same manner as the polar regions are at present. The formation of this sheet of ice, in consequence of a sudden depression of the temperature, it was insisted, must have put an end to the tertiary epoch, by annihilating the animals and plants then existing.

Such was the original form of the Glacial Theory, which was first announced in a discourse of Mr. Agassiz, in 1837, at the opening of the meeting of the *Société Helvétique*, held at Neufchatel. The opposition excited by M. de Charpentier's theory, (which only extended the glaciers of the Alps as far as the Jura,) was roused in a tenfold degree by that of Mr. Agassiz. As is always the case when a new truth dawns upon the world, two parties were immediately formed; one embracing the new doctrine with enthusiasm, the other furiously opposing it. Disputes arose even concerning the present glaciers. It was denied that they were capable of polishing and scratching rocks. Doubts were raised as to the mode in which they advanced, and as the very fact of their advance rested

solely on public notoriety, it was demanded that their movement should be shown by direct observations, before any conclusions were drawn from it. A problem before purely geological, was thus suddenly changed into a question of fact, requiring a long series of researches and experiments.

Though already overburdened by his various labors, Agassiz did not shrink from this task. He saw at once, that to obtain a satisfactory solution it was not enough to have such isolated observations as can be made in a short visit. It was necessary to examine the glaciers not only at their termination, but also throughout their whole extent; to ascertain the influence of inequalities of the soil on their movements; the temperature of the ice and the effect of external agencies upon it, under all circumstances. In a word, it was necessary to do what had never been done before; namely, to establish an intimate acquaintance with the glaciers.

Mr. Agassiz, after having visited in succession most of the glaciers, fixed his head-quarters at the Glacier of the Aar, whither he went for eight years consecutively, with his friends, to pass his summer vacations,—at first with no shelter except a large boulder lying on the middle of the glacier, and which soon became famous under the name of the *Hôtel des Neuchâtelois*. Afterwards he built a little stone cabin on the left margin of the glacier;—this received the name of "the Pavilion." Here he prosecuted the long series of researches that have obtained so much celebrity in the scientific world.

Although his retreat was situated eight thousand feet above the level of the sea, and twelve miles from any habitation, it was soon well known throughout the country, and there might often be seen assembled a select company, in which all nations were worthily represented.

The scientific results obtained from these investigations are contained in two works. The first, published in 1840, under the title of "*Etudes sur les Glaciers*," comprises a description, with plates, of the principal phenomena connected with the glaciers, together with a detailed account of the author's views as to their former extent. The second, recently published, under the name of "*Système glaciaire*," is the last, and seems to us likely to be one of the most successful works of the author; it contains a detailed account of the investigations made during his last five visits, (from 1841 to 1845,) with the view to determine the mode of progression of the glaciers in all parts of their course, at all seasons of the year, and under all conditions of temperature. This work is accompanied by beau-

tiful plates, and a topographical chart of the Glacier of the Aar, on a very large scale, ($\frac{1}{10,000}$,) allowing even the minutest details of the surface to be given, so that this glacier is better known, in a topographical point of view, than any canton or state.

We cannot, of course, undertake an analysis of the results obtained from all these observations, and summed up at the end of each chapter. We will only say, that this work, if we mistake not, is to be considered as a sort of introduction to a more extensive undertaking, for which the author has already collected a great number of materials, and which is to comprise the history of the last great revolutions which the earth's surface has undergone. We understand that Mr. Agassiz finds in this country a vast field for research, and valuable materials in the works of American geologists.

Referring those of our readers who are desirous of particular information on this matter, to the above work, we conclude our sketch with a single passage of a different character, from a little volume by Mr. Desor, entitled "*Excursions et séjours de M. Agassiz et de ses compagnons de voyage, dans les Glaciers et les hautes régions des Alpes*,"* — containing a lively and readable account of the incidents and adventures of their mountain-life, as well as of the topography and scenery of the country, and from which, (did our limits allow,) we would gladly make larger extracts. It is easy to conceive, that, living in the midst of the magnificent peaks by which the Glacier of the Aar is surrounded, the temptation to scale their dizzy heights must be strong, especially when fortified by a scientific interest. Mr. Desor gives accounts of various ascents undertaken by their little company; the most memorable of which is that of the Jungfrau, which took place in 1841; having for its object the study of the structure of the snow and ice on the higher summits. The Jungfrau is the most admired of the Swiss mountains, and — next to the Finsteraarhorn, Mont Blanc, and the Monte Rosa — the highest of the Alps, being 13,720 feet in elevation. We extract from the abovementioned work some particulars of this ascent, which was much talked of among the mountaineers; since, by many of them, the Jungfrau was considered inaccessible. Starting from the hamlet of Méril, on the Viesch Glacier, at

* Neufchatel and Paris. 1844. 18mo. For many interesting details, among others the account of a descent into one of the crevices of the glacier, to examine its structure, see an article by Mr. Agassiz himself, in the Edinb. New Phil. Journal, for 1842.

five o'clock, a. m., Mr. Agassiz and his companions arrived, at two, p. m., at the base of the highest summit, the inclination of which, on being measured, was found to be forty-five degrees. This declivity, moreover, was covered with hard, slippery ice, in which it was necessary to cut steps; and this, together with the intense cold, so retarded their progress, that, at one time, they advanced only fifteen steps in a quarter of an hour. The summit formed the vertical section of a cone; and the ice being less hard at the edge of the precipice, they walked, by the advice of their guide, on the very brink of the abyss. "Several times," says Mr. Desor, "on thrusting out my staff rather further than usual, I felt it pass through the roof of snow,"—which, as is usually the case, projected like a cornice from the edge of the precipice,—"and then we could look, (whenever the fog separated for a moment,) perpendicularly through the hole into the vast gulf below." The fog, which had hidden every thing from sight, cleared away when they reached the summit, at about four, p. m. "Here, for the first time, we had a view of the valley of Switzerland; we were on the western edge of the section of the cone, having at our feet the barrier that separates the valley of Lauterbrunnen from that of Grindelwald. . . . The mountain here forms an abrupt angle, a dozen feet below the summit, and we saw, with a sort of affright, that the space which separated us from the highest point was a sharp ridge, about twenty feet long, the sides of which had an inclination of from sixty to seventy degrees. 'There is no way of getting there,' said Agassiz, and we all inclined to the same opinion. Jacob, [their principal guide,] on the contrary, said there was no difficulty whatever, and that we should all get over. Laying aside what he carried, he commenced the undertaking by passing his staff over the ridge, so as to bring it under his right arm, and thus climbed along the western slope, burying his feet as much as possible in the snow, in order to obtain foothold." In this way he passed over, and after having removed the snow from the summit, persuaded them all to follow. "The summit is a very narrow triangular space, about two feet long, and a foot and a half wide, with the base towards the valley of Switzerland. As there was room only for one person, we took turns. Agassiz mounted first, resting on Jacob's arm. He remained about five minutes, and when he rejoined us, I saw he was unable to suppress the vivid emotion caused by the overwhelming grandeur of the spectacle."

"It is not the vast prospect that makes the charm of the higher mountains. We had already found from former experience, that distant views are generally indistinct. Here, on the summit of the Jungfrau, the contours of the distant mountains were still less defined. But what fascinated us was the spectacle in our immediate neighbourhood. Before us was spread out the valley of Switzerland, and at our feet were piled up the lower chains, the apparent uniformity of whose height gave still greater sublimity to the vast peaks that towered up almost to our level. At the same time, the valleys of the Oberland, which, until now, had been covered by light vapor, were uncovered in several places, 'revealing to us through the fissures the world below.' We distinguished on the right the valley of Grindelwald; on the left, far below, an immense chasm, at the bottom of which a brilliant thread wound along, following its windings. This was the valley of Lauterbrunnen, with the river Lutschinen. . . . On the south the view was interrupted by clouds, which had for some hours been gathering on the Monte Rosa. We were recompensed for this, however, by a very extraordinary phenomenon, which took place under our eyes and interested us much. A thick mist had gathered on our left, towards the southwest; it ascended constantly from the Rott-thal, and began to extend to the northward. We already feared lest it should surround us a second time, when we found that it terminated abruptly at the distance of a few feet from us. Owing to this circumstance, we beheld before us a vertical wall of mist, the height of which we estimated to be at least from 12,000 to 15,000 feet, since it rose from the valley of Lauterbrunnen to a considerable distance above our heads. As its temperature was below the freezing point, the little particles of vapor were transformed into crystals of ice, and reflected the sun's rays in all the colors of the rainbow; we seemed to be surrounded by a mist of gold."

The scientific results of this ascension were — the discovery that the snow, even on the highest summits, is not changed into ice, though it rests on a crust of very compact ice; also, that the summit of the Jungfrau is gneiss, and not limestone, as had been supposed. Among the lichens gathered by Mr. Agassiz at the summit, was a new species (*Umbilicaria Virginis, Schær.*); — the others were among those found by Saussure on Mont Blanc.

The general features of Mr. Agassiz' history since 1845

are probably known to most of our readers. In the fall of 1846, being charged with a scientific exploration by the king of Prussia, and having also received an invitation to lecture before the Lowell Institute, he arrived in this country, where he has since resided. On the establishment of the Lawrence Scientific School, at Cambridge, the professorship of Zoölogy and Geology was offered to him, and after some deliberation accepted. Of the results of his labors in this country it is yet too soon to speak; but the impulse given to these studies by his presence is a matter of public notoriety, and of the highest importance to scientific culture among us.

In conclusion we give a chronological list of the most important of Mr. Agassiz' works.

Spix et Agassiz, selecta genera et species Piscium, quos in itinere per Brasiliam annis MDCCCXVII–XX peracto collegit et pingendos curavit. 2 vol. cum 55 Tab. lithogr. et 46 Tab. col. Munich. 1829–31.—Recherches sur les Poissons fossiles. Soleure. 1833–43. 5 vols., 4to, et 5 vols. Planches, fol.—W. Buckland, Geologie u. Mineralogie in Beziehung z. natürl. Theologie. Aus d. Engl. übers mit Anm. u. Zusätz v. L. Agassiz. Neufchatel. 1838. Mit 69 Tafeln. 2 Bde. 8vo.—Description des Echinodermes fossiles de la Suisse. Soleure. 1839–40. Avec 25 Pl. 4to.—Monographies d'Echinodermes vivans et fossiles. Soleure. 1838–40. 4 vols. 4to.—Etudes critiques sur les Mollusques fossiles. 1840–45. 4to.—Histoire naturelle des poissons d'eau douce de l'Europe centrale. Soleure. 1839–40. Fol.—Mémoire sur les moules de Mollusques vivans et fossiles. Soleure. 1840–42. 4to.—Etudes sur les glaciers. Soleure. 1840. 8vo. 8 vols. Avec 32 Pl. fol. [Also the same work in a German translation.]—Nomenclator Zoölogicus, seu nomina generica generum animalium tam viventium quam fossilium. Soleure. 1842–1846. 4to.—Monographies des Poissons fossiles du système Dévonien. 1844–45. 4 vols. fol. Avec un Atlas.—Iconographie des coquilles tertiaires. Dans les Mém. de la Soc. Helv. des Sc. Nat. Vol. 7. 1845.—Bibliographia hist. naturalis. [In publication by the Ray Society.]—Système glaciaire, ou recherches sur les glaciaires et leur mécanisme. Avec un Atlas. Paris. 1847.—Catalogue raisonné des Echinides vivans et fossiles, par MM. Agassiz et Desor. [Annal. des Sc. Naturelles, 1847.]

Mr. Agassiz has also prepared (by request) an elementary work on Natural History, which is now in course of publication.

ART. V. — SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

1. — 1. *Phonotypy. A Report to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.* Cambridge. 1847.

2. *Significance of the Alphabet.* By C. KRAITSIR, M. D. Published by E. P. Peabody. Boston. 1846.

3. *First Book of English, founded on the Significance of the Alphabet,* by C. KRAITSIR, M. D.

AN orthography of English, properly speaking, has never had existence. The gentlemen of the American Academy, who have put forth the report in favor of Phonotypy, state very clearly the disadvantages resulting from the extreme contradiction at present existing between the writing and the pronunciation. But they have not investigated the origin and history of this discrepancy, nor shown the comparative truth to the nature of language, of the writing and pronunciation; and hence the remedy they suggest is worse than the evil, for it involves a sanction and extension of every abuse of the latter, which has the chance of present fashion in its favor; it precludes future return towards the general standard of the Indo-European tongues, in pronunciation; and, what is worse than all, it annihilates that truth to the eye which the language in a great degree still preserves, by being written with letters indicating the natural growth of the words from roots common to the whole family of languages to which it belongs.

We therefore would call attention to Dr. Kraitsir's pamphlet on the "Significance of the Alphabet," as well as to the "First Book of English," which he has published. The latter, notwithstanding some carelessness evinced in the composition of the vocabularies, is conceived in a more scientific spirit, and suggests more fundamental ideas than any primer we have seen.

In the "Significance of the Alphabet," Dr. Kraitsir shows that the Latin arrangement of the visible signs of sounds was made with reference to the organs which made the sounds respectively; and that these organs severally imitate the things, and symbolize the ideas, which are the subject of speech: consequently, that the sounds they make are significant. And, in the "First Book of English," he states, as a first principle, that *the great secret of language* is this; namely, that the sounds articulated by the lips, tongue, throat, and teeth, signify exactly what these organs symbolize to the senses and imagination.

If this is the case, and if, as he states, the alphabets used by the Indo-European nations classify sounds according to their organic origin and significance, an importance is given to these schemes of writing, in the eyes of the philologist and philosopher,

which Phonotypy does not respect, but which claims the careful investigation of both its defenders and opposers.

Dr. Kraitsir has yet to unfold, in a "Second Book of English," the practical bearings of his idea upon the treatment of the English language. In his treatise on the "significance," he has merely spoken of the alphabet we use as affording a perfect standard of Latin pronunciation, for which language it was invented. The views and arguments with respect to the pronunciation of Latin are not new, except in this country. Karl Ottfried Müller adopted this pronunciation in his lectures in Göttingen, and, in fact, it is now generally recognized as having the analogy of the language and the authority of the old Roman grammarians in its favor. Even in England, Scheller's Latin Grammar has been translated, and the translator adds to the proofs adduced by Scheller, others of his own; and Dr. Ainsworth long ago, in his dictionary, gives us the same views.

But Dr. Kraitsir goes to the root of the matter, in pointing out the organic significance of the sounds, and showing the bearings of the true pronunciation of Latin upon the establishment of a standard of radical meanings, and the laws that identify words in all the Indo-European languages.

The possibility of establishing this standard, and discovering these laws, which may be used as keys to unlock the vital treasures of that immense family of languages, containing the highest results of human civilization, gives the subject such an interest as might ensure for it the attentive study, not only of professed scholars, but of practical men, to whom it becomes yearly of more importance to speak in a variety of tongues. The suggestion of the Promptuary, (pp. 26, 27,) containing a comparative anatomy of languages, opens a new world to every man of common-sense, no less than to the philologist and philosopher.

Among the many trains of interesting thought suggested by these works, we have room only to advert to that point, in which they seem to cross the path of the phonotypists.

Dr. Kraitsir recognizes all the inconveniences of the discordance of the writing and pronunciation of English pointed out by the Report of the Academy, and touches upon others of more importance still; and, although he maintains that the English writing is less corrupted than the pronunciation, and is rather to be preserved of the two, he admits and even suggests some reform in the writing.

Since the Latin alphabet is confessedly not adequate to the perspicuous writing of the English tongue, which contains eight more vowels, and five more consonants, than the Latin, he would enlarge it by a system of *pointing*, as the Poles did, when they undertook to write their language with Latin letters. He suggests that the *a* in *man*, *o* in *not* and *nor*, *e* in *err*, *i* in *fir*, and *u*

in *fur* should have each a dot placed under them; and *u* in *fun* two dots. This would make a character for every vowel, for Dr. Kraitsir does not admit that mere quantity of sound changes the vowel. To the guttural division of the alphabet he would add *c* with a dot under it, to represent the consonant *ch* in *church*. To the lingua-dental division he would add *s* with a dot under it, to represent the *sh* in *ship*, and a *z* with a dot under it, to represent the first consonant sound in *osier*. To represent the *th* in *this* he suggests that either the Anglo-Saxon character be restored, or a *d* with a dot under it used; and for *th* in *thin*, either the Anglo-Saxon character or a dot under *t*.

These twelve additional characters would represent all the sounds of the English language; rendering the present characters not obsolete or obscure, but more clear and perspicuous, and then a great deal of the English language could be written as it is spelt.

But this last should not be done indiscriminately. There are many silent consonants in English writing, which should be preserved, because they indicate sounds that have a meaning; and the vowels *i* and *u* are often indicative of sunken consonants, and must be, in those instances, carefully preserved.

It is proper also to remark, that although Dr. Kraitsir suggests this reform in printing, it is not at all essential in his eyes. When languages are studied on the philological principle, the inconveniences of the anomalous writing of English are of less consequence.

We were quite surprised to find, from the "First Book of English," how seldom the soft sounds of *c* and *g* occur in the language. Dr. Kraitsir affirms that they never occur except in derivations from the corruptly pronounced Latin of the middle ages, or in importations from the French. In the Anglo-Saxon words, *girl*, *gird*, *get*, &c., we have *g* hard before *e* and *i* as well as before *a*, *o*, and *u*. We would suggest, that, if the writing be reformed, a dot should be placed over *c* and *g*, wherever they are soft, to facilitate the reading of the language to children and foreigners.

The space allowed has compelled us to abbreviate what we have hinted at, and we can only add, that the suggestion of pointing the letters of the Latin alphabet to represent those sounds of the English which are not found in Latin, has this unquestionable advantage over the scheme of the phonographers; that it is in analogy with the organism and in harmony with the significance of the language, and suggests to scholars true standards of pronunciation and meaning.

2. — *Prison Life and Reflections, or, a Narrative of the Arrest, Trial, Conviction, Imprisonment, Treatment, Observations, Reflections, and Deliverance, of Work, Burr, and Thompson, who suffered an unjust and cruel imprisonment in the Missouri Penitentiary, for attempting to aid some slaves to liberty.* Three parts in one volume. By GEORGE THOMPSON, one of the prisoners. Oberlin: Printed by James M. Fitch. 1847. 12mo. pp. XVI and 417.

THE above title is sufficiently descriptive of the work.

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3. — *The Characteristics of the Present Age.* By JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE. Translated from the German by WILLIAM SMITH. London: John Chapman. 1847. 12mo. pp. XVI and 271.

TWO years ago Mr. Smith translated another work of Fichte, "The Nature of the Scholar," to which he prefixed a short but beautiful memoir of its author, and last year Mrs. Percy Sinnett translated his "Destination of Man." Fichte thus is likely to become well known to English readers. The present volume contains seventeen lectures on the following subjects: Idea of universal history; a general and minute delineation of the present age and its scientific condition; the Life according to Reason; earlier conditions of the scientific or literary world, and its ideal condition; Mysticism as a phenomenon of the present age; the origin and limits of History; the absolute form and historical development of the State; Influence of Christianity on the State; Development of the State in modern Europe; Public Morality and Public Religion of the present age; Conclusion. He promises also to translate Fichte's "Doctrine of Religion," the ablest and most celebrated of all his works. The translation is more free than literal.

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4. — *A Vindication of Protestant Principles.* By Phileleutherus Anglicanus. Nihil tam tectum est, quod non sit detegendum, non semper pendebit inter latrones Christus: resurget aliquando crucifixa veritas. London: John W. Parker. 1847. 8vo. pp. XVI and 194.

THIS is the work of some man who has read much amongst philosophical and theological writers, and has thought much. He thinks William of Ockham originated the Protestant principles; that Luther and Bucer were not the main springs of the Reforma-

tion in England, but the revival of letters and the influence of Melancthon. The articles of the English church have a "comprehensive Protestantism." However, he admits errors in the church establishment, but thinks the Puritans mainly to be blamed for their existence. The most important feature of the book is the author's opposition to all worship of the Bible. He considers that Strauss has overthrown rationalism on the one hand, and verbal inspiration on the other; at the same time he thinks "the Scriptures deliver an authoritative message from God to man, in regard to all matters of essential and religious truth, therein set forth," and thinks the gradual development of religious truth was terminated by the final revelation of the gospel. After a good deal of good-humored discussion and learned talk, he comes to the conclusion, "that it is the duty of all rational men, who are subjects of the British crown, to enter the widely-spread portals of the national church, which allows full scope for the free exercise of the privilege" of reading the Scriptures, "and treats with enlightened tolerance every unimportant modification of religious sentiments." He "cannot understand why any one who acquiesces in the judicial authority of the Lord Chancellor should object to the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Archbishop of Canterbury." The author has but a poor appreciation of the doctrine of the Trinity.

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5. — *Endeavours after the Christian Life.* Discourses by JAMES MARTINEAU. Vol. II. London. 1847. 12mo. pp. XII and 349.

THE first volume of the "Endeavours" was published in 1843, and has been republished and extensively read in America. This work is thus worthily dedicated: "To Rev. John Hamilton Thom, this volume, the expression of a heart enlarged by his friendship and often aided by his wisdom, is dedicated, in memory of many labors lightened by partnership, purposes invigorated by sympathy, and the vicissitudes of years balanced by constancy of affection." This volume contains twenty-one sermons, with the following titles: Where is thy God? The Sorrow with downward Look; The Shadow of Death; Great Hopes for great Souls; Lo! God is here; Christian Self-consciousness; The unclouded Heart; Help Thou mine Unbelief; Having, Doing, and Being; The Freeman of Christ; The Good Soldier of Jesus Christ; The Realm of Order; The Christian Doctrine of Merit; The Child's Thought; Looking up and Lifting up; The Christian Time-view; The Family in Heaven and Earth; The Single and the Evil Eye; The Seven Sleepers; The Sphere of Silence — 1.

Man's, 2. God's. It is very refreshing to find a volume of sermons so bright, so original, so profound and beautiful as these. Somebody says the day of reading sermons is over — though not the day of preaching them. These are sermons which would command readers in any age — and still more in this, when sectarian dulness and flexible ethics are about all that one looks for in the desk. We have found in this volume nothing in the least degree sectarian, all is large and liberal; there is piety without silliness, wisdom without conceit, and humanity with no mawkish sentimentalism. We can only say to the author, Send us more.

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6. — *Washington and his Generals; or, Legends of the Revolution.* By GEORGE LIPPARD, Author of Ladye Annabel, The Quaker City, Blanche of Brandywine, Herbert Tracy, The Nazarene, or the last of the Washingtons, &c. With an Introductory Essay by REV. C. CHAUNCEY BURR. Philadelphia. 1847. 8vo. pp. XXVIII and 538.

IN this work and the others from the same pen, we discover traces of a man of superior abilities; of a noble and generous nature. But he seems ill at ease, stung, perhaps, by misfortune, or by neglect, by seeing the wrongs of the world, and the men who fatten upon those wrongs. He writes often from an inferior motive, yet always in the interest of mankind, showing a ready sympathy with justice, mercy, and unaffected trust in God. He does not seem at peace with himself or with the world. There are many things in his works which we are sorry to see, for his many excellences show the ability to do better things. Some day we shall hope for a work better than his terrible paintings of crime and sin in "The Quaker City." But he never makes vice lovely. The monster certainly has a "frightful mien," yet the moral effect of such a book as that is more than questionable to us. We can understand how Schiller could write his "Robbers," easier than we can read the play a second time; and are not pleased to see an able man writing from such an impulse. Even "The Quaker City" has scenes of great power and unexceptionable excellence.

The Legends of the Revolution extend over but a small part of the whole war, and relate mainly to the battle of Germantown, the life of Benedict Arnold, the battle of Brandywine, and the declaration of Independence. It contains many fine scenes, though the descriptions are too full, and the phraseology too intense, to suit a classic taste.

7.— *Narrative of an Exploratory Visit to each of the Consular Cities of China and to the Islands of Hong-Kong and Chusan, in behalf of the Church Missionary Society, in the years* 1844, 1845, 1846. By the Rev. George Smith, M. A., of Magdalen Hall, Oxford, and late missionary to China. London. 1847. 8vo. pp. xxiv and 532.

Mr. Smith visited Canton "to ascertain the precise nature of local facilities for Missionary enterprise," and "to procure a native teacher of the mandarin or court dialect." The book is marked by ignorance, conceit, and bigotry, and contains but little information of any value to the general reader. Mr. Smith conversed with a Parsee on religious subjects, and, desirous of overwhelming the heathen, "singling out especially an emaciated form of infant suffering, we once asked him how on any other hypothesis than that of the *entrance of sin into the world and the fall of man*, he could regard misery at so early an age as compatible with the infinite benevolence of the Creator. He seemed to feel the force of the argument; but endeavoured to evade it by suddenly asking us how it was there were so many sects of Christians."

One day Mr. Smith visited a Budhist: the priests came up and "intimated their desire" that he "would give them tobacco." "We made known to them," adds the author, "that we had no such gift for them, but offered them some copies of the Epistle to the Ephesians, and a tract, entitled 'The Way of Eternal Blessedness.'" One Chinaman told him that since the war with England the Chinese "were more disinclined than formerly to listen to Christian doctrine; thinking that if Englishmen were Christians it could not be a good religion which permitted them to be so insolent and mischievous." Another said, "Perhaps this English doctrine may be very good; but we wish that you would try it first on the English themselves, for they are wicked men; when this doctrine has made them better, then come and speak to us."

"My Chinese boy more than once on the voyage, [to Shanghai in a vessel carrying seven hundred and fifty boxes of opium, valued at about $750,000] asked me whether I knew there was opium on board, and what I should say in reply to the Chinese, if, after hearing me speak to them about . . . 'Jesus' doctrines,' they should ask why I had come in a ship that brought opium, of which so many of his countrymen ate and perished." The missionary does not tell us how he "evaded" these remarks. He gives rather a tame picture of the opium-ships, and a much mitigated statement of the effect of the drug. On the other hand, he exaggerates the number of cases of infanticide: "out of four daughters poor men generally murdered two, and sometimes even three."

8. — *The True Story of my Life; a Sketch by Hans Christian Andersen.* Translated by MARY HOWITT. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. VIII and 298.

THIS is a simple and unaffected little autobiography. It is full of delicate little touches of nature, not without a good-humored satire. The occasional notices of the distinguished men of the time — such as Thorwaldsen, Oehlenschlager, Grimm, Goethe, and others — enhance the variety and liveliness of the story. Andersen was once troubled by a swarm of critics, and thus writes of them. "The newspaper criticism in Copenhagen was infinitely stupid. It was set down as an exaggeration, that I could have seen the whole round blue globe of the moon in Smyrna, at the time of the new moon. That was called fancy and extravagance, which there any one sees who can open his eyes." — p. 157. He was not wholly above such criticism, but "felt a desire to flagellate such wet dogs, who come into our rooms and lay themselves down in the best place in them." — p. 158. He everywhere gives indications of a warm, humane, generous heart — though possessed of no very lofty poetic imagination. His little stories for children have a certain grace and charmingness about them, which can only come from a man's experience combined with a childlike simplicity.

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9 — *Views of Christian Nurture and subjects adjacent thereto.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford. 1847. 12mo. pp. 252.

THIS volume contains two discourses on Christian nurture, designed to show, that if you educate the religious nature of a child the child will commonly turn out a religious man, without needing to go through the process of transformation in a "revival." The child is "to grow up a Christian," and at last will be a Christian grown up, not a Christian made up. He thinks with Baxter, that "education is as properly a means of grace as preaching." Then follows an argument for "Discourses on Christian Nurture," a tract originally "addressed to the publishing committee of the Massachusetts Sabbath School Society," who had printed his discourses and then suppressed them. The argument is sharp and convincing, but, considering the weakness of the persons addressed, perhaps a little too hard and cutting.

Then comes a paper on the "Spiritual economy of Revivals;" another, entitled "Growth, not Conquest, the true Method of Christian Progress;" a third, called "The Organic Unity of the Family;" a fourth, on "The Scene of the Pentecost and the Christian Parish," and a "Note," defending himself against cer-

tain misrepresentations. We need scarcely say that Dr. Bushnell is pastor of a church in Hartford, Conn., of what is commonly called the Orthodox denomination, nor that at this day he is one of the brightest ornaments of that denomination itself. He is what may be called a "liberal Christian," holding fast to his own theory, but allowing other men to do the same for themselves. In this book, and in the numerous sermons he has published, we find talents of a high order united with a genuine Christian piety. His style is fresh and vigorous, original, always manly and often eloquent. The appearance of such a man — and he is not alone in his denomination — is a cheering sign of the times. It remains, however, to be shown, whether his denomination will tolerate such freedom of thought and speech as he claims to exercise. To him it is of no consequence how they decide, but of much to themselves.

10.— *The Gospel of To-day:* a Discourse delivered at the Ordination of T. W. Higginson as Minister of the First Religious Society in Newburyport, Mass., Sept. 15th, 1847, by WILLIAM HENRY CHANNING; together with the Charge, Right-hand of Fellowship, and Address to the People. Boston. 1847. pp. 64.

MR. Channing says, "Infinite love is the primal source of life; oneness with God and good spirits the real immortality; disinterestedness the sufficing joy; goodness the only way to heaven," but still the peculiar signs of the times require a "gospel for to-day" as well as for ever. All the tendencies of the age converge to one end. The tendencies of Piety are revivalism, naturalism, catholicism; of Philanthropy, social reforms, educational plans, and religious charities; of Politics, liberalism, legitimacy, political economy. "The whole age is sweeping onward towards the era of combined order." And in the very thought of that — "of society organized according to divine law — is revealed a prophecy of unspeakable grandeur." All things point towards perfect society. He does not describe perfect society, but announces "four fundamental Truths, the corner-stones of this Temple of Unity;" namely, 'God is Love;' 'Nature is the symbol of the Eternal Being;' 'Humanity is one — one in its physical, social, spiritual life.' 'The Law of order for humanity, among all nations, within each nation, between individuals, is, once and for ever, Love.' The anticipation of perfect society is not visionary; this appears from the character of God, from man's modes of existence — psychical, social, spiritual — and his position between nature below and heaven above. All things are leading us onward to "oneness with man, with nature, and with God." The discourse is marked by the well-known characteristics of the distinguished author; by human-

ity, piety, by rare and beautiful eloquence. The other addresses are likewise of a high order, and entirely free from bigotry and sectarianism. Mr. Higginson — like his ancestor in 1629, the first minister ordained in New England — was ordained without help or hindrance from any "ecclesiastical council."

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11. — *Modern Painters.* Third Edition. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1846. 2 vols. imp. 8vo. pp. 422 and 217. (The first volume reprinted by Wiley & Putnam. New York. 1847.)

We hope to be able at some future time to lay before our readers an extended examination of this remarkable book. Meanwhile, a mere passing notice might seem superfluous, as it appears to have already made its own way. Nevertheless, as this work seems to us not less important to the unartistic lover of Nature than to the painter or connoisseur — and as these sheets may perchance fall into the hands of some one who has not heard it praised, — we cannot refrain from making a few extracts.

This book, which at present consists of two volumes, but of which we are promised a third volume, with illustrations, originated, as the preface tells us, "in indignation at the shallow and false criticism of the periodicals of the day on the works of the great living artist [J. M. W. Turner] to whom it principally refers." Its purpose "is to demonstrate the utter falseness both of the facts and principles, the imperfection of material, and error of arrangement," on which the so-called "ideal" landscapes of the old painters are based; "and to insist on the necessity, as well as the dignity, of an earnest, faithful, living, study of Nature as she is, rejecting with abhorrence all that man has ever done to alter and modify her." The old landscapists, he thinks, "had neither love of Nature, nor feeling of her beauty; they looked for her coldest and most commonplace effects, because they were easiest to imitate;" "the deception of the senses was the great and first end of all their art." The modern English painters, on the contrary, and particularly Turner, according to him, "have looked at Nature with totally different eyes; seeking not for what is easiest to imitate, but for what is most important to tell."

Whether Mr. Turner and his countrymen deserve the high relative rank here given them, we have in this country few facilities for judging: probably few will admit the justice of all he says on this point, and we may trace here, perhaps, some injurious effects of the circumstances under which the book, or at least the first part of it, was written.

But this we conceive to be altogether a minor question. The

main point is, whether there is any thing in Nature capable and worthy of representation, which the old painters did not represent. This question can be discussed as well, perhaps, in this country, as anywhere: for, on the one hand, Nature, with all her variety, has but one system, and produces all her effects by the same means; and on the other, though much of the spirit of a picture is lost in a print, yet enough usually remains to show its general character and aim — enough, therefore, to enable us to apprehend a fundamental difference of plan, if it exist, though not to judge of its execution. Now, how much soever we may admire Claude's or Ruysdael's landscapes, this, at least, we must admit — that they portray something very *different* from what we know of actual Nature. And this is not merely the superficial difference of scene and climate, but a difference of *aim* in the painter. Nobody expects to find in the galleries of Rome or Dresden any thing reminding him of New England. Yet we are reminded of New England, and of what might seem the most local and peculiar effects and details of its landscape, on almost every page of our author's first volume, though he treats exclusively of European scenery. The difference, therefore, arises not from any foreignness of the objects represented, but of the sentiment with which they were viewed. This may be higher or lower; it is at least radically different. "I am not speaking," he says, "of the beauty or desirableness of the system of the old masters; it may be sublime, and affecting, and ideal, and intellectual, and a great deal more; but all I am concerned with at present is, that it is not *true*." "A man accustomed to the broad, wild sea-shore, with its bright breakers, and free winds, and sounding rocks, and eternal sensation of tameless power, can scarcely but be angered when Claude bids him stand still on some paltry, chipped, and chiselled quay, with porters and wheelbarrows running against him, to watch a weak, rippling, bound, and barriered water, that has not strength enough in one of its waves to upset the flower-pots on the wall, or even fling a jet of spray over the confining stone." "Nor is it only by the professed landscape painters that the great verities of the material world are betrayed. Grand as are the motives of landscape in the works of the earlier and mightier men, there is yet in them nothing approaching to a general view, nor complete rendering of natural phenomena; — not that they are to be blamed for this; for they took out of nature that which was fit for their purpose, and their mission was to do no more; but we must be cautious to distinguish that imaginative abstraction of landscape which alone we find in them, from the entire statement of truth which has been attempted by the moderns." "From the window of Titian's house at Venice, the chain of the Tyrolese Alps is seen lifted in spectral power above the tufted plain of Treviso; every dawn that reddens the towers of Murano lights also a line of pyramidal

fires along that colossal ridge; but there is, so far as I know, no evidence in any of the master's works of his ever having beheld, much less felt, the majesty of their burning." "More than this, of that which they loved and rendered, much is rendered conventionally: by noble conventionalities, indeed, but such, nevertheless, as would be inexcusable if the landscape became the principal subject instead of an accompaniment." And whether this difference of aim be attributed to inability, or to intentional limitation, the reason is, we think, in either case the same; namely, that there now exists a more profound appreciation of the landscape, by itself, without any adventitious interest, than formerly. The only alternative is to suppose that what we feel in the landscape is *beyond the reach* of pictorial art; — that the old painters felt it also, but wisely abstained from attempting impossibilities. This opinion is a common one, and is supported by the conservative instinct which everywhere holds by what has been done, and refuses to admit the possibility of any thing better. And so far the feeling is just: — we are not called upon to take possibilities for facts, or to believe that any thing *can be* until it *is*. But it is to be remembered, on the other hand, that every great action, as has been said, is an impossibility until it is done: — and that if we quit our skepticism, and say positively that it is impossible for modern art to excel the ancient, we ought to show some ground for our assertion in the nature of things.

That there are feelings which cannot be thus expressed, all will allow; — but that what Nature does every day by means which we can imitate, though at a vast interval, cannot be represented, even at such an interval, by pictorial art — remains to be proved. If authority is to govern, we on our part might well rely on the authority of the "Oxford Graduate." He shows such a profound instinct for principles; such a subtle apprehension and such an unwearied study of detail, in the work before us, as it is utterly impossible to give any adequate idea of by quotations admissible within our limits, but which is in our opinion unapproached in the language. All we knew we find here, and a great deal more. His statements therefore have a great deal of internal evidence in their favor; — it is natural to suppose that his standard is as high and his appreciation as just, in Art as in Nature.

But there are independent grounds, we think, in facts acknowledged by all, for believing that landscape by itself, that is, material nature, was less interesting and important to mankind in general, and therefore likely to be less profoundly understood and felt by artists in former times, than now.

In the works of the old painters the interest is less in the landscape itself, than in its connection with or adaptation to man. Trees, rocks, earth, and water were to them mere rubbish, of which they were to *make* a picture. These commonplace details were

to be elevated and idealized as being accessory to an historical subject; or even where they apparently stand by themselves, they always suppose some spectator present either in or out of the picture, since they are arranged with an evident view to striking at first sight some beholder. In the earlier landscape, the foreground is filled with animals, birds, and even insects and reptiles, — which no peasant could pass without observing; later, the object of attention is more elevated, but still something extraneous to the landscape. Even Claude never omits at least the glimpse of a city or castle, nor Ruysdael his distant spire.

In *tone*, that is, such a gradation of light and color as shall make the picture agreeable and intelligible at first sight, our author allows that the old masters are unequalled, but this effect, according to him, they obtained at the sacrifice of more important truth. They imitated accurately the relation and positive quantity of light and color in certain parts of the landscape, but from the inferiority of the means employed to those of Nature they soon came to the end of their scale, and were obliged "to omit the truths of space in every individual part of their picture, by the thousand. But this they did not care for; it saved them trouble; they reached their grand end, imitative effect; they thrust home just at the places where the common and careless eye looks for imitation, and they attained the broadest and most faithful appearance of truth of tone which art can exhibit."

This so-called "idealizing" of landscape, whatever may be thought of it, at all events implies at least the omission, if not the falsification, of a large part of the objects and aspects of Nature. When we select, we must neglect something. Now to *idealize* ought to mean, to seize the idea common to a variety of details, and, sufficiently expressing it, to neglect what is mere repetition, accident, or imperfection. "The true ideal of landscape," therefore, "is the expression of the specific — not the individual, but the specific — characters of every object, in their perfection." Any thing unworthy of being represented, therefore, must be something which does not, in Nature, express any idea.

Now it may be doubted, we think, whether *any thing* in Nature (as distinct from man) was felt by the old painters to be of itself the expression of an idea. Certain forms and effects of color and tone they admired; and they admired the landscape just so far as it could be made to conform to their preconceived notions. We are inclined to think, with our author, that the *idealization* of the landscape by the celebrated painters of former times, was too often a mere fanciful distortion of Nature, to suit the whim of the artist.

These views are supported by the feeling now common to all lovers of Nature, that the beauty of the landscape is a pervading quality, common to all landscapes: infinitely various, indeed, in degree, yet independent of any special assignable characters. The

charm of our autumn woods and fields is totally unconnected, not only with all human interest, but also with any striking details. It is not felt only, nor most forcibly, in presence of wide or enriched prospects, of majestic mountains and waterfalls — but of some familiar scene, in which all the features are commonplace, but exalted by some happy effect of light. The scanty range of a lonely brush-pasture in an autumn afternoon — the echoing stillness of a hemlock grove in winter — a few junipers and barberry-bushes, or the details of a mossy rock in the haze of spring — are sufficient for the highest enjoyment that can be derived from Nature. This enjoyment is distinct in kind from the admiration of remarkable natural objects, and their representation by the old painters; it is a veneration and love for the total spirit of Nature, and not for selected features. Our limits would not permit any satisfactory illustration or discussion of this novel and abstruse subject; we must refer those interested in the matter to our author's pages. We may remark, however, that this difference of feeling towards Nature between ancient and modern times, is not confined to Art, but is seen also in Science and Religion. The Greeks did not believe that the gods *created* the world, but only that they governed it; their power was a power *over* Nature, as something apart, and originally independent of them. And even after the Christian era, there was nothing like a *science* of nature. Natural Philosophy in the time of Leonardo da Vinci was either Mechanics, the art of managing the forces of Nature, or Alchemy, the art of juggling with them; Nature being looked upon as mere dead matter, or as the creation and kingdom of the devil.

"I know not," says our author, "that of the expressions of affection towards external nature to be found among Heathen writers, there are any of which the balance and leading thought cleaves not towards the sensual parts of her. Her beneficence they sought, and her power they shunned; her teaching through both, they understood never. The pleasant influences of soft winds, and ringing streamlets, and shady coverts; of the violet couch, and plane-tree shade, they received, perhaps, in a more noble way than we, but they found not any thing except fear, upon the bare mountain, or in the ghostly glen. The Hybla heather they loved more for its sweet hives than its purple hues. But the Christian spirit . . . finds the object of its love everywhere, in what is harsh and peaceful, as well as what is kind; nay, even in all that seems coarse and commonplace, seizing that which is good, and delighting more sometimes at finding its table spread in strange places, and in the presence of its enemies, and its honey coming out of the rock, than if all were harmonized into a less wondrous pleasure."

If, then, there now exists a keener sense for Nature than formerly, it will follow that the aim of painters of landscape of the present day *ought* to be, and very naturally may be, higher than

that of their predecessors; and this, as already remarked, is the important point. Our author, however, goes further than this, and endeavours to show, in a detailed dissection of the landscape in Nature and in existing pictures, which occupies the principal part of his first volume, the actual superiority of the moderns. Whatever may be thought of this opinion, this part of the book will probably be the most popular, from the keen observation and appreciation of Nature which it displays. Should we undertake to quote here, it would be difficult to know when to stop, and we can only recommend every lover of the country to buy it and read for himself. The second volume contains discussions of general principles of Æsthetics, which, though resting rather upon instinctive feeling than systematic knowledge, are yet in the highest degree interesting and valuable. In this volume also are many keen criticisms of particular works of art.

The American reprint is very neatly executed, and with tolerable correctness, — but we hope the publishers do not intend to put us off with half the work instead of the whole. We are sorry to see no indications on the cover or title-page, that this is only the first volume.

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12. — *De l'Esclavage et des Colonies.* Par GUSTAVE DU PUYNODE, docteur en droit, avocat à la cour royale de Paris. Paris. 1847. 8vo. pp. XVI and 224.

THIS is the third work of the author on the same or a similar subject. In 1845 he published a work on labor and the laboring classes. In the first two chapters he treats of slavery. He says, Liberty for all men, and in all departments of life, is the hope of the age. The two great problems of France are — to found a new order of things in Algiers, and in the West Indies to restore the slaves to the condition of entire civil and social freedom. He will not "undertake to prove the iniquity of slavery. The time has gone by when it was necessary to demonstrate that the color of the skin, or the place of birth, ought not to determine a man's rank in society." It must be remembered he is writing at Paris. "Slavery is a crime and a blunder. The solidarity of mankind was taught fully by the Stoics, and by Christianity, but has not been understood till now. France has taken the lead in developing the doctrine, and ought to abolish slavery, for she will thereby influence other nations, and slavery is at this day the greatest obstacle in the way of civilization. It perverts the master and debases the slave; it dishonors labor, renders it unproductive, corrupts the wealthy and promotes the vices of the poor. It is only possible on condition that the slaves are degraded, and the masters tyrants." To show that slavery prevents the increase

of population, he cites Mr. Clay, "one of the most enlightened men of the Union, and one of the most ardent defenders of slavery."

In 1315, Louis the Tenth made all men free who touched the soil of France, but Louis the Thirteenth introduced slavery into the French colonies. Formerly the Spanish slaves were better treated than others, but now, in point of cruelty, "Spanish slavery can only be compared to the American." He thinks the revolts and escapes show that the slaves are not happy, and quotes Mr. Humboldt, who says he has studied their condition where the laws and national habits tend to ameliorate their lot, but goes back with the same horror of slavery as when he first quitted Europe.

It seems the American churches are not alone in their defence of the "patriarchal institution," for the seminary of *Saint Esprit*, in which most of the colonial clergy are educated for their functions, teaches the legitimacy of slavery and the slave-trade; "the religion of a nation seldom prevails over its interests," says Humboldt. "It is the philosophers, not the devotees, who agitate the question of slavery." He thinks emancipation works well in the British West Indies: the blacks have money in the savings bank; they join temperance societies, build churches, and fill them; they send money to the London Abolition Society, to promote their work; they send missionaries to Africa to preach Love and Liberty on their natal soil; crime decreases from year to year. He says there are three schemes of emancipation: 1. gradual and progressive; 2. general and graduated; 3. general and spontaneous. He recommends general and immediate emancipation.

In Chapter III. he gives a history of ancient colonization, by the Greeks, Romans, and Phœnicians; in Chapter IV. he proposes a reform of the French colonies; in Chapter V. he touches upon the condition of Algiers.

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13. — *Evangeline, a Tale of Acadie.* By Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Third Edition. Boston: Wm. D. Ticknor & Co. 1848. 16mo. pp. 163.

This is a beautiful poem in Hexameter verse, and relates the adventures of a young French maiden — Evangeline — a native of Acadie. The English destroy the French settlement of Grand Pré, and carry off the inhabitants, who are scattered over the continent. Evangeline gets separated from her lover, Gabriel, and after seeking him in all the French settlements, from the great lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, becomes a sister of charity in Philadelphia. She discovers him in a hospital, sick, and too feeble to speak. He dies in her arms, and she soon joins him in the world where there is no separation.

The poem is full of beauties — now of description, or of senti-

ment, and occasionally of thought. The rhythmic movement is generally slight, but sometimes more emphatic, and sometimes sinking almost to prose. The measure seems wholly congenial to the author's mind; the sound "an echo to the sense." We give a few specimens.

"Many a farewell word and sweet goodnight on the door-step
Lingered long in Evangeline's heart, and filled it with gladness.
Carefully then were covered the embers that glowed on the hearthstone,
And on the oaken stairs resounded the tread of the farmer.
Soon with a soundless step the foot of Evangeline followed.
Up the staircase moved a luminous space in the darkness,
Lighted less by the lamp than the shining face [form?] of the maiden." — p. 46.

"Friends they sought and homes; and many despairing, heart-broken,
Asked of the earth but a grave, and no longer a friend or a fireside.
Written their history stands on tablets of stone in the churchyard,
Long among them was seen a maiden who waited and wandered,
Lowly and meek in spirit and patiently suffering all things.
Fair was she and young; but, alas! before her extended,
Dreary and vast and silent the desert of life, with its pathway
Marked by the graves of those who had sorrowed and fallen before her,
Passions long extinguished, and hopes long dead and abandoned,
As the emigrant's way o'er the Western desert is marked by
Camp-fires long consumed, and bones that bleach in the sunshine.
Something there was in her life incomplete, imperfect, unfinished;
As if a morning of June, with all its music and sunshine,
Suddenly paused in the sky, and, fading, slowly descended
Into the East again, from whence it late had arisen.
Sometimes she lingered in towns, till, urged by the fever within her,
Urged by a restless longing, the hunger and thirst of the spirit,
She would commence again her endless search and endeavour;
Sometimes in churchyards strayed and gazed on the crosses and tombstones,
Sat by some nameless grave, and thought that perhaps in its bosom
He was already at rest, and she longed to slumber beside him." —p. 84 – 86.

"Still stands the forest primeval; but far away from its shadow,
Side by side, in their nameless graves, the lovers are sleeping,
Under the humble walls of the little Catholic churchyard,
In the heart of the city, they lie, unknown and unnoticed.
Daily the tides of life go ebbing and flowing beside them,
Thousands of throbbing hearts, where theirs are at rest and for ever,
Thousands of aching brains, where theirs no longer are busy,
Thousands of toiling hands, where theirs have ceased from their labors,
Thousands of weary feet, where theirs have completed the journey." — pp. 161, 162.

We would only remind the author that the chestnut-tree does not grow in Acadie, that hoop-tire was not known among its inhabitants, and that no orchard is found "bending with golden fruit," in that region, in the month of November. American readers may well thank the author for a poem so wholly American in its incidents, its geography, and its scenery. We cannot but think it will add to the well-earned fame of its accomplished author. It has reached three editions in a few days, and we trust will soon reach many more.

14.— *Essays by R. W. Emerson.* First Series. New Edition. Boston: James Munroe & Company. 1847. pp. VI and 333. 12mo.

THIS new edition contains some poetic matters not in the earlier impression.

15.— *The Principles of Nature and her divine Revelations, and a Voice to Mankind by and through Andrew Jackson Davis, "the Poughkeepsie Seer" and "clairvoyant."* In three parts. New York. 1847. pp. XXIV and 782.

THIS book consists of three parts. 1. "The Key," containing several remarks on the condition of society in past and present times. 2. "The Revelation," containing an account of the origin and nature of the Universe, including man, and 3. "The Application," which contains an "analysis of society," a statement of its evils, and their remedy. The work treats of many important matters in physical, social, and theological science. If it had appeared as the production of some scholar, writing after much reading and careful study, it would be thought a remarkable production. Very remarkable, considering the variety of matters discussed, the boldness, largeness of mind, and general intelligence displayed therein. Many things in the book are fantastic, many statements incorrect. If it were the work of any man not twenty-one years of age, composed under the most favorable circumstances, it would still be an extraordinary book, perhaps the most extraordinary in the world. But the lectures of which the work is composed were delivered by Mr. Davis while in a state of mesmeric excitement, written down and published from his dictation while in that state. The only alterations made by the scribe were the omission of redundant words, and corrections of false syntax, for Mr. Davis is an uneducated man, who cannot speak his native tongue with common accuracy. What adds to the wonder is, that the author had no acquaintance with literature or science. The editors claim that he had access to the "second sphere of human existence," and there in part obtained his knowledge in a manner not possible except in this state of trance. We see no reason for doubting the integrity of the author or his editors; they may be mistaken. They can hardly be dishonest. Shall we suppose Mr. Davis had read Dr. Lardner's Lectures, the "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," the works of Swedenborg and Fourier, which have been circulated so extensively and in a form so cheap — and that in the intense excitement of the mesmeric state he reproduced what

he had formerly read, in this strange form, and with additions of his own? Shall it be said that the minds of living men through sympathy *impressed* themselves upon him in that excitement, and he in that manner acquired his information? His editors deny both of these suppositions; they do not claim that he is *infallible* — and there are many and great errors in the book; they claim nothing *miraculous* in his case — only that his ideas came from "the second sphere of human existence." It is certainly extraordinary that so young a man, with no education, who had never attended any school half a year in his whole life, without acquaintance with scientific works, should dictate so remarkable a work. It must then be referred to the same class with the works of Böhme, Fox, Swedenborg, and the whole host of mystical writers who wrote, more or less, in the state of ecstacy or trance. Very little is known respecting that state, and we hope the appearance of this work, and the frankness and coolness with which its claims are made to so remarkable an origin, will provoke a discussion of the whole matter. Viewed as one will, the book is one of the most remarkable literary curiosities ever heard of.

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16. — *A Summer in the Wilderness; embracing a Canoe Voyage up the Mississippi and around Lake Superior.* By Charles Lanman, Author of "Essays for Summer Hours," etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1847. 16mo. pp. 208.

The subject of this book is sufficiently explained by the title-page. The ground passed over, it will be seen, is most interesting. We are sorry, however, that Mr. Lanman, in writing his travels, has chosen rather to indulge in general reflections and sentiment, than to bring before his own mind, and thus before his readers, the characteristic features of the country and its inhabitants.

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17. — *Two Years in the Ministry; or, Farewell Discourses, comprising,* 1. *Views of the Nature and Sources of true Christian Theology; and* 2. *Views of the Nature of the Christian Religion, and Salvation by Christ.* By James Richardson, Jr., A. M. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1847. 8vo. pp. 58.

The object of the first of these discourses is to show "the necessity of making Theology an exact science, based upon Reason and Nature, accordant with the facts and realities of the Universe," and that there is no incompatibility between Religion and Science. The second, on the other hand, guards against the

danger of supposing Religion and Salvation thereby to be "a mere intellectual belief in certain doctrines," and insists "that Religion is wholly a practical matter — a thing of the life."

18.—*ΞΕΝΟΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΑΠΟΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΜΑΤΑ. Zenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates.* With notes by R. D. C. Robbins, Librarian of Andover Theological Seminary. Andover. 1848. pp. x and 417. 12mo.

In the text the industrious and accomplished editor has followed mainly the valuable edition of Kühner. The text occupies one hundred and sixty-eight pages. The notes and indices two hundred and forty-seven pages. The text is printed in a neat and clear type. The notes are full and minute, indicating careful and exact study on the editor's part. So far as we have been able to examine them they are accurate and valuable, but rather too full and learned for the use of lads in the lower classes at college, while they contain mere grammatical remarks, which the advanced scholar will not need. However, if this fulness of annotation be an error it is one on the right side. There is an English and a Greek index — both of which are mainly designed to guide the reader to a knowledge of the grammatical peculiarities of the author. This volume, so carefully prepared, is one of the numerous signs of the increased attention paid to the study of the classics.

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19 — *Human Knowledge:* a Discourse delivered before the Massachusetts Alpha of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Cambridge, Aug. 26th, 1847. By Geo. P. Marsh. Boston: Little & Brown. 1847. 8vo. pp. 42.

The subject of Mr. Marsh's address is the position and duties of the American Scholar. "With us," he says, "the pursuit of knowledge is the task of youth, or the recreation of maturity and age, rather than the stated occupation of a class." In contrast with the scanty period usually allotted to its pursuit, he reviews the immense extension of the field of science in our day; the advances made in Philology, Mathematics, Physics, History, Politics, Art, Philosophy, and Theology. In spite of improved methods, "the patrimony of knowledge has now become so wide, that none can hope to possess it in its full extent." We are reminded, however, that knowledge is not a mere aggregate of facts. "It is a mistake to suppose that all mental acquisition implies mental culture. Facts without end may be learned, familiarized, forgotten again, and leave the mind at last more inept than they found it.

The idea, or law, is what is to be learned;—"pure law is all that is truly knowable, and a knowledge of law brings us to the ultimate possible, as well as the highest and sublimest, limit of human attainment."

Knowledge, however, according to Mr. Marsh, "is but a means to an ultimate end, and therefore should be pursued with constant reference to its higher uses," which are, "not the adaptation of external means to selfish ends," but, "to reign supreme over one's self," and "to promote the best interests of mankind."

As to the prospects of literature in this country, Mr. Marsh thinks that "the American intellect combines the speculative propensities of the German, with the practical tendencies of the English mind,"—and thus sees "in the literature of America abundant promise of rich contributions to the elucidation of the highest themes which can occupy the faculties of mortal man."

*** We have received prospectuses of two new periodicals, one called "The Nineteenth Century"—to be devoted to "Science, Literature, National News, Reform theories of Government and Law, and Religion without sectarianism. To be edited by C. C. Burr, and published by G. B. Zieber & Co., Philadelphia." Among the names of promised contributors we notice those of Horace Greeley and Mr. Furness.

The other is to bear the title of "The Univercœlum," and "to be devoted to General Inquiry, Philosophies, Theology, and the inculcation of the principles of Nature, in their application to individual and social life." It is to be conducted and published by "S. B. Brittan, of New York, assisted by twelve associate editors," among whom is Mr. Davis, "The Poughkeepsie Seer."

RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

G. Phillips: Ueb. d. Ordalien bei d. Germanen. Münch. 1847. 4to. pp. 15.

B. G. Niebuhr: Histor. u. philolog. Vorträge. 2te Abth. 1r B. D. Orient bis zur Schlacht bei Salamis. Griechenland bis auf Perikles. Berlin. 1847. 8vo. pp. 475.

G. H. Pertz: J. Grimm: H. Lachmann: L. Ranke: u. H. Ritter: D. Geschichtschreiber d. deutsch. Vorzeit, in e. deutschen Bearbeitung. 1r Bd. 1r Hälfte. Berlin. 1847.

G. G. Gervinus: D. Preuss. Verfassung u. d. Patent v. 3. Feb. 1847. Mannheim. 1847. 8vo. pp. 127.

J. G. v. Herder: Lebensbild. Sein chronologisch-geordneter Briefwechsel, &c. Herausg. v. s. Sohne. 3r Bd. Erlangen. 1847.

A. Sanguineti: Vita di Cristoforo Colombo. Genova. 1846.

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J. D. W. Sachse: Verzeichniss v. Bildnissen v. Aerzten u. Naturforschern seit d. ält. bis auf uns. Zeiten, mit Biographien. 1s. Heft. Abano — D'Azzogujoi, Schwerin. 1847. 8vo. pp. VI u. 93.

H. Viehoff. Goethe's Leben. 1r Th. pp. 400 u. G's. Portr. Stuttgard. 1847. gr. 16.

K. O. Müller: Kleine Schriften: 1r Bd., nebst Erinnerunger a. d. Leben d. Verf. 1 Karte. Breslau. 1847. 8vo. pp. LXXXVII u. 550.

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NATURAL SCIENCES.

H. M. Ducrotay de Blainville: Osteographie, ou descript. iconograph. comparée du squelette et du système dentaire des cinq classes d'animaux vertebrés recens et fossiles. Paris. 1847. pp. 246. 4to et 15 planches fol.

O. Des-Murs: Iconographie ornithologique, pour servir de suite et de complément aux Pl. enluminées de Buffon, et aux Pl. colorées de Temminck, &c. dessinées par A. Prevot et Oudard. 7 et 8 Livr. Paris. 1847. imp. 4to. 12 pl. et 48 pp. texte.

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MASSACHUSETTS QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NO. II.—MARCH, 1848.

ART. I.—HAS SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES A LEGAL BASIS?

1.—*The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. Parts First and Second.* By LYSANDER SPOONER. 12mo. pp. 281.
2.—*Review of Lysander Spooner's Essay on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery.* By WENDELL PHILLIPS. 8vo. pp. 95.

ONE main pillar of domestic slavery, as it now exists in the United States of America, is the idea that it rests upon the law. Law is regarded with veneration, as the great foundation and support of the rights of property—of personal rights; in a word—of social organization. Jurists, with a natural disposition to exaggerate the importance of a profession to which most of them have belonged, have been induced to overlook or to disregard the *natural* foundation of rights. Most of them represent the idea of property as resting on a merely *artificial* basis—the law; not the law of nature, but the law of convention. Upon that same artificial basis, too, they are induced to rest even the most important of personal rights. These ideas, widely spread through the community, greatly modify public opinion upon the question of slavery. In the abstract, slavery, all admit, is sheer cruelty and injustice. But slavery, as it exists in the United States, is supposed to be *legal;* and being legal, is supposed to acquire a certain character of right. To use our best efforts for the suppression of cruelty and injustice, is admitted to be a moral duty. But then it is a moral duty, and, in the opinion of many, a paramount duty, to obey the law.

Prevailing ideas on the theory of government tend precisely

the same way. Those ideas, derived from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, represent government as a contract. The natural state of man, the state of nature, is assumed to be a state of war, of hostility on the part of each individual against every other. To escape out of this wretched condition, men, we are told, resort to the artificial expedient of government founded on contract. According to this theory, the only moral principle involved in the idea of government is — Contract; and this contract, we are told, must be preserved inviolate, or government is at an end, and chaos comes again. No matter how absurd; no matter how unjust towards ourselves or others: a bargain is a bargain; and though it stipulates for the pound of flesh, it must be fulfilled. Many excellent men, ready to denounce slavery in the abstract as the sum of all iniquities, will tell us, in the same breath, that the "compromises of the constitution" guarantee its existence. It is morally wrong, they say, to attempt to evade or get over, or set aside, those compromises; and this appeal to notions of mercantile honor is not without a powerful influence upon the best portion of the community.

These opinions respecting law and government involve, indeed, the inconsistency and absurdity of supposing that men have power, by arrangement and convention, to make that artificially right which naturally is wrong. There have not been wanting able writers to expose this inconsistency and absurdity. These writers have shown clearly enough, that the basis of law, the basis of property, the basis of personal rights, the basis of government, are to be sought for and found in the nature and constitution of man, not in any artificial contracts, or arbitrary statutes or usages. They have shown clearly enough, that law, so far as it has any binding moral force, is and must be conformable to natural principles of right; indeed, that in this conformity alone its moral binding force consists; and that so far as this conformity is wanting, what is called law is mere violence and tyranny, to which a man may submit for the sake of peace, but which he has a moral right to resist passively, at all times, and forcibly, when he has any fair prospect of success. Such, indeed, was the principle upon which the American Revolution was justified. The acts of parliament of which the colonies complained, had all the forms of law, and Mansfield and other great lawyers said they were law. But in the view of the colonists, they lacked the substance without which law cannot exist. They subverted those

eternal principles of right and equity expressed in that maxim and usage of the English constitution, which coupled taxation and representation together. Taxation without representation was denounced by the colonists as mere robbery, to which, though concealed under the form of law, they were not legally obliged to, and would not, submit.

The principle of the perpetuity and inviolability of contracts, no matter what their object, character, or operation, has been attacked with no less energy and success. It has been triumphantly shown, that the very essence and substratum of contract is, mutual benefit. Contracts, whether in law or morals, have no binding force without a consideration, a good and valuable consideration. Men cannot bargain away either their own rights or the rights of others. All such pretended contracts are void from the beginning—the spawn of fraud in the one party, and ignorance in the other, or of injustice and immoral intentions in both. To say, that by committing the folly or the crime of contracting to do an immoral act a man lays himself under a moral obligation to do that immoral act, is to overturn the very foundations of morality. Nor are these principles the mere notions of theoretical moralists. So far as relates to private contracts, they are fully acknowledged and admitted by all courts of law throughout the civilized world. They constitute, indeed, the fundamental principle upon which those courts administer the law of contracts.

But all these appeals to general principles, however able and conclusive, when applied to the question of slavery have little weight with the great body of the community. Did they relate to points in which that body had a direct, obvious, personal interest, the appeal, no doubt, would be irresistible. When Andros, governor of New England, undertook to deprive people of their lands, under pretence of defective titles, "the men of Massachusetts did much quote Lord Coke;" and finding that useless, they stripped Andros of his power. When Grenville undertook to levy taxes without their consent, they were ready at once to resort to fundamental principles, and, when those principles failed, to their muskets. Then, the case touched themselves. When it only touches the unfortunate negroes of the southern states, or a few poor colored people of our own, it is quite a different matter. Appeal to principle is then denounced as wild and visionary. Always fearful of effort and responsibility, the great mass of the community entrench themselves on this question behind statutes,

decisions, usage, the opinions of lawyers, and the current notions of the day. To be sure, slavery is wrong and unjust, and impolitic and wicked,—but then it is legal.

Nor, indeed, is this conduct to be wondered at. The very courts, those reverend depositories of the knowledge of the law, those vicegerents upon earth of eternal equity and justice, have themselves set the example. In mere questions of private right, the courts resort, without hesitation, to those eternal principles of right reason, that is, of true morality, which they boast to be the foundation of law. They set aside, without hesitation, every private contract which has in it any trace or tincture of fraud or crime. But when it comes to the enforcement of political contracts, a sad change is observable. Individual lawyers, indeed even judges on the bench, of the highest eminence, have not hesitated to say, that an act of parliament contrary to the law of God, that is, contrary to the eternal principles of right, is void. Such opinions have been thrown out incidentally, with great apparent boldness and decision. But when has an act of parliament been set aside on that ground? Never! No court in England or America ever yet dared to do it. Courts have bowed submissively at the feet of the governments, their creators, ascribing to those creators an omnipotence over right and wrong greater than the philosophy of our day is willing to ascribe to God himself. They hold, indeed, to the maxim *Fiat justitia, ruat cœlum*, but in this sense: "the will of the government must be done, though heaven itself be trampled under foot." It must be admitted as the settled doctrine of our courts of law, that the supreme legislative authority has the power to declare to be law even that which is against right. But this has been a forced concession; and as Gallileo, when obliged by the Inquisition to confess that the earth stood still, mumbled yet between his teeth, as he rose from his knees, *E pur' se muove*, "It moves though,"—so our courts of law, blushing and stammering at the disgraceful concession extorted from them by fear and power, have done their best to limit and to nullify that concession. If the supreme legislature chooses to say that manifest wrong shall be law, the courts submit to enforce it as such. But then they will never presuppose that the supreme legislature intends to do any thing so absurd and cruel. If the intention is plain, manifest, and clear, it must be enforced; but the courts will never resort to implication, or conjecture, or construction, to make out any such intention. This principle in

the interpretation of legal enactments, perfectly well settled and established in all the courts of England and America, is thus laid down by Chief-Justice Marshall, in the case of *United States* v. *Fisher*, 2 Cranch, 390. "Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects."

In all cases of attempted injustice under the form of law, courts thus reserve to themselves a power to defeat the wicked legislative intention, by refusing to suppose the legislature capable of any such wickedness. The extent to which this is carried out in particular cases, must evidently depend much upon circumstances, especially upon the character and position of the court. Where a court is resolved not to see, and is so situated as to be able to carry out its resolution, "irresistible clearness" is out of the question. No possible form of words can produce it. The disposition on the part of the court to see or not to see a wicked intention, will depend upon two things: first, the opinion of the court as to the degree and aggravation of the wickedness; secondly, their opinion as to the degree of support they will find in the community, if they attempt to defeat that wicked intention.

Take the case of slavery for example. Suppose that in a slave-holding community the question of the legality of slavery is raised, and certain legislative acts are quoted to sustain it. If the court should happen to entertain the opinions professed by Mr. Calhoun, that slavery is not only a blessing in itself, but the essential foundation of a republican government, of course they would see, with great facility, an intention in the quoted acts to give to slavery a legal basis. Even if they entertained the more common opinion, avowed by Mr. Clay, that slavery, though an evil in itself, is yet, under existing circumstances, a necessary evil, the only means of preserving the two races of whites and blacks from a war of extermination, they would still find no great difficulty in perceiving a legislative intention to legalize slavery. But suppose the judges have the feelings proper to men enlightened and humane; suppose their eyes fully open to the enormous wickedness of slavery; suppose they saw in vivid colors all its multiplied evils and miseries, both for masters and slaves; it would be very difficult for any form of words to establish, with "irresistible clearness," in the minds of such men, a legislative inten-

tion to legalize so much folly and crime. If, besides, they saw opinions hostile to slavery openly avowed and spreading around them; if they saw a certainty of being powerfully sustained in reinstating justice on her seat,—what form of words would be able to satisfy such a court that the supreme legislative authority intended to sanction a system so horribly unjust and wicked? At all events, in a case where there were no words at all, or very obscure and vague ones, a court so constituted and so situated, surely never would discover any such intention.

It is the glory of the tribunals of the common law, that, even when trampled in the mud by the feet of power, they have never consented to lie there in quiet. They have struggled, always to a certain extent, often nobly, to rise again; to cleanse the ermine robes of justice from the mire of ignorant, weak, cruel, self-seeking legislation; to lift again on high the balance of equity, and, to the full extent of their power and their light, to weigh out again equal justice to all. But to enable them to do this, the community about them must uphold their hands. What can four or five gray-haired men do against the ferocity, the wrongheadedness, the intentional injustice of a whole community? Men formed by long experience of the world in its least amiable aspects, will not cast their pearls before swine's feet. Like wise men they bide their time.

We shall find in these considerations a complete reply to a taunt frequently thrown in our teeth by the advocates of the legality of slavery. What more absurd, they say, than to question a legality recognized and admitted ever since the settlement of the country! But why absurd? From a period long preceding the settlement of North America down to the famous decision in Somerset's case, three or four years before our declaration of independence, the legality of slavery in England was also recognized and admitted. It required the enlightened humanity of a Mansfield, the indefatigable perseverance of a Granville Sharpe, an age awake to the rights of humanity, and a community free, in a great measure, from the bias of interest, to draw up "from the deep well of the law" that "amiable and admirable secret,"

"No slave can breathe in England."

"The knowledge of the law," says my Lord Coke, "is like a deep well, out of which each man draweth according to the

strength of his understanding." Is it too much to hope, that we shall yet have American judges, with hearts and understandings strong enough to draw up out of that same deep well the twin secret, that there is not, and never was, any legal slavery in America? It is not strength of understanding that has failed us. Have we not had on the bench of the United States Supreme Court a Jay, a Wilson, a Marshall, a Story? What has been lacking is heart, conscience, courage; more than all, the surrounding support of an enlightened and humane public opinion, to sustain our judges in looking this lurking devil of slavery in the face. No court of justice in the United States has ever yet dared do it, lest being called on to decide against the legality of slavery, they might be called upon, in so doing, to set at defiance a conglomeration of interests and prejudices which they have not had courage to brave, which no prudent court would venture to brave. What has been wanting, not less than a fearless court, a court daring enough to face, in the cause of justice and right, the ferocious prejudices of a ferocious nation—has been, a learned, independent, fearless bar. The court alone, unaided by the bar, is incapable of administering justice. Points must first be presented, before they can be decided; and how much depends on the manner and the medium of their presentation! Would the English law of treason ever have been stripped of so many of its terrors, and reduced so much within the limits of justice and moderation, but for the earnest struggles of an Erskine and a Curran? Had O'Connell been an ordinary lawyer, or an ordinary culprit, would the English House of Lords ever have seen those flaws in his indictment which the Irish judges had overlooked?

No counsel has ever yet been retained for the slaves; no body of influential friends has ever appeared, to impress upon the judges the necessity of serious investigation, and to assure them of support in sustaining the right. The case has gone by default; rather, it has never yet been entered in court.

We proceed to give a brief statement of the grounds upon which the assumed legality of slavery rests.

Slavery in the Middle Ages existed in England under two forms. *Villeins in gross* were slaves, substantially the same as ours, transferable from master to master, like any other chattel. *Villeins regardant* were serfs, attached to the soil, inseparable from it, and transferable only with it. These same two forms of slavery may still be seen in Hungary and

Russia. Villeinage was hereditary; — the villeins being the descendants of the ancient Britons and Saxons, held in servitude from a time whereof the memory of man ran not to the contrary.

Previous to the discovery of America, or shortly after that period, English villeinage *in gross* had almost ceased to exist. So late as the reign of Elizabeth, there only remained a few villeins *regardant*, in some obscure corners. The lawyers and the clergy, in whom the principal intelligence of that age was vested, had both greatly contributed to this result. The English common law courts refused to recognize the doctrine of the civil law — that favorite doctrine of all slave-holding communities — that the children of female slaves inherit from the mother the condition of slavery. They held, on the contrary, that the child followed the condition of the father, a doctrine which gave freedom to great numbers; for, in all slave-holding communities, the masters esteem it a part of their right to use the slave women as concubines. In all questions touching villeinage, the English common law courts made it a point to lean in favor of freedom. All men were supposed to be free, and the burden of proof lay on the claimant. The clergy had taken up the moral and religious aspects of the case. They denounced it as a scandalous and outrageous thing, for one Christian to hold another in slavery; and their preaching on this point had been so successful, that it had come to be considered a settled matter, not in England only, but throughout western Europe, that no Christian ought to be held as a slave.

With the customary narrowness of that age, this security from slavery was not thought to extend to infidels or pagans. While the emancipation of serfs was going on, black slaves, brought by the Portuguese from the coast of Guinea, became common in the south of Europe, and a few found their way to England. The newly-discovered coasts of America were also visited by kidnappers. Few, if any, of the early voyagers scrupled to seize the natives, and to carry them home as slaves. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, so active and so conspicuous in the early settlement of New England, had a number of these captured natives, whom he claimed as his property, kept under restraint, and employed as guides and pilots. The Mosaic law, then recently made familiar by the English translation of the Bible, and considered high authority on all questions of right, seemed to countenance this distinction between Christians and

infidels. The Jews, according to the Mosaic code, could hold their brethren as servants for a period of seven years only, or at the utmost, till the next Jubilee; for it is not very easy to reconcile the different provisions on this subject, in Exodus and Leviticus. But of "the heathen round about," they might buy "bondmen, as an inheritance for ever." The practice of the early English settlers in America, and their ideas of the English law on the subject, corresponded exactly with these Jewish provisions. They took with them, or caused to be sent out, a large number of indented Christian servants, whose period of bondage was limited to seven years, and who constituted a distinct class in the community till after the Revolution. But while the servitude of Christians was thus limited, the colonists supposed themselves justified in holding negroes and Indians as slaves for life. When the first cargo of African slaves arrived in James river, they were sold and held under what was supposed to be the English common law. They continued to be imported in small numbers from time to time; but more than forty years elapsed before we find any mention of slaves in the Virginia statutes. It was not imagined that any local legislation was necessary, to give the masters a life-property in these black servants and their posterity.

Massachusetts was the first colony to legislate upon this subject. The "Body of Liberties," or "Fundamentals," as they were called, — of which a complete copy has lately been brought to light, and published in the Massachusetts Historical Collections, — were first promulgated in 1641. That code contains the following provision: "There shall never be any bond slavery, villeinage, nor captivity among us, *unless it be lawful captives taken in just wars, and such strangers as willingly sell themselves, or are sold, unto us.*" But in thus giving an express sanction to negro and Indian slavery, the freemen of Massachusetts did not suppose themselves to be running at all counter to the law of England, to which, by their charter, they were bound to conform. On the contrary, they supposed themselves to be conforming as well to the law of England, as to "the law of God, established in Israel." This Massachusetts law, it will be perceived, not only sanctions slavery, but also the slave-trade. Bancroft, always too much a panegyrist or an apologist to be implicitly relied on, has undertaken to claim for Massachusetts the honor of having denounced, at that early day, as "malefactors and murderers," those "who sailed to Guinea, to trade for negroes;" a

claim founded upon misapprehension of a passage in Winthrop's Journal. It appears, on the contrary, from other passages in Winthrop, that "the trade to Guinea for negroes" was recognized as a just and lawful traffic. New England vessels, after carrying cargoes of staves to Madeira, were accustomed to sail to Guinea for slaves, who generally were carried to Barbadoes, or the other English settlements in the West Indies, there being little or no demand for them at Boston. In the particular case on which Bancroft relies, instead of *buying* negroes, in the regular course of the Guinea trade, the Boston crew had joined with some Londoners already on the coast, and, on pretence of some quarrel with the natives, had landed "a murderer," — the expressive name of a small piece of cannon, — attacked a negro village *on a Sunday*, killed many of the inhabitants, and made a few prisoners; of whom two boys fell to the share of the Bostonians. A violent quarrel between the master, mate, and owners, as to the mutual settlement of their accounts, brought out the whole history of the voyage before the magistrates, one of whom presented a petition to the General Court, charging the master and mate, not with having "sailed for Guinea to trade for negroes," as Bancroft represents it, but with the threefold offence of murder, manstealing, and Sabbath-breaking, — the first two capital, by the fundamental laws of the colony, and all three "capital, by the laws of God." It was right enough to *purchase* slaves, but wrong to steal them, especially on a Sunday, and to commit murder in doing so. The kidnapped negroes were ordered to be sent back; but no other punishment was inflicted, the court doubting their authority to punish crimes committed on the coast of Africa.

The honor of having made the first American protest against negro slavery really belongs to those arch-heretics, Roger Williams and Samuel Gorton, and their followers, settled at Providence and Warwich. In 1650, these exiles from Massachusetts had been accused by a Massachusetts spy of crying out against the reality of witchcraft, and of maintaining that most heretical and atheistic doctrine, "that there were no other witches upon earth, nor devils, except the ministers of Massachusetts and such as they." In 1652, these same free thinkers enacted a law, placing "black mankind" on the same level, with regard to limitation of service, as white servants; and absolutely prohibiting perpetual slavery within

their territories. Unfortunately for the honor of Rhode Island, this law presently fell into abeyance. In his old age, even Williams himself became a slave-holder, having received an Indian boy for his share of the spoils of Philip's war, during which contest he held a commission as captain. Perhaps, however, he only claimed to hold the boy as an indented servant.

It was not till cases arose for which the English common law, as the colonists understood it, made no provisions satisfactory to the slave-holders, that any distinct mention of slavery occurs in the legislation of Virginia. In the course of forty years, by which time the slaves numbered two thousand, in a population of forty thousand, — mulatto children had been born, and grown to manhood. What should be the condition of these children? By the English law, when the fathers were free, the children were free also. But this did not suit the interest of the slave-holders; the mulattoes were few, ignorant, and helpless, and the Virginia legislature, notwithstanding its acknowledged obligation to conform strictly to English law, did not hesitate to disregard a great and well-established principle of that law, and to enact, that children should follow the condition of the mother; and this principle, by statute or usage, was ultimately adopted in all the colonies.

Another question, not less interesting to the slave-holders, presently arose. Of the negroes brought to Virginia, some had been converted and baptized. This was the case to a still greater extent with those born in the colony. By what right were these *Christians* held as slaves? The law of England, even according to the view of it entertained by the colonists, did not allow the slavery of Christians. It was only pagans and infidels who could be enslaved. But the Virginia assembly came to the relief of the masters; and with that audacious disregard of all law and all right except its own good pleasure, by which slave-holding legislation has ever been characterized, that body enacted, in utter defiance of the English law, — even their own version of it, — that negroes converted and baptized should not thereby become free. This act bears date in 1669. Another act, passed the same year, in equal defiance of the English law, provided, that killing slaves by extremity of correction should not be esteemed felony, "since it cannot be presumed that prepense malice should induce any man to destroy his own estate."

These three acts, the legislative basis of slavery in Virginia, were enacted during the government of Sir William Berkeley, well known for his famous apostrophe — "I thank God we have no free schools nor printing, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divulged them; and libels against the best government. God keep us from both!" This wish has not been in vain. The establishment of slavery secured its fulfilment. Virginia has no free schools to this day; none, at least, worthy of the name. She has, indeed, a few printing-presses; but they are muzzled, gagged, — effectually restrained from libels against that "best government" — the oligarchy of slave-holders.

The very next year after the enactment of the two last-mentioned statutes, the assembly of Virginia plainly admitted, that no Christian could rightfully be held in slavery. It had been provided, for reasons of policy or humanity, that Indians should not be held as slaves. Whatever the reason, it places the legislation of Virginia, on this point, in honorable contrast to that of New England, where, as we have seen, the contrary practice prevailed. But did this prohibition extend to Indian captives taken in war, elsewhere than in Virginia, and brought to that colony for sale? This question was settled by enacting, that "all servants, *not being Christians*, imported by shipping, shall be slaves for their lives." Servants imported by land were to serve a limited time only. Freedom had just been denied to Christian negroes converted in the colony, or born there; but the assembly did not venture to usurp any such jurisdiction over stranger Christians. All stranger Christians coming into the colony, of whatever origin or color, were to be free. In attempting to give a legislative establishment to the slavery of Christians and mulattoes, the governor and assembly put at defiance what they knew to be the English law. Yet in the preamble to the code of 1662, in which all the laws of the colony were embodied, those laws are expressly declared to be a mere extract from the laws of England, to which the assembly "profess and acknowledge all due obedience and reverence, sometimes, perhaps, from the difference of our and their condition, varying in small things, but far from the presumption of contradicting any thing therein contained." Berkeley, too, in that very paper above quoted, containing his objurgation of free schools and printing-presses, expressly declares, that "contrary to the laws of England,

we never did nor dare make any." He admits, indeed, one exception, namely, requiring deeds to be recorded. Such an exception seems to be one of those that prove the rule.

As a necessary pendant to the slave code, the system of subjecting the free to disabilities now also began. It was enacted in Virginia, in 1670, that negro women, though free, should be rated and taxed as tythables. Free negroes and Indians were also disqualified to purchase or hold white servants.

The virtuous resolution of Virginia on the subject of Indians did not last long; nor did its freedom from schools and printing-presses preserve the colony from rebellion. The immediate cause of Bacon's insurrection was the refusal of Berkeley to authorize expeditions against the Indians, who had lately committed some depredations. Berkeley prepared a scheme of defence by forts, but the colonists alleged that his interest in the fur-trade made him too tender of the Indians. A law enacted in 1676, by Bacon's insurgent assembly, might seem to imply, that the eagerness of the colonists for offensive war was not altogether disinterested. Into an act for the prosecution of the Indian war a provision was inserted, that Indian prisoners might be held as slaves; and this, with some other of Bacon's laws, was continued in force after the suppression of the insurrection.

In 1682, during Culpepper's administration, the slave code of Virginia received some additions. Slaves were forbidden to carry arms offensive or defensive; or to go off their master's plantation, without a written pass; or to lift hand against a Christian, even in self-defence. Runaways, who refused to be apprehended, might be lawfully killed. Already the internal slave-trade was begun,—that trade in which Virginia still bears so unhappy a part. As yet, however, the colony was purchaser, not seller, and facilities for purchasing were extended by a partial repeal of the existing provision in favor of stranger Christians. It was enacted, that all servants, whether negroes, Moors, mulattoes, or Indians, brought into the colony by sea or land, whether converted to Christianity or not, (provided they were not of Christian parentage and country,) and also all Indians bought of the neighbouring or other tribes, might be held as slaves. Yet, with all this eagerness for new purchases, the evils of the slave system were already felt. The colony was suffering severely from an overproduction of tobacco; to such a degree, that the poorer people could scarcely purchase clothes for themselves;—an over-

production to which, as Culpepper stated, in an official report, "the buying of blacks had exceedingly contributed."

In 1691, shortly after the breaking out of the first French and Indian war, policy or humanity, or both combined, recovered the mastery. The slavery of Indians, sanctioned by statute since the time of Bacon's rebellion, was now finally abolished. Yet the humane intentions of the legislature were but partially fulfilled, and the practice of enslaving Indians was still continued. The Virginia records were always in the most disorderly state. As it was the judicious custom, in that colony, to codify all the statute law from time to time, the original date of particular enactments was apt to be forgotten. This law, forbidding the enslavement of Indians, was included in the codification of 1705, and was long supposed to have been originally enacted in that year. When, at a period shortly subsequent to the Revolution,—the golden age of Virginia,—an interest began to be felt in emancipation, many of the descendants of Indians were encouraged to bring suits to vindicate their freedom. In all cases in which the servitude of the ancestor appeared to have commenced subsequent to 1705, (the supposed earliest date of the prohibitive act,) the Virginia Court of Appeals held the claimants entitled to their freedom; but many petitions were dismissed, because the petitioners could not bring themselves within that limit. When, at length, the act of 1691 was discovered in manuscript, the Court of Appeals recognized its authority, and decided, in conformity to it, that no Indian, subsequently to the year 1691, could lawfully have been reduced to slavery; and that the descendants of all such Indians were free. This decision, however, availed but few of the unhappy sufferers. They were too ignorant and helpless to vindicate their rights. "Multitudes of the descendants of Indians in Virginia,"—so says Hening, the learned and laborious editor of the Virginia statutes,—"are still unjustly deprived of their liberty;" another proof how little the law avails the feeble and defenceless.

This same code of 1705 above referred to, made some additional modifications in the statutes relating to slaves and the mixed race. "All servants imported and brought into this country by sea or land, who were not Christians in their native country, (except Turks and Moors in amity with her Majesty, and others who can make due proof of their being free in England, or any other Christian country, before they

were shipped in order to transportation hither,) shall be accounted and be slaves, and as such be here bought and sold, notwithstanding a conversion to Christianity afterwards." "All children to be bond or free, according to the condition of their mothers."

Such was the final enactment of Virginia, under which near half her population are still held as slaves. But even in this act, the original idea, that no Christian could be reduced to slavery, is still apparent. In the case of servants newly brought into the colony, religion, not color, nor race, is made the sole test of distinction between slavery and indented service. Whatever may have been the practice, it is plain enough, that under this act no negro who was a Christian in his native country could be brought into Virginia and held there as a slave; and this law remains unrepealed to the present day.

This same code also provided, that persons convict in England of crimes punishable with loss of life or member, and "all negroes, mulattoes, and Indians," should be incapacitated to hold office in the colony. White women having bastard children by negroes or mulattoes were to pay the parish fifteen pounds, or, in default of payment, to be sold for five years, the child to be bound out as a servant for thirty-one years. "And for a further prevention of that abominable mixture and spurious issue, which hereafter may increase in this her Majesty's colony and dominion, as well by English and other white men and women intermarrying with negroes and mulattoes," as by unlawful connection with them, it was enacted, that any man or woman intermarrying with a negro or mulatto, bond or free, should be imprisoned six months and fined ten pounds,—the minister celebrating the marriage to be fined also. Thus early was the bugbear cry of "amalgamation" raised in Virginia. Similar laws enacted in the other colonies operated to degrade and keep down the colored race, and to prevent the institution of slavery from assuming that patriarchal character, by which, in other countries, it is greatly softened, and sometimes has been superseded.

Nothing, indeed, is more striking than the different treatment bestowed by Anglo-American slave-holders, especially those of the United States, upon their own children by slave mothers, and the behaviour of Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and French slave-holders towards their children similarly begotten. In the slave-holding colonies of these latter nations,

that white man is regarded as unnatural, mean, and cruel, who does not, if his ability permit, secure for his colored children emancipation and some pecuniary provision. Colored children are not less numerous in the United States; but here conventional decorum forbids the white father to recognize his colored offspring at all, or to make any provision for them: they are still held and sold as slaves, among which unfortunate class may be found the descendants of more than one signer of the Declaration of Independence, patriot of the Revolution, and leading politician and presidential candidate of our own day. To what shall we ascribe this strange and most disgraceful difference? To what, if not to that narrow spirit of puritanic asceticism, that insolent Jewish bigotry, derived from the superstitious study of the Old Testament, with which the whole British race is so thoroughly imbued? The careful student of our history will discover this spirit of religious bigotry and asceticism as rampant in the southern colonies as in those of New England. Moses was good authority in all the English colonies for prohibiting intermarriage with negroes and Indians; and for denouncing the intermixture of races as unnatural and wicked. But no law could control the appetite of the planters, or prevent that intermixture which inevitably takes place, whenever two races are brought into contact, especially if one race be held in slavery. That austere morality (pretending to be religious,) for which the United States are distinguished above all nations on the face of the earth, has been obliged, in this case, as in others, to content itself, in defect of conformity to its rules, with cruel grimace, and a lie acted out. Hypocrisy, it is said, is the tribute which vice pays to virtue. Of that sort of tribute the religious treasuries of our country are full. The virtuous man,—southern church-member, or peradventure minister of the gospel,—expiates his peccadilloes with his female slaves, by looking on his own children with cold glances, in which no recognition dwells; as a further proof of his austere morals, occasion offering, he sells them at auction!

We have dwelt thus long on the slave statutes of Virginia, and have carefully traced them from their commencement to their final development, because upon these statutes the practice, and finally the enactments, of all the other southern colonies, were modelled.

Slavery had existed in Maryland from its first settlement;

but no statute appears to have defined its nature or designated the parties subject to it, till 1715, by which time negroes held in bondage composed a fifth part of the population. In that year, upon occasion of the restoration of the government to the Calvert family, the laws of Maryland were revised, and the new code provided, "that all negroes and other slaves, already imported or hereafter to be imported into this province, and all children now born or hereafter to be born of such negroes and slaves, shall be slaves during their natural lives." Upon this statute rest all the claims of the slave-holding system of Maryland to a legal foundation.

The "grand model," the first proprietary constitution of Carolina, the production of the celebrated Locke, contained the following clause: "Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion and religion soever." But "the grand model," in compliance with the repeated and earnest requests of the colonists, was abrogated in 1693, and for nineteen years the system of slavery in South Carolina remained without any legal basis but that furnished by the mistaken notions of the colonists as to the English law. The assembly, however, at length thought it necessary to provide some statute authority of their own for holding two thirds of the population in servitude. An act for that purpose, passed in 1712, provided, "that all negroes, mulattoes, mestizos, or Indians, which, at any time heretofore were sold, or now are held or taken to be, or hereafter shall be bought and sold for slaves, are hereby declared slaves, to all intents and purposes;" with exceptions, however, in favor of those who have been or shall be, "for some particular merit, made or declared free," and also of such "as can prove that they ought not to be sold as slaves." This most extraordinary piece of legislation, worthy of a South Carolina assembly, was reënacted in 1722, and again in 1735. By the act of 1740, it was modified as follows: "All negroes, Indians, mulattoes, and mustazoes, (free Indians in amity with this government, and negroes, mulattoes, and mustazoes who are now free, excepted,) who now are or shall hereafter be in this province, and all their issue and offspring, born or to be born, shall be, and they are hereby declared to be and remain for ever hereafter, absolute slaves, and shall follow the condition of the mother and shall be deemed in law chattels personal." In all claims of freedom, the burden of proof was to be on the claimant, and it was to be always presumed that every negro,

Indian, mulatto, and mestizo is a slave, unless the contrary appear. This act, which forms the legal basis, such as it is, of the existing slave-holding system of South Carolina, was preceded and followed by all the customary barbarous enactments of slave codes. Yet the South Carolina assembly seem to have supposed themselves to be legislating within the limits of the English law; for at the very same session at which the slave act of 1712 was enacted, the common law of England was declared to be in force in South Carolina. In North Carolina, the slaves were already a third part of the population; but no act of that colony seems ever to have given a legislative basis to the authority of the master, which rested, and still rests, upon mere custom, and the old imaginary right, under the English common law, to reduce infidels and their descendants to servitude. So far as relates to the slavery of Indians, the Carolinians had been from the beginning notorious sinners. They had an irresistible propensity to kidnap the unhappy natives, and reduce them to slavery. One chief ground of quarrel with the proprietors grew out of efforts made by them to put a stop to this iniquity.

Georgia, it is well known, was originally intended to be a free colony. During the eighteen years that its affairs were administered by the trustees who had planted it, slavery was strictly prohibited. During this whole period, the vagabonds from the streets of London, the principal English settlers in Georgia, had raised a loud outcry against this prohibition, ascribing to it the poverty and slow progress of the colony, the natural result of their own idleness and incapacity.

The famous Whitfield had pleaded with the trustees in favor of slavery, under the old slave-trading pretence of propagating, by that means, the Christian religion. The Moravians settled in Georgia long had scruples; but they were reässured by the heads of their sect in Germany: "If you take slaves in faith, and with the intent of conducting them to Christ, the action will not be a sin, but may prove a benediction." Thus, as usual, the religious sentiment and its most disinterested votaries were made the tools of worldly selfishness, for the enslavement and plunder of mankind.

The amiable Berkeley, afterwards bishop of Cloyne, had already served as a similar cats-paw. In spite of the enactments of the colonial legislatures to the contrary, the idea still remained strongly impressed on the colonial mind, that Christians could not be held in servitude, and many mas-

ters refused to allow their slaves to be instructed or baptized, lest thereby they might become free. During Berkeley's residence in America for the purpose of founding a missionary college in Bermuda, his attention was attracted to the religious condition of the slaves. To get rid of the opposition of the masters to their religious instruction, he applied for aid to Yorke and Talbot, the one attorney-general, the other solicitor-general of England.* These learned lawyers, feed for that purpose by the planters, had already certified that negroes might be held as slaves even in England,—a doctrine afterwards set aside in the famous case of Somerset,—and now at Berkeley's request, they "charitably sent an opinion signed by their own hands," that the conversion and baptism of negroes did not make them free. This opinion Berkeley caused to be published in Rhode Island, where he resided, and to be disseminated through the colonies.

The poor settlers of Georgia, with fatal ignorance of their true interests, influenced by some vague hopes of wealth, or the pleasure of seeing beneath them a class more miserable and degraded than themselves, had raised, as we have seen, a clamor for slaves; and one of the first acts of the new government, which succeeded to the authority of the trustees, was, the repeal of the prohibition of slavery. It was not, however, till thirteen years after, that the legislature of Georgia sustained what they supposed to be the common law on this subject, by positive enactment. In 1765, they copied the South Carolina act of 1740, excepting, however, from the stern doom of slavery, not only such negroes, mulattoes, mestizos, and Indians as already were free, but such also as might afterwards become free; thus acknowledging a possibility of future manumissions, which the South Carolina statute seemed to cut off.

Such is the legislation, and all the legislation, by which it can be pretended that slavery, during the colonial times, acquired in our southern states the character and the dignity of a Legal Institution. Was this legislation valid? Could it have the effect to legalize slavery in America?

As our state legislatures are now restricted in their powers by constitutions, state and federal, so the colonial legislatures

* Both afterwards Chancellors; the one as Lord Hardwicke, the other as Lord Talbot.

were restricted in their powers by the law of England. Contrary to the great principles of that law they could not make any acts. This limitation was expressly declared in the colonial charters. Thus, for instance, the charter of Maryland provided, that all laws to be enacted by the provincial legislature "be consonant to reason, and be not repugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be,) agreeable to the laws, statutes, customs, and rights of this our kingdom of England." Similar provisions are to be found in the charters of Virginia, Carolina, and Georgia. It is true, that these charters, except that of Maryland, were surrendered or taken away, previous to the Revolution. But this proceeding, so far from extending the authority of the colonial legislatures, operated the other way; conformity to the law of England being still more strictly demanded in the royal than in the chartered provinces. This doctrine of the restricted powers of the colonial legislatures was perfectly well established, and has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as by the state courts. No lawyer would pretend that any colonial legislature had power, for instance, to abolish trial by jury. The limits of colonial legislative authority may be well exemplified by a transaction in South Carolina. That province was violently distracted by disputes between churchmen and dissenters. In 1704, the churchmen, happening to have a majority of one in the assembly, passed an act, by the help of a good quantity of good liquor, that none but churchmen should vote. This act was approved by the proprietaries; and as the charter of Carolina reserved no negative to the crown, it thus obtained the form of law. The dissenters, indignant at this outrage, sent an agent to England, on whose petition the House of Lords, swayed by the eloquence of Somers, pronounced this disfranchising act unreasonable and contrary to the laws of England; while Queen Anne, by the advice of the attorney and solicitor-generals, issued a proclamation declaring the obnoxious act void, because it violated that clause in the charter which required the laws of the colony not to contradict those of England.

If the colonial legislatures could not abolish trial by jury; if, after the toleration of all Protestant sects had become the law of England, they had no power to enact laws disfranchising any Protestant — had they any power to establish slavery?

Certainly not, if slavery was contrary to the law of England. That it was contrary to the law of England, was fully decided in 1772, after repeated and solemn argument, in the famous case of Somerset. In that case, Lord Mansfield held, that since the extinction of the old villeinage of the Middle Ages, no such thing as slavery had legally existed, or could legally exist, in England. Villeinage had been hereditary: the sole way of proving a man a villein, was, to prove that he had been born so. There existed no other way of recruiting the ranks of slavery. The old notion upon which the colonists had acted, that pagans and infidels and their descendants might be bought and held as slaves, was by this case wholly set aside, as a vulgar error. The particular decision in Somerset's case was limited to England, beyond which the jurisdiction of the court did not extend. But its principles were equally applicable to the colonies, and struck a fatal blow at all the slave laws; for if slavery was contrary to English law, then the colonial legislatures had no power to legalize it.

Slavery had been carried to a much greater extent in some of the colonies than in England; yet for a hundred and fifty years preceding the decision in Somerset's case, West India planters and others had claimed and exercised the right to sell, beat, and control their alleged slaves, as fully in London as in America. The supreme tribunals of England having clearly established it as law, that all persons within the realm of England were free, that great principle became the overruling law of the English colonies, and swept away the only basis upon which the acts of the colonial assemblies legalizing slavery could rest.

It has, however, been attempted to evade this conclusion; and the omnipotence of Parliament has been invoked, as having, at least by way of inference and recognition, legalized slavery in America. For this purpose, several acts of parliament are cited, relating to the African trade; also the act of 1732, for the speedy recovery of debts in the colonies. It is very true, that, in these acts, negroes are spoken of as merchandise. In those relating to the African trade, the fact of the transportation of Africans from the coast of Africa, to be sold in America, is fully recognized. But there is nothing whatever, in any of these acts, to distinguish negroes, in this respect, from the servants regularly exported from England, Ireland, Germany, and elsewhere, and sold and rated as merchandise in the colonies. Negroes are nowhere, in these acts,

spoken of as *slaves*, nor is there any shadow of ground for distinguishing, so far as these acts are concerned, between the servitude of Africans and that of Europeans. The importation into the colonies and sale there of servants, *to be held for a limited period*, to be esteemed during that period the goods and chattels of the purchaser, and to be sold at his pleasure, was undoubtedly legal by the law of England; and there is nothing whatever in the acts above cited, to show that any thing more was intended to be recognized in the case of Africans. Such, indeed, seems to have been the view taken of these acts by Lord Mansfield. If they legalized slavery in the colonies, they just as much legalized it in Great Britain; for the exportation of negroes was not limited to America. But though these acts were cited and relied upon in Somerset's case, Lord Mansfield allowed them no weight.

We are led, in this connection, briefly to notice an oft-repeated statement, that slavery was forced upon the colonies by the mother country, against their will, and in spite of their efforts to prevent it. Bancroft has labored, by insinuation at least, to give some color to this charge, which originated with Jefferson, and made its first appearance in the declamatory introduction to the first constitution of Virginia. Jefferson wished to repeat it, in a still more direct and emphatic form, in the Declaration of Independence. But it was rather too much to ask the delegates from the Carolinas and Georgia to denounce the slave-trade as "a cruel war against human nature, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty." Georgia had struggled against, and had finally defeated, the attempt to make her a free state; could she charge the king with forcing upon her that "execrable commerce," the slave-trade? Jefferson hated Britain, he hated slavery, and he wished to bring these hatreds into juxtaposition; but to do so required a very excited imagination. Had any colony ever prohibited the introduction of negroes; had any colony ever enacted that negroes should stand on the same ground as white servants, and be discharged at the end of seven years' service; and had the king vetoed such enactments—he might then have been justly charged with forcing slavery on the colonies. But no colony ever passed any such law, or thought of it. The vetoes on which Jefferson relied were of a very different sort. The colonies, especially those of the South, wished to raise a part of their revenue by duties on imports, with the double object of lightening the burden of direct tax-

ation, and giving protection to domestic manufactures. The English merchants, in whose hands the commerce of those colonies was, were then, as now, advocates of free trade; they complained of those duties as an interference with their commercial rights, and had interest enough with the British government to procure a standing instruction to all the royal governors, not to consent to such sort of taxes. Among the chief imports into the southern colonies, were negroes. But in seeking to impose a tax of a few pounds on each negro imported, the colonial legislatures no more intended to abolish or to restrict slavery or the slave-trade, than Congress, when it agreed to the square yard minimum upon cotton goods, intended to abolish or restrict the use of muslins and calicoes.

It seems, then, to be very plainly made out, that at the commencement of our Revolution, slavery had no *legal* basis in any of the North American states. It *existed*, as many other wrongs existed, in all of them. In many of the colonies, the assemblies, under a mistaken view of the law of England or their own powers, or through wilful disregard of acknowledged restraints, had attempted to give it the sanction of law. But by that same law of England, which the colonists claimed as their birthright, and to which they so loudly appealed against the usurpations of the mother country, such statutes were all void. The negroes were too ignorant to know their rights, and too helpless to vindicate them. They could not appeal to England, like the South Carolina dissenters, nor had they a powerful party there to support their rights; but, legally speaking, they were all free.

It remains, then, to inquire, whether the American Revolution, which we are accustomed to extol as an outburst of liberty, a memorable vindication of the rights of man — did, in fact, give to slavery a legal character. Whether men, entitled by British law to their freedom, became slaves under the state and federal constitutions. Interesting and important subjects of inquiry, these! But we have already exceeded our limits; and this inquiry must be reserved for a future occasion.

ART. II.—*A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive; being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation.* By JOHN STUART MILL. 2 vols. pp. 580 and 630. Second Edition. London. 1846.

WE beg the reader not to take fright at the unpromising heading of our article. After all that can be said, Logic, at least in the common sense, it must be confessed, has to do only with the dry bones and dust, as it were, of thought, from whence all interest has fled. But our business with Mr. Mill's book, on the present occasion, is only to illustrate from it and by it the point of view from which, in England especially, the first principles of science in general are approached and treated by a large class of writers, comprising, particularly in the department of Natural Sciences, some of the most famous names in literature. It is not, then, as a treatise on Logic, in the sense above alluded to, that we have to do with it, but as a system of Metaphysics — namely, as the best recent exposition we have met with of the *Inductive System*, or however otherwise the prevailing modifications of Bacon's and Locke's philosophy, according to time and place, may be designated. Of the detail of the work before us, therefore, its merits as a system of practical rules or methods, and the manner in which questions subordinate to the general problem are treated, we shall say nothing.

Logic is usually understood to signify merely an account of the forms and arrangement of propositions in the *syllogism*, and the employment of the syllogism in argument; without regard to the subject-matter of the propositions, or to the question whence the syllogistic form is derived, or on what its authority depends; the *art*, therefore, rather than the *science* of Reasoning. Mr. Mill, however, following Whately, declares it to be "the science, as well as the art of reasoning," and that "a right understanding of the mental process itself, of the conditions it depends upon, and the steps of which it consists, is the only basis on which a system of rules fitted for the direction of the process can possibly be founded." But though he makes Logic coëxtensive with Reasoning, yet he confines it to the investigation of data furnished *aliunde*, and thus presupposes other faculties, to which the obtaining of these data exclusively belongs. So that Logic with him is

but a *part* of philosophy. It is necessary for us, therefore, in the first place, to justify our procedure in treating his Logic as a theory of Knowledge in general.

"Truths," says Mr. Mill, "are known to us in two ways; some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of Intuition, or Consciousness; the latter, of Inference. The truths known by intuition are the original premisses from which all others are inferred. Our assent to the conclusion being grounded upon the truth of the premisses, we could never arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless something could be known antecedently to all reasoning. Examples of truths known to us by immediate consciousness, are, our own bodily sensations and mental feelings. I know directly, and of my own knowledge, that I was vexed yesterday, or that I am hungry to-day. Examples of truths which we know only by way of inference, are, occurrences which took place while we were absent, the events recorded in history, or the theorems of mathematics." This faculty of Intuition, or Consciousness, is elsewhere called "direct Perception," "a mental or physical seeing," &c. "Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees, or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our knowledge of them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic for this portion of our knowledge."

The other source, that of mediate or indirect Knowledge, is Inference, or Reasoning. This is the province of Logic, which is "restricted to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known. . . . Logic is not the science of Belief, but the science of Proof, or Evidence." "The distinction is, that the science or knowledge of the particular subject-matter furnishes the evidence, while logic furnishes the principles and rules of the estimation of evidence. Logic does not pretend to teach the surgeon what are the symptoms which indicate a violent death. This he must learn from his own experience and observation, or from that of others, his predecessors in his peculiar science."

Logic thus presupposes propositions, to which its rules are to be applied. Every proposition "is formed by putting together two names," and "consists of three parts; the Sub-

ject, the Predicate, and the Copula." Names he divides into several classes, of which the only ones of importance to our purpose are the Connotative and Non-connotative. "A non-connotative term" (I. 37,) "is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute only. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute." "Connotative names have hence been also called *denominative*, because the subject which they denote is denominated by, or receives a name from, the attribute which they connote. . . . James and Robert receive the name man, because they possess the attributes which are considered to constitute humanity." Naming thus presupposes generalization. "Whenever the names given to objects convey any information, that is, whenever they have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they *denote*, but in what they *connote*." So that "the only names of objects which connote nothing, are proper names; and these have, strictly speaking, no signification," but their object is merely distinction. "A proper name is but an unmeaning mark, which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object; and it is even conceivable that I might know every single individual of whom a given name could be with truth affirmed, yet could not be said to know the meaning of the name." Every non-connotative, therefore,—that is, every term which simply denotes something,—must be an unmeaning name. A name, to have any meaning, must include an attribute or quality common to the thing named, with other things, and thus refer the thing to a previously-existing class.

Direct Perception then is possible only of unmeaning names. For Connotation presupposes not merely a simple perception of the thing, but also a knowledge of its attributes; that is, a generalization, which is given, not directly, or by intuition, but by a mental process.

The existence of a connotative name, therefore, presupposes that direct perception is transcended, and that reasoning has taken place.

It may perhaps be objected, that connotatives may be directly known, though unconsciously, inasmuch as the connotation, though existing, might not be at first perceived, but discovered afterwards. This seems to be what Mr. Mill means by what he says about *ascertaining* and *fixing* the connotation. But here the connotation is presupposed, as a foregone process, and the question is, how it came about. Connotation is surely an act or process of the mind, and if so, how can we call that di-

rect knowledge—"antecedent to all Reasoning"—which has been preceded by a connotation? It is difficult to understand Mr. Mill here, unless we suppose, that, as he had laid it down that the meaning is in all cases discovered by connotation, the notion might have floated through his mind that the connotation is the meaning; thus confounding the act or process with the result obtained by it. However this may be, our clear result is this: that wherever we *know* any thing, we find that a mental process, beside that of mere direct perception, has preceded; and that direct Intuition, according to the principles started with, is impossible.

We are very far from supposing that this result is at all contemplated, or would be admitted, by Mr. Mill. On the contrary, as we have seen, he depends upon and refers to direct Perception for the subject-matter and ultimate foundation of all Science. This doctrine, that ultimate truths are directly perceived, is, we believe, under one form or another, common to most English and French metaphysicians. A writer in the Edinburgh Review (Vol. L., p. 196) thus states it:—"Our knowledge rests ultimately on certain facts of consciousness, which, as primitive, and consequently incomprehensible, are given less in the form of *cognitions* than of *beliefs*. But if consciousness in its last analysis—in other words, if our *primary experience*, be a faith, the reality of our knowledge turns on the veracity of our generative beliefs. As ultimate, the quality of these beliefs cannot be inferred; their truth, however, is in the first instance to be presumed."

The result of direct perception, therefore,—according to the Inductive Theory,—must be *incomprehensible* and *incognizable*. For as these results, according to the supposition, are altogether independent of, and unmixed with, mental action, they must be purely objective, and given to it from without.

Many perceptions, however, which seem intuitive, all will allow to be in fact either inferences which habit has made rapid and easy; or else in reality included in something already known. Of the first class, namely, conclusions which are commonly mistaken for intuitions, our author (I. 7,) gives as an example our perception of distance, than which, as he remarks, nothing can seem more directly intuitive. An example of the other class of intuitions falsely so called, is given by the truths of Number: thus, that $2 + 2 = 4$. The same is true of all intuitions of which we are conscious;—all Cognition presupposes something more than mere reception from without.

But for the present we will observe only, that if the guaranty of their truth be only an uncomprehended and incomprehensible *feeling*, which we know leads us astray very often, and of which we can have *in no case* any ulterior test—the intuitions would seem to form a very unstable foundation for Science. And here we must notice a great inconsistency in the procedure of the philosophers of the Inductive School: namely, that while they claim in behalf of their own system unhesitating confidence in intuitive beliefs, they will not allow this to others. Now, if these intuitive beliefs are to pass unquestioned, as truths, it is evidently impossible to draw the line between those to be admitted as of scientific validity, and those to be rejected. Whatever we fully believe, then, is true. There is no test but subjective persuasion. Then the visions and prophecies of clairvoyants and seers of various kinds must be allowed as scientific truth. And even if the fact of full belief in their own assertions be denied in these cases; or if the belief of all mankind be required, it will at least be admitted that some undoubted blunders have, in the history of Science, been held with as full and universal belief as any scientific truth at the present day. The believers in the Ptolemaic System no doubt as fully believed that the sun moved round the earth, as we now do the converse. Now the important point is, not that we believe, ever so strongly, but that we have reason to believe.

If passive Belief were the source of knowledge, not only would all men of equal acuteness of sense be on a par in scientific capability, but the brutes also would stand on a level with Man; for they also have feelings and sensations; and what we call Instinct is precisely "incomprehensible" or uncomprehended Knowledge.

Our result, therefore, that this so-called direct Knowledge is no Knowledge at all, though deduced from our author's premises against his intention, justifies itself from the absurdities to which the opposite supposition necessarily leads. It is moreover confirmed by Mr. Mill's subsequent admission, that we cannot in any case know any thing of *objects themselves*, but only the impressions or representations in the mind. This point, he says, (I. 78,) "is one upon which those [idealist] metaphysicians are now very generally considered to have made out their case; namely, that *all we know* of objects is the sensations which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of those sensations." Now as "sensations are states of the sentient mind, not states of the body, as distinguished from

it," (I. 68,) this would certainly seem equivalent to saying, that of the outward world we know absolutely nothing at all, directly, but only as represented or conceived by the mind. This is not only involved, but openly stated, in the theory of Phenomena; yet we find writers on Metaphysics constantly speaking of Phenomena as if they were *things;* of a more airy and unsubstantial sort, indeed, but things still; having a material existence, though wanting the attributes of Matter: instead of being the results of a mental process. Thus, when it is said that Phenomena have no existence out of the mind, this is taken to be a denial of all objective Reality. Whereas, on the contrary, if the objects of Sensation were Reality,—Sensation being, of itself, cognizant only of abstracts, (as we have already seen,) and not of Reality,—evidently we should be cut off from all objective Knowledge. What we perceive is undoubtedly the thing itself; but the representation is no thing, and what is present in the mind is not the thing, but the representation. So that we are not to fancy things existing in our minds, as *fragments* of truth out of which Science is to be built up by mechanical aggregation. In what we call facts, and in all general names, (provided they stand for any thing, and are not merely repeated by rote,) the outward world is seen metamorphosed; the directness of the sensuous impression being removed by Reflection. It is true that there exists spontaneously in the mind much that resembles the results of Cognition, and may be called immediate Knowledge, but differs from Knowledge properly so called, in this, that it exists unknown to the mind itself, and is manifested only in action. This immediate Knowledge, or Instinct, shows in its results a resemblance to the products of conscious Reason; as, for instance, in the knowledge of geometry shown in the construction of the bee's cell. This knowledge is displayed certainly by the bee, but unconsciously; so that it cannot be said to belong to the bee, but is given to the insect from without.

But when we speak of science and method, and the moment we reflect upon the nature of our Knowledge, that moment it ceases to be instinctive. It is no longer Knowledge, merely, but *our* Knowledge, and thenceforth nothing can properly bear the name, except the results of conscious mental action.

Thus it is to the second of the two sources above mentioned, that which involves a productive action of the mind—namely,

Reasoning or Inference — that we are referred for the origin of all our Knowledge; and Logic, therefore, as the Science of Reasoning, will be synonymous with Philosophy, or the Science of Knowledge.

"Most of the propositions which we believe," says Mr. Mill, (I. 216,) "are not believed on their own evidence, but on the ground of something previously assented to, and from which they are said to be inferred." "To infer a proposition from a previous proposition or propositions, . . . is to *reason*, in the most extensive sense of the term." "Reasoning . . . is popularly said to be of two kinds — reasoning from particulars to generals, and reasoning from generals to particulars; the former being called Induction, the latter Ratiocination, or Syllogism."

And first, of the syllogism. "To a legitimate syllogism it is essential that there should be three and no more than three propositions; namely, the conclusion, or proposition to be proved, and two other propositions which together prove it, and which are called the premisses. It is essential that there should be three and no more than three terms; namely, the subject and predicate of the conclusion, and another called the middle term, which must be found in both premisses, since it is by means of it that the two terms are to be connected together. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term of the syllogism; the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term." "One premiss, the major, is an universal proposition, and according as this is affirmative or negative, the conclusion is so too. All ratiocination, therefore, starts from a general proposition, principle, or assumption." "The other premiss is always affirmative, and asserts that something belongs to the class respecting which something was affirmed or denied in the major premiss." That is, the subject of the major premiss always includes that of the minor; so that the minor must always be relatively particular. Thus even where it is universal in its form, as in the syllogism, All men are mortal — all kings are men — therefore, &c., — the minor in fact only specifies something already contained in the major: "all kings" being contained in "all men." So that what is said (I. 275,) about the minor as affirming a *new case*, must be rejected as inconsistent with the general principle; unless by a new case he means only a case not before thought of. The conclusion must therefore be already contained in the major; being merely *pointed out* by the syllogism. Thus "it must be

granted, that in every syllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a *petitio principii.*" Accordingly he allows, that "no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove any thing; since from a general principle you cannot infer any particulars but those which the principle itself assumes as foreknown." "But this is in fact to say, that nothing ever was or can be proved by syllogism, which was not known, or assumed to be known, before." All real accession to our knowledge, then, must be contained in the general proposition, the major premiss. But (I. 249,) "whence do we derive our knowledge of the general truth? No supernatural aid being supposed, the answer must be, by observation." "Now all which man can observe are individual cases. From these all general truths must be drawn, and into them they may be again resolved; for a general truth is but an aggregate of particular truths; a comprehensive expression, by which an indefinite number of individual facts are affirmed or denied at once." Thus "general propositions are merely registers of such inferences already made, and short formulæ for making more. The major premiss of a syllogism, consequently, is a formula of this description; and the conclusion is not an inference drawn *from* the formula, but an inference drawn *according to* the formula; the real logical antecedent, or premisses, being the particular facts from which the general proposition was collected by induction." But if the syllogism be only an explication of what already exists in the premisses, or a test of such an explication, its office must be an altogether dependent and secondary one, and it cannot take any part in the original investigation of truth. For if Truth consists of an aggregate of facts, and if the syllogism neither collects nor aggregates the facts, clearly nothing is left for it beyond examination of the bearings and consequences of truths already elsewhere obtained. Mr. Mill accordingly assigns to the syllogism altogether a subordinate place in the system. "Its function," says he, (I. 261,) "is interpretation," and its chief use is, that it affords "a set of precautions for correctly reading the general propositions or records of facts."

To *obtain* general propositions, therefore, as well as particular facts, we must resort to the other branch of Inference; namely, Induction. "What Induction is, therefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, cannot but be deemed the main question of the science of logic — the question which includes all others."

It is this operation (I. 352,) "by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, Induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class, is true of the whole class; or that what is true at certain times, will be true under similar circumstances at all times." At first sight, it might seem as if Mr. Mill's own criticism on the *dictum de omni et nullo*, would apply to this definition: "What," says he, (I. 235,) "do we learn by being told, that whatever can be affirmed of a class, may be affirmed of every object contained in the class? The class *is* nothing, but the objects contained in it; and the *dictum de omni* merely amounts to the identical proposition, that whatever is true of certain objects, is true of each of those objects. If all ratiocination were no more than the application of this maxim to particular cases, the syllogism would indeed be, what it has so often been declared to be, solemn trifling." Now, as the *dictum de omni et nullo* is evidently only an inversion of Induction, as above defined, all this would seem to be true of the definition. But in order to understand what is really meant here, we must bear in mind the position above quoted, that a general truth is a mere *aggregate* of particular truths, whence it will follow, that a class is an aggregate of particular individuals. And as Particularity is here taken abstractly, as mere Diversity, there results from this postulate a principle of classification, founded not on affinity, but on diversity; for an aggregate of particulars contains no relation of affinity, but only of difference.

It is true, that where we find certain facts associated, we are inclined to suppose an affinity among them; — but this is because we (instinctively at least) suppose their being associated *to depend* on some internal affinity. But the Inductive Theory consistently avoids any such suppositions, as hypothetical.

Accordingly, "every class is a real kind, which is distinguished from all other classes by an indeterminate multitude of properties not derivable from another;" "while, on the contrary, differences that are merely finite and determinate, like those designated by the words white, black, or red, may be disregarded if the purpose for which the classification is made does not require attention to those particular properties." (I. 171, 167.) But a distinction in class, which we

may make or not, at our pleasure, we may acknowledge or not, when made by another; and thus where the diversity is definite, no valid distinction, according to these principles, can be made. This, however, it is unnecessary to consider, until it be shown that a definite diversity can be found in nature; — that is, that in any case, the differences between two things can be exhausted. Unless we draw a line somewhere, and declare that certain differences may be disregarded, as unimportant, (a proceeding utterly unwarrantable on the principles of this system,) it is evidently impossible to come to the end of the differences between any two acorns, or oak-leaves, or any other two things in nature. The most minute examination would only widen the field and complicate the problem. All difference, then, must be difference of class; and, as (I. 93,) no two things are the *same*, every object in the universe must form a class by itself: that is, Classification is impossible, except as a matter of arbitrary convention, — "a relation," (I. 162,) "grounded not upon what the predicate con-notes, but upon the class which it *de*notes," that is, upon the *proper name*, or what we have agreed it shall stand for, "and upon the place which, in some given classification, that class occupies relatively to the particular subject."

If, then, from certain apparent resemblances between a number of things, we form them into a class; and if, then, it be proposed to conclude from these resemblances, that a given attribute belonging to a certain individual among them, but not known to belong to the rest, does in fact belong to them, — the proposition would be so far from identical, that, on the contrary, it would be altogether unfounded.

The problem of Induction, therefore, instead of a triviality, seems to be a hopeless puzzle. That we do infer general truths from particular experience, all will allow; but how this is even possible, on the principles here laid down, (much more the ground of it,) it is difficult to perceive. For any thing that appears, it may be a groundless prejudice.

It is of the utmost necessity, therefore, to discover some test, or evidence *a posteriori*, by which the wanting foundation may be supplied to generalization, and until this be done, the whole fabric of science must swing in air.

Some of the practical difficulties growing out of this defect in his principle Mr. Mill notices, though not the defect itself. The popular induction, he says, (I. 377,) "consists in ascrib-

ing the character of general truths to all propositions which are true in every instance that we happen to know of;" — it is "simply a habit of expecting that what has been found true once or several times, and never yet found false, will be found true again." But this by no means follows. Thus, "from the earliest records, the testimony of all the inhabitants of the known world was unanimous on the point, that all swans are white." Yet this "cannot have been a good induction, since the conclusion has turned out erroneous." "The uniform experience, therefore, of the inhabitants of the known world, agreeing in a common result, without one known instance of deviation from that result, is not always sufficient to establish a general conclusion." And, we may add, if not *always* sufficient, in the absence of any test as to when it may be relied upon and when not, it can *never* be sufficient. Mr. Mill accordingly makes a distinction (I. 359, 369,) between a mere aggregation of cases, and a real induction: namely, that the facts must not only be brought together, but, moreover, that "the connecting link must be some character which *really exists* in the facts themselves, and which would manifest itself therein if the conditions could be realized which our organs of sense require."

But this is saying, in other words, that our classification must not be conventional or accidental, but founded in the nature of things: — a direct contradiction to the notion of Classification before mentioned. This contradiction is necessarily inherent in the system; for the problem of Science is to generalize particulars, and this the Inductive theory renders impossible. But let us see what the "connecting link" must be. As it is to be a character "really existing" in the facts, it must be something common to all of them. All community of attributes and all identity in principle being abstracted, (as the exclusion of prejudice and hypothesis demands,) we have nothing left whereby to group objects, except their position in Time and Space. Avoiding the question, whether even these relations do not presuppose an ulterior principle of affinity among particulars so related, it is true, that in all our experience we find things and events occurring in a certain order, in Time and Space; — every object occupies a certain space, and every event happens in a certain time, whilst other characters may be abstracted without destroying them. One or both of these characters, then, must be the link which we seek. Kant takes both: — Mr.

Mill selects position in Time; that is, Succession. For this selection he gives no reason; but evidently he is restricted to it by his postulate, and his negative principle of classification. Extent in Space is present and continuous; — extent in Time, on the contrary, implies diversity and succession. "We take no note of Time, but by its loss," for Time is the abstract form of Change. Things are connected, then, as being transient and successive, and this is their only general and common character: the only one which we can say *really exists* in all things.

"Of all truths relating to phenomena, the most valuable to us are those which relate to the order of their succession;" but "among all those uniformities in the succession of phenomena, which common observation is sufficient to bring to light, there are very few which have any, even apparent, pretension to this rigorous indefeasibility; and of those few, one only has been found capable of completely sustaining it." This is succession in Time, or, as he calls it, Causation. "Between the phenomena which exist at any instant, and the phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order of succession;" "to certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe, always will, succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the cause; the invariable consequent, the effect." "Upon the universality of this truth depends the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules;" and this notion of Cause is "the root of the whole theory of Induction." (I. 395.) Now, as we are in search of "rigorous universality," and as the theory of Cause is introduced to give such universality to the results of Induction, it is above all necessary, as our author (I. 411,) remarks — that the succession itself should be universal and unconditional, and unless it is so, it cannot have any title to the name of Cause. Uniform experience, therefore, he says, is not sufficient to establish the fact of Causation. But if so, it is clearly incapable of being established at all, on the Inductive theory. No conceivable method, no variation nor comparison of experiments, can ever establish the unconditionalness of a succession in Time; for to do so, the experience must be coextensive with all Time. It does not follow, because a particular succession has hitherto been invariable, that it will henceforth continue to be so. Even that we suppose or guess that it will be, is not accounted for. At all events it is a mere hypothesis.

Whether such a succession is a causation or not, must then always be doubtful; and the doubt must be, from the nature of things, incapable of solution. So that to select from the endless maze of successive phenomena certain of them as Cause and Effect, must be mere guess-work, without the slightest scientific value. We know beforehand that an immense mass of phenomena precede any given one, (and many of them invariably precede it,) — which must either all be causes of it, or else some of them not causes. But if all are causes, the principle will be useless to Science; and if some only are causes, we cannot distinguish them. "In making chemical experiments, we do not think it necessary to note the position of the planets; because experience has shown, as a very superficial experience is sufficient to show, that in such cases that circumstance is not material to the result." On the contrary, by his own showing, nothing less than an experience coextensive with the existence of the planets, and reaching beyond them, could be sufficient. Or by what process are their possible influences to be eliminated? Nor if we forsake the principle, and trust to invariable experience merely, is the difficulty lessened. Many phenomena — as the fixed stars — are constant, and have *assisted*, in the French sense, throughout History; — are we, therefore, to conclude that they have assisted also in the sense of Causation? The confusion of *post hoc* with *propter hoc* is, indeed, a matter of daily experience, but will hardly be maintained as a scientific principle.

And it cannot be allowed, even as a matter of common experience or opinion, that Cause and Effect are always related as antecedent and consequent. On the contrary, Mr. Mill's own definition of Cause implies coexistence. He says, (I. 404,) "The cause, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequence invariably follows." The cause, then, does not exist until all the conditions are assembled. But what interval can there be between the assemblage of all the conditions and the existence of the effect? Clearly only an imaginary one. Not merely will the interval of time be too small to be appreciated by the senses, but more than this, there will be an absolute coincidence. You cannot assemble the conditions of water, without at the same instant producing it. The chemical combination of oxygen and hydrogen, is equally a description of the cause and of the effect. If the

effect is not produced, it is because some of the positive conditions are wanting, or some of the negative present. This, indeed, Mr. Mill (I. 413,) seems to admit, but thinks it unimportant. "Whether the cause and its effect be necessarily successive or not, causation is still the law of the succession of phenomena. Every thing which begins to exist must have a cause." That is, all that the common notion of Causation demands, is *some* necessary connection between the phenomena,—in which it is undoubtedly right. Only there is not the slightest ground for attributing any weight to Succession,—which, instead of giving, receives all its importance from the ulterior fact of a real connection.

What this connection is, then, or how it is to be known, is left undecided. This principle of Causation, therefore, will not accomplish what it is brought forward to do. As before, its application shows its deficiencies. Thus, (I. 506,) "In the first place, it is not true that the same phenomenon is always produced by the same cause; the effect *a* may sometimes arise from A, sometimes from B. And, secondly, the effects of different causes are often not dissimilar, but homogeneous, and marked out by no assignable boundaries from one another." "One fact may be the consequent in several invariable sequences; it may follow, with equal uniformity, any one of several antecedents, or collections of antecedents." So that, (I. 543,) "Where, in every single instance, a multitude, often an unknown multitude of agencies are clashing and combining, what security have we that in our computation *a priori* we have taken all these into one reckoning? How many must we not generally be ignorant of? Among those we know, how probable that some have been overlooked; and even were all included, how vain the pretence of summing up the effects of many causes, unless we know accurately the numerical law of each,—a condition in most cases not to be fulfilled; and even when fulfilled, to make the calculation transcends, in any but very simple cases, the utmost power of mathematical science with its most modern improvements." These difficulties Mr. Mill supposes confined to certain classes of investigations; but, as remarked on a former occasion, even allowing this, the trouble is that we can never be sure whether or not any given case belongs to one of these classes. This uncertainty, therefore, must extend to all our results.

As a remedy for these deficiencies of Induction, Mr. Mill

proposes the Deductive Method. (I. 534.) "The mode of investigation which, from the proved inapplicability of direct methods of observation and experiment, remains to us as the main source of the knowledge we possess . . . of the more complex phenomena, is called . . . the Deductive Method; and consists of three operations: the first, one of direct induction; the second, of ratiocination; and the third, of verification." "The problem of the Deductive Method is, to find the law of an effect from the laws of the different tendencies of which it is the joint result. The first requisite, therefore, is to know the laws of these tendencies; the law of each of the concurrent causes; and this supposes a previous process of observation or experiment upon each cause separately; or else a previous deduction, which also must depend for its ultimate premisses upon observation or experiment." This being accomplished, "the second part follows; that of determining, from the laws of the causes, what effect any given combination of those causes will produce." Thus far there is nothing peculiar in the method; its essential characteristic is the third process, Verification, whereby the general conclusions formed by deduction are compared with the results of direct observation. Without Verification it is acknowledged (I. 544,) that all the results of the Deductive Method "have little other value than that of guess-work." It is upon Verification, therefore, that the validity of all scientific results must at last depend. "That the advances henceforth to be expected even in physical, and still more in mental and social science, will be chiefly the result of deduction, is evident from the general considerations already adduced."

But it is not a sufficient verification, that the supposed cause "accounts for all the known phenomena, since this is a condition often fulfilled equally well by two conflicting hypotheses." It is sufficient only "provided the case be such that a false law cannot lead to a true result;—provided no law, except the very one we have assumed, can lead deductively to the same conclusions which that leads to."

Here the whole difficulty is provided for in advance, in a summary manner. The uncertainty whether our investigation has been sufficiently ample to exclude all possibility of influence from unsuspected causes, is disposed of, but by a postulate, for the admissibility of which we can see no grounds. Previously to Verification we have no means of obtaining such knowledge concerning the law in question, except through In-

duction, and reasoning founded thereon. Unless by attributing some additional efficacy to Induction on account of its forming part of the deductive process, we see no chance that the proviso can ever be complied with. Mr. Mill, however, is of a different opinion. He thinks it may "often be realized," and gives as an instance Newton's demonstration that the law governing the motion of the planets is Gravitation. But in all mathematical demonstrations, as our author himself remarks, (I. 297, 300,) the result is already implied in the premisses, and the premisses (II. 112, 162,) empirically derived from simple enumeration. That the proviso can ever be complied with in cases other than mathematical, he does not show. And he is obliged to admit that in order that Verification shall be proof, it is necessary that "the supposed cause should not only be a real phenomenon, . . . but should be already known to have some influence upon the supposed effect; the precise degree and manner of the influence being the only point undetermined." And "that what is an hypothesis at the beginning of the inquiry becomes a proved law of nature before its close . . . can only happen when the inquiry has for its object, not to detect an unknown cause, but to determine the precise law of a cause already ascertained." (II. 17, 14.)

Verification, therefore, is a subordinate matter, and does not help us at all in the main point; namely, the discovery of Cause. For this we are referred back to Induction. Observation and Experiment (II. 18,) furnish the independent evidence *aliunde* on which Verification depends. "The hypothesis, by suggesting observations and experiments, puts us upon the road to that independent evidence, if it be really attainable; and until it be attained, the hypothesis ought not to count for more than a suspicion."

In this account of Verification, it may be observed we have throughout assumed that the preliminary induction is in all cases an hypothesis; since, from what has already been shown, it must always answer to Mr. Mill's definition of an hypothesis; namely, a supposition made upon insufficient evidence. If it is not an hypothesis, there is no need of Verification; if it is, Verification is no more possible than before. Deduction is thus only an inverted Induction;—Verification, with which it ends, being nothing more than Experience, with which Induction begins.

It results, therefore, that the "connecting link" of phenomena cannot be discovered; the passage from the Particular to

the General remains unexplained and inexplicable. We must remain content with particulars; and not only this, but also, as the particular testifies only of itself and not of other particulars, we must be content with a partial or empirical Knowledge. "Experimental philosophers" (II. 41, 46, 93,) "usually give the name of Empirical Laws to those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but upon which they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason *why* such a law should exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an empirical law, that it is not an ultimate law; that if true at all, its truth is capable of being, and requires to be, accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation of which is not yet known." "Empirical laws, therefore, can only be held true within the limits of time and place in which they have been found true by observation; and not merely the limits of time and place, but of time, place, and circumstance; for since it is the very meaning of an empirical law that we do not know the ultimate laws of causation upon which it is dependent, we cannot foresee, without actual trial, in what manner or to what extent the introduction of any new circumstance may affect it." "In proportion, therefore, to our ignorance of the causes on which the empirical law depends, we can be less assured that it will continue to hold good; and the further we look into futurity, the less improbable is it that some one of the causes whose existence gives rise to the derivative uniformity, may be destroyed or counteracted."

The nearest that the Inductive Philosophy can come to Truth, therefore, is Probability. Universal experience being impossible, Knowledge must be so also. Its first principles must be assumptions. "The whole problem of the investigation of nature is, What are the fewest assumptions, which, being granted, the order of nature as it exists would be the result." (I. 560.) It cannot aspire to know the nature or the reason of any thing, but must content itself with the bare fact. It divides the universe into two mysteries — the mystery of Existence and the mystery of Knowledge. Body is the "unknown exciting cause of sensations;" the "mysterious something which excites the mind to feel;" and mind "the unknown recipient or percipient" of sensations; "the mysterious something which feels and thinks." "On the inmost nature of the thinking principle, as well as on the inmost nature of matter, we are, and with our human faculties must

always remain, entirely in the dark." (I. 81.) Thus it is often said, that, from the general limitedness of human faculties, we ought not, *a priori*, to require or expect human knowledge to attain to any thing more than probability. To demand for Science absolute and necessary truth, seems to many persons a kind of sacrilege;—at least the extreme of presumption. For if we regard Truth as an aggregate, the largest conceivable aggregate will still be a finite quantity, distinct from the infinite not in degree, but in kind.

But, in the first place, it ought to be distinctly understood and confessed, that Probability, of itself, can have no scientific value. We do, it is true, often attribute high scientific importance to what are only probabilities, but this is on the supposition that they are not to *remain* probabilities, but to become truths. Their importance consists in the prospect of Knowledge; and if this be absolutely cut off, as in the Inductive Theory, their value is at an end.

In the second place, we maintain that this whole theory of Probability is founded on an inadmissible postulate; namely, that Cognition is nothing higher than Sensation, (I. 78);—that there is nothing in Knowledge which our senses could not perceive, provided they were perfect of their kind, (I. 361,) and thus nothing but a mechanical aggregation of particulars.

That the material world is such an aggregate of particulars, we admit. But at the same time it is allowed that we have no communication with objects, except through the senses, and that "sensations are states of the sentient *mind*, not states of the body." Cognition, therefore, is based, at all events, not directly on any thing material, but on something mental. As appeared at the beginning of our examination, we have no direct cognition of objects, but all our knowledge presupposes a mental process; namely, Connotation. Connotation, however, is Generalization. To connote, is to attach to the particular an attribute; that is, a general character. A particular attribute, an attribute which does not attach the particular to a class, is a contradiction in terms. Mr. Mill himself says, (II. 211,) "In every act of what is called observation, there is at least one inference—from the sensations to the presence of the object; from the marks or diagnostics, to the entire phenomenon;" that is, we infer the general character indicated by the particular sensations. And again, (212,) "We cannot describe a fact, without implying more than the fact. The perception is only of one individual thing; but to describe it is

to affirm a connection between it and every other thing which is either denoted or connoted by any of the terms used." Or rather, we should say, *what we perceive* is an individual thing; but the thing, as an *object* or phenomenon, is generalized. This is what is meant by the distinction between *phenomena* and *things in themselves*. "There is not the slightest reason," says Mr. Mill, (I. 78,) "for believing that what we call the sensible qualities of the object are a type of any thing inherent in itself, or bear any affinity to its own nature. A cause does not, as such, resemble its effects; an east wind is not like the steam of boiling water; why, then, should matter resemble our sensations? Why should the inmost nature of fire or water resemble the impressions made by these objects upon our senses? And if not on the principle of resemblance, on what other principle can the manner in which objects affect us through our senses afford us any insight into the inherent nature of those objects? It may therefore safely be laid down as a truth both obvious in itself, and admitted by all whom it is at present necessary to take into consideration, that, of the outward world, we know, and can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations which we experience from it." That is to say, our thoughts, and even the representations we make to ourselves of outward things, are not material things, but of a nature altogether distinct from Matter; and Sensation, considered as mere passivity to outward impulses, is an abstraction, and not a fact of experience.

In this statement of Mr. Mill's, however, as in Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena, the notion seems to remain, that the reason we perceive only phenomena lies in a weakness of our powers; that phenomena are still *things*, but as it were the shadows or ghosts of the things, and that if our faculties were more perfect we should perceive the things themselves lying behind. Of the same sort is the notion elsewhere alluded to, that conceptions are "*copies* of the things," or "impressions from without." (I. 361, II. 223.) These and the like views all flow out from the primary assumption that Reality is equivalent to Matter. Now that "Matter is the test of all things under the sun," we are ready to allow. Whatever does not manifest itself we are at liberty to conclude does not exist: *de non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio*. But that material existence is not Reality, we think sufficiently appears from the principles of the Inductive Philosophy itself. According to it, the only character common

to all the material world, (its essence therefore) — is Succession. Every natural event tends to destroy itself, and bring something else in its place. The bud makes way for the flower, and the flower for the fruit. The growth of the tree is a hastening to decay. Every chemical and every mechanical force aims at being neutralized or spent. The spring strives to uncoil: the acid seeks the alkali. There is throughout nature a perpetual reference of each thing to something else; each by itself is incomplete, and partly in another. Material existence is thus an incomplete, insufficient existence; the idea of the thing is not realized in the thing itself, but partly in another thing, and this again in another, and so on to infinity. Reality, therefore, or the existence of the Idea, manifests itself *in* the phenomenon: but as Negation; namely, a negation of the form of existence (Particularity): and affirmation of the form is negation of the reality manifested in it. This is shown, for instance, in the effect of poisons on animal organization, alluded to by Mr. Mill, (I. 481.) Their effect, he says, is "the conversion of the animal substance (by combination with the poison) into a chemical compound, held together by so powerful a force as to resist the subsequent action of the ordinary causes of decomposition. Now, organic life . . . consisting in a continual state of decomposition and recomposition of the different organs and tissues, whatever incapacitates them for the decomposition destroys life." So soon as the form is made permanent, life, which is the reality manifested in it, is destroyed.

Material existence, or particularity, accordingly, is an embodied self-contradiction; a contradiction between the form and the substance, and thus a prolonged annihilation, the form of which is Change, or abstractly, Time, and the assertion that we know only particulars, must be coupled with the admission that these particulars, or "facts," are nothing more than phenomena; to know which is to know their unreality.

Another prevailing notion is, that Matter is a *temporary* reality; that though it does not endure for ever, yet it contains a certain amount of Being. But Time, as is shown by the old puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, cannot be divided into independent moments; that is, cannot be really divided. Otherwise, each moment would be an eternity. Every force, say the mathematicians, will act for ever, unless impeded. Not that we have any experience of a force acting for ever; but if we isolate a force, it necessarily becomes eternal, since the

notion of Existence does not include, but excludes, non-existence. A temporary reality, therefore, is a false reality; a reality which is partly unreal. The succession of Time is the development of this unreality.

That we sensuously perceive only Phenomena, as already remarked, is so far from being incompatible with a knowledge of objective reality, that, on the contrary, it simply declares the superficial nature of the unreality that we see in things. That which changes is not the reality but the unreality; and to annihilate this is to affirm its opposite. So that to reduce Matter to a superficial and transient form, is not to deny, but to affirm the Reality it contains; and Change, though apparently a mere negation, or destruction of Matter, is in truth affirmative, being a negation of the negative. Though on the other hand it is not to be imagined that the reality is something existing apart, *behind* the phenomenon; for the phenomenon is nothing else than the reality, appearing, or existing, though in an inadequate form. It is no degradation, therefore, to spiritual things, that they exist materially. Man, for instance, exists as body, and we may say that his body is a complete incarnation of his soul; provided we keep in mind that this is an inadequate or partially false, (and thus transitory,) existence, and do not confine the spirit to its temporary manifestations.

As we have already seen, all Knowledge is Generalization. But to generalize the particular is to destroy its particularity. Knowledge of particulars, therefore, is a knowledge of their connection with and dependence upon a general principle. And here we see the root of the inability of the Inductive theory to form a satisfactory generalization. Each particular refers to some other, and this again to another, and so on. When we come to examine one, therefore, we are necessarily referred to the next, and thus the problem is prolonged to infinity, or rather to indefinitude. Thus it is that Mr. Mill makes the term *general* equivalent to *indefinite*; whereas it properly denotes what is universal, and therefore definite, in opposition to what is accidental, and thus indefinable. Were each object in Nature a definite fact, it would be necessary to study each separate thing by itself; each grain of sand on the sea-shore would require as special and careful examination as any other fact. The problem proposed by the Inductive philosophy — to construct knowledge out of particular facts — is the wildest of chimeras; the nearest approach that an aggre-

gate of finites can make to the universal, is the Indefinite; — that which requires to be, but is not, finished. There is no reason, therefore, to attribute the failure to the weakness of human faculties, when the task proposed is an absurdity. It would derogate nothing from Omnipotence to say that two hills cannot be made without a valley between. The talk about the finite nature of Man, and his consequent inability to grasp universal Truth, betrays an entire misconception of the whole process of Knowing. The whole argument is this: a finite, that is, a thing, must have definite dimensions, and thus cannot contain the Infinite. But *a thing* can no more contain a sensation than it can the Infinite. The difficulty, then, would be not how we can have absolute Knowledge, but how we can have any knowledge, or even sensation.

If, then, it be allowed that we mentally perceive (are conscious) at all, there is no reason why Knowledge should be limited. Knowledge, as we have seen, is Generalization. Now what grounds have we for supposing that the generalization must be imperfect? For on this ground alone can Knowledge be partial. That our Knowledge of the Universe is in point of fact *incomplete*, no one will question. New objects and new facilities for observation are presented to us every day. And if by Knowledge we understand an aggregate of empirical facts and observations, this incompleteness is a defect in kind as well as degree. We cannot generalize safely until we have gathered the Universe into a heap, and weighed, measured, and sifted the whole of it. This, however, being impossible, either Knowledge is so too, or else the theory is wrong. It will not help us at all to call our present Knowledge an *approximation*, as if it were defective only in degree. There is not the slightest hope that all mankind, in any imaginable lapse of ages, could exhaustively analyze even a single grain of sand; — for this reason — that Matter is divisible indefinitely, and can be stretched to match any extent of time. This, however, is at least as fatal to empirical Knowledge as to any other. Of what use is it to talk about a *partial* generalization, when the *part* must be an infinitely (or rather indefinitely) small quantity, — and thus a merely abstract or imaginary amount? Degree and kind are here one. We either know *nothing*, or else the argument against absolute Knowledge falls to the ground. Here again the Inductive Theory is beaten by its own weapons. It refers for its authority to Consciousness, Experience, or Common-sense. But Common-

sense claims to *know*, and moreover to know *the things themselves*. The distinction between the knowable appearance and the unknowable "inmost essence," is altogether foreign to it. The contradiction implied in the supposition that Reality (the Universal) can be contained in a particular; in other words, that particular things are real — exists therefore, in its whole strength, in the Inductive Theory itself.

As we have already shown, the perception even of phenomena presupposes Generalization. Things, then, ought not even to *seem* to be, for this equally involves the contradiction. It is not enough to say that objects make *impressions* on our senses; — for they make impressions also on other objects, — one stone, for instance, on another, — but there being no generalization, no sensation is caused.

The confounding of Aggregation with Generalization does not, indeed, seem to satisfy even our author, in its practical working. "Why," says he, "is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception, known or presumed, go such a very little way toward establishing an universal proposition? Whoever can answer this question knows more of the philosophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved the great problem of induction." That this difficulty should occur is, indeed, most natural: for, were the theory sound, Generalization ought to proceed in exact proportion to the amount of facts collected. The force of Evidence ought to be calculable with mathematical precision: — a certain number of instances being given, we must know; — the number being less, believe or conjecture accordingly. But without having the slightest intention of measuring ourselves with even the less wise among the ancients, we think the answer to the problem a very plain one — simply this: that in some cases we apprehend the idea at once; and at other times grope a long time for it. The difficulty is confined to the Inductive System, and our business in this examination has been only to show this, and thereby to answer the arguments founded upon it. As to the ulterior question, what is the true theory of knowledge, we do not propose to go much into it at present.

All empirical or materialistic systems of philosophy are necessarily self-contradictory, since the problem proposed is incompatible with the means employed for its solution. To know is to generalize, but Generalization cannot be accomplish-

ed by Sensation, nor by any aggregation of sensations; for the reason that Sensation requires Particularity, and has to do only with particulars, whereas to generalize is to perceive the secondary and dependent nature of particulars, and thus implies that the faculty corresponding to particulars — namely, Sensation — is a subordinate one. Of this, indeed, the Inductive theory is partly conscious, for Induction implies that less weight is given to particulars, as such, and a more or less distinct feeling that the important point is what is common to all of them? But its error consists in this: that instead of seeing that the common principle must be the one *reality* manifesting itself under these various forms, it sees in it only an (accidental) coincidence of certain attributes, to be got at by abstracting the other attributes. Instead of a common principle, therefore, we have as many coincidences as there are attributes distinguishable by the Understanding. It is thus a system of abstractions. We hear various philosophies, that of Kant, for instance, or Aristotle, blamed for their *abstractness*, by writers of this school. But the abstractest of all philosophies is the Inductive; for its great principle is Abstraction, and its results are abstract attributes, which it seeks again to embody by attaching them to fancied substrata, — the existence of which it does not always even pretend to believe, and can in no instance show. Where do we find such a string of abstractions as in the modern English Physics — their "philosophy" *par excellence?* — Caloric, Electricity, Galvanism, Magnetism, and the rest. Has any one ever seen these things? So far from it, that it is not pretended that they are things at all. Yet a separate existence is given to them, and they are supposed to be induced upon or imparted to Matter. Now, to the Inductive Philosophy, if consistent, whatever is no *thing*, that is, has not material existence — is *nothing*. Hence the hypotheses of *fluids*, *vapors*, *latency*, &c., — in which qualities are supposed to exist, yet unattached to Matter: that is, to exist and not exist, at the same time. Thus, for instance, it was formerly fancied by physiologists, that nervous communication must take place by means of a fluid, and accordingly they conjured up for the occasion, not only the fluid, but canals through the nerves for it to run in. But the nerves being found to be solid, and Galvanism meanwhile offering itself as a yet more convenient hypothesis, was proposed instead. So the great category of Force, which is nothing else but abstract motion or action.

It would be easy to point out inconsistencies in this system, in pretending to derive all knowledge from observation, and yet building theories upon assumptions, where observations are confessedly impossible, or at least have never been made. But the point of interest is, that these errors are not accidental or at random, but show a progress of the system itself beyond its own principles; — that it transcends, and thereby refutes itself. The term *transcendental* is often used by persons of this way of thinking, as equivalent to Utopian or mystical, — (or *misty*, which is supposed to be the same thing,) — and as denoting a pretence of human faculties to accomplish what is beyond their sphere. But this again can apply nowhere so well as to the Inductive System itself. For this is precisely its position. It has got so far as to feel that the reality it seeks is *not* the phenomenon; — but recognizing no concrete reality except Matter, it does not get beyond this negative conception of unphenomenal matter; matter, that is, from which all attributes are abstracted; thus it makes Reality an abstraction, and at the same time speaks of it as concrete and present to experience. It may be worth while shortly to describe the process gone through by the Inductive Theory.

Were phenomena pure realities, one fact would be as conclusive in Science as a thousand; all that we can learn at all we could learn at once, and there would be no need of Induction. But every one feels that in every fact there is much that is accidental, and belongs to the particular circumstances of its appearance. If every fact were a pure reality, then a five-legged calf would be a new species. This, however, was never imagined, unless by a child or a savage. Men, with very little aid of Science, come unconsciously to the notion of a *type*, that is, a universal form, to which phenomena ought, but sometimes do not, conform. An ideal standard is established; — that is, the reality of the thing is declared to be outside of it, and not attained in any one thing, though all aim and tend towards it, — but each hits more or less wide of the mark. This is the true sense of Induction, which is nothing else than the attempt to discover the reality in phenomena. But this establishing of a *type* is, nevertheless, directly contrary to the assumption with which the theory begins — namely, that Reality is equivalent to Matter; for here a distinction is made between the thing and its reality.

Common-sense knows nothing of these distinctions. To it the world is a solid and unmixed reality; a calf with a leg or two more or less does not puzzle the farmer; he is used, indeed, to see them with four legs, and is thus at first struck with the novelty. But he knows no reason why, if it pleased God, they should not have twenty legs as well as four; and if the birth of a five-legged calf should happen half a dozen times, would be quite reconciled to it, and think no more of the matter; — that is, his conceptions are undefined; he is content with his immediate experience, and his generalization being merely instinctive, and not a matter of reflection, is readily modified. Instinctively he makes a distinction between phenomenon and reality; Matter and Form; so that different degrees of connection between them (and thus different degrees of reality) are recognized and acted upon in practice, though not in theory. As the mind is further developed it becomes by degrees conscious of this distinction, and reasons upon it. The *laws* of the material world become the object of interest, and the question arises whether these laws are invariable. The answer is, that the law invariably acts, but, from various hindrances, the effect does not always follow. Greater importance is thus given to the law, the general form, and less to the particular case, the subject-matter in which the law is manifested. Thus the distinction before instinctively made, is now recognized theoretically, also; Matter and Law are separate, as Form and Substance, and come together only in the *typical cases*, in which the law is completely embodied, and the body completely obedient to the law. This is a great step, for here Reality is placed in the coincidence of Matter and Law; that is, they are declared to be *really* identical, and where they do not completely coincide there must be proportionate unreality. Here, however, the Inductive Theory becomes transcendental, or rather, (to adopt Kant's distinction,) *transcendent*.

The notion of *type* presupposes that Matter is not equivalent to Reality; that is, that the fundamental assumption is unfounded. Mr. Mill accordingly consistently rejects this notion; others, as Mr. Whewell, (*Philosophy of Inductive Sciences*,) admit it. But the main point is admitted by all, since otherwise Induction could not go on. But though they hold fast to the new view, they do not let go the old one; a contradiction thus arises. Reality is outside of Matter; and yet is identical with it. It is, therefore, both identical and not identical; that is, it is *partly* identical. Material objects, them, are

partly real and partly unreal. These sides are to be separated; the phenomenon is to be split in halves, and the one half retained, the other thrown away. This is the actual position of the Inductive Theory.

Here, however, it is to be remarked, that the two sides are merely antithesized, declared opposites; so that if we fix A to be Reality, B must be Unreality — but it does not appear by what authority one is preferred to the other; that is, why B should not as well be Reality, and A Unreality. In whatever way we establish it, some one else may choose to reverse their relative positions — to declare our abnormal cases typical, and vice versa. All classification, then, must be subjective, conventional; we cannot affirm any identity between things, but only diversity.* It is necessary, therefore, to find some principle of connection between these opposites. But as they are of themselves mere opposites, there is either no such principle, or it is something distinct from and including both. Mr. Mill, as we have seen, does not distinctly show any such principle; others, as Berkeley, have sought it in *God:* and perhaps this is involved in the stress which he also lays on the *finiteness* or *human* character of our cognitive faculties. This reference to God, however, though satisfactory to some minds, and convenient for putting an end to discussions and replying to arguments which we know not otherwise how to answer — is in fact a mere subterfuge, and, as Spinoza says, "the asylum of ignorance." It means only that we suppose a final principle to exist somewhere, but are at a loss where to look for it. The name, therefore, is indifferent, it being a mere category of the Unknowable; and various writers have designated the same thing by various terms; Cousin, for instance, calls it "Reason;" Mr. Whewell, "Ideas;" Reid, "Common-sense," &c. In either case it is merely a reference to an ultimate authority, about which no questions are to be asked, and amounts only to saying that the reason of the thing, its reality, is not only unattained, but unattainable.

The occasion for the introduction of a third principle is this: On the one hand the original instinctive feeling that Matter and Reality are identical, is gone; Reflection has revealed to us the chasm that exists between the mind and its object; Matter is outward, unideal, rude; it does not always conform

* Ante, p. 177.

to its laws; indeed, we are obliged to begin our study of phenomena with avoiding any hypothesis as to their law, in order that we may learn the law from a series of observations, and not be led astray by an abnormal instance. The material world is to the understanding a chaos, on which a foreign and opposite principle has impressed itself from without, and arranged the originally lawless Matter into order and forms belonging to itself, and not to Matter. On the other hand, Law, whencesoever it may come, is certainly found in intimate connection with Matter. To explain this, a higher, combining principle of some sort is required, and this higher principle *of some sort*, this indefinite *something above*, is that already mentioned. This, however, after all explains nothing; for the point to be explained is not how Matter and Law coexist in themselves, but how we come to *know* of their coexistence. That God created the Universe according to his infinite wisdom, and ordained a certain order among things, does not prove that we know this order, or that our notions in any way correspond with reality. On the contrary, Berkeley was driven to his theory precisely by this difficulty, (to him an impossibility,) of conceiving how a finite subject can have any objective knowledge. And he very consistently declares, that our ideas, as well as the order of things, are the immediate creations of God. This, indeed, is the only logical conclusion from these premises; — only, in that case, the knowledge and the ideas are God's, and not ours, and therefore Philosophy is an empty word.

Metaphysics being nothing else than the first principles of all thought, of all intellectual and spiritual interests, wherever the views of the Inductive System have prevailed among metaphysicians, we shall recognize them also in the prevailing forms of Religion, Morals, and Government.

In Religion this is the position of the Catholic Church, (the term Catholic being used as the opposite of Protestant, as denoting that sect of Christians who rest Religion on an outward *authority*.) If the Highest, the object of worship, is of a different nature from the mind, and therefore inaccessible to its unassisted efforts — that is, something outward, it follows necessarily that it can be manifested to us only outwardly, as Law, or outward authority, which we have only to obey, and not to reason about. And if, then, following these principles, we admit that the Catholic Church ever *was* a Church, and its faith ever *was* Religion, that is, that it ever was a divine in-

strument, its claims must now also be admitted as valid, to their full extent. For it never could have been a religion unless divinely ordained; religion being something which man of himself could never create. Its creed and its forms, then, must be divinely authenticated, and its claim of infallibility just. Then those who have separated from it must have set up human reason against the Divine Will, and from the first to the last be all heretics.

Of the same sort are those theories of government and ethics which deny that the standard of Right is an inward principle. If the foundation of absolute Right is something outward, it must be unintelligible and unknown to us, and any pretence at making it a matter of conscience and free inquiry is mere rebellion, and if allowed, shows a state of anarchy and universal license. The only form of government consistent with this view is despotism, which, we are told, would be the best form of government, provided we could have always a good man for despot—the difficulty of which is urged as an answer to objections that despotisms do not work well in practice, and are found only where the people are degraded. But the organization of the universe is not such a blunder that what is true in principle can never be true in practice.

Even in Ethics, where the very nature of the problem seems to imply that the standard is inward, the system of Utilitarianism has been invented, with the sole aim, as it would seem, to contrive, as a substitute, an outward one, the adaptation of actions to ends foreign to the mind; so obedient are men to a theory, fancying themselves all the while unbiassed and practical.

As man's instincts always outrun his conscious perceptions, so here the religious and moral instincts have long since rebelled against the views upheld theoretically by the understanding;—the religious instinct, as the deepest, leading the way—in Protestantism. Protestantism is the declaration that the authority in Religion, the mediator between God and man, is not without, merely, but also within us; and what Protestantism requires is not an outward persuasion, or belief, but Faith, or inward sight. So in Morals; virtue is no longer obedience to a decree of fate, a command of the Church, nor (in spite of the theory,) to a calculation of profit or use; but to Conscience. Man is a law unto himself. On this ground, also, rests the right of self-government.

These principles, it is true, are as yet mostly matters of

instinct, and not of consciousness;—felt and acted upon, but not understood. Thus, few Protestants comprehend or would acknowledge the truths their Faith presupposes and rests upon. So in the theory of government, the opponents of self-government have the argument mostly on their side. In England and Germany, for example, there is no end to triumphant demonstrations that this country is irretrievably sunk in anarchy and license; the newspapers, from month to month, ever since we had a separate political existence, have reëchoed the announcement — we, on the spot, however, failing to be convinced.

Theory, also, must sooner or later come to the same level, and meanwhile must show itself to be behind the age, in not being able to comprehend or explain historical phemomena which are no longer to be overlooked or denied. "History," says Hegel, "is progress in the consciousness of Freedom." Freedom, however, is the unity of the outward law with the inward, or the idea; thus a free man is not coerced from without, but obeys the law of conscience. The first awakenings of this consciousness we see in the revolutions in religion and government. Philosophy, having no merely instinctive side, but requiring throughout the clearest consciousness, must be reached last. Thus the Inductive System, as we have seen, recognizes, more or less distinctly, that Reality or Truth can exist only in the unity of Matter and Law. These, however, are not of themselves united, but opposed, and we cannot discover any bond of union between them. If we resort to a third principle, by way of postulate, this is not only an unauthorized proceeding, but moreover does not at all remove the difficulty, since, the union being outward merely, the opposition (apart from the temporary effect of the uniting principle,) continues as before. Knowledge requires not only connection, but fundamental unity of these opposites. It is not enough that Matter should obey a law — it must be *its* law: else we could not generalize; for it would not follow, that because any thing is true to-day it will therefore be true to-morrow. As we have not the third principle within our power, in other words, as we do not know through God's mind, but through our own, we know at most only single instances of its action, and not its law; nor can we predict how it will act in future. Either the knowledge is impossible, or else these opposites are only superficially opposed, but in reality united of themselves, without the intervention of any other principle.

Law is not, then, an outward form, impressed upon Matter, but its Idea.

The same reform is thus necessary in Philosophy which we have seen making its appearance in Religion, Morals, and Government; and the demands made on the science from without coincide with the inward requirements which it is driven to make of itself.

ART. III.—1. *City Document* No. 40.—*Reports of the Annual Visiting Committees of the Public Schools of the City of Boston*, 1847. Boston: 1847. 8vo. pp. 124 and 92.

2. *Eleventh Annual Report of the Board of Education; together with the Eleventh Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board.* Boston: 1848. 8vo. pp. 136 and IX.

EDUCATION, in the wide sense of the word, is the harmonious development of all the natural powers of man,—of the Body, of the Mind, Conscience, Affections, Will, and Religious Sentiment. The general means to that end are twofold—the World of Matter, and the World of Men. Leaving the former out of account, the latter may be considered under four several forms, as constituting so many educational forces, which influence the development of the rising generation in this country. There is—

I. The Political action of the People, represented by the State;

II. The Material action of the People, represented by Business;

III. The Literary and Scientific action of the People, represented by the Press;

IV. The Ecclesiastical action of the People, represented by the Churches.

Now these four, the State, Business, the Press, and the Churches, are the great Educational Forces which most powerfully affect the intellectual and moral development of the People, modifying the original tendency of each generation as it rises. This is so from the very nature of man and the constitution of society.

But subordinate to these general educational forces, there are likewise Special Institutions, whose design is to prepare the child, and put him in communication with these general influences. The more completely they do that, the more completely are they commonly thought to do their work; and for this purpose schools and colleges have mainly been established — to put the youth in connection with these forces, and thus enable him to do the duties and receive the instruction which the State, Business, the Press, and the Churches may demand or afford him. He who has learned to read, to write, and to calculate, has got possession of the three most important educational tools or helps; and by the use thereof receives the aid of these great general educators. He who learns, also, a foreign language, letting alone other advantages of that study, may thereby receive the instruction which the State, Business, Press, and Churches of another land have likewise to offer him.

Were these great and general educational forces of a higher or a lower character than now with us, their influence would be modified accordingly. It is the duty of a wise educator to appreciate the kind and degree of influence which these forces actually exert on the young, and act with or against it, as the case may require. The State, by its actions, may teach men to reverence the eternal Right, or only the power of armies and commerce. The Business of the nation may teach respect for honesty and manly usefulness, or only the omnipotence of the dollar. The Press may direct men to honor justice, truth, and manliness, may fill them with noble ideas and sentiments, or teach them to be mean and little, taking Public Opinion as their standard. The Churches may instruct men to love God and to love man, as the supreme objects of ideal or practical affection, or they may teach men to comply with public sins, to believe a lie, and for a pretence make long prayers, hypocritically affecting a belief in all manner of absurdities and contradictions. It is the duty of such as direct the public education of the people to understand the character and influence of all these. It will be hard work for the teacher to make his pupil ascend, though by their proper motion, while these forces are contending to drive him down. But when these forces act in the right direction, it is difficult for the youth to go wrong. However, it is not our task at present to criticize these educational forces, and inquire what they actually teach in America at this day, — what good they promise, what ill they threaten,

for the future; — we wish rather to look at the Subordinate Institutions for the public education of the people, whose aim is to furnish the youth of our land with the rudiments of learning.

After a nation has provided for the common material wants of protection, food, shelter, clothing, and the like, the most important work is to educate the rising generation. To do this is not merely a duty which the father owes to his own child, but which Society, in virtue of its Eminent Paternity, owes to every child born in its bosom. The Right of the State to control alike person and property, is continually set forth, till it often comes to be considered as superior to Reason and Conscience; but the Duty of the State to watch over the culture of its children is too often forgot. But this Duty is coextensive with the Right, and both grow out of the relation of sovereignty which the State holds over the individuals that compose it.

It has always been acknowledged that Society owes something to each person subject to its power. In the rudest ages of social existence it is felt to be the duty of the State to protect, as far as possible, the Lives of its citizens from the violence of a public enemy from abroad, or a private enemy at home. Next it becomes recognized as a natural duty to protect also the Property of each man, as well as his Person: then the State admits its obligation to aid all its citizens or subjects in their Religious Culture, and so, in some form or other, provides for the Public Worship of the God of the State. There is no government in Europe which does not admit all these obligations. All have established Armies, Jails, and Churches, with their appropriate furniture, to protect the Persons and Property of their subjects, and do something to advance their Religious Culture. At a period of social progress considerably more advanced, the State first admits it is a public duty of the sovereign power to defend a man from Want, and save him from starvation, not only in times of famine and war, but in the ordinary state of things. At a period of progress still more recent, it is also recognized as a public duty to look after the Education of all the children of the State. This duty rests on the same foundation with the others. At this day it is admitted by all civilians, that each citizen has a right to claim of his State protection for Property and Person; Food enough, likewise, to keep him from perishing — on condition that he

does what he can to protect himself. In New England and most of the enlightened states of the world, it is also admitted that each child has a Right, likewise, to claim of the State an opportunity of acquiring the rudiments of Education. But how far ought the State to carry this Education, which is to be placed within the reach of all? The answer to this question we will attempt to give in another part of this article, only premising here, that in a progressive people the zero-point of Education is continually rising; what was once the Maximum of hope, one day becomes the Minimum of sufferance.

In New England it has long been admitted in practice, though not proclaimed in our political theories, that the State owes each child in it a chance to obtain the average education, so far as schools can secure that attainment. Our scheme of Public Education of the People is one of the most original things in America. In Literature and Science America has hitherto shown little invention, and has achieved little worth mentioning. In Business the nation is eminently creative, and in Politics we are the most original of nations, both in respect of Ideas and the forms in which they become actual. With these exceptions, the New England scheme of Public Education, now extended over most of the free states, is the most original thing which America has produced. Take New England as a whole, with the states which have descended from her — her public free schools are the noblest monument of the character of the people; of their industry, their foresight, their vigorous and thrifty manhood. New England has been complimented for her ships, her roads — of earth and iron — her factories, her towns, and her shops; she has often looked with pride on her churches, once the dwelling-place of such piety, and long the bulwark of civil freedom in the new world: but she has far more reason to be proud — if aught human may be proud — of her Common Schools. These are more honorable to her head and heart, than even the great political and legal institutions which have grown around them, and above them, often, but always out of the same soil.

Democracy is the government of all the citizens for the sake of all the citizens, and by means of them all. Of course, it is only possible on condition that it is itself conducted by the eternal laws of Justice, which man has not made, but only found made; otherwise it will not be for the sake of ALL, but hostile to the welfare of some. Such a Democracy is of course

only an Ideal as yet. But the prevalent Sentiments of America, especially of New England and her descendant states, are democratic; her Ideas are democratic; her Institutions, in the main, democratic, — all progressively tending towards that Ideal. The Public Schools of New England have grown out of these democratic sentiments and ideas, — their growth as unavoidable as that of lichens and mosses on Monadnock.

Democracy is the Ideal of America. But it is an Ideal which can never be realized except on the condition that the People, the whole People, are well educated, in the large sense of that word. There may be a Monarchy — despotic or constitutional, or an Aristocracy, without any considerable culture on the part of the mass of the People; but a Democracy under such circumstances cannot be. A nation of ignorant savages may be governed: it is only a wise People that can govern themselves. The very political constitution of New England, therefore, demands a degree of culture in the People hitherto unknown in the most advanced nations of the world. Thus in America there is not only the general duty of Society to educate all its members, but also the special duty of a democratic government — which thereby is fulfilling the most imperative conditions of its existence.

At the first settlement of America, it was not possible for the infant state, struggling for existence, to spend much time in the education of the children; yet, considering all things, the ideal set up in New England, in the seventeenth century, was exceedingly high, and the achievement, likewise, greater than a sanguine man would have dared predict. At this day, the intelligence of the mass is much enhanced, and the wealth thereof is prodigiously increased. The zero-point of Public Education has also risen.

This may be laid down as a maxim — that it is the duty of Society to afford every child born in it a chance of obtaining the best education which the genius of the child is capable of receiving, and the wealth and intelligence of Society are capable of bestowing. It seems to us, from the very nature of man and of Society, that each child has just as good a claim for this as for protection from violence or starvation. Much, doubtless, will be possible in the way of education, a hundred years hence, not thought of now; but *now* much is possible which is not attempted — much not even hoped for. When the opportunity for obtaining even a liberal culture is afforded to all, is there danger that men will leave the laborious call-

ings of life, and rush to what are called the educated professions? Quite the contrary. There will always be five hundred good carpenters to one good philosopher or poet. There are but few men who have an innate preference for being lawyers, ministers, and doctors, rather than farmers, shoemakers, and blacksmiths. Many are now in the professions solely because these offered a chance for some liberal culture which the trade did not afford, though otherwise far more attractive. When education is thought equally necessary for the Farmer and the Lawyer, and all honest and useful callings equally honorable; there is more danger that the office be neglected than the field; we may safely count on more corn and less litigation.

The process of education at this day consists of three distinct things.

I. The Acquisition of certain Positive Knowledge, namely, of the Facts of Science and the Facts of History, — including also the Ideas of Science and History.

II. The development of the Faculties of the Learner, so that he may also effectually possess all his natural powers, and act originally for himself. At present the Common Schools do a little of both; the High Schools and Colleges a little more. But in the Common Schools, taken as a whole, so far as we know — far too little is attempted in the way of an original development of the faculties themselves. Memory and Imitation are the chief faculties which are cultivated. The reason of this is too plain to need showing.

Now the foundation of the Public Education of the People must be laid in the Common Schools. Take the whole population of any northern state, perhaps not more than an eighth part of the people receive any instruction from any private school. The faults, then, of the Common Schools will show themselves in the character of the people, and that in a single generation.

The Common Schools, therefore, are the most important institutions of New England. If there had been none such for two hundred years past, the mass of men would have been unable to read, and write, and calculate; those attainments would be the monopoly of a few men of superior wealth or superior natural ability. As the natural consequence, Agriculture would have been in a poor state; Commerce in a poor state; Manufactures a hundred years behind their present condition. There would not be the signs of life, activity, thrift, of contin-

ual progress, visible all over the New England states. The crowds which in Boston now attend the lectures of the Lowell Institute, and other means of instructive or refined amusement, would seek their entertainment in a Bull-fight, or a Bear-baiting; perhaps in a Man-fight of Bruisers in a ring, or a Soldier-baiting on the Common. Public lectures would be as rare in Boston, as in Montreal, Halifax, or even New Orleans and Naples. The government would not be a Democracy, getting more and more democratic, but a Despotism in the form of a Monarchy or Aristocracy; a government OVER all, but by a few, and against the interest of the many. The Few and the Strong would own the bodies of the Weak and the Many in New England, as well as in South Carolina and Morocco. There would not be a hundred churches in Boston, filled by intelligent men of more than a hundred different ways of thinking on religious matters — each claiming freedom of conscience; but three or four magnificent and costly temples, in which the ignorant and squalid people, agape for miracles, ridden by their rulers, and worse ridden by their priests, met to adore some relic of a Saint — the pocket-handkerchief of the Mother of God, and the nail from the cross, or from the horse the Queen of Sheba did not ride, a hair from Saint Joseph's beard, or perhaps the seamless coat of Christ! The city would swarm with monks dedicated to ignorance and filthiness, and religiously fulfilling at least that part of their vow. There would be slaves in New England, not black slaves alone, but white; Freedom would be in few hands; Land in few hands; Education in few hands; Power in few hands; Comfort and Virtue in few hands. New England might then be the Heaven of the Rich and the Noble, the Purgatory of the Wise and the Good, but the Hell of the Poor and the Weak.

If there had never been any public schools for girls in New England, then the majority of women would have had the monopoly of ignorance. They would be the slaves of the men; not their companions. The hardest and most revolting work, in the streets, the scows, and the drains, would be performed by the hands of sisters, wives, mothers. Woman would be the victim of Lust, of Intemperance, of every crime — trod down into the dust, but poisoning still the oppressive foot.

On the other hand, if the Public Schools could have been better — could have been as good and well attended in 1748 as now, New England would have gained, perhaps, at the least, fifty years. Where would have been the Intemperance, the Pau-

perism, the Crime — which now prey on Society? We should not need so many jails, and five thousand magistrates of the Police in Massachusetts. We should not have a Nation with so little shame and so much to be ashamed of; a Press so corrupt and debasing. Business would be marked by an activity wiser and yet greater, and by its purer morals; the Churches would be far other than what now they are; the amount of intelligent activity might be tenfold what it is now, and that tenfold activity would show itself in all departments of human concern — in a tenfold morality, comfort, order, and welfare in general.

There are several causes which prevent the Common Schools from doing the service which is needed of them; we will mention only the two chief. All the children from five to sixteen do not attend regularly. From a fourth to a third part are always absent. Mr. Mann complains of this as "an enormous loss." "The most frugal and thrifty community in the world here plays the spendthrift and prodigal." The State can do little directly to repair this evil. To make attendance compulsory would be inconsistent with the spirit of American institutions, and perhaps productive of little good. Teachers, School Committees, and the Clergy, can doubtless do much to check this evil.

The next cause is found in the inferior character of the teachers employed. Far be it from us to find fault with these persons; — there is no class in the community for whom we feel a more profound respect, or regard with a deeper sympathy. "Madam," said Dr. Johnson to a lady who grumbled about her servants, "Madam, you cannot expect all the celestial virtues for three shillings a week." Eminent ability does not naturally flow towards the master's desk in the Common Schools. Take two thousand five hundred of the men of Massachusetts most marked for general ability, and probably not ten of them would be found among the teachers of public schools in that state; certainly not seeking there a permanent resting-place. There is no honor connected with the calling; the pay is miserably little. Massachusetts rewards her teachers better, we think, than any other state; but on the average, after deducting the expense of board, pays the male teacher less than twenty-five dollars a month, and the female but eight dollars and seven cents! In Vermont it is but twelve dollars a month for males, and four dollars and seventy-five cents for females.

The celestial virtues are seldom to be had so cheap. Such a stipend is not likely to attract men of superior energy; they will flee from a calling which can offer no inducement but the vow of poverty. Men of inferior ability have hitherto had little encouragement to fit themselves for the duties of a teacher. Indeed, there have been no means hitherto placed within their reach. There have long been establishments for the training of Lawyers, Physicians, Clergymen, and Soldiers,—until lately none for the education of Teachers. There are even now few good works treating either of the art or the science of teaching. There is no college, we think, in the United States, in which lectures are given on this art or science, though it is necessary for every parent to practise the art, and to understand it belongs to the very profession of the teacher. The Normal Schools have already done something to remedy this evil. Teachers' institutes, lectures by accomplished men, the production of books treating of the art and science of teaching, will also do good.

But all this will not reach the root of the evil. Martyrs may always be found to go on the forlorn hope of Humanity, but no State ever relied on a whole army of martyrs—to man its forts and its fleets, to form the rank and file of the very militia! A more mundane argument must be resorted to than the hope of eternal rewards in heaven. Superior talent will always be attracted towards Wealth and social Rank—in no country more certainly than in America. A Christian minister was once sure of a competent support for his natural life; sure, also, of a high social rank. Then men of masculine ability and superior culture came to that calling and did it honor, representing the superior thought of the nation. Circumstances changing, the minister's salary becoming uncertain in its continuance, or comparatively small, his social rank in reality far less—that masculine ability and superior culture seek other channels of usefulness, and only by exception flow through the pulpit, then to the amazement and consternation of the church, long wonted to the drowsy tinkle of an humbler stream.

Now it is entirely in the power of the people to command superior talent, cultivation, and skill, solely by paying its price. Some men are born with a genius for teaching; many with a talent for it. Offer a sufficient pay, and they will come, and the results will appear in the character of the next generation. It is not difficult for Colleges to obtain men of fine ability and culture for their service, because, though the salary is not large

compared with the income of a thrifty grocer or a master mason in a large town—yet a certain honor and respectability, as well as permanency, is connected with the post of Professor. Give the same reward to the teacher of the Common Schools, and a similar result will follow.

Now the State demands its ablest men for Judges, Senators, and the like, and easily obtains them. The business of educating the whole generation of youth in the land between four and sixteen is one of the first importance; on which the destinies of the nation depend. Common-sense demands, then, a class of men with superior powers, with a generous development of all their faculties, and especially masters of the science and art of Education. Soon as the people are satisfied of this, they can have such a body of men at their disposal. Until this is done, the State must suffer. It is easy to be penny-wise and pound-foolish, and it seems to us that the system of small salaries for schoolmasters hitherto pursued, even in New England, is like sacrificing a whole cloak of velvet to save the end of a farthing candle.

Compare the attainments of a child of fourteen, trained in one of the Common Schools, say of Boston, and another of equal age and capacity trained under the care of the most judicious and skilful teachers of that city, and what a difference; a difference not only in the amount of positive knowledge acquired, but still more in the actual development of faculties. The one is ten times better educated than the other; the difference arising solely from the fact that one has had the discipline of a superior person, and the other not. Yet it is possible to make every public school in the land better than the best private school now in it; the people have never done their duty until this is attained. It were a bad thing that the children of the rich should grow up with little knowledge, little possession of their faculties: but it is worse still that the children of the poor grow up in this state, for in adult years they cannot command for themselves the educational resources so easy of access to the man who has enough of both time and money, which commands also the time of other men.

The services of women cost less than men; educational ability, also, is more common amongst women, and therefore it is easier to obtain for the Common Schools eminent educational talent in the female teacher than in the male. The community is wisely availing itself of this advantage, and the number of female teachers advances more rapidly than the males. But

here, too, is a difficulty. The idea has commonly prevailed, that woman was inferior to man—not deserving of superior culture. Her business was

"To suckle fools and chronicle small beer."

Her education, therefore, need not go beyond the merest rudiments, to qualify her for these functions. Like father like son—the rude boy inheriting this traditional notion of woman, refuses to submit to female government at school, and the father thinks he is more than half right. Besides, woman has not counted herself the equivalent of man, but tamely accepted the place assigned her; and now, too, it is difficult to find women of competent culture to assume their natural position, and educate the aspiring youth of the land, and so the country school is poorly taught, by men of little natural or acquired fitness for the work, and taught, likewise, but few months; while the same money would better pay the services of a competent woman for the whole year.

But the Common Schools must be occupied mainly with the rudiments of education. Some scholars will wish to obtain more than these offer. The number of such is continually increasing. To meet their wants there is needed a class of High Schools, to take boys and girls where the Common Schools leave them, and advance them yet further. The law provides for the establishment of such schools in large towns; but even there the want is but ill supplied, and in the small towns it is still severely felt. If several small towns would unite and establish such a High School in some convenient place, the evil would be remedied in part; at any rate, such a scheme would work better than any thing which is now offered to the public. In such a school, ancient and modern languages might be taught; mathematics, the natural sciences, ethics, and metaphysics. At present, for their higher culture, children must repair to the numerous private academies which testify to the want of such public institutions, rather than supply it. The money now paid to the private academies for the education of a few would be more than sufficient to establish such public schools as might better teach all the hopeful youth who would avail themselves thereof. At present, these private academies, with a few honorable exceptions, do their work but poorly, as we think. They are not under the vigilant supervision of a committee appointed by the public, and responsible

to them; there is seldom a regular and systematic course of studies prescribed; still more rarely a wise and vigorous method of education pursued, by which the pupil's mind is well disciplined. Much of the quackery of education, we fear, takes refuge in the private schools. Besides, the private academies are often so sectarian in their character that much of the good they might do is prevented, and much time is wasted in teaching the child what he will slowly and painfully unlearn in later years, or else be blighted all his life by a barbarous theology, forced upon him when he was too feeble to resist the baneful imposition.

We will not pretend to mention all the details which ought to be considered in establishing such High Schools as are hinted at above, but this, at least, seems possible — for two or three small towns to unite, or, if it were needful, all the small towns in a county, and establish such an institution. We see not why it would not work as well as the Normal Schools, which already have done so much to advance the education of the People. Such schools should provide for the youth of both sexes. Originally, the Public Schools of New England were open only to the boys. The Hebrew notion has long prevailed, that man was created for his own sake, woman only for man's sake, because it was "not good that the man should be alone." She has been considered as inferior to man, and, therefore, not entitled to any considerable culture. This barbarous notion still prevails; as proof of which we need only look at the one hundred and nine colleges in the United States, and ask what analogous provision has been made for the superior education of young women. Boston has done much for the public education of her children, and thereby been honorably distinguished above the other cities of the western or the eastern world. Her Latin and English High Schools would be an ornament and honor to any city in the world. But, even in Boston, there are no public schools for girls at all corresponding to those excellent institutions for boys. Why not?

Perhaps nothing would give so direct and powerful an impulse to popular education in New England, as the establishment of free schools for girls in Boston, analogous to the Latin and English High Schools for boys. Rich men can give their daughters a superior culture; some of them will do it, at any cost. But nine tenths of the girls must depend on the public schools alone. There is no reason in the nature of

things, or the duty of the State to its citizens, why superior education should be confined to the rougher sex. In the higher seminaries and the first class of the grammar schools, few boys are found from the humblest ranks of the People; — their services are so valuable that their needy parents will not allow the boy to attend school. Now, to the man of small means the daughter's time is not worth so much as the son's. She, therefore, could attend school much longer were there any superior school for her to attend. Such, too, is the demand for active young men, and the general hurry of the times, that young men rush from the schools and colleges into active life long before they are prepared. Young women, less needed in active life — finding, indeed, few callings to fill — could remain longer at school, and would gain a superior culture. In such schools there would come many Daughters out of the humblest portion of the People, and, getting well educated, they would become the mothers of men of no humble class; would diffuse an ennobling influence wherever they were, and elevate that class which is now a burthen and a reproach to the young Democracy.

Further still, the presence of a body of highly educated young women would stimulate the other sex more than any amount of appeals from the Press or the Pulpit. A coarse and ignorant young man — foppish and conceited, his head filled with nothing better than the newspapers and play-bills, who abhors thought as Nature a vacuum — he hates nothing so much as to be found inferior to the women he constantly meets. While the majority of women have a very inferior culture, their heads even more scantily furnished than the young men's; while they are illiterate, ignorant, incapable of all serious thought, even of attention enough to understand a common lecture and report it faithfully — it is no wonder that men, who have a better culture, though still coarse and ignorant, conceited and foppish, should think woman their inferior. When such men meet a woman of really superior culture, they only mock and call names, looking on her as a curiosity, almost as a monster. Were there many such women, were the majority of women of such a character, our ignorant young man, finding himself in a minority, would become seasonably ashamed, would give over calling names, and, finding that his boasted superiority of nature only made him ridiculous, would betake himself to diligent culture of his better faculties, and would end by becoming something of a man.

It need not be said the expense of such establishments could not be afforded, for all experience of public education shows that it costs less to educate the whole at public charge than to educate the select portions who now occupy the private seminaries. We think it could soon be shown, that the sums now paid for the education of two or three hundred young women at private schools in Boston, would more than suffice for the superior education of the thousand who would avail themselves of such an education, were it possible. Were there a thousand young women furnished with the best culture which this age could afford, scattered about in society, as wives and mothers, it is easy to see the change which they would soon effect in a single generation. Nay, it is not easy to see ALL the change they would effect. Their influence would soon appear in the churches, in the newspapers, the theatres, in all our literature,—yes, in the State itself,—and produce effects by no means anticipated now. The establishment of such an institution would in a very few years double the number of persons who have a superior education, and every such woman is not only an ornament, but a blessing, to Society.

To crown the whole system of Public Education, a Public College would seem necessary, founded by the State, watched over by the State, and by the State preserved from all sectarian and partisan influence; a college with libraries and lectures open to all who were able to understand their use. Our scheme of public education is exceedingly incomplete until this, also, is established. At present, many young men of superior talent are debarred from a generous education solely by their inability to meet the expenses of a college course. They suffer for lack of culture, and Society suffers for lack of their services. Inferior men, but born of parents thriftier or more fortunate, obtain the culture and occupy the more elevated posts of society, which can only be *filled* by men born with superior gifts not less than well-bred.

Everywhere we see signs that a free Public College is needed and desired. Amongst them are the rise of cheap colleges, which only express the want which they cannot satisfy; the numerous lyceums and courses of lectures; the Mercantile Library Association, the Association of Mechanics' Apprentices, and the like, in Boston. It would be easy for any one of the free states to establish such a Public College in one of its principal cities, offering gratuitous instruction to all

who could pass such an examination as would show they were capable of appreciating the instruction offered. We will not go into the details of such a scheme, wishing only to invite public attention to the subject. Such institutions would soon furnish a large body of men with a superior education, and free us from one of the troubles of American society — professional men ignorant of their profession; lawyers, doctors, ministers, whom it would be flattery to call half-educated, but who are yet not to be blamed, having all the culture they could get. Still more, it would diffuse a liberal education amongst all classes of society, and the advantages of that we have not time to point out. It is no mean reproach to us that the Prussians, the Saxons, and the French have done far more for the *superior* education of the people than we have thought proper even to attempt. Massachusetts has taken the lead in many important movements of the nation. We wish she would set the example of a Public College; for surely, no state is so competent, for various reasons, to make the experiment, and perhaps none so much feels the need of it. Every man of superior education, so far as that goes, is a blessing to Society, not less than an ornament. He gives dignity and honor to his calling, not it to him. He may sit on the bench of a Judge, or on the bench of a Shoemaker, be an Upholsterer or a Clergyman, that is of small account; his thought, his wisdom, his character, do their work in Society. As things now go, we get rich faster than we get intelligent, and as a nation deserve the reproach of being material and vulgar. Aristotle said in his day, the mass of laboring people should not be "of a character too elevated." A democratic government demands for all the best education which it is possible for all to receive; the superior education of as many as possible.

In all the large towns of Massachusetts, men and women have associated together, established lyceums, and secured to themselves courses of lectures every winter. This movement shows the want of something more than schools, colleges, and churches have hitherto afforded. The effect of these lyceums with their lectures is excellent in many ways, intellectual, moral, and social. But as yet little is accomplished by them in comparison with what may easily be done. No system is pursued by such institutions; lectures come pell-mell after one another, without order. There is no sufficient body of men well trained for the business of popular lecturing. Brilliant

and showy men serve for an hour's amusement, but fail of accomplishing the great work which waits to be done. It seems to us that the lyceums of several towns might combine together, and have regular and systematic courses of lectures delivered in each by the same person. In this manner men of ability and suitable education might easily be well paid for the labor of preparing valuable lectures, and the People receive the advantage of instruction from the best minds in the land. The business of a popular lecturer might soon become as important as that of a judge; his social rank as high, and his salary still more. In this manner some of the best talent of the State might be applied to its most appropriate work — the Education of the People. Lectures might be delivered treating of the Facts of Nature, or Science in its various departments; the Facts of Man, his history, literature, laws, and the like; — lectures on Facts, and lectures, also, on Ideas.

A few years ago, in Boston, one of her sons founded an Institute for the better education of the people, by means of lectures, and thereby did a greater service to that town, as we think, than any American has ever done to his native place. Education, in its large sense, is the greatest charity which can be bestowed on a town or a city. We refer to the Lowell Institute. Its usefulness is now only beginning. There the services of some of the most able men of America and of Europe have been wisely obtained for the purpose of instructing the People. The experience of that Institute shows that superior talent and culture can easily be commanded for this great work whenever the pecuniary means are provided. A combination of numerous lyceums, though individually poor, can also secure the services of men of superior ability for their purpose, as soon as they will. The apparatus most important in education is men, — able men. The influence of lectures like those of Agassiz and Walker at the Lowell Institute, of Emerson at the various lyceums and elsewhere, it is not easy to calculate. Not only do those men give positive information, but they stimulate all their ingenuous hearers to desire a yet nobler culture, and suggest the intellectual and other methods by which it may be won.

In New England there is no public or even social Amusement — recognized as such. The old and barbarous sport of military exhibitions has long been unpopular, and is now ridiculous. The amusement of getting drunk is rather old-fashioned, and though still the only pastime of the wretched, is not

likely to revive amongst intelligent or even merely respectable men. Politics and Theology may serve for awhile in place of amusement — this for the men, that for the women; but they will not do the work. This absence of amusement, and the somewhat unsocial character with which America has been reproached, render it the more desirable that lyceums and public lectures should be provided, to meet numerous wants, and, while they cultivate the mind, cultivate, also, social feelings amongst all.

Public libraries, also, will powerfully aid this work. We think there is not a public library in any large town in the United States, — a library to which all persons have access. The land is full of books; valuable books, even, are now becoming more and more common. True, the "yellow literature," the literary trash that is hawked about at the railways, indicates a low taste in the manufacturers and consumers of such miserable productions. The school-books in most common use, we regret to say, are poor and low; such as relate to Science often poorly constructed, and devoid alike of scientific principles and scientific method. It is commonly thought that an ignorant man may write for the ignorant; if he wishes to keep them so, he had better. But the most skilful physicians are needed by the sickest men. Still, spite of the increase of these ephemeral works, and the spread of that yellow-fever of literature, the taste for really valuable books has increased with astonishing rapidity. The want of public libraries in most of our large towns is beginning to be felt. The establishment of social libraries, which are not so often merely domestic as heretofore, — of District School libraries, the libraries of the various institutes, associations, athenæums, lyceums, and the like, is only an indication of the want, not adequate provision to meet it. It is a remarkable fact, that in the city of Paris there are more books thrown open to the public every day, than are contained in all the college and state libraries of this country. There we have seen, with republican and Christian delight, a Professor from the Sorbonne and a Teamster in his blouse of blue cotton, sitting at the same table, diligently studying works which neither of them, perhaps, could afford to own. We are glad to learn, while writing these pages, that attempts are seriously making in Boston to found such a library. The generosity of the wealthy men of that city is well known, and seems to have almost no limit; but we think

their wealth has seldom been directed to a nobler object than this work of educating the People.

The Lawrence Scientific School in the University at Cambridge, recently established, will doubtless afford valuable aid in promoting the solid education of the People. A want has long been felt of some institution which should afford a culture somewhat different from that of our better colleges, not less severe and scientific, but more so, if possible, only less monastic and mediæval. We see it suggested by the distinguished President of Harvard University, that something is perhaps to be done "with a view to the formation of accomplished teachers for classical schools and colleges;" and hope that some provision may soon be made there or elsewhere for instruction in the Science of Education — what the Germans call Pädagogik. Apart from the art of teaching there is a Science of Education, as distinct from the practical business of instruction as Geometry is from the art of surveying land or making an almanac. This, also, is a liberal science, to be cultivated in part for itself, as an end, and therefore should have a place in every liberal scheme of education, as well as Ethics and Metaphysics; but is a means, also, and will prove useful in practice, as most men come, at length, to have the charge of forming and developing the characters of others, at the most tender age, committed to their care. The English language is singularly deficient in works which treat of this subject, though the German is sufficiently rich, at least so far as quantity is concerned.*

We come now to speak, though briefly, of the works named at the head of our article. No. 1 contains the Reports of two sub-committees of the Boston School Committee. The first is the Report of the "annual examination of the Grammar department of the Grammar and Writing Schools." The second, of the "annual examination of the Writing department of the Grammar Schools." The first is a plain statement of the results of the examination of each particular school. The reading in the upper divisions of the first class is pronounced admirable, as that class is under the direction of the head masters. But the three lower classes, including more than four fifths of all the children in the schools, are under the care

* See Von Raumer, *Geschichte der Pädagogik, &c.* 2te Ausgabe. Stuttgart. 1843. 2 vols., 8vo.

of subordinate teachers, with much smaller salaries, and probably with inferior qualifications. The author, Mr. G. B. Emerson, thinks a considerable majority of all the children never reach the first class, and therefore do not partake directly in the advantages of the best instruction provided for the schools. Some children have been two years in the grammar schools, who yet have not advanced at all since they entered them. Something ought to be done to remedy this injustice. There is a considerable deficiency in the furniture of the schools, but in special there is a great want of libraries. There are not two thousand volumes in all the grammar schools in the city! The author thinks libraries should be provided; that the study of Physiology should be introduced into all the schools as soon as possible, and recommends, also, that the art of Drawing should likewise be taught in all, and Geometry in the schools for boys. The Report also mentions the want of schools for ignorant adults; a want deeply felt, and now but imperfectly supplied by the benevolence of a few private persons. Many ignorant foreigners come yearly amongst us; many, also, from "woodsy" places in New Hampshire and Vermont, where there are no schools accessible — who cannot even read. It is hard to leave these men to the irregular care of private benevolence, which already finds more than enough to do; it is unjust to neglect them, leaving them in their ignorance. The little which would be required to establish such schools would perhaps be a gain to the city in the end.

The Report of the other committee is a literary curiosity. A document so ill-written we have seldom seen, and know not which is the more remarkable, the confusion of thought or of speech. Speaking of the Hawes School, the author says, "The teacher has had no *Philosophical apparatus to illustrate* or interest the pupils in." In the Winthrop School, he says, "No *permitted* books are used." The tenth question in Natural Philosophy laid before the pupils at the examination was as follows: "*Is* the North Pole of the Earth and the North Magnetic Pole in the same part of the Earth's surface." But we forbear from giving any more specimens of the *style* of the Report. The committee recommend, as it seems to us very justly, that *plain sewing* should be taught in all the girls' schools. To some this will doubtless seem a trifling matter, while in reality it is one of great importance. But the committee also recommend that Algebra and Geometry should be discontinued in the Writing Schools, that "Boys should be

educated only by men," and that medals should be distributed to the most excellent scholars. We trust the city will not take three steps backward in compliance with these suggestions.

We wish the Boston Examining Committee had recommended the appointment of a general superintendent of all the schools in the city, to look after teachers and pupils both. The School Committees, from their very nature, can at best do their work but imperfectly, as their reports show. It would be easy for each town with ten thousand inhabitants to appoint a superintendent of public schools, who should make it his whole business to look after their welfare; and we think that in a few years most beautiful results would follow. The School Committees have seldom much time to devote to their work; they are yet more rarely men who understand the science or the art of education so well as the teachers themselves. The result is, that the teachers become substantially irresponsible, adopt inferior methods of instruction, or attempt to teach with no method at all; and much of the time of the children and the money of the people is thereby wasted.

No. 2 contains a large amount of valuable information and important suggestions offered by the indefatigable Secretary of the Board of Education. His report will doubtless be extensively circulated, and therefore we say but little of its contents. The most important part is the section which treats of "the power of common schools to redeem the State from social vices and crimes." He thinks that more than half of the bodily debility and disease, of the pains and expenditures of sickness, of all cases of death before the age of seventy years, are the consequence of sheer ignorance, and therefore can easily be avoided. He gives the testimony of eight distinguished friends of popular education, all of them believing in the natural depravity of the human heart, to show that the Common Schools may be made to "expel ninety-nine hundredths of all the vices and crimes under which Society now mourns and agonizes." "The crowning beauty of the whole is," he continues, "that Christian men of every faith may cordially unite in carrying forward the work of reform, however various may be their opinions as to the cause which has made that work necessary; just as all good citizens may unite in extinguishing a conflagration, though there may be a hundred conflicting opinions as to the means or the men that kindled it."

He thinks the most generous public education is the best economy for the State. "What is engulfed in the vortex of

crime, in each generation, would build a palace of more than Oriental splendor in every school district in the land; would endow it with a library beyond the ability of a lifetime to read; would supply it with apparatus and laboratories for the illustration of every study, and the exemplification of every art, and munificently requite the services of a teacher worthy to preside in such a sanctuary of intelligence and virtue."

He contrasts the cost of war and its preparations with the cost of education.

"Since the organization of the Federal government, in 1789, the expense of our military and naval establishments and equipments, in round numbers, is $700,000,000. Two of our ships of the line have cost more than $2,000,000. The value of the arms accumulated, at one time, at the arsenal in Springfield, in this State, was $2,000,000. The Military Academy at West Point has cost more than $4,000,000. In our town meetings, and in our school district meetings, wealthy and substantial men oppose the grant of $15 for a school library, and of $30 for both library and apparatus; while, at West Point, they spend $50 in a single lesson at target-firing, and the government keeps a hundred horses, and grooms and blacksmiths to take care of them, as an indispensable part of the *apparatus* of the Academy. The pupils at our Normal Schools, who are preparing to become teachers, must maintain themselves; the cadets at the Academy receive $28 a month, during their entire term, as a compensation for being educated at the public expense. Adding bounties and pensions to wages and rations, I suppose the cost of a common foot-soldier in the army cannot be less than $250 a year. The average cost of female teachers for the Public Schools of Massachusetts, last year, was only $13 60 a month, inclusive of board; or, at a rate which would give $163 20 for the year; but the average length of the schools was but eight months, so that the cost of *two* common soldiers is nearly that of *five* female teachers. The annual salary of a colonel of dragoons in the United States army is $2,206; of a brigadier-general, $2,958; of a major-general, $4,512; that of a captain of a ship of the line, when in service, $4,500; and even when off duty, it is $2,500!! There are but seven towns in Massachusetts where any teacher of a Public School receives so high a salary as $1,000; and, in four of these towns, one teacher only receives this sum."

He might have added, that the annual cost of a single regiment of dragoons in the United States service is $700,000, more than $30,000 greater than the annual cost of the public education of the People of Massachusetts. There are now in

service three such regiments, costing yearly $2,100,000; a sum greater than the cost of all the colleges of New England. No boy can waste his cake and have it too.

"It being proved, if all our children were to be brought under the benignant influences of such teachers as the State can supply, from the age of four years to that of sixteen, and for ten months in each year, that ninety-nine in every hundred of them can be rescued from uncharitableness, from falsehood, from intemperance, from cupidity, licentiousness, violence, and fraud, and reared to the performance of all the duties, and to the practice of all the kindnesses and courtesies, of domestic and social life,—made promoters of the common weal instead of subtractors from it;—this being proved, I respectfully and with deference submit to the Board, and through them to the Legislature, and to my fellow-citizens at large, that *every man is* POOR, *in an educational sense, who cannot both spare and equip his children for school, for the entire period above specified;* and that while he remains thus poor, it is not only the dictate of generosity and Christianity, but it is the wisest policy, and profoundest statesmanship, too, to supply from the public treasury,—municipal or state, or both,—whatever means may be wanted to make certain so glorious an end. These principles and this practice, the divine doctrines of Christianity have always pointed at, and a progressive civilization has now brought us into proximity to them. How is it, that we can call a man *poor* because his body is cold, and not because his highest sympathies and affections have been frozen up within him, in one polar and perpetual winter, from his birth. Hunger does not stint the growth of the body half so much as ignorance dwarfs the capacities of the mind. No wound upon the limbs, or gangrene of vital organs, is a thousandth part so terrible as those maladies of the soul that jeopard its highest happiness, and defeat the end for which it was created."

We should not perform our duty did we omit all mention of the movements recently made in this state for the improvement of popular education. The condition of our public schools in 1836 and for some years previous, is well known. The state raised annually less than $400,000 for educational purposes. There were no public seminaries for teachers; many of the teachers themselves were incompetent to a degree almost exceeding belief. Little interest was felt in the public education of the People, either by the mass of men or the classes most favored with culture and with wealth — the natural guardians of Society. A few noble men, generously feeling for the common good of mankind, formed the brilliant exception to the

general and melancholy rule. By the efforts of a few men, the Board of Education was established, in 1837. At that time Horace Mann was President of the Massachusetts Senate, with a fair prospect of advancing in his political career. He had abundant talents; good men of all parties gave him their confidence. He was also a lawyer, with a reputation rapidly increasing, and a professional income of about $3,000 a year. Some one was needed to take the office of Secretary of the Board of Education, and toil for the common good of the people of Massachusetts. Mr. Mann accepted that arduous post. He gave up his chance of political preferment—so dazzling to the greedy aspirant for noisy fame; gave up his profession, with the certainty of wealth which it offered. He became Secretary of the Board of Education, with a pitiful salary of fifteen hundred dollars a year, and the chance that even that would be reduced one half by a vote of the legislature in a year or two. He knew he must toil far harder than ever before, and that, too, with the certainty of being abused by each lazy and incompetent schoolmaster coveting a sleepy supervision of his work; by every demagogue who could get up the insane cry of "expense," and talk of the folly of Massachusetts paying fifteen hundred dollars for a man to look after the Common Schools; yes, by every sectarian bigot from Provincetown to Williamstown, who feared nothing so much as education wide spread amongst the people. Such was the prospect. Many thought him a fool for taking the office, and some said so. But one good man, soaring far above the heads of his contemporaries, thanked him for his heroism, and bade him God speed. That man long since ceased to be mortal, and needs no praise of ours. A single guess would solve the mystery,—it was Dr. Channing.

The ends which could so easily have been foreseen soon came to pass. The penny-wisdom of the state was appealed to by the pound-foolishness thereof, and the talk was of the expense—the great cost of the Board of Education; fifteen hundred dollars in one year actually paid to the Secretary! Truly, the commonwealth was in danger. The demagogues, also, took their turn, attacking the Board and its Secretary, not with success, but not without effect. Sectarians were true to their ruthless craft, and raised the old cry of "Infidelity," and "church in danger," till the land rung again. But if the ears of the People tingled at that cry, we think other ears, also, smarted at the retort, and its echo loud and long. "Sus-

picions, political and denominational, were excited and widely diffused;" "dark insinuations, imputing sinister and ulterior designs, were clandestinely circulated, and they worked longer and more efficiently for working beneath the surface." Even the schoolmasters, or a part of them, joined, also, in the battle, excited we know not whence or how, and fought with fierceness if not with science and with skill. Even now we fear the battle is not over.

The Normal Schools got established, a single man thereby doing much for education, that greatest charity; much in public, though as green a growth still marks the unseen windings of that same stream of private bounty flowing towards the same end.

By means of this movement — by the Board of Education, by the Normal Schools, and still more, as we think, by the able efforts of the Secretary, matters are rapidly getting mended; the Education of the People goes forward rapidly, and yet more certainly. Bigots are losing their influence; demagogues their power. But it is getting light. When the day dawns wild beasts lie down in their dens, and bats and owls are not seen nor heard. If we were asked for the man who in the last ten years has done the greatest service to his state, we should not hesitate to name the Secretary of the Board of Education, who will doubtless blame us for writing of him who hides himself behind his work. He has had the reward always given to such services, — not riches and not rank, not honor, — but a Crown. Not a crown of gold or of laurel, by grateful men pressed upon an honored brow, but a CROWN OF THORNS, put there by quite other hands and for purposes somewhat unlike.

We cannot forbear saying a word on the causes which impede the public Education of the People amongst us. One is the Effect of Habit. It has never been the habit of any State to demand a wide culture of its citizens, or to use the public wealth for the public education. Said the present emperor of Austria, a few years ago, to the assembled students of the University of Vienna — "Austria wants not so much accomplished students as obedient subjects." The money which built Versailles and the Tuileries — what colleges and common schools might it not have founded. What sums are squandered by England, France, Prussia, the United States, on armies, navies, fortifications, which would easily educate those nations! True, a cannon speaks with a loud voice, yet a school-

master can be heard the furthest. The hundred million dollars already spent, it is said, in the Mexican war, would found one hundred and twenty-five free colleges, each as costly as Harvard University, — Library, Professorships, Scientific School, and all. Yet nobody thinks it very strange that the public book-money and school-fund are taken to buy powder and ball! Even the Churches, which certainly have played an important part in the general education of the human race, are doing little directly to advance the intellectual culture of mankind. They have favored that by God's Providence, not their own design; — unconscious ministers of a good they knew not. At this day, in many instances, the clergy actually retard the education of the People — counting Reason as *carnal*, forbidding thought, mocking at Science, "now hawking at Geology and Schism," now justifying ignorance, pauperism, slavery, war — out of the Bible itself taking pains to establish unity of belief in some miserable tradition, rather than that independent wisdom which takes old things if good, and new ones, likewise, if also true. We wish such men may be found the exceptions; — yet we blame not the Church or the State, doubting not that the leaders of both walk by such light as they have. We only take their walking as the index of their light.

It has not been the habit of the people to look on Church and State as two keepers of a Dame's school for mankind, and therefore the nation has not held them to that work. Yet it is, if thoughtfully looked at, their highest function. Pope Pius IX. and Louis Philippe are but larger schoolmasters. The People themselves think little of education; make it consist of a very few things, a poor use of these three educational tools; a knowledge of their calling, so as to get along without many blunders — of a few good rules, but not in a generous culture of Mind, Conscience, Affection, and the Religious Sentiments.

In every community there is a class called educated. Their knowledge is their power; "the one-eyed man is lord among the blind." But the educated class even here have taken far too little pains to educate the multitude; have rather laughed at the toiling mass, as incapable of culture, and often made the matter worse than they found it. Certainly they are not doing what Christianity, or even Patriotism, demands of them. With the exception of that small but ambidextrous class, hard-headed, hard-bodied, who support themselves at

school and college, every man, rich or poor, who gets a superior education, is a charity-scholar of Society, for others earned his bread while he was at school. He owes, therefore, for his schooling; the least he can do in payment is to help the education of all. When such a man sneers at the ignorance of the public, calling them incapable and unwashed, it reminds us of a beggar abusing the man who fed, clad, and gave him a house. The staple literature of the nations has seldom been written in the interest of mankind—only of a class. One great excellence of the New Testament is, that it is written in the interest of the Human Race; that is one reason why it is the Book of the People, and will long continue such; one reason, also, why, in Catholic countries, it has been withheld from them. An eloquent writer, Rev. H. W. Beecher, says, "Men become scholars that they may become benefactors." "The body of educated men should stand so far above the level of society as shall give them scope to exert their greatest attractive force. If privileged at all, it is as the clouds are privileged to rain in gracious showers that they have gathered up; as the sun's satellites are, to reflect light."

Then from our very circumstances there is an excessive demand for practical men. It is not merely Brain that is wanted, but Brain in the Hand. We turn all things to some immediate and economic use; would put Homer to lead the singing in some village church; set Raphael to paint the faces of silly women and sillier men, or, that failing, to daub sign-boards and make arabesques for calicoes: Michael Angelo and Da Vinci we should employ on a railroad, or place them with the sappers and miners in the army, and put Newton at the head of some annuity office. High intellect, accomplished with high culture, goes to the Church, the Forum, or the Bar, and finds itself above the market. Superior ability, therefore, in America, finds its most fitting sphere in common Business, where superior talent provokes no jealousy while it wins its gold.

Such being the case, the general aim in education is not to get the most and the best, but the least one can get along with. It is counted the means, not the end, and is taken as a maid servant, as HELP, its demands granted with a grudge; not taken as a wife, for itself. Education is valued, as it helps make men able to serve as tools in the great workshop of Society. This man is an agricultural implement; that a tool of the court-house; another a piece of ecclesiastical furniture.

The farmer must have a little culture for his special work on the soil, less for his general work as a man; the merchant a little more, special and general; the lawyer, minister, and doctor, a little more yet. But even in the learned professions it is rare to find men of large general culture; the special absorbs the general; the Whale of the profession swallows down the prophetic man, and makes way with him for ever. The title of Doctor of Law, Medicine, and Divinity has sometimes seemed to us a misnomer, for which it would be well to substitute Mechanic at Law, Medicine, and Divinity. Many professional men seem not educated, but wonted to their profession, as the mill-horse to his narrow beat, and have scarcely more saliency of intellect than the beast. How many lawyers and ministers are there who are only parts of their profession! You look for a man in the calling of the attorney or minister, and find only a limb of the law, or a slip of divinity. We have few scholars ripe and good; each man gets a taste of education, some a mouthful, but nobody a meal. Such being the case, then, how much less can we expect a good and general education to be sought after and won by the laboring mass of mankind. Yet one fact is encouraging and prophetic: each man, as a general rule, is better educated than his father.

The reason of this neglect of the higher education in the educated class, of all but the rudiments in the humbler class, lies deep. We take mean views of life, of Man and his possibility, thinking the Future can never be better than the Past. We think the end a man is to live for is this: Wealth, Fame, Social Rank. Genius, Wisdom, Power of Mind, of Heart and Soul, are counted only as means to such an end. So in the hot haste to be rich, famous, respectable, many let manhood slip through their fingers, retaining only the riches, fame, and respectability. Never till manliness is thought the end of Man; never till education is valued for itself, can we have a wide, generous culture, even among the wealthiest class. Not till then in the mass of men shall we find a scheme of education worthy of the American people and the great ideas given them to unfold in life. But day teaches day, and Experience offers wisdom if she does not give it.

[On page 199, sixth line from the bottom, for *their* read *his*. On page 203, thirteenth line from the top, for *three* read *two*.]

ART. IV.—*A History of the Hebrew Monarchy from the Administration of Samuel to the Babylonish Captivity.* London. 1847. 1 vol. 8vo. pp XII. and 372.

THE Hebrew nation seems never to have had a genuine historical spirit. It is certain they have left us no pure historical compositions in the scanty records of their national literature. Perhaps none of their historical books preserved in the Old Testament are wholly authentic and free from fiction. In the early ages of the world it was natural that Mythology should take the place subsequently occupied by Philosophy, and that events should be referred directly to God which come only by the usual mediation of finite causes. An intelligent reader would be surprised to find Mr. Bancroft referring the war against King Philip to the direct counsel of God miraculously given to the governor of Massachusetts, but he will not be at all surprised to find similar events referred directly to the counsels of God miraculously given to Moses, or to Agamemnon, in the poetic writings of an earlier day. He would be surprised at the absence of such phenomena. We should be astonished if we did not find a mythology among the Hebrews in their earlier history, as well as among the Greeks and Hindoos. The earliest historical works of the Greeks which have come down to us are poems, not histories, and are of course mythological and not philosophical. At length we find a genuine historical literature in which the attempt is seriously made to relate historical facts in their natural historical order, referring human events to human and obvious causes; to tell a round, unvarnished tale. But such a genuine historical literature is scarcely found in the Hebrew records; all are more or less tinged by this mythological character. The books which treat of the earliest periods are, as it is natural, most strongly tinged with it.

Let any impartial man undertake to study the rise and progress of the nations of western Asia by the help of the Hebrew literature alone, and he would arrive at very remarkable results if he treated his documents as purely historical, and placed implicit confidence in their authority. Let us take the first work—Genesis. We shall not speak of the omissions, nor of ordinary mistakes, which are natural and unavoidable, but of the fact that an attempt seems studiously made to blacken the characters of the numerous nations hostile to

the Hebrews, by pointing out some bend sinister on their escutcheon, or some enormous fault in their early progenitors — thus ascribing to them an infamous descent. At the same time an attempt equally studious seems made to dignify and elevate the original stock of the Hebrews, referring that nation to ancestors the most celebrated and unimpeachable.

Abraham is regarded as the common father of many nations in western Asia who speak substantially the same language, and have many customs and traditions in common. The curious traditions respecting him may easily be seen in D'Herbelot and elsewhere. The book of Genesis traces the descent of the Hebrews directly to Abraham. He is descended from Shem, the oldest son of Noah, and is but the tenth removed from that patriarch, deriving his lineage through nine generations of oldest sons. Abraham marries a wife, Sarah, of the same stock, she being his half-sister. They dwell in Ur, the land of the Chasdim, or Chaldees, but emigrate thence at the command of Jehovah. Now, the patriarch has also other wives of an inferior rank, but the Hebrews are descended from Sarah, the first wife, who is of superior rank, and also of the same illustrious birth with Abraham himself.

That is not all. Isaac, the son of Abraham, from whom the Hebrews originate, is born under peculiar circumstances; in the old age of his mother, born, too, miraculously, in fulfilment of a promise made directly to Abraham and by Jehovah himself — a promise which seemed ridiculous even to the mother, and notwithstanding the dignity of the Being who made the promise. Other promises likewise are made; his posterity are to possess the territory of ten distinct tribes or nations, — all the land from the Euphrates to Egypt. When the miraculous child is born, God commands the father to sacrifice the new-born son, but the offering is miraculously prevented. The son grows up to manhood; a wife must be found for him. But she must not be a woman of ordinary descent, coming from the nations of his own neighbourhood. She must come from the classic and distant land whence Abraham himself had emigrated; must be of the same lineage as her husband. So Rebekah, the daughter of a wealthy and conspicuous man, is found, and becomes the wife of Isaac. Jehovah takes a special care of the son, not less than of the sire. Rebekah bears two sons, twins, — Esau and Jacob. One of these, Jacob, is the ancestor of the Hebrew race. He is the younger of the two, but for a trifle buys the rights of the first-born

from his elder brother, and gains in consequence a blessing from his father, which for ever entails upon him and his posterity all the favors that Jehovah had promised to bestow upon the children of Abraham. Jacob is thus represented as born of most illustrious ancestry, having a lineage spotless and august, and is heir of the promises formerly made by God.

When he also grows up to manhood, a wife must be sought for him, but not among the women of the neighbourhood. To keep the race pure and unmixed, he must return to the native land of his grandparents, and take a partner from the celebrated family which had already given to the world an Abraham, a Sarah, and a Rebekah. Jehovah watches over Jacob with the same speciality of affection he had formerly bestowed on Isaac and Abraham. He visits Jacob by night, gives counsel by day — instructing him in the art of overreaching his wives' father, and cautioning that father against interfering. To Jacob are born twelve sons and two daughters. The family are the special objects of Jehovah's care.

In this way a genealogy is made out which no ancient herald would find fault with. The Hebrews are the noblest of the noble, descended from the prime nobility of the earth. It is true, the character of Jacob is base and treacherous, when measured by the Christian standard of modern times; but in the estimation of the author of the narrative, the characteristic vices of the Supplanter were doubtless virtues, and seem to be related as if in themselves deserving praise. Had it seemed otherwise to him, he probably would have represented Jehovah as interposing to punish Jacob, or to prevent the birthright from descending to his posterity.

Now, as if this illustrious descent were not enough to dignify the Hebrew nation withal, a corresponding and parallel effort is made to cast a cloud over the origin of the other races most immediately in contact with them. Many of them, it is said, are descended from Ham, the second son of Noah, a mythological person held in high veneration by many of the Oriental races. But it is said that Ham committed an infamous offence which demanded the severest chastisement on the part of his father. Accordingly Noah curses Canaan, the youngest son of Ham. The Canaanites were the special objects of hatred to the Hebrews, in the early part of their history. The latter conquered and gradually "absorbed" the territory of the former, expelling the inhabitants or reducing them to bondage. So the author of Genesis, after relating

the crime of Ham twice in a single paragraph, mentions the fact that Canaan is the son of Ham. The patriarch curses Canaan for his father's fault, and the curse is repeated three times in a single paragraph.

Thus, according to the ethnography of Genesis, one third of the human race are disgraced by the act of their great progenitor, Ham. His descendants are the numerous nations of Caucasian descent in the south and west of Asia, and the north of Africa, — the Ethiopians, Philistines, and the Egyptians. But though the disgrace must be shared equally by all the children of Ham, yet the curse falls specially upon Canaan. His posterity — taking the names from the common version of the Old Testament — are the Sidonians, the Hittites, the Jebusites, the Amorites, Girgasites, Hivites, Arkites, Sinites, Arvadites, Hamathites, the Phœnicians, and the Syrians, with many others. These are the nations with whom the Hebrews are so often at war, and who were unworthy to furnish wives for Isaac and Jacob.

In language, manners, and institutions, some of the Arabian tribes were more closely allied to the Hebrews than the Canaanites, as it appears. This fact must be accounted for in the Hebrew history and ethnology. Accordingly they are derived from Abraham. But they also are polluted in their origin. They are not allowed to be descended from Sarah, the honorable and well-born wife of the great patriarch, but from Hagar, a secondary wife, or concubine, and also a slave in Abraham's family, whom Sarah once drove out of doors on account of her insubordination. In addition to this reproach, Hagar is herself an Egyptian woman, and therefore disgraced by her descent from the infamous family of Ham. However, after her expulsion from Abraham's household she returns, bears a son called Ishmael, and remains there until after the birth of Isaac, till Ishmael has nearly attained the age of manhood, as it appears. Then, at the instigation of Sarah, the slave-mother is turned out of doors and her son with her. God himself approving of the expulsion, Ishmael must not be a joint-heir with Isaac, nor inherit the land or the promises. Still, as he also is Abraham's son, he must have a blessing and become a nation; but when Ishmael's posterity are enumerated, pains are taken to add that he was the son of a female slave and she an Egyptian, a daughter, therefore, of the race of Ham.

Other kindred nations are also said to have been descended from Abraham, but having for their mother only an obscure

woman, Keturah, whom the author of the Chronicles seeks to degrade still more, calling her by a bad name, — calumniating Abraham while he blackens the origin of a hostile neighbour.

The Edomites, or Idumeans, had likewise a strong national resemblance to the Hebrews in many respects; they therefore must be referred to the same original. Accordingly they are descended from Esau, the twin-brother of Jacob. But Esau had shown himself unworthy of his privilege of primogeniture, and had shamefully sold the promises entailed upon the first-born. Thus the ancestry of the Idumeans is disgraced at an early period of the family history. But that is not enough; Esau marries against his parents' consent, makes a shameful *mésalliance*, taking two wives, both of them Hittites, descendants, therefore, of the infamous family of Ham, and still more, of Canaan, the most infamous of that family, and inheritor of a special curse. Pains are taken to enumerate the descendants of this unfortunate marriage; but we need not follow the children of Esau further than to show that the Edomites and Amalekites, powerful enemies of the Hebrews, were traced back to that original.

There remain yet two other nations often at war with the Hebrews, the Ammonites and the Moabites. The most intense national hatred appears to have existed between them and the descendants of Jacob, which continued long after the establishment of the monarchy. To these nations so formidable and detested, an origin yet more disgraceful is assigned: they are the children of Lot and his own daughters — the sons of incest and drunkenness at the very beginning. When the birth of Moab and Ben-ammi is recorded, the author diligently adds that they are the parents of the Ammonites and Moabites. Thus the early and most important enemies of the Hebrews are disposed of, and referred to some disgraceful original. An ingenious man might put all these things together, and, considering also what nations are not thus traduced, might give a shrewd guess at the date of the book of Genesis itself.

The other four books of Moses, as they are called, are not more precisely historical than the first, equally legendary and mythical in the portions which relate to history, and marked by the same intense nationality, which is at times ferocious. Of the historical inaccuracies of Deuteronomy, the last of these, and of the apparent mode in which it was composed, we shall speak in a subsequent part of this article.*

* See also De Wette, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, Vol. II. pp. 144 – 164.

The book of Joshua is in many respects like its predecessors. It is mythical, full of historical inaccuracies and contradictions.

The book of Judges is less artificially constructed than Deuteronomy, and free from the peculiarly sacerdotal spirit which pervades that book; but it is also legendary, mythological, and by no means a historical document on which any certain reliance can be placed.*

The books of Samuel and Kings have a more authentic and historical character. All the outlines of the period they treat of are sketched by the hand of contemporary prose writers. State records seem to have been kept from the time of David downwards. The originals seem often to have been in the hands of the authors of Samuel, Kings, and even Chronicles. The mythological spirit is much diminished in its intensity. But the author of the work named at the beginning of this article treats of their character, and we will presently give his opinion upon the subject. His aim is to write a political history of the Hebrews, but he treats, also, of their religious affairs, for "the whole value of Hebrew history to us turns upon the Hebrew religion." To this end he uses the Hebrew documents with the same critical freedom that Niebuhr and Dr. Arnold show in their treatment of the Roman documents. He does not scruple to point out the inconsistencies between the books of Kings and Chronicles, nor to reject a statement which is absurd, nor to set down a fiction under its appropriate name. "As we have to deal with human fortunes, guaranteed to us by the evidence of documents which bear plentiful marks of the human mind and hand, we cannot dispense with a free and full criticism of these. And in criticizing, we have no choice but to proceed by those laws of thought and of reasoning which in all the sciences have now received currency. We advance from the known towards the unknown. We assume that human nature is like itself; and interpret the men of early ages by our more intimate knowledge of contemporary and recent times, yet making allowance for the difference of circumstances. Much more do we believe that God is always like himself, and that whatever are his moral attributes now and his consequent judgment of human conduct, such were they then and at all times. Nor ought we to question that the relations between the divine and the human mind are still

* See De Wette, ubi supra, pp. 166–174.

substantially the same as ever, until we find this obvious presumption utterly to fail in accounting for the facts presented to our examination. We explain all the phenomena by known causes, in preference to inventing unknown ones; and when one anomaly after another is found gradually to be cleared up by patient research, and a world of reality to evolve itself before the mind, fresh confirmation is added to the grand principles of modern philosophy, which experience proves alone to lead to self-consistent, harmonious results."

The author has not the common superstitious reverence for the Bible, and does not take the Jewish letter to strangle the Christian spirit with. He shows everywhere a large, humane, and Christian spirit. He is aware that his way of treating the Hebrew documents is not usual with his countrymen, and says,

"A thoughtful and conscientious reader will probably meet here many things which have before passed across his mind, but have been rejected under the idea that if they were true, they would surely be well known to professed divines. But let him be assured there is not the same apathy and ignorance concerning the Old Testament, in the German, as in the English Universities. If the Hebrew history has hitherto been nearly as a sealed book to us, it is because all the academical and clerical teachers of it are compelled to sign thirty-nine Articles of Religion before assuming their office. It is *not* easy to conceive how little we might know of Greek history, if, from the revival of Greek studies, test-articles had been imposed with a view to perpetuate the ideas of it current in the fifteenth century; but it is *very* easy to assure ourselves that neither Thirlwall nor Grote could have produced their valuable works under such a restriction. Until the laity strike off these fetters from the clergy, it is mere hypocrisy in them to defer to a clergyman's authority in any theological question of first-rate importance. We dictate to the clergy from their early youth what they are to believe, and thereby deprive them of the power of bearing independent testimony to it in their mature years. True religion consists in elevated notions of God, right affections and a pure conscience towards Him, but certainly *not* in prostrating the mind to a system of dogmatic history. Those who call *this* religion are (in the writer's belief) as much in the dark as those who place it in magical sacraments and outward purifications. But while utterly renouncing both these false and injurious representations, he desires his book to carry on its front his most intense conviction, that pure and undefiled religion is the noblest, the most blessed, the most valuable of all God's countless gifts; that a heart to fear and love Him is a possession sweeter

than dignities and loftier than talents; and that although the outward Form of truths held sacred by good men is destined to be remodelled by the progress of knowledge, yet in their deeper essence there is a Spirit which will live more energetically with the development of all that is most precious and glorious in man." — pp. V–VII.

This book must be regarded, we think, as the most valuable contribution ever made in the English language to our means of understanding that portion of Hebrew history and the biblical books which relate to it. Only two writers in the English tongue, Dr. Geddes and Dr. Palfrey, so far as we know, have ever treated the historical books of the Old Testament with the same freedom and courage. Mr. Norton has made a highly valuable contribution to the study of the Old Testament, but as he starts with the gratuitous assumption that "Christianity has made itself responsible for the fact that the Jewish religion, like itself, proceeded immediately from God," his critical and philosophical progress is impeded by a foregone conclusion.*

The work before us is sufficiently learned, but a little more copious reference to other writers would enhance its value. The author appears to be familiar with the works of the best German writers who have treated the subject — even the most recent. In writing a history he has written at the same time a good historical commentary on the books of Kings and Chronicles, and sheds light, also, on contemporary passages in the prophetic works. He agrees with the most profound of modern critics, that "the five books of Moses" were written long after the time of David; that the Hebrew code of laws, like all others, was formed part by part during a considerable period of time, and that the establishment of the Levitical priesthood is of later date than the monarchy itself. He thinks the books of Kings were compiled during the Babylonian exile, and those of Samuel a little earlier.

We will not give an analysis of the whole work, but only of parts which appear of most value. The political aim of the Hebrew institutions was to constitute a people of small independent land-owners; the most remarkable law was that which forbade the sale of land beyond the year of Jubilee. This was the Mosaic law of entail, which aimed directly to keep land in each family, and therefore, indirectly, to prevent accumulation of large masses of landed property. The prac-

* *Evidences of the Genuineness, &c.*, Vol. II., Note D, p. xlviii, et seq.

tical result was, that no permanent aristocracy could exist. But he admits that the law of Jubilee rested on usage and traditionary feeling rather than on any statute or positive enactment.

He thinks that Samuel may be called a second Moses; that the results of his ministry were greater and his instructions more permanent than those of Moses himself. But we see not how this can be, unless he assign to Samuel and not to Moses the first introduction of the worship of ONE GOD to the Hebrew nation. The Hebrew creed, he thinks, "was not monotheistic, in the sense of denying the *existence* of other gods. It rather degraded them into devils." Samuel preached against idolatry as John Huss and John Knox in Bohemia and Scotland preached against "Popish idolatry and foreign tyranny." The brief dissertation on the prophets (pp. 31–37,) is perhaps the best account of those remarkable men in the language. With all their excellences they were not free from various tinges of fanaticism; they often worked themselves into a religious frenzy. In the administration of Samuel, and during the reigns of the early kings, there were two great parties in the land; one favored the exclusive worship of Jehovah, the other allowed also that of Baal and other deities. A sign or monument of each of their tendencies may be noticed in the proper names of persons and places. Some are compounded with *El*, some with *Baal*, others with *Jah* or *Je*, for *Jehovah*. In the family of Saul there is a singular mingling of these names; but after his time the names derived from Jehovah predominate. Samuel and the prophets favored the Jehovistic party. Saul's policy was to foster the worshippers of foreign deities as a counterpoise to the influence of the prophets.

A parallel to the barbarity of David's treatment of the Philistines is found in the conduct of the North American Indians and other savage tribes. His "ecclesiastical proceedings were not modelled according to the Pentateuch." His public cruelties and his private sins are not excused by this author, but looked at with a clear, cool, human eye. He says,

"The complicated baseness involved in his murder of Uriah so casts his honor in the dust, that thenceforth we rather pity and excuse than admire him. All the brilliancy, alike of his chivalry and of his piety, is sullied, and cold minds suspect his religious raptures of hypocrisy. If Nathan had been wise and bold enough to slash open the monarch's conscience, before the wen of wickedness had swelled into a carbuncle, most happy might it have been; but

we cannot wonder that it was so very hard to rebuke a despotic and victorious prince. David was not indeed an Antoninus, an Alfred, or a Saint Louis; yet neither was he one of the vulgar herd of kings. The polygamy in which he indulged so injuriously must in part be laid to his personal weakness, when we observe how restrained (in comparison) was his predecessor Saul. Nevertheless, as a man, he was affectionate and generous, sympathetic and constitutionally pious: as a king, his patronage of religious persons was highly judicious, and his whole devotional character of permanent importance to the best interests of his people and of mankind; as a warrior, he taught Israel a mutual confidence and common pride in Jehovah their God; and first elevated his countrymen into a ruling and leading race, whose high place it was to legislate for and teach the heathen around. His career may serve to warn all who are wanting in depth of passion or enlarged knowledge of human nature, that those on whose conduct society has relaxed its wholesome grasp are not to be judged of by their partial outbreaks of evil, but by the amount of positive good which they habitually exhibit. Compared with the great statesmen of the educated nations of Europe, David's virtues and vices appear alike puerile; but among Asiatics he was a truly great man; and of his own posterity, though several, who were happily subjected to greater restraints, were far more consistent in goodness, there is none who more attracts our interest and our love than the heroic and royal Psalmist."—pp. 112, 113.

Solomon built the temple from mingled motives of policy, ostentation, and piety. The splendor of the building, the gorgeousness of the ceremonies performed there three times a year, led the people to assemble there partly from curiosity, partly for business, and in part for religious purposes. Thus a custom was established which helped consolidate the nation. To this circumstance the author attributes a good deal of the superiority which Judah had over Israel in later times. In Solomon's time "the strange awe of the dangerous Ark appears to have evaporated. . . . The Ark was opened, and in it were found neither the rod of Aaron which budded, nor the golden pot of manna, but only two tables of stone." Yet it is not certain that the successive high-priests dared examine them and compare the inscription with the copy in their books.

The author finds a remarkable disagreement between the two copies of the Decalogue, "which is uniformly overlooked by divines." We give his version of the Decalogue as found in Exodus, xxxiv., only remarking, that he has abridged the t, third, and sixth commandments.

"[First Table?]

I. Thou shalt worship no other god than Jehovah; for Jehovah, whose name is Jealous, is a jealous God.

II. Thou shalt make thee no molten gods.

III. The feast of unleavened bread shalt thou keep, and dedicate all firstlings unto me: but the firstborn of thy sons thou shalt redeem. None shall appear before me empty.

IV. Six days shalt thou work, but on the seventh day thou shalt rest: in ploughing time and in harvest thou shalt rest.

[Second Table?]

V. Thou shalt observe the feast of Weeks, the Firstfruits of Wheat-harvest, and the feast of Ingathering at the year's end.

VI. Thrice in the year shall all your males appear before the Lord Jehovah, the God of Israel.

VII. Thou shalt not offer the blood of my sacrifice with leaven.

VIII. The sacrifice of the feast of the Passover shall not be left to the morning.

IX. The first of the firstfruits of the land shalt thou bring into the house of Jehovah thy God.

X. Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk."

During the latter part of Solomon's reign, through the influence of his seraglio, the party opposed to the worship of Jehovah came again into favor, and Abijah, a popular prophet, appealed to Jeroboam, an eminent man, for redress of the wrongs which the nation was suffering. This was the beginning of the revolution which finally separated the kingdom. But the pious design of the prophet was by no means accomplished. Jeroboam is painted in black colors by the Hebrew writers, and, as our author thinks, mainly because he did not favor the Levitical priesthood. "The grand quarrel was a ceremonial one." But the prophets made no real opposition until the reign of Ahab.

The author relates the counter-revolution which took place in favor of the monotheistic party, in which the descendants of Ahab were so cruelly slaughtered by Jehu, "a tiger of a man."

"Such is the train of atrocities which Elisha's message entailed on both the Hebrew kingdoms. A third time was the royal house of Israel extirpated, and now likewise that of Judah. That Jewish writers can gloat over such funeral events, so deadly to their own people, is sufficiently wonderful. That men called Christians can read them with calm approbation, is still more melancholy; for this is the training of mind which steeled all Europe to cruelty

under the name of religion. This has lit up hell-fires in Christendom; this has perpetrated perfidious massacres unknown to Paganism; this has bequeathed, even to the present age, a confusion of mind which too often leads those who are naturally mild and equitable, to inflict hardship, vexation, degradation, and loss on the professors of a rival creed. Until men learn that Jehovah neither does, nor ever did, sanction such enormities as Elisha commanded and Jehu executed, they will never have a true insight into the heart of Him who is the God of the Pagan as well as of the Jew." — p. 210.

The account of the development of the priesthood is ingenious and valuable. The *priestly* system was complete, while that of the Levites was in its infancy; the sacerdotal caste included the Professional or Learned men. By frequent intermarriages they became almost an hereditary caste, and thus the idea of a tribe of priests, descendants of Levi, gradually grew up. Then the regular priests became exclusive. Books were written by them, or under their influence; facts were suppressed or distorted to suit their purposes, and insertions made. Some books are thus strangely marked by a Levitical spirit. This appears eminently in Deuteronomy, and in the Chronicles, not to mention other books. Sometimes the priests furnished an important check to the fanaticism of the prophets. This was particularly the case in Judah and Jerusalem.

"It is undeniable, that in the Israelitish prophets, as in the Scotch Reformers, the pugnacious principle was too much in the ascendant. There was earnestness and deep conviction, noble ends proposed, and unshrinking self-devotion to them; but nothing of the meekness of wisdom; no gentleness and sensitiveness as to other men's equal rights, and far too little scruple to combine with bad men and commit their good cause to wicked means. . . . The forty days' fast of Elijah, his journey to the solitary Horeb, the stormy wind, the earthquake, and the fire, in which Jehovah was not; with the still small voice in which Jehovah was found; are a noble poem. But Elisha, sitting in Samaria, and miraculously revealing the plans of Benhadad's campaign and the words which he speaks in his bedchamber, is far less dignified, and reminds us of tales of magic. When Elijah twice calls down fire from heaven, and slays two bands of fifty soldiers sent to arrest him, he is severe and terrible; but when Elisha curses a troop of young children in the name of Jehovah, and brings two bears out of the wood who devour forty-two of them, because they mocked at his bald head, he is ludicrous as well as savage. Elijah, who assembles the prophets of Baal, and after vanquishing them in a public

trial of miracles, incites the spectators to slay them all, commits a semi-heroic crime; but Elisha, who by proxy incites a captain with an army at his back to kill his wounded and confiding master, and make away with Ahab's children and little grandchildren, besides being barbarous, is cowardly and deceitful. Elijah appears before Ahab face to face, to threaten him bitterly for the murder of Naboth; but Elisha, when the king is angry with him, and seeks his life, has supernatural intimation of it, and gives orders to shut the door in the messenger's face, while others arrest him outside. Elijah predicts a drought to Ahab, and again predicts rain, in simple words; but Elisha, when about to spell warlike successes to king Jehoash, makes them depend on a piece of luck. He bids him to take his arrows and shoot upon the ground. The youth (who lavishes appellations of honor on the aged prophet) intends to obey, and shoots three times. But Elisha is enraged that he has not shot five or six times, because (as he now reveals) Jehovah had decreed to give him as many victories over the Syrians as the times he should shoot. Finally, when Elijah's hour of removal is come, he is carried up to heaven in a chariot of fire; but when Elisha dies and is buried as other men, his bones have a like virtue to those of a dark-age Saint:—they raise to life a strange corpse, which by accident touches them."—pp. 281, 282.

Our author thinks the Pentateuch was produced about the time of Josiah; that is, about six hundred and fifty years before Christ, or nearly nine hundred after Moses. The first four books of the Pentateuch he regards as a growth and not a composition. They received their final shape and public recognition at that time. We will not repeat his arguments, which have been often given before, but make a single extract.

"The high pretensions made for the Pentateuch are disproved by a topic which cannot be plainly stated without extreme offence, yet which it would be cowardice on that account to suppress. Its prophecies indicate a marked acquaintance with events which preceded Josiah, but nothing at all clear which needs to be referred to later times. The book is familiar with the tribes of Israel and their distribution; with the qualities which characterized Judah and Ephraim, Reuben or Zebulon. It knows well the extent of David and Solomon's empire; the conquest of Edom and its final liberation; the fortunes of the Ishmaelites, and the desert over which they roved. It knows even the numerous wives of Solomon, his wealth, and his importing of horses from Egypt. It foresees the horrible fact of a woman devouring her child in a siege, as in that of Samaria by Benhadad; also the scattering of Israel by piracy and by invasion into many distant lands. It predicts not only the vanishing of Amalek from among the names of na-

tions, but the wide-spread power of *Assyria*, which shall carry the Kenites into captivity. Nay, it is acquainted with the Cyprian force which attacked Esarhaddon from the Cilician coast, and perhaps also declares the final ruin of Assyria. But the *Chaldees* are not named as a conquering nation; nor had they yet become formidable to Judea when the book at length came out. Knowledge thus limited to the era which preceded its publication, cannot be imputed to a divine prescience, nor yet to accident."—p. 336.

He traces in the prophets the growth of a wide and expansive spirit which, extending beyond the Hebrews, embraces the whole world. He finds this especially in Isaiah, and yet more eminently in the anonymous author of the last twenty-six chapters of the book of Isaiah, whom he calls the younger Isaiah.

"More important is it to observe the softened tone towards *the Gentiles* here pervading. Indeed the tenderness and sweetness of this prophet is far more uniformly evangelical than that of any other. His very rhythm and parallelisms generally tell of the more recent polish and smoothness. He retains, moreover, all the spirituality of the older school: ceremonial observances are in no respect elevated by him. The *Sabbath* alone is named, and that in a tone the very reverse of formalism, although indicating the same high reverence for that institution which Christians in general have retained. With the exception of the fall of Babylon, which was the immediate means of release to his people, he does not concern himself with Gentile politics; but dilates on the trials, sorrows, and hopes of Zion, and the promises of divine aid to her, in general terms, to which the heart of spiritualized man in all ages and countries has responded."—pp. 366, 367.

After the return from captivity the nation was changed. Those who returned were chiefly persons "over whose minds sacerdotal principles had a commanding influence." The nation became enslaved by the letter of their old law; reverence for the Levitical priesthood became more profound; the exposition of the law became the most important profession.

"It is not intended here to pursue the later fortunes of the Jewish nation. We have seen its monarchy rise and fall. In its progress, the prophetical and the sacerdotal elements were developed side by side; the former flourished in its native soil for a brief period, but was transplanted over all the world, to impart a lasting glory to Jewish monotheism. The latter, while in union with and subservient to the free spirit of prophecy, had struck its roots into the national heart and grown up as a constitutional pil-

lar to the monarchy: but when unchecked by prophet or by king, and invested with the supreme temporal and spiritual control of the restored nation, it dwindled to a mere scrubby plant, whose fruit was dry and thorny learning, or apples of Sodom which are as ashes in the mouth. Such was the unexpansive and literal materialism of the later Rabbi, out of which has proceeded nearly all that is unamiable in the Jewish character: but the Roman writers who saw this side only of the nation, little knew how high a value the retrospect of the world's history would set on the agency of this scattered and despised people. For if Greece was born to teach art and philosophy, and Rome to diffuse the processes of law and government, surely Judea has been the wellspring of religious wisdom to a world besotted by frivolous or impure fancies. To these three nations it has been given to cultivate and develop principles characteristic of themselves: to the Greeks, Beauty and Science; to the Romans, Jurisprudence and Municipal Rule; but to the Jews, the Holiness of God and his Sympathy with his chosen servants. That this was the true calling of the nation, the prophets were inwardly conscious at an early period. They discerned that Jerusalem was as a centre of bright light to a dark world; and while groaning over the monstrous fictions which imposed on the nations under the name of religion, they announced that out of Zion should go forth the Law and the word of Jehovah. When they did not see, yet they believed, that the proud and despiteful heathen should at length gladly learn of their wisdom, and rejoice to honor them."—pp. 369, 370.

We thank the anonymous writer for his valuable book, and would gladly see it reprinted here, but as its publication would not favor any Sect, we have no reason to expect to see it in an American form, and accordingly have been thus copious in our extracts from its pages. A few works written with the industry, learning, and philosophical discernment so perceptible in this, and above all marked by the same humane spirit of religion, would do much to relieve the Christian world from the incubus of superstition now resting on its bosom, disturbing its sleep with ugly dreams, yet at the same time forbidding it to awake. So long as Christianity is thought responsible for Judaism, so long will the letter of the Old Testament strangle the spirit of the New. The Bible will be appealed to for sanction of slavery, war, formalism, and a thousand abominations; and so long, likewise, will the real spiritual beauty, the hearty piety, the manly faith which fills so many a page of Psalmist and Prophet, be lost to the world. The modern Christian may say, with the ancient Greek, Give us light: in the darkness only are we afraid.

ART. V.—*The Pictorial Book of Ballads, Traditional and Romantic: with Introductory Notices, Glossary, and Notes.* Edited by J. S. MOORE, ESQ., &c. London. 1847–8. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. VI and 424, VI and 428.

THE origin of Ballads and Ballad-singers we shall for the present leave to the philosophical antiquaries, and for ourselves confess that we know not whether they claim their descent from Shem, Ham, or Japhet. Neither will we undertake to observe the nice distinctions that have been made between Ballads, Romances, and Legends; and the many other distinctions which have not yet been made, but might easily be if any one would show a difference sufficient to afford a basis for such a distinction—or even without that difference. We take a ballad to be a lyrical narration of some human event real or pretended. It may be a ballad of love, or a ballad of war; it may set forth the feelings of the author, and so far be mainly subjective in its character,—or only the feelings of the persons described in the poem, and so be mainly objective in its character. It may be long or short, good or bad, old or new. To us in either case it may be a ballad. We say all this, lest it should be supposed from what follows that we are not aware of the distinctions above hinted at, and which have been made by critics and criticasters, who, if not very wise, were at least very nice. On the contrary, we are painfully aware of such distinctions, and respectfully would notice such differences,—but at present we bid farewell to both, and address us to the ballads themselves—understanding the word in the wide sense we have given to it. However, let us narrow the signification a little, so as not to include all the narrative poetry in the world, ecclesiastical and secular. As a general rule, the ballad is simple in the structure both of the plot and the language, which has but a slight rhythmical movement; and in this particular, as well as others, it is distinguished specifically from odes, songs, and yet other kinds of lyric poetry. Nobody doubts that the poem called Chevy-Chase is a ballad, and we give the same name to those beautiful lyrical productions which Mr. Macaulay has wrought out of the Roman materials. Indeed, he found the materials in Livy almost in the form of ballads, though certainly rude in form and moving with prosaic foot.

We find ballads, in one form or another, in almost every

nation which has attained any considerable degree of social development. They differ widely in form, and not less widely in spirit. Taken as a whole they are valuable indications of the spirit of the nations amongst whom they have been produced. Some ballads have been made by regular artists, and are pieces of literary sculpture; others have grown up amongst the people, and are not so much the statues as they are children of the people. The latter are of course the most valuable of all as indications of national thought and feeling, even though they have but inferior poetic merit. They are the field-flowers of poetry,—not so rare and exquisitely beautiful as the briefer songs, of love, of religion, which spring up in a poetic people as the water-lily and the fringed gentian, and by no means so nicely framed and finished off as the artistic creations of well-bred poets, the choice garden-flowers and exotics of the greenhouse,—but yet, like the violets, the dandelions, and the wild roses, breaking the monotony of the landscape, and lending a certain charm to the common places of the world.

A collection of all the popular poems which are in the mouth of the people would pretty truly represent the character of that people; at least, at the time when they were collected. The old Greek spirit of the heroic age is reflected in the ballads of the Homeric cycle of poets, as sharp and clear as the mountains and their clouds in the Lake of Geneva, of a still summer day. In the sombre ballads of Spain we find the superstitions, the gloom, and the fire of that nation. Their love, their patriotism, and their jealous sense of personal honor obtain here, perhaps, the fullest expression they have anywhere found in the national literature. The ballads of the Teutonic race express not less fully the peculiar character of the Danes, the Germans, and the English. Had we space, we would gladly pause awhile over the popular poetry—the Volkslieder—of the continental portion of the race, and give some specimens thereof, from Volker Babbulus in the tenth century down to "The Song of the Three Kings of Cologne" in the seventeenth, not neglecting the artistic ballads of Bürger, Uhland, Schiller, and Goethe.

The ballads of the English partake of the characteristic homeliness of the nation; of their manly good sense, their humanity not without a certain admiration of rough strength, of coarse pastimes, of gross eating and drinking. There appears likewise that strong tendency to individual freedom

which marks all the movements of the Anglo-Saxon people. Their ballads delight in representing the man of nature as superior to the man of circumstances. All distinction of rank is occasionally broken through, sometimes in the most absurd and impossible manner. This characteristic appears eminently in "The Blind Beggar of Bednal Green," in "King Cophetua and the Beggar-maid," which under the title of "A Song of a Beggar and a King" was old in Shakspeare's time, for Moth, in the play, says, "the world was very guilty of such a ballad some three ages ago." Then there is a strong moral sense running through the English ballads, as indeed it appears in most songs of the people everywhere. The popular minstrel loves to show how cunning is baffled by simple wisdom, and innocence proves too strong for crime; thus "the unnatural father" in the well-known ballad, falls into trouble, and is delivered by the son whom formerly he had spurned. Poetical justice must be done on the unworthy guardian of "the Children in the Wood:"

"And now the heavy wrath of God
Upon their uncle fell;
Yea fearful fiends did haunt his house,
His conscience felt an hell:

"His barnes were fired, his goods consumed,
His landes were barren made,
His cattle dyed within the field,
And nothing with him stayed."

If a man is unjustly treated by the powerful, and especially by the government, the bard of the English people loves to tell how the innocent was rescued by force or stealth. The Story of Robin Hood "rescuing the squires three" is of this character.

"Bold Robin Hood ranging the forest all round,
The forest all round ranged he;
O then did he meet with a gay ladye,
She came weeping along the highway.

"'Why weep you, why weep you?' bold Robin he said."

She answers that she weeps for her three sons, for "they are all condemned to die,"—who, it seems, have not committed the most ordinary offences.

"'What have they done then?' said jolly Robìn,
'Come tell me most speedily.'
'O! it is for killing the king's fallow deer,
That they are all condemned to die.'

"'Get you home, get you home,' said jolly Robìn,
'Get you home most speedily,
And I will unto fair Nottingham go,
For the sake of the 'squires all three.'

"Then bold Robin Hood for Nottingham goes,
For Nottingham town goes he,
O there did he meet with a poor beggar-man,
He came creeping along the highway.

"'What news, what news, thou old beggar-man?
What news, come tell unto me.'
'O there's weeping and wailing in Nottingham town,
For the death of the 'squires all three.'

"This beggar-man had a coat on his back,
'Twas neither green, yellow, nor red;
Bold Robin Hood thought 'twas no disgrace
To be in the beggar-man's stead.

"'Come, pull off thy coat, thou old beggar-man,
And thou shalt put on mine;
And forty good shillings I'll give thee to boot,
Besides brandy, good beer, ale, and wine.'

"Bold Robin Hood then unto Nottingham came,
Unto Nottingham town came he;
O there did he meet with great master sheriff,
And likewise the 'squires all three.

"'One boon, one boon,' says jolly Robìn,
'One boon I beg on my knee;
That, as for the death of these three 'squires,
Their hangman I may be.'

"'Soon granted, soon granted,' says master sheriff,
'Soon granted unto thee;
And thou shalt have all their gay cloathìng,
Aye, and all their white monèy.'

"'Oh I will have none of their gay cloathìng,
Nor none of their white monèy,
But I'll have three blasts on my bugle-horn,
That their souls to heaven may flee.'

"Then Robin Hood mounted the gallows so high,
Where he blew loud and shrill,
'Till an hundred and ten of Robin Hood's men
Came marching down the green hill.

"'Whose men are these?' says master sheìrff,
'Whose men are they?' tell unto me.
'O they are mine, but none of thine,
And are come for the 'squires all three.'

"'O take them, O take them,' says great master sheriff,
'O take them along with thee;
For there's never a man in fair Nottinghàm
Can do the like of thee.'"

Sometimes, indeed, this moral feeling, which is cosmopolitan, sinks down into patriotism and is limited to the country of the bard; sometimes it is bounded by men of his own humble rank in life. But this seldom happens in such poetry, except when war or oppression has made wise men mad, bringing out passions which are narrow and hateful. Notwithstanding the English ballads so commonly scorn the authority of circumstances, they yet betray the purely empirical character of the English nation. With the exception of these overleapings of the conventions of life, they contain scarce any thing which has not its parallel in actual experience. We look in vain for the signs of that more elevated spirituality so noticeable in the popular poetry of some other nations.

The Americans have produced but little poetry in the simple form of ballads; little which circulates among the people, and that little is destined to a speedy and unlamented burial, as we think. Hitherto circumstances have not favored the production of original literature. With the perpetual exception of speeches and sermons, — which grow out of the daily wants of state and church, — they from their nature must ever be ephemeral. New England has always been the most literary part of America; but the fathers of New England had a form of religion — or rather of theology — perhaps the most unpoetic that was ever developed on a scale so extensive. Calvin was no poet: he dwelt years long on the Lake of Geneva, preaching within sight of Jura and Mont Blanc, with the most beautiful scenery in the world spread out before him, and yet, so far as we remember, there is not in sermon or letter a single allusion to that wondrous beauty wasted on his cold eye, — not a single

figure of speech ever is drawn from the scene before him — the lake, the mountain, or the sky. His followers in America had scarce more inclination to poetry than he. Men who are reflecting on the "five points," discoursing of election, reprobation, and the kindred themes, or inwardly digesting the Assembly's Catechism, would not be likely to write war-songs, or to make ballads. They did well in allowing "the nursery rhymes" to be sung to children; in not suffering "unworthy Barbara Allen" to be wholly forgotten. Still further, their outward circumstances were most unfavorable to the production of popular poetry, songs, and ballads amongst the people. They were struggling against poverty, against the wilderness, the wild beasts, and savage men, — not to mention the difficulties which came from the other side of the water. Thus stood the fathers of New England. On the one side was Starvation, and Destruction on the other; and the Indians laying in wait and ready to hasten the advance of both. Under such circumstances few men would incline to sing any thing very secular, or æsthetic. Besides, to the Puritan "common things" had a certain savor of uncleanness about them, and were thought scarce worthy of being sung. Would a man be merry, he might indeed sing, for there was a scriptural argument for his singing; but it must be — psalms. New England psalmody is a proverb amongst nations. We speak not of the melodies, so long-drawn and so nasal, but of the substantial words which endure while the volatile melodies have long ago been hushed into expressive silence. We give a verse from an old American version of "the Psalms of David," assuring our readers that it is no invention of ours, but an undoubted original.

"The race is not to them that do the swiftest run,
Nor the battell,
To the peopel,
That carries the longest gun."

Of psalm-singing there was no lack in New England. But that was not quite enough even for the Puritans. The natural heart of man wanted something a little more epic — some narrative of heroic events in a form slightly poetical, with a tinge of moral feeling, and a minute specification of time, place, person, and all particulars thereto belonging. This want was supplied — so far as we can learn — by the public prayers so abundantly made by the Puritans. They were as narrative as

the popular ballads, about as long-winded, equally garrulous, it is said; only the rhythmic element was wanting; and that was supplied, we suppose, by the intonation of the orator, or by the repetition of particular phrases — as a sort of refrain, or "burden." Few men esteem the founders of New England more than we, but we honor them for what they were, not for what they were not — not so much for their poetry as for their masculine character and unshrinking faith in God.

We have seen many of the early American ballads, but few of any merit. New England ran to theology, politics, and practical life; not to lyric poetry. Even war, which forced such music from the Greeks and the Spaniards, extorted but little song from the stern men of America, — and that little poor. Of the ballads which belong to the Revolutionary period, there are few which are worth perusing. We insert a portion of one, which seems to us the best. Its date is obvious.

"While I relate my story, Americans give ear;
Of Britain's fading glory you presently shall hear,
I 'll give you a true relation, attend to what I say,
Concerning the taxation of North America.

"The cruel lords of Britain, who glory in their shame,
The project they have lit on they joyfully proclaim;
'T is what they 're striving after, our rights to take away,
And rob us of our charter in North America.

"There are two mighty speakers, who rule in Parliament,
Who always have been seeking some mischief to invent,
'T was North, and Bute, his father, this horrid plan did lay,
A mighty tax to gather in North America.

"He search'd the gloomy regions of the infernal pit,
To find among those legions one who excell'd in wit,
To ask of him assistance, or tell them how they may
Subdue without assistance this North America.

"Old Satan, the arch traitor, resolved a voyage to take,
Who rules sole navigator upon the burning lake;
For the Britannic ocean he launches far away,
To land he had no notion in North America.

"He takes his seat in Britain, it was his soul's intent,
Great George's throne to sit on, and rule the Parliament,
His comrades were pursuing a diabolic way,
For to complete the ruin of North America.

"He tried the art of magic to bring his schemes about,
At length the gloomy project he artfully found out;
The plan was long indulged in a clandestine way,
But lately was divulged in North America.

"These subtle arch-combiners address'd the British court,
All three were undersigners of this obscene report —
There is a pleasant landscape that lieth far away,
Beyond the wide Atlantic in North America.

"There is a wealthy people, who sojourn in that land;
Their churches all with steeples, most delicately stand;
Their houses, like the gilly, are painted red and gay;
They flourish like the lily in North America.

"Their land with milk and honey continually doth flow,
The want of food or money they seldom ever know:
They heap up golden treasure, they have no debts to pay,
They spend their time in pleasure in North America.

"On turkeys, fowls, and fishes most frequently they dine,
With gold and silver dishes their tables always shine,
They crown their feasts with butter, they eat and rise to play,
In silks their ladies flutter in North America.

"With gold and silver laces, they do themselves adorn,
The rubies deck their faces, refulgent as the morn!
Wine sparkles in their glasses, they spend each happy day
In merriment and dances, in North America.

"Let not our suit affront you, when we address your throne,
O king, this wealthy country and subjects are your own,
And you their rightful sovereign, they truly must obey,
You have a right to govern this North America.

"O king, you 've heard the sequel of what we now subscribe,
Is it not just and equal to tax this wealthy tribe?
The question being asked, his majesty did say,
My subjects shall be taxed in North America.

"Invested with a warrant, my publicans shall go,
The tenth of all their current they surely shall bestow,
If they indulge rebellion, or from my precepts stray,
I 'll send my war battalion to North America.

"I 'll rally all my forces by water and by land,
My light dragoons and horses shall go at my command,
I 'll burn both town and city, with smoke becloud the day,
I 'll show no human pity for North America.

"Go on, my hearty soldiers, you need not fear of ill —
There 's Hutchinson and Rogers, their functions will fulfil —
They tell such ample stories, believe them sure we may,
That one half of them are tories in North America.

"My gallant ships are ready to hoist you o'er the flood,
And in my cause be steady, which is supremely good;
Go ravage, steal, and plunder, and you shall have the prey;
They quickly will knock under in North America.

"The laws I have enacted, I never will revoke,
Although they are neglected, my fury to provoke,
I will forbear to flatter, I 'll rule with mighty sway;
I 'll take away the charter from North America.

"O George! you are distracted, by sad experience find
The laws you have enacted are of the blackest kind.
I 'll make a short digression, and tell you by the way,
We fear not your oppression in North America.

"Our fathers were distressed, while in their native land;
By tyrants were oppressed, as I do understand;
For freedom and religion they were resolved to stray,
And try the desert regions of North America.

"Heaven was their protector while on the roaring tide,
Kind fortune their director, and Providence their guide;
If I am not mistaken, about the first of May,
This voyage was undertaken for North America.

"To sail they were commanded, about the hour of noon,
At Plymouth shore they landed, the twenty-first of June;
The savages were nettled, with fear they fled away,
And peaceably they settled in North America.

"We are their bold descendants, for liberty we 'll fight,
The claim to independence we challenge as our right,
'T is what kind Heaven gave us, who can take away?
Kind Heaven, too, will save us in North America.

"We never will knock under, O George, we do not fear
The rattling of your thunder, nor lightning of your spear:
Though rebels you declare us, we 're strangers to dismay;
Therefore you can 't scare us in North America.

"To what you have commanded, we never will consent;
Although your troops are landed upon the continent;
We 'll take our swords and muskets, and march in bright array,
And drive the British rustics from North America.

"We have a bold commander who fears not sword nor gun,
The second Alexander, his name is Washington,
His men are all collected, and ready for the fray,
To fight they are directed for North America."

The "whig songs" of 1840 are still fresh in the recollection of their authors, no doubt, and are pretty fair samples of what America has produced in the form of poetry for the people, and were besides valuable as specific signs of that period.

The work of Mr. Moore named at the beginning of this article is intended to supply the want of a book containing all the good, or at least all of the best, ballads in the language. Certainly the want has long been felt, and remains still unsupplied. These volumes contain some pieces unworthy of a place in such a collection,—as it seems to us,—such as the "Story of John Gilpin," Kirk White's "Gondoline," and "The Rime of the Auncient Waggonere." Valuable ballads are omitted to make way for them. We miss, and who would have thought it, "the grand old ballad of Sir Patrick Spence," the "Friar of Orders Grey," the ballads relating to "sweet William" and "fair Margaret," and even those about King Arthur. "Auld Robin Gray" is likewise omitted. The most valuable that he has inserted which are not in the hands of lovers of ballad lore, are "The Luck of Muncaster," "Robin Conscience," "The King and a poore Northerne Man." The last — which seems to be the original of a popular song, "A Farmer there was in the west countrie," — is supposed to have been written by one Martin Parker, a celebrated author of ballads. We give some extracts from it.

"Come hearken to me all around,
And I will tell you a merry tale
Of a Northumberland man that held some ground,
Which was the King's land, in a dale.

"He was borne and bred thereupon,
And his father had dwelt there long before,
Who kept a good house in that country,
And staved the wolfe from off his doore.

"Now for this farm the good old man
Just twenty shillings a-year did pay.
At length came cruell death with his dart,
And this old farmer he soone did slay;

"Who left behind him an aulde wife then,
That troubled was with mickle paine,
And with her cruches she walkt about,
For she was likewise blinde and lame.

"When that his corpes were laid in the grave,
His eldest sonne possesse did the farme,
At the same rent as the father before:
He took great paines and thought no harme.

"By him there dwelt a Lawyer false,
That with his farme was not content,
But over the poore man still hang'd his nose,
Because he did gather the King's rent.

"This farme layd by the Lawyer's land,
Which this vild kerne had a mind unto:
The deele a good conscience had he in his bulke,
That sought this poore man for to undoe.

"He told him he his lease had forfite,
And that he must there no longer abide:
The King by such lownes hath mickle wrong done,
And for you the world is broad and wide.

"The poore man pray'd him for to cease,
And content himselfe, if he would be willing;
And picke no vantage in my lease,
And I will give thee forty shilling.

"Its neither forty shillings, no forty pound,
Ise warrant thee, so can agree thee and me,
Unlesse thou yield me thy farme so round,
And stand unto my curtesie."

The tenant sets off to carry the matter before the King.

"He had a humble staffe [stuffe] on his backe,
A jerkin, I wat, that was of gray,
With a good blue bonnet, he thought it no lacke;
To the King he is ganging as fast as he may."

So he goes to London, and thence to Windsor. He gives the porter a penny and a nobleman a groat to introduce him to the King, who is playing at bowls.

"Loe, yonder 's the king, said the Nobleman,
Behold, fellow, loe, where he goes.

Beleevet hee's some unthrift, sayes the poore man,
That has lost his money and pawnd his cloathes.

"How hapt he hath gat neere a coate to his backe?
This bowling I like not; it hath him undone.
Ise warrant that fellow in those gay cloathes,
He hath his coyne and his doublet won.

"But when he came before the King,
The Nobleman did his curtesie:
The poore man followed after him,
And gave a nod with his head and a becke with his knee.

"If you be Sir King, then said the poore man,
As I can hardly thinke you be,
Here is a gude fellow that brought me hither,
Is liker to be the King than ye.

"I am the King, his Grace now sayd,
Fellow, let me thy cause understand.
If you be Sir King, Ime a tenant of yours,
That was borne and upbrought within your owne lande.

"There dwels a Lawyer hard by me,
And a fault in my lease he saycs he hath found:
And all was for felling five poore ashes,
To build a house upon my owne ground.

"Hast thou a lease here? said the King,
Or canst thou shew to me the deed?
He put it into the King's owne hand,
And said, Sir, 't is here, if that you can read.

"Why, what if I cannot? said our King,
That which I cannot, another may.
I have a boy of mine owne not seven yeares old,
A will read you as swift as yould run i' th' highway.

"Lets see thy lease, then said our King.
Then from his blacke boxe he puld it out.
He gave it into the King's owne hand,
With four or five knots ty'd fast in a clout.

. . . . . .

"When the King had gotten these letters to read,
And found the truth was very so;
I warrant thee, thou hast not forfeit thy lease,
If that thou hadst felld five ashes moe.

. . . . . .

"Thoust have an injunction, said our King;
From troubling of thee he will cease:
Heele either shew thee a good cause why,
Or else heele let thee live in peace.

. . . . . .

"Thoust have an attachment, said our King;
Charge all thou seest to take thy part.
Till he pay thee an hundred pound,
Be sure thou never let him start.

"A, waise me! the poore man saide then;
You ken no whit what you now do say,
A won undoe me a thousand times,
Ere he such a mickle of money will pay.

. . . . . .

"Thou art hard a beleefe, then said our King:
To please him with letters he was right willing.
I see you have taken great paines in writing,
With all my heart Ile give you a shilling.

"Ile have none of thy shilling, said our King;
Man, with thy money God give thee win.
He threw it into the King's bosome;
The money lay cold next to his skin.

"Beshrew thy heart, then said our King;
Thou art a carle something too bold:
Dost thou not see I am hot with bowling?
The money next to my skin lies cold.

. . . . . .

"The King called up his Treasurer,
And bad him fetch him twenty pound.
If ever thy errant lye here away,
Ile beare thy charges up and downe.

"When the poore man saw the gold tendred,
For to receive it he was willing.
If I had thought the King had so mickle gold,
Beshrew my heart, Ide a kept my shilling.

. . . . . .

"The poore man got home next Sunday;
The Lawyer soone did him espy.
Oh, Sir, you have been a stranger long,
I thinke from me you have kept you by.

"It was for you indeed, said the poore man,
The matter to the King as I have tell.

I did as neighbours put it in my head,
And made a submission to the King mysel.

"What a deel didst thou with the King? said the Lawyer;
Could not neighbours and friends agree thee and me?
The deel a neighbour or friend that I had,
That would a bin sike a daies man as he.

"He has gin me a letter, but I know not what they cal 't;
But if the King's words be true to me,
When you have read and perused it over,
I hope you will leave and let me be.

"He has gin me another, but I know not what 't is;
But I charge you all to hold him fast.
Pray you that are learned this letter reade;
Which presently made them all aghast.

"Then they did reade this letter plaine,
The Lawyer must pay him a hundred pound.
You see the King's letter, the poore man did say,
And unto a post he sal straight way be bound.

"Then unto a post they tide him fast,
And all men did rate him in cruell sort;
The lads and the lasses, and all the towne
At him had great glee, pastime and sport.

"Ile pay it, Ile pay it, the Lawyer said,
The attachment, I say, it is good and faire;
You must needes something credit me,
Till I goe home and fetch some meare.

"Credit! nay thats it the King forbad:
He bad, if I got thee, I should thee stay,
The Lawyer payd him an hundred pound
In ready money, ere he went away.

"Would every Lawyer were served thus!
From troubling poore men they would cease:
They 'd either show them a good cause why,
Or else they 'd let them live in peace.

"And thus I end my merry tale,
Which shews the plain man's simplenesse,
And the King's great mercy in writing his wrongs,
And the Lawyer's fraud and wickednesse."

Mr. Moore has not inserted any songs in his volumes, as most collectors of ballads have done. We cannot forbear

adding a little piece not so well known as it deserves to be, called

"ROSELYND'S MADRIGAL.

"Love in my Bosom like a Bee
Doth suck his sweet;
Now with his wings he plays with me,
Now with his feet.
Within my Eyes he makes his nest,
His bed within my tender Breast.
My Kisses are his daily feast,
But yet he robs me of my Rest!
Ah Wanton — will ye!

"And when I sleep, then percheth he
With pretty flight,
And makes his pillow on my Knee,
The live-long night.
I strike the harp, he tunes the string,
He music plays if so I sing,
He gives me many a lovely thing,
But cruel, he my heart doth sting!
Whist, Wanton, still ye."

Here is a little piece by Anastasius Grün, a German poet of the Swabian school, not without merit. We know not the name of the translator.

"THE LAST POET.

"'When will be poets weary,
And throw their harps away?
When will be sung and ended
The old, eternal lay?

"'When will your horn of plenty
At last exhausted lie?
When every flower is gather'd,
And every fountain dry?'

"As long as the sun's chariot
Rolls in the heavenly blue,
As long as human faces
Are gladdened with the view:

"Long as the sky's loud thunder
Is echoed from the hill,
And, touched with dread and wonder,
A human heart can thrill:

"And while, through melting tempest,
The rainbow spans the air,
And gladden'd human bosoms
Can hail the token fair:

"And long as night the ether
With stars and planets sows,
And man can read the meaning
That in golden letters glows:

"As long as shines the moon
Upon our nightly rest,
And the forest waves its branches
Above the weary breast:

"As long as blooms the spring
And while the roses blow,
While smiles can dimple cheeks,
And eyes with joy o'erflow:

"And while the cypress dark,
O'er the grave its head can shake
And while an eye can weep,
And while a heart can break:

"So long on earth shall live
The goddess Poesy,
And make of human life
An endless melody.

"And singing, all alone,
The last of living men,
Upon Earth's garden green,
Shall be a poet then.

"God holds his fair creation
In his hand, a blooming rose,
He smiles on it with pleasure,
And in his smile it glows.

"But when the giant-flower
For ever dies away,
And earth and sun, its blossoms,
Like blooms of spring, decay;

"Then ask the poet — then —
If you live to see the day —
'When will be sung and ended
The old, eternal lay?'"

Art. VI.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

1.—*The Princess.* By Alfred Tennyson. Boston: W. D. Ticknor & Co. 1848. 16mo. pp. 168.

On the day after the publication of "The Princess" we were informed that Timms had pronounced it an entire failure. Timms is a gentleman who readily admits whatever has been universally admitted for a century or two, but has his fears that the world will admire too much. He therefore devotes his energies to putting down all new aspirants to the lucrative office of giving the public a fresh source of delight. He protects his fellow-citizens from being too easily pleased. For this desirable purpose he has erected a small battery, mounted with what he calls the received canons of criticism, and serves the guns himself. When there is no immediate danger of a hostile incursion, he fires at nothing, for practice; and it must be allowed that his shots tell upon this kind of target with admirable precision and effect. It cannot be denied that Timms possesses a large amount of valuable information. He is as familiar with schools of poetry as a Cape Ann fisherman is with schools of mackerel, and regards them very much from the same point of view. He has a notion that Pope and Goldsmith are exactly alike, and that, though nobody can ever be like them, every body ought to be. Within a few years he has made prize of the terms "objective" and "subjective," which he uses merely as conductors whereby to convey his own confusion of ideas into the heads of other people. He considers poetry as only a convenient disguise assumed by designing men whose real object is to destroy all our time-honored institutions. He has a vague horror floating in his mind with regard to some German school, the master of which must be a very abandoned man, judging from our friend's account of the principles advocated by his scholars. Timms keeps a kind of private Valhalla, into which he admits the statues of such poets only as have nothing dangerous in them. A new idea, a new rhyme, a new metre, constitutes with him a violent presumption of poetical Jacobinism and heresy. Any one of these he considers as a blow aimed at the foundations of society. He only declared peace with Wordsworth on his being appointed laureate, and that out of reverence for an office which had been illustrated by a Pye and a Whitehead. He is a conservative of the amber kind, which conserves only grubs. In short, he is a valuable member of society, and the *original* (there have been five since,) American Jeffrey.

This fulmination of our respected friend ringing in our ears, we opened the "Princess" with a tremulous hand. Not that we

ourselves had not been in the habit of interpreting his judgments, like dreams, by contraries, but we feared the effect of his verdict on the public, which has always shown a curious predilection for having its opinions made up for it by its Timmses. We read the book through with a pleasure which heightened to unqualified delight, and ended in admiration. The poem is unique in conception and execution. It is one of those few instances in literature where a book is so true to the idiosyncrasy of its author that we cannot conceive of the possibility of its being written by any other person, no matter how gifted. Had Tennyson left it unfinished, it would have remained a fragment for ever, like the stories of Cambuscan bold and Christabel. We beg pardon,—Mr. Martin Farquhar Tupper *has* completely finished the latter poem. We will therefore qualify our remark, and say, that had "The Princess" been broken off in the middle, it would have continued a *torso* till Providence sent us another Tupper.

In the first place, we must look at the poem not as the work of a beginner, but of an acknowledged poet, and of one who has gained his rank and maintained it by the unerring certainty with which he has produced his effects, and his conscientious adherence to the truths of Art. We know of few poets in whose writings we have found that entire consistency which characterizes those of Tennyson. His conception is always clear, his means exactly adequate, and his finish perfect. So entirely free is he from any appearance of effort, that many have been led to underrate him, and to praise his delicacy at the expense of his strength. It is true that he never wastes an atom of force. He never calls all his muscles into play for the plucking of a flower. Yet he is never found wanting to the demand of the occasion. Milo, with his fingers in the oak-cleft, made, after all, rather a sorry display of sinew. Though one chief characteristic of Tennyson's mind be a flowing grace, and a feminine sensitiveness to every finest suggestion of beauty; though thought in him seems to be rather a luxury of sensation than an activity of intellect; though his metres adapt themselves to every subtle winding of expression with the yielding freedom of water, yet his outlines are always sharp-cut and severe. Perfection of form seems to be with him a natural instinct, not an attainment. We must therefore regard "The Princess" as the work of a master, and it must argue a poverty in ourselves if we cannot see it as a harmonious whole. For so perfect is Tennyson's appreciation of his own strength, that he has never in a single instance fallen below himself. His self-command is not the least wonderful quality in him.

The growth of the poem is as natural as its plan is original. The gradual absorption of the author in his subject, till what was begun as a song "turns out a sermon," the growing predominance

of the poet over the mere story-teller, as the higher relations of his subject appeal to him, and the creative faculty feels itself more and more taxed, are exquisitely true to the intellect and the heart. We know of no other man who could have mingled the purely poetical with the humorous in such entire sympathy as nowhere to suggest even a suspicion of incongruity. But Tennyson's humor is peculiar to himself. It is as refined as all the other parts of his mental constitution. We were about to compare it with Chaucer's. It is as genial and simple, but not so robust. It has more of the polish of society. It is like Addison's, etherealized and sublimated by the poetic sense. It has none of that boisterousness which generally goes with it when it is the predominant quality of the mind. It is not a laugh, but a quiet smile and a light in the eyes. It is a delicate flower which we can perceive and enjoy, but which escapes definition. In short, it is Tennyson's. If we take by itself any one of the little touches of humor scattered through "The Princess," it will seem nothing extraordinary, and we shall wonder whither its charm has flown, so perfectly and artistically dependent on each other are all parts of this delicious poem. For Art is like the invention of the arch. Each piece taken singly, has no especial fitness. The material is no rarer than that of the Cyclopean doorway, two upright blocks with a third laid across the top. Nor is the idea less simple, after we have once found it out. We feel this book to be so true an expression of the man, its humor is so thoroughly a part of him, and leads up to or falls off from the higher and graver passages with so graceful an undulation, that the whole poem would suffer vitally by losing the least shade of it. It subsides out of the story as unobtrusively as it had entered, at the moment when the interest, becoming concentrated in the deeper moral to which the poem is naturally drawn, necessarily excludes it. The progress of the poem is carried forward, and its movement modulated, with the truest feeling and tact. It is as if some composer, in a laughing mood, had seated himself at the organ to *fantasy* for the entertainment of a few friends. At first, he is conscious of their presence, and his fingers run lightly over the keys, bringing out combinations of notes swayed quaintly hither and thither by the magnetism of the moment. But gradually he becomes absorbed in his own power and that of his instrument. The original theme recurs less and less often, till at last he soars quite away from it on the uplifting wings of his art.

One striking excellence of Tennyson's poetry, as noticeable in "The Princess" as elsewhere, is its repose and equilibrium. There is nowhere the least exaggeration. We are never distracted by the noise of the machinery. No one beauty is so prominent as to divide the effect, and to prevent our receiving the full pleasure arising from our perception of completeness. The leading idea keeps all the rest in perfect subjection. He never gives us

too much. With admirable instinct, he always stops short where the reader's imagination may be safely trusted to suggest all the minor accessaries of a thought or a situation. He gives all that is essential, not all that he can. He never indulges his invention with two images, where one is enough. And this self-denial, this entire subordination of the author to his work, has been remarkable in him from the first. It marks the sincere artist, and is worthy of all praise. If some of his earlier poems were chargeable with slighter excesses of mannerism, it was only the mannerism natural to a mind which felt itself to be peculiar, and was too hasty in asserting its peculiarity before it had learned to discriminate clearly between the absolute and the accidental. But he has long since worked himself clear of this defect, and is now only a mannerist because he is a Tennyson.

The profound and delicate conception of female character for which Tennyson is distinguished, and which, from the nice structure of his mind, we should expect to find in him, is even more perfectly developed in "The Princess" than hitherto. It marks the wisdom of the man no less than the insight of the poet. Whatever any woman may think of the conclusions he arrives at, she cannot help being grateful to the man who has drawn the Lady Psyche and Ida.

The design of "The Princess" is novel. The movement of the poem is epic, yet it is redolent, not of Homer and Milton, but of the busy nineteenth century. There are glimpses of contemporary manners and modes of thought, and a metaphysical question is argued, though without infringing upon the freedom of the story. Indeed, it is the story itself which argues. On the whole, we consider this to be the freest and fullest expression of Tennyson which we have had. The reader will find in it all the qualities for which he is admirable so blended and interfused as to produce a greater breadth of effect than he has elsewhere achieved. The familiarity of some passages, while it is in strict keeping with the character he assumes at the outset, indicates also the singer at last sure of his audience, and reposing on the readiness of their sympathies.

2.—1. *Traitement Moral, Hygiène, et Education des Idiots et des autres Enfants arriérés, &c.* Par EDOUARD SEGUIN. Paris. 1846.

2. *De l'Idiotie chez les Enfants, &c.* Par FELIX VOISIN.

3. *Briefe ueber den Abendberg und Heilanstalt fur Cretinismus*, von Dr. med. GUGGENBUHL. Zürich. 1846.

DURING the tempestuous and bloody fermentation of the French Revolution, when the human intellect was goaded into a delirium

of excitement and put forth its fiercest energies; when demi-gods struggled with demons; many noble plans for the elevation of humanity were proposed, and partially tried, but speedily failed in consequence of the death of their authors, or were forgotten in the excitement of new and more brilliant schemes. Many of those plans, however, contained germs of vitality which can never perish, and we find them reappearing after long years of neglect and forgetfulness. Among these was the plan of the philosopher and physician Itard, for teaching the SAVAGE OF AVIGNON.

This wild and strange creature in the human form, who was caught in the woods, furnished to the delighted *savans* of Paris an opportunity of proving the truth of their theory, that man was originally savage, and rose to civilization through long ages of painful travail in barbarism, *savagedom*, and semi-civilization. They thought that an individual might skip all these transition stages, and become at once a highly civilized being, if he were properly instructed.

Itard undertook to train, teach, and civilize this savage. No one was more capable of the task, and his enthusiastic confederates, accustomed to the rapid changes of the drama of the Revolution, expected that the savage of yesterday would be a *petit maître* on the Boulevards to-morrow, an haranguer of his fellow-citizens the next day; ready to be a leader of some reform the next week, and a victim to the guillotine the next month.

But Itard failed, because, as it proved, his subject was not a savage, but only an IDIOT! Itard failed, but truth never fails. He got a glimmer of it; he saw that idiots might be taught; he communicated the feeble light which dawned upon him to one of his disciples, Monsieur Seguin, who, by following it up, has been guided to the knowledge of a method of teaching all idiots, and vastly improving their physical, moral, and mental condition.

The first work named above contains not only the beautiful and satisfactory results of his treatment, but the theory on which he bases all his mental and physical appliances. It is not altogether sound and philosophical, but we have no heart to find fault with a man's philosophy when his practice brings such a harvest of good fruit.

The second work, *De l'Idiotie chez les Enfants, par Felix Voisin*, shows a more intimate acquaintance with what we regard as the only philosophy which can guide us in training and teaching idiots and backward children; namely, the absolute and entire dependence of all mental manifestations upon the structure and condition of the bodily organization. In all cases where the mind does not manifest itself at the usual period, or in a normal manner, the cause must be sought in some original defect of the physical organization, or in some derangement of its functions.

Voisin is also a practical and successful educator of idiots: his

établissement orthophrenique, as he says truly, *manquait à la science et à l'humanité*; but it is wanting no longer.

Besides the establishment at Paris for the training and teaching of idiots, there is another among the magnificent edifices of Berlin, and a third high up among the more magnificent structures of the Alps, at Abendberg. The latter school, perched upon its lofty eyrie, seems like a monastery, nunnery, or other establishment devoted to pious purposes. But there is this difference, that while in them we find religion *in theory*, in this we find it *in practice*. It was established and is kept up by the labors of Dr. Guggenbuhl, and is devoted to the instruction of idiotic cretins.

We have no space for a detail of the interesting process of instruction pursued in these schools, or of their beautiful results. The good and gifted persons who manage them work greater miracles, without spell or charm, than even did necromancers of old, who transformed men into brutish beasts, while our modern magicians transform brutish beings back into the likeness of men again.

Idiots of the lowest grade, who could not talk, who could hardly stand erect, who could only eat, sleep, and fatten like swine, whose greatest enjoyment was to lie slavering in the noon-day sun, who seemed utterly without the pale of humanity, are gathered into these schools and taught to use their limbs; to speak intelligibly; to keep themselves tidy; to observe the decencies of life, and in many cases to write, to reckon, and to do some simple work.

There is probably no task assigned to man requiring more courage, zeal, patience, and perseverance, than that of training and teaching idiots. Some idea of its difficulty may be had from the following account given by Seguin of his course in teaching an idiot boy *to use his eye in looking at his teacher.*

The first exercise is that of taking the boy into a dark room into which a single ray of light is introduced, as by a hole in the shutter. The eye is naturally attracted to this, and the boy soon learns to command the muscles enough to keep the ball fixed. Afterwards this luminous point is moved about from right to left, and the idiot is gradually trained to follow it with his eyes.

Another exercise, and the one most depended upon, is for the teacher to place the pupil before him, and to endeavour to catch his wandering eye with his own earnest look, and to *fascinate him*, as it were. These and other methods are followed until the idiot learns *to see that he sees.*

These directions are easily given, but, as Seguin himself says, what exercise, what labor, what perseverance, is necessary before you can ever seize upon the favorable moment! "You approach your pupil, — he hides his face; your eye seeks his, which flies from you; you follow it up, but it escapes again; you seem to meet it, when he suddenly closes the lids; you wait, watching the

opening of the lids that your glance may penetrate them, and if, after all, the child repels you the first time he fairly sees you, or if, in order to avoid confessing the original idiocy of their child, his parents misrepresent and disparage all you have done, then you have got to begin again, and wear away your life with another, not for the love of the individual, but for the triumph of the doctrine which you understand, and in which you bravely trust."

"It is thus that I followed," says he, "during *four months*, the flying eye of an idiot boy. The first time that his eye fairly met mine, he uttered a wild cry and sprang away; but the next day, instead of placing his hand mechanically upon me as usual, in order to ascertain my identity, he looked at me an instant as at something new, and the next did so again, looking longer and more intelligently each time, until he could satisfy himself without manifesting any surprise or curiosity, and finally he used his sight like an ordinary person."

No school of this kind has yet been established in this country, but we rejoice to learn that the way has been prepared for one.

Commissioners appointed by the Governor have been for some time at work examining into the condition of idiots in this state. We learn that they find there are more than a thousand unfortunate creatures of this class within the borders of Massachusetts.

A thousand human beings here in our very midst, sunk in the depths of brutish idiocy, and not a helping hand held out to lift them up upon the platform of humanity! A thousand men and women in Massachusetts in whom exist the glimmer of reason and the elements of improvement, and yet we leave them to perish like the brutes, without an effort to awaken them to a consciousness of their humanity, while we send our missionaries to the uttermost parts of the earth to make doubtful converts of ignorant pagans at a thousand dollars a head!

But it will not be long so, we trust. Men are beginning to see that religion consists in something besides building churches and frequenting them; besides preaching, praying, and believing;—that it consists in work—zealous and steadfast work for the good of our brethren of mankind. We must work for their temporal good; we must supply their pressing wants; we must heal their bodily infirmities and enlighten their minds, or the barren WORD which we send them is but as a stone instead of bread. There is something repulsive in the subject, but we shall return to it in our next, and endeavour to learn from the condition and treatment of these pariahs of society some lessons which may be useful; for there is no subject so "ugly and venomous" that does not contain within itself precious jewels to reward the earnest seeker after truth.

3.— *General Principles of the Philosophy of Nature: with an Outline of some of its Recent Developments among the Germans, embracing the Philosophical Systems of Schelling and Hegel, and Oken's System of Nature.* By J. B. STALLO, A. M., lately Professor of Analytical Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Chemistry, in St. John's College, N. Y. Boston: Wm. Crosby and H. P. Nichols. 8vo. pp. 520.

NOTHING but a regularly projected article can do justice to or fitly introduce this book to the American public. It is altogether the best thing upon the profound subjects to which it relates that has ever appeared on this side of the water. It is the best, because it gives the most intelligible and thorough analysis of the modern Identity-systems of the Germans, and because that part of the book which is original with Mr. Stallo discriminates most sharply and successfully the true theory of Development from that bold, popular generalization which first appeared in the "Vestiges," and thence dribbled, but not distilled, through the abnormal predicament of Mr. Davis. It is a counter-revelation of reason and science, with which, luckily, "spirits from the second sphere of existence" did not meddle.

Some pages of Mr. Stallo's book are written with rare warmth and vigor; for instance, nearly all the sections under the head of "Organization of Society." But we must be allowed to say that we do not think he has fairly stated the theory of Fourierism, or rather, that particular foreshortening or modification of it which is held by the spirited and devoted associationists of this country. We agree with Mr. Stallo as to the fact that the centre must always create its circumference, and that, therefore, the phalanx, so long as it is an exterior scheme to be applied, is impracticable. But there is no associationist in this country who will dispute his position that "the *person and family* are an *essential* existence in society." It is not true that their system annuls the natural feeling, "the immediate *reality* of the relations of brother and sister," in favor of an abstract brotherhood. It should always be sufficient to state the central objections to Fourierism, without complicating the question with these special issues, which were first started by the newspapers. Mr. Stallo has had some private jousts on this arena; and personal arguments, which never convince any body, have left their sediment perturbing the discussion.

What is the Identity-system of the Germans? Briefly said, and without mentioning its necessary terminations in thought and science, it is this: Mind and Matter are "eternally opposed to each other, and, nevertheless, eternally one. They are different but corresponding revelations of the Deity, which is their source only

in so far as it is their identity." So that, to use Mr. Stallo's apt illustration, "the symbol of the absolute is the magnet; one principle constantly manifesting itself as two poles, and still resting in their midst as their identity. Divide the magnet; every part will be a complete system in itself,—two poles and a point of indifference. And just as every part of the magnet is the entire magnet in miniature, so, also, every individual development in nature is a miniature universe." This figure comprises the true theory of development, and involves the true immanence and function of God in the world. It is the formula of that great Synthesis of Nature, which is the present task of science to construct, and noble fragments of which, prophesying the whole harmonious system to which they must belong, are already discovered and accredited. "All science is but a rehearsal of the absolute science," starting from this new term of the Identity, yet difference, of God and the Real.

Mr. Stallo is completely informed upon the present state of science, and knows its latest acquisitions. He holds firmly and clearly the great idea which the active thought of this epoch, in every domain of life, is pledged to substantiate. He is a German, yet we are harassed by no mysticism. He has a system, yet it is not a mere scaffolding of formulæ enclosing nothing, and it has not crowded out a single tender feeling or moral aspiration. The destiny of the individual has been identified by him with the destiny of the race. God becomes completely manifested only when every individual has that "absolute egotism," which is the perfect expression of his nature, and which is embodied in the text, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself; that is, as much as God. Mr. Stallo, in speaking of social questions, finely says, "the assurance that the discords of this world are to be silent in a *better* one, is not accepted as an indemnification and a reprieve; these discords are to become *accord* here,—to resolve themselves *now* into harmony. A Sunday of uninterrupted, stagnant inactivity cannot compensate for the brutal, unmitigated toils of the preceding week; the descent of heaven upon earth, the consecration of every day of labor as a legitimate Sunday, is the great expectancy of our generation." Whittier expressed the whole humanitary philosophy of the day in the single line:

"The New Jerusalem *comes down* to man."

We may as well pause in our notice here; for a discussion of all the points which throng upon us, suggested or re-awakened by this book, would carry us far beyond our limits. We cordially greet this work, and hasten to recommend it to our scholars. As far as we are able to judge, its analysis of the German systems from Kant to Oken is just, clear, and comprehensive. We should

object somewhat to his estimate of Fichte, were it not evident that he regards him simply from a metaphysical point of view. Some of Fichte's fine moral and social utterances are not unknown to the heart of Mr. Stallo.

Our young men will not find this book so easy to read as the last "Mysteries," or even the bloody campaigning pages of Mr. Headley. Yet we hope they will put themselves under its suggestive influence, undismayed by an occasional involution of sentences, a sturdy Germanism, or a stray obscurity of style. For these exist, and we think that a second edition might safely contain a few verbal alterations to the benefit of the general clearness of the text, It is a grand, solid book, full of German thought and Saxon sense, and just the thing for our meridian.

4.—*Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China, and on the Chinese Language, &c., &c.* By THOMAS TAYLOR MEADOWS, Interpreter to Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate at Canton. London. 1847. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. XVI and 250.

THE work is readable and is evidently written by an intelligent man. He thinks the Chinese a sober-minded, rational people; that their official documents are generally superior to those of the English. He thinks the long duration of the Chinese Empire is explained by the fact that each successive dynasty has taught this as a cardinal principle: "that good government consists in the advancement of men of talent and merit only, to the rank and honor conveyed by official posts." To prove that this principle has long been recognized there, he cites numerous passages from ancient writers. Thus, Yu, who began to reign 2205 years before Christ, says to the Emperor Shun, his predecessor, "When a king knows how difficult it is to be a good king, and when a subject knows how much it costs to fulfil all his duties faithfully, the government is perfect, and the people make a swift progress in the ways of virtue."

"That is certain," replied the emperor, "and I love to be discoursed with in this manner. Truths so well grounded ought never to be concealed. Let all wise men be distinguished, then all the kingdoms of the world will enjoy a profound peace. But to rest entirely upon the sentiments of wise men, to prefer them to his own, to treat orphans with kindness, and never to reject the suit of the poor, are perfections only to be found in a very wise king."

In the year 179 B. C., the Emperor Wan te published a declaration, in which he says to the people, "You know that I have neither virtue nor qualifications sufficient for the weight of govern-

ment. This engages me to publish this present declaration, to inform all who are in posts in my empire, from the prince to the simple magistrate, to inquire carefully after persons of merit for my service. Such, for instance, as know the world perfectly well; others who have a thorough understanding of all affairs relating to the State; *but above all, such as have resolution and honesty enough to inform me fully of what they think amiss in my conduct.*"

The author concludes that "the certainty of attaining rank and wealth in the State, merely through personal qualifications, stimulates the whole nation to healthful exertions, thus diffusing prosperity throughout it, and multiplying its powers to a great extent."

The following quotation is from Mencius. "Those who wrangle and fight for territory and fill the wastes with dead bodies, and who fight for cities so as to fill the cities with dead bodies, may be said to lead [men] on the earth to eat human flesh. Death is not a sufficient punishment for such crimes. Those, then, who delight in war, deserve the highest punishment."

The family of the king, lineal descendants of Confucius, are still numerous, and have just claims to be considered the oldest and most noble family in the world. "Confucius never pretended to any superhuman powers, or intelligence with superior beings; was neither a fanatic nor an impostor, but simply a moral philosopher and a statesman, and his doctrines have obtained their present great authority merely because they are generally sound."

The author thinks infanticide is not much more common in China than in England; but lying is a vice almost universal.

5.— *Theodore Parker's, neu-unitarischen Predigers zu Boston, Untersuchungen über Religion; aus dem Englischen übersetzt und mit einem Vorwort begleitet.* Von Heinrich Wolf, Archidiaconus an St. Nicholai in Kiel. Kiel: Karl Schröder und Comp. 1848. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. xxvi and 374.

This is a translation of Mr. Parker's Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, and is executed with extraordinary diligence, success, and beauty. In the preface the translator says, there has never been a period of so much movement of thought in the religious world since the Reformation, as now. He doubts whether the age of the Reformation itself was so rich as ours in religious developments. But it is still the old controversy between the One Religion and the various Theologies. The victory is certain, but the question is, How can it be achieved with the least cost? The old forms of theological belief are no longer tenable. The Reformation was a great advance, but not the end of progress. It

broke the chains of tradition, fell back on the Bible, and allowed entire freedom in the criticism and exposition of that. We have now to confess that the standard measure of religious truth is not to be found in the Bible, but in Reason and Conscience. The reformers were not advanced enough to accomplish that work. If we are to go no further than they went we may complain that the first step was taken; for what avails it to declare the soul free, and then insist on entire uniformity of theological belief? That can only be accomplished by fettering the soul. Men may create silence and call it peace, but the man who feels the fetters calls it sullen — Death.

He gives a brief account of the rise of the Unitarian sect in Europe, and thinks it was they who most clearly understood the fundamental principle of the Reformation, have most faithfully represented it in the ages, and have continually endeavoured to bring themselves and the world into a clearer consciousness thereof. He cannot understand how Francke could have said "The Socinians are the only Christian sect which have no seed of Regeneration in them." To an unprejudiced eye they are eminently the representatives of the Protestant Idea.

He touches briefly the history of the Socini and their followers, and says that at Siebenbürgen there are at present one hundred and four Unitarian parishes, one hundred and twenty clergymen, and about forty thousand souls; then follows an account of Unitarianism in England and America, taken mainly from the writings of Drs. Baird and Lamson. He thinks that in America the Unitarians have latterly been somewhat untrue to their first principles, and have neglected their high vocation. He mentions the distinguished men in America who have once been Unitarian preachers and have since left that calling, considering their action as an important sign of the times.

6.—*An American Dictionary of the English Language, &c., &c., by Noah Webster, LL. D., &c., &c. Revised and Enlarged, by Chauncey A. Goodrich, &c., &c.* Springfield. 1848. 1 vol. 4to. pp. LXXXIV and 1368.

We would have copied the whole title, but had not space to insert more than a brief notice of the work itself, and thought it better to omit part of the title than the whole of the notice.

This new edition contains all the matter of the former edition of Webster's Dictionary, in 2 vols, 4to., with additions by his son-in-law, the editor. It is a work of great research and learning,— a work of great value. No pains seem to have been spared to render the dictionary accurate and complete. The words relating

to various arts and professions have been examined by eminent men to whose special studies such words apply. An attempt is made to give all the words in common use, and all that are found in such writers as Bacon, Spenser, and Shakspeare. *American* words, also, have a place in the dictionary, though they are few in number. Some alterations have been made in the orthography of Dr. Webster, but perhaps not enough to satisfy the demands of a classic English reader. With all the gratitude we feel to Dr. Webster for his great services to all departments of English lexicography, we must confess that he has tended somewhat to vulgarize the tongue in some of his changes of the orthography. We could wish he had not been quite so obstinate in his adhesion to an opinion once formed and expressed.

The introductory furniture of the dictionary is abundant and valuable. The etymologies are sometimes extraordinarily felicitous, — sometimes a little far-fetched. We could wish to see a few more words relating to the ritual of the Roman and English churches, which an American often meets with both in ancient and modern writers, but which none of the common dictionaries help him to understand. The tables of proper names, Hebrew, classic, and modern, with their pronunciation, are exceedingly serviceable. We cannot hope Dr. Webster will be followed in all respects, but we are sure he has done a great service to all who speak the English tongue, and are happy to see the proof of his widening usefulness and increasing reputation which this new edition of his great work affords.

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7. — *Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull, prepared from his manuscripts by his daughter*, Mrs. Maria Campbell; *together with the History of the Campaign of* 1812 *and surrender of the Port of Detroit; by his grandson*, James Freeman Clarke. New York. 1848. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. xv and 482.

The first part of this work, relating to the Revolutionary services of General Hull, is a valuable contribution to American history, reflecting honor on the early life of the General. But the second part is the more important, inasmuch as it entirely exculpates General Hull from the charges so long and so often brought against him, and, as it has long seemed to us, unjustly. This history has only confirmed the impressions made on us years ago by the report of the trial of the General, — that he was entirely innocent of the offences charged on him; that the failure of his expedition and the fall of Detroit were not to be charged to him. The work is written throughout with good temper, with evident

freedom from all party spirit, with clearness and simplicity, and as it should be, by a grandson — with mingled reverence and affection. Yet, while General Hull is defended, it became unavoidable that his detractors should be spoken of. Doubtless we shall hear from them, and the whole matter will probably be thoroughly sifted anew, the old charges reiterated, and the old battle fought over again.

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8. — *A Letter to the People of the United States, touching the Matter of Slavery.* By THEODORE PARKER. Boston: J. Munroe & Co. 1848. pp. 120.

[The following communication has been handed to us as a note on the part of the work relating to the effects of Slavery on industry.]

"The aggregate annual earnings" of the free and slave states, *stated in dollars*, give no proximate idea whatever of the comparative *wealth* which a free and a slave population respectively produce; and for this reason: —

The *labor* which it costs to produce a commodity, — and not its market price *at a particular time*, — is the measure of its value, as wealth, judging generally. The market price of a commodity, at a given time, will depend mainly upon the greater or less quantity in the market, at that time, relatively to the demand. Thus, a commodity which has cost but one hour's labor may, owing to the scarcity of the article at a particular time, bring as much in the market as another commodity that has cost ten hours' labor. This shows why the productions of the South, when estimated in money, at their present market price, approximate in value to those of the North. The South enjoys a monopoly for some of its most important productions; and not producing enough to supply the demand, obtains a high price for what has really cost but little labor; and its "aggregate earnings," estimated in money, make a somewhat tolerable comparison with those of the North. Yet it is probable that the population of the North, with its superior diligence, energy, skill, implements, and machinery, perform ten, twenty, or thirty times as much labor, and therefore produce ten, twenty, or thirty times as much wealth (judging wealth by its true *general* standard,) as that of the South, man for man. But the North, by its labor, produces such an abundance of its peculiar commodities, and sells them subject to so severe a competition from abroad, that their market value is reduced, and "their aggregate" value, *measured by money*, makes no fair comparison with the aggregate value of the commodities of the South, which are produced in but small quantities, and sold with all the advantages of monopoly in their favor.

If the South performed as much labor as the North, man for

man, its productions would be much more various, and yet so much more abundant, as to be reduced in price. It would thereby add ten or twenty fold more than now, to the aggregate wealth of the world, although the nominal value, *in money*, might be little or nothing greater than that of their present productions.

A necessary consequence of the present state of things is, that when the North and the South make an exchange of productions, of the same nominal value, the North gives the South ten or twenty times as much wealth — or the product of ten or twenty times as much labor — as the South gives in return.

When the North sells to the South a yard of cotton in exchange for a pound of tobacco, she gives to the South an article of wealth, which its *slave* labor, if educated only by the masters, with no aid or instruction from free laborers, would probably never have been able to produce. A community consisting solely of slaves and slave-holders, if cut off from the rest of the world, would probably never bring the mechanic arts to that degree of perfection that would enable them to manufacture a yard of our cheap cotton.

These things illustrate, in some measure, how little in comparison a slave population — if placed in the same circumstances as a free one — would contribute to the aggregate wealth of the world. They show also that *our* slave states in reality give comparatively little in exchange for what they receive, when they make exchanges with the free states.

[We learn from the best authority that there are not in the state of Connecticut *ten* adults born in that state and unable to read and write; of the 536 persons reported in the census as ignorant to that degree, almost all are Irishmen. This fact makes the educational difference between Connecticut and South Carolina still more enormous than before. — T. P.]

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9. — *Essays, Lectures, and Orations, by Ralph Waldo Emerson.*

> "Thus deeply drinking in the soul of things,
> We shall be wise perforce."

London: William S. Orr & Co. 1848. 1 vol. 18mo. pp. XII and 364.

THIS is a piratical reprint of nearly all the published prose writings of Mr. Emerson. The volume contains a preface entitled "Emerson and his Writings;" the first volume of his Essays, his essay called "Nature," sketches or reports of three lectures on the Times, and four Orations; namely, the Addresses delivered before the Divinity School; before the Mechanic Apprentices' Library Association; before the Phi Beta Kappa Society; and before the Adelphi in Waterville College.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.

Arnobii: adversus nationes. Libri VII. Ex nova cod. Paris. Collatione recens. &c. Dr. G. F. Hildebrand. Hal. Sax. 1. 8vo.

Dr. F. X. Diefinger. Die barmherzigen Schwestern vom heil. Karl Borromäus zu Nancy; geschichtlich dargestellt, &c. Bonn.

J. H. Thommes. Thomas Morus, Lord Kanzler v. England. Historisches Gemälde d. despotischen Wilkürherrschaft Heinrich's VIII., &c. Augsburg. 1847. I. 1 Thl.

F. T. Clemens. Giordano Bruno und Nikolaus v. Cusa; Eine philosophische Abhandlung. Bonn. 1847.

Dr. F. X. Diefinger. Der heil. Karl Borromäus und d. Kirchenverbesserung seiner Zeit. Köln. 1. 8vo.

Leibnitzens Gesammelte Werke, a. d. MSS. d. Kön. Bibliothek zu Hannover herausg. v. G. H. Pertz. Vol. I.–III., Annales Imperii occidentis Brunsvicensis. Vol. IV., Leibnitzens geschichtliche Aufsätze und Gedichte.

Briefwechsel zwischen Leibnitz, Arnault, und d. Landgrafen Ernst v. Hessen-Rheinfels. Herausg. v. Dr. C. L. Grotefend.

Leibnitz-Album, herausg. v. C. L. Grotefend.

Historia et origo Calculi differentialis a G. G. Leibnitio conscripta. Herausg. v. C. L. Grotefend.

Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Fr. H. Jacobi, Herausg. v. M. Jacobi. Leipzig. 1847. 12mo. s. VIII. u. 274.

Schiller's Briefwechsel mit Körner. 1 Thl. Berlin. 1847. 8vo. s. 404.

De l'Italiè dans ses rapports avec la liberté et la civilization moderne. Par A. L. Mazzini. Paris. 1847. 2 vols. 8vo.

Die Mährchen v. Clemens Brentano. Zum Besten der Armen, nach d. Willen d. Verf. herausg. v. Guido Görres. Stuttgard. 2 Bde. 8.

Der deutsche Protestantismus, seine Vergangenheit, und seine heutigen Lebensfragen beleuchtet von einem deutschen Theologen. Frankfort A. M.

Gravenhorst. Dr. J. V. C. L. Vergleichende Zoologie. Breslau.

Nasse, W. Commentatio de functionibus singularum cerebri partium, ex morborum perscrutatione indagatis. Bonn. 1. 8vo.

Sammlung der schönsten Grabmäler im Baustyl des Mittelalters, &c. Coblenz. Heft 1.

F. X. Karker. Die Schriften der Apostolischen Väter übersetzt und durch kurze Anmerkungen erläutert. Breslau. 1. 8vo.

J. H. Friedslieb. Quatuor Evangelia sacra; Matthaee, Marce, Lucae, Johannis, in harmoniam redacta, &c., &c. Breslau. 1. 8vo.

Dr. A. Corul. Biblische Hermeneutik, nach den Grundsätzen der Katholischen Kirche. Fulda. 1. 8vo.

Dr. J. Chr. K. Hofmann. Egyptische und Israelitische Zeitrechnung. Ein Sendschreiben an Dr. Böckh. 1. 8vo.

H. Hattemer. Denkmale des Mittelalters, gesammelt und herausgegeben. Vol. III. 8vo.

Von Hammer-Purgstall. Cardinal Khlefl's Leben. Mit eine Sammlung von Khlefl's Briefen, Staatschreiben, &c., &c., bisher ungesammelt. Bonn. 4 vols 8vo.

Waitz. Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. Kiel. 1847. 8vo. XVII und 668 s.

LIST OF NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

The Past, the Present, and the Future. By H. C. Carey, author of "Principles of Political Economy," &c. Philadelphia: Carey & Hart. 1848. 12mo. pp. 474.

Don Quixote de la Mancha. Translated from the Spanish of Miguel de

Cervantes Saavedra, by Charles Jarvis, Esq. Carefully revised and corrected, with numerous illustrations by Tony Johannot. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard. 1847. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 465 and 456.

The Haunted Barque, and other poems. By E. Curtiss Hine. Auburn: J. C. Derby & Co. New York: Mark H. Newman & Co., 199 Broadway. 1848.

The Children at the Phalanstery: a Familiar Dialogue on Education. By F. Cantagrel. Translated by Francis Geo. Shaw. Boston: Wm. D. Ticknor & Co. 1848. 24mo. pp. 60.

Position and Duties of the North with regard to Slavery. By Andrew P. Peabody. Reprinted from the Christian Examiner of July, 1843. Newburyport: Charles Whipple. 1847.

The Triumphs of War: a Sermon. By Andrew P. Peabody. Portsmouth: John W. Foster. 2d ed. 1847.

Fame and Glory: an Address before the Literary Societies of Amherst College, at their Anniversary, Aug. 11, 1847. By Charles Sumner. Boston: Wm. D. Ticknor & Co. 1847. 8vo. pp. 51.

Poems. By James Russell Lowell. Second series. Cambridge: George Nichols. Boston B. B. Mussey & Co. 1848.

A Lecture delivered before the Female Anti-Slavery Society of Salem. By William W. Brown, a fugitive slave. Boston: 1847.

A Discourse delivered before the Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, N. Y., upon Thanksgiving day, Nov. 25, 1847. By Henry Ward Beecher. New York: 1848.

The Duty of Obedience to the Civil Magistrate. Three Sermons preached in the Chapel of Brown University. By Francis Wayland, President of the University. Boston: 1847.

The New Church Repository, and Monthly Review: devoted to the exposition of the Philosophy and Theology taught in the writings of Emanuel Swedenborg. Conducted by Geo. Bush, A. M. Vol. 1, No. 1., Jan., 1848. New York: John Allen, 139 Nassau street.

On Self-Government, together with General Plans of a State Constitution, and a Constitution for a Confederation of States, &c., &c., to which is added the new Constitution of the State of New York. Boston. 1847.

Supplement to Essays on the Progress of Nations in Productive Industry, Civilization, Population, and Wealth, illustrated by Statistics. By Ezra C. Seaman. No. 1. New York. 1847.

An Introductory Lecture delivered at the Massachusetts Medical College, Nov. 3, 1847. By Oliver Wendell Holmes, M. D., Parkman Professor of Anatomy and Physiology. Boston. 1847.

Ueber Religion und Christenthum, Eine Aufforderung zu besonnener Prüfung, an die Deutschen in Nordamerika. Von Frederik Muench. Herrman. Mo. 1847.

A Grammar of the Mpongwe Language, with Vocabularies. By the Missionaries of the A. B. C. F. M. Gaboon Mission, Western Africa. New York. 1847. 8vo. pp. 94.

Reminiscences of the last hours of Life, for the hour of Death, &c. By Jean Paul Friedrich Richter. Boston. 1. 24mo. pp. 98.

The Library of American Biography. Conducted by Jared Sparks. Vol. XXV. Second Series, XV. Boston: Little & Brown. 1848. 16mo. pp. 461. [Contains, 1. Life of Wm. Richardson Davis. By F. M. Hubbard. 2. Life of Samuel Kirkland. By S. K. Lathrop. With a portrait of Kirkland.]

Immigration into the United States. By Jesse Chickering. Little & Brown. 1848. 8vo. pp. 94.

Address and Poem delivered before the Boston Mercantile Library Association, Jan. 3, 1848. Boston: Printed for the Association.

The History of Roxbury Town. By Charles M. Ellis. Boston. 1848.

Oregon Missions and Travels over the Rocky Mountains, in 1845–46. By Father P. J. De Smet. New York: Edward Dunnigan. 1847.

MASSACHUSETTS QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NO. III.—JUNE, 1848.

ART. I.—HAS SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES A LEGAL BASIS?

WE examined in a former article the pretensions of slavery, as it existed in the British North American colonies prior to the revolution which converted those colonies into the United States of America—to rest upon a legal basis. We found in most of the colonies statutes of the colonial assemblies of an earlier or later date, and in all of them a practice, assuming to legalize the slavery of negroes, Indians, and the mixed race; to make that slavery hereditary wherever the mother was a slave, and in all claims of freedom to throw the burden of proof on the claimant. But we also found that this practice, and all the statutes attempting to legalize it, were in direct conflict with great and perfectly well settled principles of the law of England, which was also the supreme law of the colonies; principles which the colonial legislatures and the colonial courts had no authority to set aside or to contradict; and thence we concluded that American slavery, prior to the Revolution, had no legal basis, but existed as it had done in England for some two centuries or more prior to Somerset's case; a mere usurpation on the part of the masters, and a mere wrong as respected those alleged to be slaves.

Nor is this view of the matter by any means original with us, or at all of recent origin. It was taken and acted on and made the basis of emancipation in Massachusetts, while the British rule still prevailed in America. The best account, indeed, almost the only original account of the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, is contained in a paper by Dr. Belknap, printed in the Massachusetts Historical Collections. Dr. Belknap states, that about the time of the commencement of the Revo-

lutionary disputes, several opponents of slavery "took occasion publickly to remonstrate against the inconsistency of contending for our own liberty, and at the same time depriving other people of theirs." Nathaniel Appleton and James Swan, merchants of Boston, distinguished themselves as writers on the side of liberty. "Those on the other side generally concealed their names, but their arguments were not suffered to rest long without an answer. The controversy began about the year 1766, and was renewed at various times till 1773, when it was very warmly agitated, and became the subject of forensic disputation at the public Commencement in Harvard College."

This subject, at least so far as concerned the further importation of negroes and others "as slaves," was introduced into the General Court; but neither Bernard, Hutchinson, nor Gage would concur in any legislation upon it. "The blacks," says Belknap, "had better success in the judicial courts. A pamphlet containing the case of a negro who had accompanied his master from the West Indies to England, and had there sued for and obtained his freedom, was reprinted" at Boston, "and this encouraged several negroes to sue their masters for their freedom and for recompense of their services after they had attained the age of twenty-one years." This pamphlet was undoubtedly the Somerset case, though Belknap dates the first of these Massachusetts cases in 1770, two years previous to that important decision. "The negroes collected money among themselves to carry on the suit, and it terminated favorably. Other suits were instituted between that time and the Revolution, and the juries invariably gave their verdict in favor of liberty." The old fundamental law of Massachusetts authorizing the slavery of Indians and negroes was no longer in force; it had fallen with the first charter. Under the second charter no such statute had been reënacted, but slavery had continued by custom, and had been recognized by the statutes of the province, apparently as a legal relation. "The pleas on the part of the masters were, that the negroes were purchased in open market, and bills of sale were produced in evidence that the laws of the province recognized slavery as existing in it, by declaring that no person should manumit his slave without giving bond for his maintenance, &c. On the part of the blacks it was pleaded, that the royal charter expressly declared all persons born or residing in the province to be as free as the king's subjects in Great Britain; that by the law of England, no man could be deprived of his liberty

but by the judgment of his peers; that the laws of the province respecting an evil existing, and attempting to mitigate or regulate it, did not authorize it. And on some occasions the plea was, that though the slavery of the parents be admitted, yet that no disability of that kind could descend to the children." "The juries invariably gave their verdict in favor of liberty," nor does it appear that these verdicts were in any respect inconsistent with the instructions of the judges as to matter of law.

The blow thus dealt at slavery in Massachusetts might perhaps have been repeated in other colonies; but before there was time for any thing of the sort, the Revolution occurred, and new governments stepped in to take the places of the old ones. This brings us back to the question started at the close of our former article: Did the new governments, established at the Revolution, do any thing to give any additional character of legality to the institution of slavery?

Let us begin with the commonwealth of Virginia. The convention of delegates and representatives from the several counties and corporations which assumed the responsibility of framing a new government for that state, very properly prefaced their labors by setting forth a Declaration of Rights, as its "basis and foundation." This Declaration of Rights, bearing date June 12, 1776, announced among other things, "that all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Upon "the basis and foundation" of this Declaration of Rights, the convention proceeded to erect a "constitution, or form of government," in which it was provided that the "common law of England," and all statutes of parliament not local in their character, made in aid of the common law prior to the settlement of Virginia, "together with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony *now in force*, so far as the same may consist with the several ordinances, *declarations*, and resolutions of the general convention, shall be considered as in full force until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony." But this provision could give no validity to the colonial acts for the establishment of slavery; in the first place, because those acts,

legally speaking, were not *in force*, and never had been, being void from the beginning, enacted in defiance of great principles of the English law, by which the powers of the colonial assembly were restricted; and in the second place, because they did not and could not consist with that "declaration of the convention," above quoted, laid down by the convention itself as "the basis and foundation" of the new government.

Immediately after the adoption of this constitution, provision was made for revising the laws of Virginia, and a committee was appointed for that purpose; but nothing was done till 1785, when several bills prepared by the committee of revision were sanctioned by the assembly and enacted as laws. It was provided in one of these acts, "that no persons shall henceforth be slaves in this commonwealth, except such as were so on the first day of this present session of assembly, and the descendants of the females of them." This act embodied into the codification of 1792, still remains in force, and through it all legal titles to slave property in Virginia must be traced. But in 1785, there were no persons legally held as slaves in Virginia. The practice on this subject, and the acts of the colonial assembly which countenanced that practice, were contradictory to the law of England, always binding on the colonial assembly, and specially adopted by the revolutionary government as the law of Virginia; and contradictory, also, to those general principles and that declaration of natural rights specially adopted as "the basis and foundation" of the new government.

The convention which framed the constitution of Virginia was far from conferring, or claiming any power to confer, on the assembly any authority to reduce any of the inhabitants of that state to a condition of slavery. The assembly was far from claiming the possession of any such power, or from attempting to add any thing to the legal basis upon which slavery rested prior to the Revolution. It remained then what it had been in colonial times, a mere usurpation, without any legal basis; a usurpation in direct defiance of the Declaration of Rights, upheld by mere force and terror, and the overwhelming power and influence of the masters, without law and against law.

The convention of Maryland, (which upon the breaking out of hostilities with the mother country had displaced the proprietary government,) following in the footsteps of Virginia, adopted, on the 3d of November, 1776, a Declaration of

Rights, the introductory part of a new constitution, in which they declared, "that all government of right originates from the people; is founded in compact only, and is constituted solely for the good of the whole;" and "that the *inhabitants* of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England; to all English statutes applicable to their situation, passed before the settlement of Maryland, and introduced and practised on in the colony; and also to all acts of the old colonial assembly "in force" on the first of June, 1774. But the acts of assembly sanctioning and legalizing slavery were not "in force" on the first of June, 1774, nor at any other time. They never had been in force; they were contrary to the law of England, to a correspondency with which the colonial assembly was specially limited by charter. Yet it is on these void acts that the supposed legality of slavery in Maryland still continues to rest.

The constitution of North Carolina, formed Dec. 17th, 1776, contains not one single word respecting slavery. That institution did not receive even the semblance of support derived in Virginia and Maryland from the continuation in force of the colonial acts; for no act of the colonial assembly of North Carolina had ever attempted to define who were or might be slaves. Nor was any such attempt made by the newly established assembly. Slavery remained in the state of North Carolina what it had been in the colony, — a mere custom, a sheer usurpation, not sustained by even the semblance of law.

Neither the first constitution of South Carolina, adopted in March, 1776, nor the second constitution, adopted March, 1778, contains a single word attempting to legalize slavery, nor even any clause continuing in force the old colonial acts. But in February, 1777, in the interval between the two constitutions, an act of assembly revived and continued in force for five years certain of those acts, among others the act of 1740, on the subject of slavery, of which a synopsis was given in our former article; and in 1783, this act was made perpetual. But the act of 1740 was void from the beginning, by reason of numerous contradictions to the law of England which the colonial assembly of South Carolina had no power to enact into law. If, then, the reviving acts of 1777 and 1783 are to have any validity, they must be considered as original acts, subjecting half the population of South Carolina to perpetual slavery. Had the assembly of South Carolina any authority to pass such acts? Has it any such authority at this mo-

ment? Could the South Carolina democrats, having a majority in the assembly, pass a valid act for selling all the whigs into perpetual slavery? or all inhabitants of Irish descent? or all white men not freeholders and not possessed of visible property? or all citizens of Massachusetts who might land on her hospitable coast?

We must always remember, in considering questions of this sort, that not the Federal government only, but the state governments, also, are governments of limited powers. The sovereign power is in the people, or that portion of it possessed of political rights; the holders of offices created by the state constitutions possess no authority not specially conferred upon them by those constitutions. Admit, for the sake of the argument, that the sovereign people of South Carolina are omnipotent, and can give the character of law to the most atrocious wrongs; yet, surely, no state legislature can exercise any such authority, unless it be expressly delegated. But the constitutions of South Carolina delegated no such power; and a power in a state legislature, to reduce at its pleasure, to the condition of perpetual servitude, any portion of the inhabitants of a state, and that not for public but for private uses, is hardly to be presumed as one of the ordinary powers of legislation, at least in a state which, in the solemn act of separation from the mother country, had united in declaring that all men are born free and equal, and that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights.

The first constitution of Georgia, formed in February, 1777, contains no allusion to slavery. The legislative power of the assembly is restricted to "such laws and regulations as may be conducive to the good order and well-being of the state." Unsupported by any new authority, the system of slavery was left in Georgia as in the other states, to rest on such legal basis as it might have had during colonial times. The rottenness of that basis was not perceived by the state legislatures or the state courts. Their preconceived prejudices, their unwillingness to look into the matter at all, kept them blind to it; but their blindness, their ignorance, their mistakes, could not alter the law, or make that legal which in fact was not so.

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that the natural freedom and equality of all men, acknowledged in the Bill of Rights prefixed to the constitution adopted in that state in 1780, was totally inconsistent with the existence of involuntary

servitude, and that slavery under that Bill of Rights could not be legal. A similar clause in the second constitution of New Hampshire was held to guarantee personal freedom to all persons born in that state after the adoption of that constitution. In Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, personal liberty was secured by statute to all future natives of these states; and, to complete this scheme of abolition in these three states, as well as in New Hampshire, the further introduction of persons claimed as slaves, or the exportation of such persons from those states, was prohibited.

In five of the eight remaining states, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, slavery was regarded by the most intelligent and enlightened of the citizens, and by all those distinguished men who had taken a conspicuous part in the late Revolution, as an evil and a wrong inconsistent with the principles on which that Revolution was founded. Its termination was anxiously looked for and confidently hoped. All those five states had taken the first step in that direction by prohibiting the further introduction of persons claimed as slaves; while Virginia and Maryland, by repealing the old colonial acts which forbade manumissions except by the allowance of the governor and council, had opened a door for the action of individual sentiment in favor of liberty, which came soon into active exercise.

Such was the state of things in the ten northern states, when the Federal convention came together. While that convention was still sitting, the famous ordinance of 1787 was passed by the Congress of the confederation, by which involuntary servitude, except for crime, was for ever prohibited in the territory northwest of the Ohio, the only territory to which at that time the confederacy had a joint title.

Yet this rising sentiment in favor of impartial liberty encountered a formidable opposition. The abolition had been carried, indeed, in five of the states, but in only one of those five had it been thorough, sweeping, and complete. Four had provided for the future, but had not thought it expedient to interfere with the present. In five other states, a commencement only had been made. The mass of the slave-holders in those five states clung with tenacity to their prey, and the friends of emancipation, though their influence was apparent, did not yet venture to propose any very decisive measures. In the Carolinas and Georgia the case was much worse. The Quakers of North Carolina had indeed commenced the emanci-

pation of their slaves, but the assembly of that state put a stop to that "dangerous practice," by forbidding emancipations, except by allowance of the county courts. Since the peace, the importation of slaves from the coast of Africa into the three southern states, had been recommenced, and was vigorously carried on. There was no thought in those states of foregoing a system from which great gains were hoped.

Let it be remembered, however, — and this consideration, though frequently overlooked or disregarded, is absolutely essential to a correct understanding of the case, — that the Federal convention did not assemble to revise the laws or institutions of the states, nor to determine or enforce the political or social rights appertaining to the inhabitants of the states, as such. That had been done already by the state constitutions. The states existed as bodies politic; they had their laws defining the rights of their citizens and inhabitants; and their courts for enforcing those rights; and with none of those arrangements, either by way of enforcement or alteration, was it any part of the business of the Federal convention to interfere, unless in cases where these arrangements had or might have an injurious bearing upon the citizens of other states, or upon the foreign relations of the confederacy. The business of the Federal convention was, so to amend the articles of confederation as to carry into effect the objects at which that confederation aimed; namely, the enabling the states to act as one nation in their foreign affairs; and securing the several states and their individual inhabitants against injustice, oppression, or injury, on the part of other states or their individual inhabitants.

It might indeed become necessary, for the accomplishment of these objects, to interfere to some extent with some of the existing laws and institutions of the states, or at least to reserve to the authorities to be created by the new constitution, the power of doing so; and under the plan adopted, of submitting that constitution to be separately ratified by each of the states, any alterations so made or authorized would rest on the same basis of popular consent with the state constitutions themselves. But this interference with state constitutions or state laws, any interference in any shape with the internal affairs of the states, was a power to be very daintily exercised, especially in its application to particular cases; otherwise, any constitution which the convention might form, would be sure of being rejected by the states.

It was from this view of the case that the convention omitted to prefix to the Federal constitution any general Bill of Rights; — an omission much complained of by those who opposed its adoption. It was not in their character as individuals about to enter into a primary political organization, but in their character as inhabitants of certain states already constituted and organized, that the Federal constitution had to do with the people of America. Their rights as inhabitants of each particular state, it belonged to the state governments to settle: the Federal constitution had only to declare what should be their additional and supplementary rights as citizens and inhabitants of the confederacy.

Under this view of the subject, slavery in the states was a matter with which the convention was not called upon directly to interfere, and which, indeed, could not be directly interfered with, without exposing the proposed constitution to certain rejection. It did, however, come before the convention incidentally; and the question which we now have to consider is, Whether, in dealing with it thus incidentally, the Federal constitution has acknowledged the *legal* existence of slavery, in any of the states, so as to bind the confederacy, and to impart to that institution in the states, that legal character which the laws of the states themselves have failed to give to it.

The article in the Federal constitution principally relied upon by those who maintain the affirmative on this point, is that which determines the ratio of representation in the House of Representatives. That article is frequently spoken of as though it were the great compromise; the fundamental concession upon which the constitution was based. This was not so. The great difficulty that occurred at the outset was, to reconcile the pretensions of the larger and the smaller states. The smaller states insisted upon that political equality which they already possessed under the articles of confederation; the larger states maintained, that representation in the national legislature ought to be based on "wealth and numbers." The larger states having carried a resolution to that effect, as to both branches of the legislature, the smaller states threatened to quit the convention; and this result was only prevented by a concession recommended by a committee of one from each state, to whom the subject was referred, which was finally adopted by the convention, yielding to the small states an equal representation in one branch

of the national legislature. This was the great compromise, — the particular ratio of representation to be adopted in the other branch was quite a subordinate matter. Yet though subordinate, it was interesting and important. The subject of the distribution of representatives in the first Congress, after being referred to two committees, whose reports were based on a conjectural estimate of wealth and numbers, was finally arranged by the convention. The regulation of the future representation was a more difficult matter. One party, headed by Gouverneur Morris, wished to leave it entirely to the discretion of Congress, with the avowed object of enabling the existing states to retain a political ascendency over such new states as might be admitted into the Union. But this was objected to as unjust, and it became necessary to fix upon some precise rule of distribution. That distribution was to be regulated by "wealth and numbers;" as to this there was a general agreement. Numbers might easily be ascertained by a census: but how was wealth to be measured?

This was a point upon which, under the existing confederation, difficulties had already occurred. In framing the articles of confederation, it had been proposed to distribute the charges of the war, and other common expenses, among the states, in proportion to their population; on the ground that population, on the whole, was the best practicable test of wealth and ability to pay taxes. But the southern states had strongly objected to this arrangement, on the ground that the labor of their slaves was far less productive than the labor of the same number of northern freemen; and the value of buildings and cultivated lands, to be ascertained by an appraisement made by the authorities of each state, was finally adopted as the basis of taxation and pecuniary liability. Bu such an appraisement was found liable to great difficulties, expenses, delays, and objections; very few states had made it; and Congress, since the peace, had proposed to amend the articles of confederation, by substituting for it "the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not taxed." This proposed amendment, to which eleven states had already acceded, had only been agreed on in Congress after a good deal of higgling between the northern and southern members as to the relative productiveness

of free and slave labor. That question was now revived in the convention, and the same compromise was suggested there, which the Continental Congress had already proposed as the basis of taxation. Having first agreed that representation and direct taxation should go together, it was finally arranged, and so it now stands in the Federal constitution, that the number of representatives from each state shall be determined, "by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, *three fifths of all other persons.*"

The question is, whether the use of the phrase *three fifths of all other persons*, recognizes the validity of the slave laws of any particular state, and affords a sufficient basis for those laws to stand upon, notwithstanding their original defects already pointed out? The first thing to be observed is, that the validity of those laws was not of the least consequence in settling the point under consideration, to wit, the productiveness of the industry of the several states. Whether the negroes of Virginia, for instance, were held in slavery by law or against law, made in this point of view no difference at all. Suppose, for example, (as we hold,) that they were illegally deprived of their liberty; the illegality of their servitude would not increase their industry, or the wealth of the state, so as to entitle her whole population to be counted, in determining her representation. What the constitution had to deal with, in settling this distribution of representation, was a question of external fact, not a question of law or right. The question of the individual rights of the inhabitants of the states was one over which this article required the assumption of no control. Their condition in fact, not their condition in law, was the real point according to which the distribution was to be regulated.

Even in referring to the matter of fact great caution was used. "The question of slavery in the states," said Gerry, in reference to another point to be presently considered, "ought not to be touched, but we ought to be careful not to give it any sanction." Madison thought it wrong to admit into the constitution "the idea that there could be property in men"; — and the whole phraseology of the instrument was carefully settled in accordance with this view.

It is fair enough to conclude that the "other persons," referred to in this article, were those held as slaves in the

several states. But the constitution takes care not to commit itself by calling them slaves, or by using any term that would seem to pass a judgment on the legal character or particular legal incidents of their condition. That remains what it was; this article does not affect it in any way; and if the laws of the states fail, as we maintain, to give any legal authority to those who claim to be masters, surely they will look for it in vain in this article of the Federal constitution.

When the Federal convention, in the course of its labors, arrived at the clauses investing Congress with the power to regulate navigation and foreign commerce, a new occasion for compromise arose. Ten states out of the thirteen had already prohibited the importation of slaves from abroad, and if the Federal government were invested with unlimited control over the intercourse with foreign countries, it was plain enough that one of its first acts would be the prohibition of the African slave-trade.

For this, Georgia and the Carolinas were not prepared; and the opinion was very warmly and confidently expressed by the delegates of those states, that such an unlimited power conferred upon Congress, would insure in those states the rejection of the constitution. To avoid this result, a provision was inserted, "that the emigration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress, prior to the year 1808; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."

We observe in this clause the same cautious phraseology as in that which we have already discussed. As to the legal character or condition of the persons so to be admitted, nothing whatever is said. There is not the slightest implication that the constitution assented in any way that any of the persons so introduced into the states should be held in a state of slavery. If that was done, it could only be on the responsibility of those who did it, and of the states that allowed it. The constitution did not assent to it, and by the power which it reserved to itself, — all the power which was possible under the circumstances, — it secured the right, after the lapse of twenty years, of preventing the possibility of such an occurrence. But for this right thus reserved to the Federal government, there is every reason to believe that in all the states south of Virginia the foreign slave-trade would be now

vigorously prosecuted. The concession made to Georgia and the Carolinas was temporary and limited; the point carried was of a permanent character.

There still remains one other clause of the constitution, relied upon as sanctioning slavery in the states. "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." It may be worth while to mention in this connection, that in the original draft of the apportionment clause, the phrase "bound to servitude" was used, following in this respect the proposed amendment to the articles of confederation from which the idea of the federal ratio was derived. But "servitude" was struck out, and "service" substituted, as Madison informs us, because "servitude" seemed to be only appropriate to express the condition of slavery. Yet in the article now under consideration, the term "service" is employed; — "no person held to service or labor." But without dwelling on this distinction, it is sufficient for our purpose to refer to the pointed difference between this and the apportionment clause, in the express reference which this clause makes to law. Practice, usage, fact merely, is not sufficient, but law is required. "No person held to service or labor in one state, *under the laws thereof*," &c. The question, then, whether this clause stipulates for the return of fugitive slaves, is entirely dependent on the previous question whether there is any lawful slavery in any of the states; — a question upon which this clause expresses no opinion, and throws not the slightest light whatever. If there is any such slavery, it must exist by virtue of state laws, laws complete and authoritative in themselves; for whatever might have been the intention, or whatever the legal effect of this clause, it neither intended to give, nor has it any effect to give, a legal or rightful character to claims of service not previously rightful and legal.

The three clauses of the Federal constitution above considered, are the only portions of that instrument whch have ever been set up as giving any sanction to the slave system of the states. So far from finding in these clauses any such sanction, we find, on the contrary, evidence of a fixed determination in the constitution not to yield it. They contain

no endorsement of the slave laws of the states, no recognition even of slavery as a state institution, entitled to the favorable regard of the Federal government. General Pinckney of South Carolina, in the course of the debates of the convention, more than once insisted on some such guaranty for slave property; but, so far from yielding to this demand, the greatest care was taken not to admit into the constitution the idea that there could be property in men; that is to say, the very fundamental idea upon which the whole slave system rests. It was impossible for the Federal constitution, by its own proper vigor, to abolish slavery, or to make its abolition one of the conditions of the federal compact; for on such conditions no constitution could be formed; but on the other hand, the greatest care was taken not to give any sanction to a practice or a principle so inconsistent with those natural rights upon which all the American constitutions professed to be founded.

This view of the Federal constitution corresponds very nearly with the view taken of it, both north and south, for many years subsequent to its adoption. It is only within a very recent period that the idea has been set up, that the "compromises of the constitution" include the recognition of slavery as an institution of the states, or some of them, entitled to protection and support. Not only does the Federal constitution, so far from recognizing slavery in that character, take the greatest pains to avoid doing so; but in point of fact, as we maintain, slavery is not even a state institution, legally speaking, but a mere usurpation, unsupported by law, and in that character certainly not entitled to support or countenance from the Federal government, or any other.

But, if the Federal constitution, though cautiously avoiding to commit the union to the support of slavery, has yet left the determination of the rights of the inhabitants of the states to the state authorities; even allowing that slavery exists by usurpation and not by law, — has the Federal government any warrant to interfere, in any way, to set this matter right? Is it not bound to wait patiently till the state authorities shall themselves do it?

Besides the specific and particular powers conferred upon Congress by the Federal constitution, that body, by a clause of a very extensive and comprehensive character, is authorized "to provide for the common defence and general wel-

fare of the United States." Now suppose the opinion to be adopted by the majority of the people, that the "common defence and general welfare of the United States," their defence against invasion from abroad, and insurrection at home; their welfare, moral, social, and economical, demand the termination of the system of slavery; — and in this point of view, it seems to matter but little, whether we consider that system an illegal usurpation, or a legal institution of those states in which it exists; — suppose the conclusion to be arrived at, that the continued existence of slavery, whether legal or not, will be fatal to the success of that great democratic experiment, which the American people are now making; — looking at the matter in this point of view, has not the Federal government a right to interfere, and to adopt such measures as seem best calculated to stop the increase of this evil, and to bring it to an end? If, under the clause above cited, Congress had power to buy Louisiana, to buy Florida, to annex Texas, to buy California, has it not power, under the same clause, to vote money and take other needful steps towards the liberation of some millions of native-born inhabitants from most cruel servitude?

It is true, that heretofore Congress has not legislated with this intention. It is also true, that, on a petition signed by Franklin and others, and presented to the first Congress, praying that body to take measures for the abolition of slavery, the conclusion was arrived at after a warm debate, that Congress had no jurisdiction over the subject of slavery within the states. But this decision, binding only on the Congress that made it, though very generally acquiesced in since, still remains open to revision; and a change of circumstances, changing the light in which the question presents itself, cannot fail to have a serious influence on the decision to be made upon it.

When the first Congress met, slavery was a crime and disgrace in which the whole of Christendom was more or less involved; and in the wars which the nations of Europe carried on with each other, their practices in this matter were mutually respected. When France, England, Spain, and Holland invaded each other's colonies, they never thought of putting arms into the hands of the slaves. Early in our Revolutionary war, some suggestion was thrown out in the British House of Commons, that the slaves in the southern states might be liberated, armed, and employed to keep those colonies in subjection; but the opposition, headed by Burke and Fox, denounced

the idea as barbarous, atrocious, and infamous, and the suggestion, never seriously entertained, remained unacted upon. Mason of Virginia feelingly acknowledged in the Federal convention, that if the British had availed themselves, as they might have done, of the aid of the negroes, the war in the southern states might have had a very different termination.

During the last war with England, a plan, it is said, was formed, for occupying the peninsula between the Chesapeake and the Delaware with a British army, turning it into an asylum for the slaves of Virginia and Maryland, to whom liberty was to be proclaimed; organizing and training a black army, under English officers, and marching with it to the conquest of the South. But Britain had slaves of her own; it would not do to set an example of insurrection and of liberty won at the point of the bayonet; and this brilliant scheme was consequently abandoned. Had it been energetically undertaken, something more might have happened than the burning of the Capitol.

Since that period, opinions have greatly changed. England has abolished slavery throughout her wide-spread dominions. France has but a very slight interest in it, and is seeking to get rid of that.* All Christendom cries out against it. Should we become involved in war with France or England, especially with England, — and war with England is one of the commonplaces of our politics, — no matter what the cause or origin of the war, a proclamation of freedom to the enslaved would sanctify it in the eyes of the world. It would become the cause of humanity against despotism; — a despotism the more hateful from its attempt to cloak itself with the name of democracy, and from its audacious efforts to trample out the doctrine of the rights of man, in the community in which that doctrine was first proclaimed as the basis of political organization. The enemy would strike us in our vital parts, and Christendom would honor and applaud the blow. Under these circumstances, will not due regard to the "common defence" justify Congress in adopting a course of legislative policy, such as may narrow, limit, restrict, and tend to the extinction of a source of weakness, which no provision of forts and steam-frigates can guard against?

The "welfare of the United States," their internal well-be-

* Has already abolished it, or seems likely to, while these sheets are passing through the press. — Ed.

ing, apart from any dangers from without, and more especially the welfare of the slave states themselves — seems to call still louder for Congressional interference. The perception of the evils of slavery has, till recently, been confined to an enlightened and reflecting few, — a class of persons more inclined to think than to act, and disabled, by the smallness of their number, from any effectual political action. But sensibility to those evils, especially to the obstacles which the existence of slavery opposes to the further extension of the principles of equality and justice, even in their application to the free, — thanks to the efforts and labors of those known as *abolitionists*, — is now beginning to penetrate the mass; to find representatives and an expression in the legislatures of the free states, and even in Congress. When a majority in Congress come to be thoroughly impregnated with these ideas; when they come to look upon slavery, not merely as an evil, a calamity, a thing to be lamented and regretted, but as a fatal obstacle to the progress of our free institutions, a consuming cancer eating into the heart of our liberties, and threatening the extinction of those principles upon which our constitutions are founded; — perceiving that the "welfare of the United States" is seriously compromised, — can they hesitate to come to the rescue? Will they not feel themselves called upon, not alone by humanity, by patriotism, but by the very letter of the constitution itself, to come to the rescue?

It is not to be supposed that such a feeling can become predominant in Congress, without penetrating also, to a greater or less extent, into the slave states themselves. But the evil of slavery is so immense, and in most of our slave states it has become so firmly rooted, — swallowing up, as it were, the state and the church, and enlisting in its support the wealth, the talent, the intelligence, the education, the ignorance, the prejudices, and the passions of the people, — that to wait for those states to take the leadership in the abolition movement, would be absurd. The effects of such waiting have been long since manifest. The abolition of slavery in Maryland and Virginia, so confidently expected and so devoutly wished for by Henry, Washington, Jefferson, Mason, Madison, has not taken place. The slave-holders of those states have, on the contrary, added to the injustice of slave-holding, the cruelty and turpitude of slave-breeding and slave-exporting; and in diffusing this evil over the new regions of the southwest, they have found new inducements for continuing it among them-

selves. For the purpose of extending this slave market, they do not hesitate to involve the Union in disgraceful wars of conquest. Texas they have seized already; California is in their gripe; and the annexation of Cuba is already suggested, — to which Virginia might serve as a new Africa, the slave-trade to that coast having been mainly cut off by the vigilance of the English cruisers. This let-alone policy, this waiting for the parties most immediately interested, to take the lead, came near proving fatal even to Congress itself. The right of petition, even freedom of debate, seemed about to be extinguished in that body. The Federal government put itself forward as the champion and defender of slavery; the antagonist, on this point, of all Christendom. What a change was evident, even on the question of the African slave-trade! The Federal government, which had once itself proposed a mutual right of search on the coast of Africa, exerted all its efforts, and not without success, to defeat a treaty of that sort, into which Britain had induced the great powers of Europe to enter. The thraldom, thank God, into which Congress was fast sinking, has, by the noble efforts of a few noble men, at last been partially shaken off. The attention of the people has been aroused to the question, — shall the Federal government be a slave-holding or an anti-slave-holding government? Experience seems to show that any middle ground, practically speaking, is out of the question. If the Federal government is not the one, it must be the other.

But supposing the Federal government to have power, to have a constitutional right to act in this matter, how is it to act? Shall Congress employ force? Shall a law be passed declaring the right of the southern negroes to freedom, and an army be marched into the southern states to enforce that law? Such rude and violent methods of effecting political changes, correspond neither to the principles of our institutions, nor to the enlightened philosophy of the present age. It is not the office of the Federal government to abolish slavery by a mere act of its own authority imposed upon the slave-holding states, — an act which might justly be denounced as arbitrary, and which the whole white population of the South would unite to resist. Great evils are not thus to be got rid of by a single blow. To be effectually and peacefully abolished, slavery must be abolished by the legislatures of the slave states themselves. There exist in all the slave states

ample materials for a party ready to undertake that great and illustrious task. Some moving of the dry bones has been of late discernible; but for the most part, the anti-slavery party of the South, strong, morally and intellectually, and by no means contemptible in point of numbers, lies at this moment prostrate, completely paralyzed by terror, and prevented by terror from any movement or organization; held down in as pitiable a state of fear and helplessness as can well be imagined. The great excitement of 1834 — the alarm then raised among the slave-holders by the symptoms of an anti-slavery movement at the North — caused the extemporaneous introduction into the southern states of a suppressive system — based apparently on the Spanish inquisition, — but with the democratic improvements of turning every slave-holder into an inquisitor; and the miserable uneducated mob of the southern villages and hamlets, into spies and officers; the proceedings, without any troublesome or tedious formalities, being regulated by the code of Lynch-law, the same parties acting in the four-fold capacity of accusers, witnesses, judges, and executioners. That same despotic spirit, which without law and against law, holds the slaves in subjection, does not hesitate a moment to set aside all the most sacred principles of law, for the sake of speedy vengeance upon those inclined in any way to question its authority.

Yet it is to this down-trodden party, this humbled and silenced party, this party existing, indeed, as yet only in embryo, without organization or self-consciousness, these southern anti-slavery men, that we must look for the abolition of slavery. The spirit of despotism must be encountered in the slave states themselves, by a power potent enough to awe it down and keep it under; and this power can only be a mass of citizens combined together, acting in concert, and having such weight of social and especially of political influence, that it shall become necessary to respect their feelings, their opinions, and their rights. Such a combination must be formed in all the slave states, before the first effectual steps can be taken, we do not say towards the abolition of slavery, merely, but even towards the enforcement of the rights of those nominally free; those great rights of free discussion and a free press, which no despotism or would-be despotism willingly tolerates.

Congress, however, or the friends of freedom in Congress, are not to wait till such a party rises up. It is their business

to help it up, to reach out a hand to it, on every possible occasion. Could the immense patronage of the Federal government once be directed to that point, we may judge of the result likely to follow, by the effect which that same patronage has produced at the North, in a counter direction. It is by calling upon the Federal government, on every possible occasion that occurs, or can be made to occur, to abjure all responsibility for slavery, and all countenance of it; it is by finding and making perpetual occasions to point out the evils of slavery in particular instances, its incompatibility with the "general welfare," and the obstacles which it opposes to the "common defence;" — it is by imitating the example of steadfast old Cato, and repeating at every opportunity, in season and out of season, — "I think also that slavery ought to be abolished;" — such are the means by which even a very few members of Congress may effect great things, not indeed by way of direct legislation, — for direct legislation constitutes after all but a small part of the influence which Congress exerts, — but by keeping this subject constantly before the public mind, enabling and compelling the slave-holders to see what they have hitherto so obstinately shut their eyes to; — and what is of more importance yet, giving the non-slave-holding freemen of the South an opportunity to see what the slave-holders hitherto have so dexterously kept out of their sight.

Just in proportion as the anti-slavery party increases in Congress, just in proportion as that body shall evince symptoms of a settled, firm, and steady opposition to slavery, just in the same proportion will the southern anti-slavery men be encouraged to confess themselves; first to themselves, then to one another, and then to the world. It is only through the medium of Congress, and the Federal government, that the anti-slavery sentiment of the North can be brought into any active coöperation with the anti-slavery sentiment of the South; and surely, until northern representatives of non-slave-holding constituencies can stand up on the floor of Congress and boldly speak their minds upon the subject, and secure a hearing too, it is quite too much to expect any such boldness or any such hearing in the legislature of any slave-holding state.

It needs, as we believe, only this free discussion, to show that even the technical legality behind which slavery claims to entrench itself, cannot be maintained. This point has

hitherto been conceded to the slave-holders, hastily, without examination, and, as we believe, without reason. The fact seems to be, that although the people of the southern states were willing to allow slavery to continue among them as a matter of fact, they left its legality to rest upon the enactments and practice of the colonial times, without undertaking by any fundamental act of sovereignty on their part to confer any new or additional legality upon it. The legality of slavery rests, then, upon a colonial usage, — a usage not only unsustained by the English law, but in several most important points, directly contradictory to it; a usage totally incapable of furnishing any legal foundation for any claim of right; a usage upon which neither the state constitutions nor the Federal constitution undertake to confer a legal character.

Art. II. — SWEDENBORG AS A THEOLOGIAN.

We cannot hope in the compass of this article to do justice to the various claims which the writings of Swedenborg prefer to the respect of the religious and philosophic mind. We shall, indeed, attempt nothing more than a statement of their leading theological import.

In entering upon a brief survey of Swedenborg's theology, it will be advisable to consider for a moment his claim to a peculiar spiritual illumination. In the first place, this illumination differs very signally from the phenomena of Animal Magnetism, in that it involved no dishonor to his senses. In what is called clairvoyance, the subject is obliged, as a first requisite, to become insensible to the material world. He is in fact reduced to a condition very nearly approaching the death of the body, before the spiritual consciousness is able to unfold itself.

With Swedenborg, however, the case was otherwise. His illumination involved no denial of the sensuous life. His senses maintained their unobstructed action, although he consciously transcended their sphere, and became the familiar denizen of scenes which they were all too gross to apprehend. In short his illumination was a *rational* illumination, disclosing to him the *reason* of things. He saw the organic forms of the

mental sphere, because he had acknowledged, as no man before him, the only organising principle to be Use, or Beneficence. It is this which gives his writings all their worth to the theologian or philosopher,—that he reports principles and not facts, or rather that his facts are all principles. He describes the Heavens and the Hells, or the things pertaining to either state, not as ultimate facts or interesting on their own account, but as constituting by their correlative existence the indispensable basis of human individuality, and thus of the divine manifestation in nature. He describes them as the necessary means to a divine and eternal end, which is the communication of Divine Life to the creature; an end which, when truly apprehended or viewed in its fulfilment, stamps the means, also, with ineffable divinity. For the grand reason, he says, of all experience, the essential cause of all the causes and effects in the universe, is the divine *Humanity*, or the fact, that God is a man, not figuratively, but really and actually, or spiritually and naturally; that is, as being the original and fountain of every truly human relation.

Now, however we may judge of the sufficiency of this reason, or cause, for the effects witnessed in nature, at all events, we cannot deny that here is an attempt to construct a universal theology, or philosophy. And this pretension, in the second place, separates Swedenborg *toto cælo*, as to the claim of illumination, from the whole race of seers and fanatics. These persons have always some private mission; they are always endowed with some personal authority over others, and degrade the Deity from an equal providence over all his creatures into the special benefactor of a select few. But Swedenborg claimed no authority of any sort over men's opinions or actions. He simply claimed to have his understanding or spiritual sight opened to the apprehension of the universe of causes; and this with a view to the explication of certain effects then becoming visible in society, and of the highest possible import to Christian nations. He refrained from all vulgar notoriety; never spoke of his pretensions except when appealed to by an enlightened curiosity; and published all his books in a learned language, as if purposely to bar their extensive recognition, at all events, during his life. So far was he from originating, or dreaming of originating, a new sect, that he treated the established institutions of worship with unvarying respect; and in order to do so with the greater emphasis,

sent for a minister of the Swedish church in London, to receive the sacrament at his hands *in articulo mortis*.

We look upon Swedenborg's illumination, then, as an orderly enlargement of his understanding in spiritual things, growing, doubtless, out of a life of singular virtue, but for that very reason bearing a very encouraging instead of an insulting aspect towards the rest of the race. Any illumination which does not attain this height and claim this basis, makes a very ineffectual appeal to our respect or attention. In this point of view we not only do not deny to Swedenborg's illumination its special providential use and significance, but are disposed, on the contrary, to attribute consequences of incalculable benignity to it, in the future history of humanity upon the earth.

The great declaration of Swedenborg is this: that a New Church is establishing itself on the earth, which shall prove the fulfilment of all divine promise and all human hope. As was natural at the epoch when he wrote, his chief aim was to justify this annunciation by a searching criticism of the evils and falsities of the current Christian life, rather than very clearly to indicate the points of difference which should characterize the new economy. We presume he had himself no adequate foresight of the features of natural order, as they are yet to disclose themselves. Indeed, in a very explicit passage of his latest work, (*True Christian Religion*, n. 123,) he disclaims a sufficient comprehension of this subject, and refers the curiosity of his reader for satisfaction to some possible future performance. But we are at no loss to understand what he meant by a New Church. Whenever in his survey of the past he describes the rise of a New Church, he describes it as the development of a new mind in man. Thus the earliest church — comprising the fœtal or paradisiacal condition of humanity — he declares to have been celestial; that is to say, the ruling principle in that state was the love of God, or, of unlimited Goodness. To this elevated beginning succeeded a church of an inferior character, as the intellect is inferior to the affections, — in which the love of God sank into the love of the neighbour, or of limited Goodness. The selfhood had now become well pronounced in men, producing differences of character among them, and consequently giving rise to the hitherto undeveloped play of personal sympathies and antipathies. Viewed in itself, however, this was still an elevated phase of spiritual life. Whilst the influence of the earlier dispensation lasted; whilst the love of God, or the sentiment of

justice, remained unextinct in it, these personal relations were preserved pure and unselfish, and were a blessing and ornament to the earth. But the mind of man tended ever to more external states, until at length the original love of the human bosom dwindled from its universality of scope in the love of mankind, through the love of the neighbour, into the love of self.

This, according to Swedenborg, was the end of the spiritual dispensation, being symbolized in Scripture under the figure of the building of the tower of Babel, which signifies the preposterous attempt on man's part to deify himself, or to place the acceptable worship of God in self-love. Internal worship, which is charity, or love of the neighbour, had now perished, and an external worship, generated of the love of self, and therefore idolatrous, took its place.

But let no one imagine that the divine design towards man was now disconcerted; rather let him acknowledge that this apparent declension of the human mind was in truth in the strictest keeping with its fulfilment. For man, says Swedenborg, was created to love himself as well as his neighbour and the Lord; only this love should be strictly subordinated to the others; that is to say, he should not so love himself as to violate Truth and Goodness. But of course it was impossible that this subordination of self-love should be attained so long as the Divine remained unrevealed in the laws of natural order. And the spiritual world, consequently, must have been in the condition described by Swedenborg; namely, a mixed or disorderly condition, arising from the yet unreconciled extremes of the love of God and the love of self; and hence have offered a very inadequate medium for the Divine influx into nature. Meanwhile, until a new mind in man were formed by the reconciliation of these extremes, and divine worship placed upon a new and indestructible basis, that worship must reflect its temporary disability, and sink from a living reality into a mere representation of future realities. Thus, according to Swedenborg, all that long stage of human history comprised between the Abrahamic period and the middle of the last century, was merely a transition process introductory to "the new heavens and earth," or the new internal and external Man who is to constitute the true and universal church. The Jewish economy he declares to have been purely representative of that living worship which is about to supervene upon the earth. Jerusalem itself was but a type of the true divine

polity which is now descending to sanctify the natural life of man. And the Christian church, in its internal character, had as little claim to the name of a positive church, since the temper of mind predominant in it as well as the Jewish church, avouched the still undiminished hostility of self-love and universal love. For although the Christian church confessed the divine incarnation, it ascribed a meaning to it which greatly vitiated its healing influence upon the human mind. Instead of perceiving in the experience of the divine man the actual unition of self-love with universal love, by means of the orderly subjection of evil to good, or the hells to the heavens, in the spiritual sphere, and the consequent fusion of these hitherto warring extremes in the promotion of a new and infinite good, which is Art, or Social Use; the Christian church has represented that experience as designed purely to aggravate the old hostility of good and evil, and thus fixed upon the Creator the stigma of an eternally impotent relation towards one half of his creatures.

Swedenborg, however, pointedly affirms, that the Christian church in its sublimely prophetic rites of Baptism and the Supper, has always evinced an external correspondence with heaven, inasmuch as all heavenly good is comprised in the things which these rites symbolize; namely, the shunning of our natural evils, and the imbibition of good and truth from the Lord. These rites, in proclaiming the truth of the Divine Humanity, set forth also the essential constitution of the new heaven in man. The social, or distinctively human principle, is the unity of self-love and universal love. It is the marriage of these two extremes, the point in which they become united. Universal love alone, or self-love alone, would alike defeat society; the one because it would render its subject indifferent to any special fellowship, the other because it would render him averse to all fellowship. Thus the existence of society implies both the heavens and the hells, or the extremes of self-love and of universal love; while its maturity or perfection implies their actual union in all the varied forms of art or productive wealth. So long as this union remains unactualized in a divine society, or church upon the earth, so long, of course, the earthly society, as Swedenborg shows, must possess only a ritual sanctity, a sanctity confined to its representative ordinances. But when this union has begun to be actualized in nature, as, for example, in the unprecedented progress the last century has shown in all the sciences and arts of life, then this mere ritual sancti-

ty loses its hold upon men's esteem, and gives place to the deeper, because positive, sanctity of Art, or productive use.

These remarks will have prepared the reader for the recognition of the distinctive genius of the new and universal church. Swedenborg does not so much explicitly declare this, as supply us with data for our own independent conclusions on the subject. If we accept his pregnant dogma, that the church is a man, and therefore, like every thing human, involves a social development, we can be at no loss from the data of the distinctive genius of the two earlier churches to infer the relative character of the third and final church. If we take man as the analogon, we shall have the "most ancient church" answering to the sphere of love or the affections; the "ancient church" answering to the intellectual sphere, and the "new" or coming church to the practical sphere, or the plane of the activity. If we take universal order as our analogon, we shall have the first church celestial, the second spiritual, the third natural. Thus we have an inexpressibly fertile augury of the developments of the coming church. For as affection and thought are impotent without action; as the head and chest are worthless without the abdomen and extremities, so the natural is the seat of power to the celestial and spiritual, and the coming church which corresponds to it, therefore, and which is the crown and complement of the two bygone churches, is destined to *actualize* whatsoever they *realize* of divine good and truth. It will be to them an every way worthy *body*, while they to it are a soul and intellect. Whatsoever depths of disinterested love, whatsoever splendors of intellectual intuition, have failed of adequate natural ultimation in the past, are the infallible heritage of the coming church, which will reproduce them in scientific and permanent forms, and so achieve the utter extinction of evil and falsity from the earth. For the human mind craves science as the human body craves food; and the church, therefore, which boasts a scientific basis, claims an empire not less universal nor less indestructible than the human mind itself.

The bare assertion of a *natural* church, even though it be proved to be a *divinely* natural one, is sure to beget much honest misconception. Nature is so totally without a doctrine to most minds, and is so exquisite an evil to renowned philosophies and theologies, that it requires the support of a very enlightened conscience to give it respectful mention, or postulate for it a really divine destiny. But it is time these mists of

ignorance were dispersed, and we know of nothing so effectual to this end as the free diffusion of that great truth which underlies all Swedenborg's disclosures; namely, the actual *humanity* of God.

We cannot hope to do any thing like justice to this great truth in our confined space, and would rather refer the reader at once to Swedenborg himself, in whom he will find mines of still unsunned gold soliciting his exploration. And our diffidence is not diminished by the fact that the theme has as yet attracted so little attention. So far as we are aware, none of the professed disciples of Swedenborg, with the exception of Mr. Charles Augustus Tulk, has attempted a rational reproduction of his theology. They have repeated it in every form of fragmentary and wearisome repetition, but have never essayed to give it a unitary and harmonic reproduction. Mr. Tulk has attempted its elucidation on the basis of the Idealistic philosophy. But while we admit the scholastic merits of his attempt, and recognize in its rounded flow the impress of his own beautiful mind, we cannot but feel that it proceeds upon a very partial induction, and utterly fails to represent the grandly affirmative nature of the system it would unfold.

Let us, however, attempt a brief illustration of this doctrine according to our own light. We shall be abundantly satisfied, if, failing ourselves to give a successful exposition of it, we yet succeed in attracting the curiosity of abler minds towards it.

It will be admitted by all reflective persons, that no man is *positively* or absolutely differenced from another man, by virtue of his nature, or what is the same thing, by virtue of his connection with the race, because this very nature, or connection, being what is common to all men, must entail upon all a uniform development, and thus defeat the possibility of positive differences.

To explain the fact, then, of moral distinctions among men, we must consider man as related to something besides the natural life, or the life which flows from his connection with the race; we must consider him as related, also, to some *higher* life. But the only conceivable life higher than man's, is the divine life. To attain, then, the ground of moral differences among men, we must consider man as related also to the divine life.

But the divine life, considered in itself, considered absolutely, ignores all distinction of good and evil. The differ-

ences which separate one man from another, to our sight, sink into nothing in approaching God. Nothing can be either good or evil to Him, considered absolutely, because all things alike come from Him, and are therefore alike to Him. He is the same always, and His operation, consequently, is uniform.

Thus both the Divine and the Human natures, regarded in themselves, regarded as distinct one from the other, refuse to explain the actual differences which exist among men.

Our only resource, consequently, unless we deny the existence of these differences, is to accept the truth of Christianity, which affirms the actual unition of the divine and human natures, or, what is the same thing, the essential humanity of God.

But how does this explain the moral experience of mankind? The answer to this question, involving, as it does, an orderly apprehension of the divine end or object in creation, will also perfectly illustrate the truth of the Divine Humanity. What, then, is the divine end or object in creation?

God, says Swedenborg, is infinite or perfect love. Divine love, in other words, is utterly unlimited by self-love. For as God constitutes the BEING of all his creatures, as His selfhood is the absolute ground of all other selves, so there can be no possible antagonism in Him between the love of others and the love of Himself. The two loves in Him are absolutely one and indivisible. Thus divine love is not an emotion or passion; that is to say, it is not the quality of a subject in relation to an object, but the absolute unity of subject and object. It is thus a creative love. It does not exercise itself in petting or rewarding its favorites, but in the actual creation of subjects who shall image or reproduce its own powers and delights. Thus God, says Swedenborg, *is essentially communicative of Himself to others:* in other words, is essentially creative. "The Creator," he proceeds, "CANNOT BUT BE IN OTHERS, created from Himself." His essential perfection, or the absolute indistinction in Him of self-love and universal love, necessitates this. Upon the perception of this truth, Swedenborg declares all right knowledge of creation to depend. And in exact consistency with it, he represents the whole end or object of creation to be "THE ETERNAL CONJUNCTION OF THE CREATOR WITH THE CREATURE."

But how shall this great end be practically accomplished? The creature has manifestly no absolute, but only a derived existence, and a derivative existence would appear to afford

no adequate basis for the divine conjunction with it. For how shall He who is emphatically the All in All, conjoin Himself with that which in itself is sheer nought? How shall the infinite come into such correspondence with the finite, as shall leave the reaction of the one proportionate to the action of the other? Absolutely, of course, the question is insoluble. In the absolute truth of things, as men say, there is no ratio between Creator and creature, or infinite and finite, and consequently the conjunction of Himself with the creature, which is God's end in creation, must be a purely practical conjunction, or a conjunction which stands in the exact correspondence of the created and creative activity. Now the grand distinction of the creative action is that it is self-prompted and self-sustained. And accordingly the action of the creature, in order to correspond with this, must be self-moved and self-sustained. But the creature is intrinsically finite or social; that is, he is dependent, in all that he is and does, upon the fellowship of others. Hence his actions can never be self-prompted until he becomes socially perfect; until all opposition between the universal and individual elements disappear, and society exhibit the unity of a man.

The fulfilment of the divine end in creation, then, requires the SOCIAL man, or the man in whose experience the universal life and the individual life are perfectly at one. In other words, the end of creative beneficence on earth, involves the construction of a perfect society, in which every member's love of himself shall be convertible with his love of all the rest; in which self-love and the love of others shall cordially join hands in the infinite aggrandizement of the associated life. The conjunction of the Creator with the creature, says Swedenborg, is wholly impracticable, "unless the latter be a *subject* in whom the former may dwell *as in Himself*."* "These subjects, in order that they may be habitations and mansions of the Creator, must be recipients of His perfections *as from themselves:* must be such as to elevate themselves to the Creator as from themselves, and join themselves to Him: without this reciprocation in the creature, no conjunction is possible." In plain English, the Creator must not be in the creature as a foreign power, but *as the creature's self*. The consciousness of the creature must be a productive consciousness; the consciousness of a power to generate his own activity. And a

* Divine Love and Wisdom, 170.

self-consciousness of this sort, as we have said, implies a perfect harmony between the public and private life of man. No man can attain to productive consciousness, or the consciousness of a power to generate his own activity, unless by the concurrence of all other men. If the interests of others be in any manner opposite to my own, then my activity shapes itself accordingly, and gives evidence of a constraint imposed by that opposition. It is an activity generated not of myself absolutely, but of myself as opposed to others. But if all other men's interests harmonize with my own, then my action exhibits no constraint, but appears to be generated of myself alone.

What, then, is the precise condition of this harmony? What is that thing without which all harmony between the race and the individual is actually impossible? It is that Man, both universally and particularly, be, in Swedenborg's phrase, "a form of use," — be, in other words, reciprocally *productive*. If the relation which I am under to my kind, supply me the gratification of all my natural wants, if there be no opposition between my individual interests and those of any other man, then my self-consciousness will *ipso facto* become creative, or attest the full divine conjunction with me, and all my activity exhibit the fruits of such conjunction. But if this relation do not supply me the gratification of my natural appetites; if these appetites cannot be gratified without injustice to other men; then it is manifest that I am by no means as yet a subject of the Divine, but a bond-slave of nature, and all my activity consequently attests this bondage. Before the will of Divine Love, then, can be accomplished in humanity, before man can exhibit this exclusive subjection to the Divine, it is absolutely necessary that a perfect *fellowship* of man with man be established, such a fellowship as shall make the interest of every individual man entirely accordant with that of all other men. And the condition of this fellowship, we repeat, is, that the universal man and the individual man be reciprocally beneficent or productive; that the universal man on his part relieve the individual man of his otherwise invincible servitude to nature, and that the individual man, thus emancipated and delivered over to the sole subjection of God, bring forth the exclusive fruits of such subjection in every varied form of divine art or productiveness.

ART, then, or the use accomplished by man as of himself, and not of natural or accidental constraint, is, according to the

new theology, the divine end in humanity; and the evolution of this end is exclusively social. Art is thus the distinctive glory of man. It is what defines the Creator's abode within him, and gives him the lordship of the lower creation. Every animal form, indeed, as well as all other forms, is a form of use, because, as Swedenborg affirms, God cannot possibly create any thing but use: but then it is an *involuntary* form, and thus incapable of conjunction with the divine. Neither the animal, the vegetable, nor the mineral performs its proper uses *as of itself*, but only by constraint of its own or some other nature. It cannot help performing them. But the uses which characterize true or distinctive humanity are voluntary uses, uses which do not flow from any constraint of nature or position, but exclusively from the will of the subject. The Creator, says Swedenborg, would be in the created subject *as in Himself*, and this is possible only in so far as the creature acts *as of himself*, or freely. Thus, true divine uses in man are not those which grow out of our natural relations, or are imposed by our natural affections, but those which grow out of our social relations, or our relations to all mankind. My parent, my brother, my child, stand in a diviner relation to me than any which these names import — the relation of human *fellowship*, which divests my natural sentiment towards them of all its intrinsic narrowness and injustice, and clothes it instead with a truly divine grace. The uses which our natural relations impose, are all involuntary, and therefore, although of an indisputable dignity in their proper sphere, do not attest the divine conjunction with us. Our affection for ourselves or our offspring, may equal the animal's in fervor, but can hardly exceed it, though our superior intelligence affords us vastly superior methods of gratifying it. And clearly our endowments should differ not merely in measure, but in kind, from those of the animal. Man, indeed, embraces in himself the animal and all lower natures, but it is only that he may glorify them all with the crown and diadem of his own regal humanity, and so lift them into the mediate splendors of the Divine.

The family or domestic relation, then, although it beautifully typifies, yet by no means constitutes the true divine achievement in humanity. The finished work of God is to be seen only in the *social* relations of man, those relations which conjoin the individual and the race, or the universal family of man with every individual member of it. And now we are prepared for the upshot of the whole matter.

For why, will it be asked, should this divine work necessitate the moral experience of mankind? Why should it not be accomplished *at once*, so to speak, and without involving in the creature any knowledge of good and evil?

This question proceeds upon a misconception of the whole matter in discussion. It proceeds upon the assumption that the divine end in creation was to make an *essential* or *absolute* conjunction of himself with the creature, which of course is absurd, for it would be to make the creature the Creator. Essentially or absolutely the creature is of necessity embraced in the Creator, and therefore to talk of the Creator *effecting* a conjunction in this point of view between himself and the creature, *effecting* an essential or absolute conjunction, would be to use words without understanding. What is essential or absolute cannot be *effected*, or disclaims all actual genesis, for the simple reason that it is itself the basis of all effects or actuality. The divine end in creation, then, imports no such conjunction as this, but wholly a formal conjunction, or a conjunction to the creature's consciousness.

But how shall this conjunction take place while the creature is without a consciousness or selfhood? For absolutely, of course, the creature is without a selfhood, or *is not*, — God being the only absolute selfhood. How, then, shall the conjunction in question take place? Manifestly the first condition is, that the creature possess, if not an absolute, yet a *quasi*, or apparent, selfhood, a phenomenal self-consciousness, which shall furnish the requisite basis of conjunction.

But here again a difficulty occurs. For how shall this *quasi* or apparent selfhood become pronounced, become possible? How shall this phenomenal self-consciousness become developed? For God is essentially creative, and His creature, therefore, cannot be a mere illusion; he must be a real and actual verity. If all this be undeniable, then it results of absolute necessity, that this selfhood of the creature become pronounced only by the descent of the Divine to natural conditions, by His manifestation in the principles of natural order. It results, in other words, that the absolute or infinite reveal himself in the conditional and finite, that the Creator manifest *himself* in the creature.

Creation, then, considered objectively,— as a divine achievement or finished work, — is the reproduction of the Divine perfections in the laws of natural order.

But creation considered subjectively, considered as the ac-

tual revelation of the Creator in the creature, or, in Swedenborg's language, as the Divine proceeding, involves of necessity a mediate plane of existence, a plane intermediate to that of absolute life and absolute death, or, absolute good and absolute evil. For absolute life or good of course cannot be imparted, and absolute death or evil is equally, of course, an impracticable experience, since its experience would be tantamount to a denial of the subject's creaturehip. Hence we repeat, that creation, regarded as a subjective process, as the procession of the creative subject towards the created subject, as the transit from absolute to conditional existence, necessarily involves a mediate experience, an experience which shall be that neither of absolute life nor of absolute death, but the indifference or equilibrium of the two. And the subject of this experience is exclusively the MORAL man, the man who is both good *and* evil, or, in Swedenborg's phrase, both angelic *and* infernal.

The reason, then, why the falfilment of the Divine end in creation, which is the conjunction of the Creator with the creature, necessitates the moral man, or the moral experience of mankind, is plain. For inasmuch as the Creator *in himself* is absolute and hence incommunicable life, and the creature *in himself* is the absolute negation of life, so there can be no actual conjunction of the two save in some middle life which shall be common to both.

Swedenborg accordingly depicts the mediate or spiritual sphere of creation altogether under this mixed aspect, or as wholly made up of this moral subjectivity. No trace of absolute life appeared in it, but the Deity varied according to the endless varieties of the individual subjectivity, and this subjectivity reflected every phase between an almost total absorption in Deity, and an almost total denial of Him: or between the sensible experience of Him as a vivifying and overpowering splendor, and a destructive and overshadowing darkness. The true divine man, in whom the Deity dwelt as in Himself, or, what is the same thing, with whom He was sensibly conjoined, was nowhere visible; for, to the senses of the morally good or angelic man, the Deity shone as a beneficent sun, at an infinite remove above his head; and to the senses of the morally evil or infernal man, He appeared as that sun eclipsed, at an infinite remove below his feet. In the one subject, the Creator was seen *dominating* the creature, in the other the creature was seen dominating the Creator.

In neither subject were the two presented in perfect accord or combination, for in neither do we see the Creator dwelling as in Himself, nor, consequently, the creature bringing forth all divine fruit as of *himself*. The heavenly man, in proportion to his relative superiority, acknowledged only the *creative* subjectivity; the infernal man, in proportion to his relative inferiority, acknowledged only the *created* subjectivity.

Now, to our apprehension, what renders Swedenborg of infinite "pith and moment" to the theologian or philosopher, is the strictness with which he exhibits the minute and perfect subordination of this subjective sphere of creation to the grand ultimate or objective sphere, which was to reveal the true Divine Humanity, or the man with whom the Deity should be sensibly conjoined. This man is exclusively the Artist, or Worker; the man who, in Swedenborg's phrase, loves Use or Art for its own sake, and not for its subserviency to his physical or social necessities. Art is the only positive or divine good on earth. Its products may exhibit every variety of comparative excellence; but there is none of them, however humble be its sphere, which is positively evil—which is not, when considered in itself, positively good, and does not therefore attest the conjunction of God and man. When, accordingly, the true divine man appears, perfectly reconciling self-love and universal love, in the supreme love of Art or Use, then the antagonism of heaven and hell, or moral good and evil, will be seen to import only the difference of internal and external, or soul and body, and both alike will proclaim the exuberant Divine goodness.

We have now given, according to our apprehension of it, a faithful statement of the doctrine of the LORD, or the DIVINE HUMANITY, a doctrine which gives to Swedenborg's pages all their interest. The *essential* Divine Humanity consists in CREATIVE love. The divine natural humanity consists in every varied form of Art, or productive use, and is conditioned upon a perfect society. This latter theme is the mystic burden of all sacred scripture since the world began, and we are now, according to this gifted seer, on the very verge of its accomplishment.

The great obstruction, according to Swedenborg, which this doctrine meets among Christians, lies in their sensuous or material conceptions. They cultivate no faculty of supersensuous thought. Hence they conceive of the Lord, or the glorified Humanity, as a material body exalted into the heavens, and

challenging the personal homage and adoration of every neophyte spirit, under penalty of death and destruction. They doubtless fail to see that they thus obliterate every vestige of the spirit which actuated Jesus on earth, and convert him into a being of consummate selfishness and vanity. It is this sensuality of the Christian mind which has always kept the church from the true acknowledgment of the Divine Humanity. Having no conception of God but as a body conditioned in time and space, they could only conceive of Christ's divinity as lying in the conjunction of some other person with him; they never dreamt of his actual *humanity* or human nature becoming divine. If they had done this, then we should doubtless have lost among the professed followers of Christ much of the nauseous cant and whining flattery which have always greeted his name, and gained much of the practical truth and sweetness which constitute its divinest charm.

We have only space barely to indicate the bearing of this great truth upon a rational doctrine of nature. The universe, spiritually regarded, is a man: all creation flows through man: nature is but a type of man: these and a thousand similar maxims stand in the truth of the divine natural humanity. If true humanity be exclusively the fruit of a conjunction between the Creator and the creature; if, in other words, the man whom God creates have of necessity no being *in himself*, and derive all being from the divine conjunction with him: then all the tribes of inferior nature, of a nature below the human, serve but to mark the successive stages of elevation between absolute creatureship or nonentity and truly divine conjunction, through which the creative love lifts its creature. In the impalpable ethers and gases, in the palpable but unorganized mineral, in the organized and sensitive vegetable, and in the sensitive and intelligent animal, we see only so many enlarging types of the human nature struggling out of absolute nothingness into positive self-consciousness; and in the unity which binds all these lower natures together, the unity of a perfect subjection to the human nature, is typified the subjection which the natural selfhood thus pronounced, itself undergoes to the divine selfhood, and which is illustrated in every ennobling form of Art or social use. Thus man involves the universe, and the history of nature is to be sought only in the history of man.

ART. III. — 1. *De la Misère des Classes Laborieuses en Angleterre et en France.* Par EUGENE BURET. Paris. 1840.

2. *Report of the Massachusetts Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Condition of Idiots in the Commonwealth.* By S. G. HOWE. — Senate Document, No. 31. 1848.

THE interest which is beginning to be so generally manifested in the condition even of the most wretched members of the human family, is one of the cheering signs of the times. Nothing more truly tests the degree of progress which a people has made in true civilization, than the respect which it shows to humanity by raising up and tenderly caring for those who, in the earlier and ruder march of society, are trampled under foot, or left behind to perish.

As soon as the nobler part of men's nature begins to be developed, they are pained and shocked by the sight of suffering and misery, and they strive to relieve or remove them. It is not, however, benevolence or religion alone that bids us to care for the unfortunate and the helpless, but self-interest comes in and repeats the command, for all History teaches that there can be no real peace, no true social happiness, no lasting prosperity, so long as the just claims of any large class of men to their share in the benefits arising from the social union are despised or neglected. Revolution has followed upon revolution, and will continue to follow so long as one class enjoys the wealth, the comforts, and the luxuries of life, and leaves others to labor on in ignorance, poverty, and misery. Each society is repeating upon a small scale what humanity has so long been undergoing upon a large one. We live in the midst of changes, called revolutions when effected by force, reforms when brought about peaceably, the totality of which is carrying us forward in the career of progress, though now and then we seem to take a step backward.

Not only the freedom but the practical equality of men, as far as it regards political rights and social privileges, is becoming less a matter of theory and more a matter of fact. It is beginning to be seen that the chief end of man in this state of existence is the development of all his faculties, capacities, and affections, and the enjoyment of all the objects with which God has stored this beautiful world for the gratification of

his nature. Now, so long as there are social or political institutions which prevent great classes of men from enjoying their birthright — the *time* and the *means* necessary for this development of their intellectual, moral, and social capacities — so long will there be antagonism, strife, and war, open or concealed; and so long as these exist, so long must the favored classes suffer with the suffering ones. Poets may sing the siren song of contentment, and preachers may preach the duties of patience, but there will not and ought not to be contentment and patience, so long as the *natural* inequalities of men's capacities are increased by social institutions into monstrous differences in the means of development and enjoyment.

You cannot kill humanity, and you cannot make it lie still in an unnatural position. You may prate about the ignorant and laboring classes as not knowing and therefore not desiring those refinements and comforts of life which you deem necessary for your happiness; but it is a false and pernicious doctrine. The slave seems not to want freedom — the boor not to want refinement — the ignorant, knowledge; — no! but then they *want to want them*, and they never will be quiet until they know and understand the nature of the want, and have the means of supplying it.

An ignorant, vicious, or suffering class is a disturbing class — is a disturbing element in society; it has no business there; it must be removed, or there never can be order. Now, as it cannot be removed bodily, as the men and women composing it cannot be put out of the world, the only way of removing the disturbing element is to change them into intelligent, virtuous, and *enjoying* persons, and then there will be harmony.

It is curious to observe how the poor and suffering classes come in all times, "creeping, creeping everywhere," and demanding of the privileged classes their birthright. Despotism knocks them on the head, fetters their limbs, mows them down by millions, but still they come, "creeping, creeping everywhere," clinging to, cramping, and finally strangling despotism. Feudalism rides over them, booted and spurred, or shuts itself up in its lordly castle; but still they come, "creeping, creeping everywhere," over moat and ditch, rampart, wall, and tower, and throttle feudalism itself, in the very donjon keep. Constitutionalism throws to them certain sops, charters, written laws, — messes of pottage, — and bids them keep quiet at a distance, but still they come, "creeping, creeping everywhere," and demanding more. Republicanism

gives to them certain privileges,—ballot-boxes—juries,—and cries, "Peace, be still!" but still they come, "creeping, creeping everywhere," and crying for they know not what. Democracy finally throws down all the political barriers, abolishes all legal distinctions, yields the whole field of state, and bids them in God's name to vote, and vote, to their heart's content, but only to leave Mammon and respectability quiet in their possession; but still they come, no longer creeping, but standing erect, asserting their birthright, rejecting all messes of pottage, and claiming BROTHERHOOD.

This principle may be illustrated by the history of any social institution. Take the punishment of crime, for instance. Once, whoever offended against the "powers that be" was instantly beaten, branded, maimed, killed, without other warrant than the temper of the tyrant. Little by little it was found necessary to make some show of proof, though it were only the thumb-screw, pincers, or wheel. This would not do very long, and it was found that the man must be tried before even the lord could mutilate or hang him. Soon it was found that only his peers could judge of his guilt, and then juries were organized.

The *kind* of punishment too, must be modified; a man must not be drawn and quartered, disembowelled, hung in chains, or even hung by a rope like a dog, but shut up in prison.

But the prison, too, must be modified. At first they were only receptacles into which could be thrown the nuisances that came between the wind and the noses of nobility or property; common-sewers, in which, if only out of sight, the poor and ignorant might breed mutual corruption. This could not be endured, and so prisoners were made cleanly, orderly, and industrious, but still regarded as worthless wretches, to be punished with stripes and privations,—blows upon the body and blows upon the soul. But this could not be tolerated; and at last humanity comes "creeping, creeping," and crying—"Make your prisons moral hospitals; strive to *cure* as well as *punish* our sons and brothers, or your granite and iron shall fare as did the stone walls and steel armor of feudalism."

Strange how men, reading the lessons of the past, can be heedless of the cries and demands of humanity in the present! but so it ever is. Nobility in his saddle, Aristocracy in his coach, Respectability in his gig, Property in his counting-room, Propriety in his pew, ever have, and still do cry, "Peace, be still!" when the poor and lowly strive to struggle up a step higher upon the platform of humanity.

The foremost countries in the world (and Massachusetts is one of them,) are, however, beginning to heed the warning of the past, and the threatening of the future. Some of the claims of the poorer classes are beginning to be understood and granted, though still too much as boons, rather than rights. The time was when colleges were considered as all that was necessary for national education; the time has come when the Common School is considered still more necessary; and the time is at hand when universities for the rich alone shall dwindle into insignificance compared with the vast machinery which shall be put in operation for the education of the children of the poorest citizens. The pay of the dismissed soldier, and the honor now paid to his tawdry tinsel, shall go to encourage and elevate the teacher; and the hulks of navies shall be left to rot, that the school-house may be built up and adorned.

In the way, too, of what is called charity, but which should be called religion and duty, we are advancing. The time was when deformed children were exposed and left to perish; a Taygetus and Eurotas were everywhere at hand for those who could not be reared to beauty and strength; but now, the more deformed they are the more solicitude is manifested in their behalf. The sick are gathered into hospitals, the dumb are taught to speak, the blind to read, the insane to reason, and at last the poor idiot is welcomed into the human family.

We do not propose to write a disquisition upon Idiocy — much less upon the means that should be used to improve the subject of it; but we would utter some thoughts suggested by reading the books at the head of our article, and especially by an examination of the statistics recently collected by the Commissioners appointed by the Legislature of Massachusetts.

The seed of our thought is this great truth — that the mental and moral condition of men is made by nature to be mainly dependent upon the structure and condition of their bodily organization; the fruit, is the sad conviction that this truth is overlooked or disregarded among us. The reports of the Commissioners show clearly that the vast majority of cases of insanity, imbecility, and idiocy, are traceable to palpable and outrageous violations of the laws of physiology. And yet the venerable and astute Senators of Massachusetts, at this very session, vetoed a project for favoring the introduction of more general knowledge of those laws in the community! They can protect pigeon-beds, — encourage alewife-fisheries, and push rail-roads; the people, it would seem, need encouragement in

that line: — but as for physiology, they need no knowledge of that!

Now, will it be believed in the face of all this, that in our Commonwealth there are over one thousand men and women in a state of deplorable idiocy; — one thousand beings in the form of humanity, but shorn of all its glorious attributes — and this mainly because their parents ignored the laws of physiology! Yet such is the case, beyond all question. Now, if we add to these sufferers the greater number of the insane; the still greater one of helpless paupers; the blind, the deaf and dumb, and that class whose name is legion, and which outnumbers all the rest put together — the drunkards, — what a fearful load of unfortunate and degraded dependents do we find that society has to carry; — and what a serious drawback must it be to any progress.

We speak within bounds when we say, that there are over ten thousand wretched and helpless creatures of the classes alluded to in this our fair Commonwealth. And if so many here, then what must be the case elsewhere?

Great as this standing army of unfortunates is, we could better afford to support it than to maintain as many mail-clad warriors; indeed, the burden they impose upon society comes not in the shape of money; it is felt in a more dreadful form. Each century's experience is bringing home with ever increasing force the truth, that society is a unit. God willed that there should be community of interest among men; He affixed dreadful penalties to the violation of His will, and all the efforts of the upper ten, or ten thousand, to walk on the heads of the multitude, are unavailing. There is not a spot on the globe where a man can find means to enjoy his riches and his culture beyond the reach of the troubles occasioned by the ignorance and degradation in which the mass of the people may be left. And it ought so to be, for otherwise the favored few will neglect the laboring many. Ignorance, intemperance, crime, brutality, dirt, vulgarity, are all around us and in our very midst; they breed moral as well as physical pests; they are contagious, and we ourselves, or more probably our children, may become infected by them unless we see to it that they are cured. Now the cure must be radical, and it must be undertaken by the more intelligent and wealthy class. Nothing short of this will answer. We may cut off a diseased or cancerous limb, but we cannot cut off the *people*, for they are the body social.

Some remarks in the Commissioners' report are pertinent to this subject; it says,

"In some families which are degraded by drunkenness and vice, there is a degree of combined ignorance and depravity, which disgraces humanity. It is not wonderful that feeble-minded children are born in such families; or, being born, that many of them become idiotic. Out of this class domestics are sometimes taken by those in better circumstances, and they make their employers feel the consequences of suffering ignorance and vice to exist in the community. There are cases recorded in the appendix, where servant-women, who had the charge of little girls, deliberately taught them habits of self-abuse, in order that they might exhaust themselves, and go to sleep quietly! This has happened out of the almshouses, as well as in them; and such little girls have become idiotic!

The mind instinctively recoils from giving credit to such atrocious guilt; nevertheless, it is there with all its hideous consequences; and no hiding of our eyes, no wearing of rose-colored spectacles, — nothing but looking at it in its naked deformity, will ever enable men to cure it. There is no *cordon sanitaire* for vice; we cannot put it into quarantine, nor shut it up in a hospital; if we allow its existence in our neighbourhood, it poisons the very air which our children breathe."

There it is! that is the doctrine! we have got to look at it in that light, and treat it as a matter which affects us and our children, before we shall be moved to cure it. In another part of the report it is said, that

"The moral evils resulting from the existence of a thousand and more of such persons in the community are still greater than the physical ones. The spectacle of human beings reduced to a state of brutishness, and given up to the indulgence of animal appetites and passions, is not only painful, but demoralizing in the last degree. Not only young children, but 'children of an older growth' are most injuriously affected by it. What virtuous parent could endure the thought of a beloved child living within the influence of an idiotic man or woman who knows none of the laws of conscience and morality, and none even of the requirements of decency? And yet, most of the idiots in our Commonwealth, unless absolutely caged up, (as a few are) have, within their narrow range, some children who may mock them indeed, and tease them, but upon whom they in return inflict a more serious and lasting evil. Every such person is like an Upas tree, that poisons the whole moral atmosphere about him."

Yes! the spectacle of a man created in God's image, but made brutish and brutal by being given over to his appetites and passions, must ever be demoralizing to all who witness it; and this spectacle, multiplied as it is in our State a thousand times, and presented daily and hourly to thousands of our citizens, is doubtless hurtful in a high degree.

But, there is even more dreadful import in this than at first appears; for these thousand senseless human beings, who are utterly dependent upon others, who are regarded as irresponsible by the law, who may commit even murder without legal or moral guilt, are only the occupants of the *lowest* rank in the social scale. Rising above them, little by little, are other ranks, up to the high platform upon which stand our most gifted and best educated men and women. In the rank next above the idiot stand those helpless creatures who are supposed to know right from wrong, and from whom are drafted almost all the tenants of our jails and prisons. It is a feaful question whether most of this class, though rising above *mental* idiocy, are not still in a state of *moral* idiocy; whether, by the necessity of the case, by the operation of our social system, they are not born in sin, nurtured in ignorance, and trained in depravity, so as to be certainly and necessarily predestined to the prison and the almshouse.

We are not of that school of philosophy which teaches that all offences against human and divine laws are the necessary consequences of a vicious organization, which irresistibly impels the offender into crime and sin; but we cannot shut our eyes to the facts that are pressing with increasing force every day, and which tend to show that a very large class of criminals are made so by causes altogether beyond their control.

Quetelet and others have shown, beyond all possibility of doubt, that, certain data being given, such as the religion, the education, the material condition, and the population of a country — the number and even the *kind* of crimes that will be committed in a given time may be calculated with as much certainty as the number of deaths. A farmer who has ten thousand apple-trees, cannot tell you with half so much certainty the quantity and quality of fruit that they will bear next year, as a statist can tell you the number and kind of crimes that will be committed next year in a community of ten million persons.

The more closely the great principles which govern the actions of men are studied, the more clearly is it seen that cer-

tain social influences produce certain crimes, just as certain atmospheric influences are favorable to certain vegetable products; and that the harvest of crime may be calculated with more certainty than the crop of corn, since the social influences are more appreciable than the atmospheric ones. It has lately been asserted, for instance, (and the statistics of France sustain the assertion,) that there is a wonderful regularity in the ratio of suicides and of crimes against the person; that the years which produce most suicides produce most crimes accompanied with violence; and that the proportion is very exact.

If we consider half a dozen cases of death among persons of our acquaintance, of various ages, we might be disposed to doubt whether a table of mortality could be constructed that would give with any accuracy the average longevity in the community. So when we consider the cases of half a dozen robbers, murderers, and suicides, we may be disposed to doubt whether the widely varying causes which led them to deeds of violence and death can ever be classified so as to show the effect which like causes will produce in future times and circumstances; but, when rising from individual cases of death we embrace thousands, and tens of thousands, and millions, we see that there are general laws ever in force, which limit the average duration of life with wonderful precision; and if we could embrace time and cases enough we should be able to see the laws which govern the amount and kinds of crime which will be committed in a community. The difference which at first sight might be supposed to exist between the cases supposed — death being inevitable, and crime being voluntary — will disappear on closer examination.

We have no space here, however, for the examination, nor for a consideration of the various forms of poverty, infirmity, degradation, and crime, which one meets at every turn in our community; we allude only to the single one of idiocy, and we ask, why is it that in such a community as ours, second to none of equal numbers, we believe, in point of physical and moral excellence, — why is it that in Massachusetts such a fearful number of mental and moral idiots should cumber the earth and burden society? Is it from any natural or political necessity? God forbid! It is, as we believe, the consequence of ignorance of natural laws, and intended to be the cause of making men find out and obey those

laws. If sound and thorough instruction were given to all our youth; especially if they were made familiar with the nature of their own bodies and the rules of health, much of this evil would be rapidly removed.

European physiologists have confined their observations mostly to the idiots themselves, and sought for the peccant cause in their physical organization. Our Commissioners have gone further, examined the physical condition of the progenitors of idiots, and sought for some satisfactory causes of the very vice or defect in the organization which causes idiocy, or rather, which prevents the development of the moral and mental faculties.

Several striking truths seem to be the result of these inquiries. One of the most important is, that eight tenths of the idiots are born of a wretched stock; of families which seem to have degenerated to the lowest degree of bodily and mental condition; whose blood is watery; whose humors are vitiated, and whose scrofulous tendency shows itself in eruptions, sores, and cutaneous and glandular diseases. This condition of body is the result of intemperance, of excesses of various kinds, committed, for the most part, in ignorance of their dreadful consequences. It is found, generally, (though not always,) among the poorest parts of the population, those who do not know the priceless blessings of pure air and cold water; and who stimulate their nervous system in order to overcome the weakness caused by deficient or innutritious diet. They are lean, nervous, puny, and sore-eyed; they have salt-rheum, king's-evil, and kindred afflictions; they cannot digest well, cannot sleep well, and they die young. Their mental and moral condition is as low as their bodily one.

This class is much more numerous in other countries, especially in England, than it is here; and it is a fearful thing to think, that so many of our noble Saxon race are, by the very operations of the social system, which ought to protect and elevate them, brought down to such a fearful degree of bodily degradation as almost necessarily causes both mental and moral idiocy.

Now, the points we would make, are these. This degradation is the result of ignorance, and this ignorance is the almost inevitable consequence of extreme poverty. Want is ever pressing so closely at the heels of the poor, that their whole energies must be expended in keeping ahead of it. In truth,

the real and mighty evils of poverty are little known, or little thought about. Scanty food, thin raiment, comfortless houses — these immediate effects of poverty are but as the small dust of the balance, compared with the remoter ones which prevent the development and exercise of the truly human part of our nature. Nay, to the healthy and intelligent poor, who have a fair field before them, these are only discomforts, which act as spurs and incentives to activity, industry, and success.

There is no end to the books in which the sufferings of the poor are described and commented on; but the history of the real evils of poverty is yet to be written. The world is full of charitable establishments for taking care of those whom poverty has brought to dependence; but the means are not yet found out for the prevention of pauperism. The difficulty is, that people do not know what the poor most need. It is not by bread alone that man liveth.

There are many social institutions in Christian countries, which, while they seem to do good to the poor by feeding and clothing their bodies, really keep them down nearly upon a level with the brutes, because they leave them no time and no opportunity for improving themselves. We need not go abroad to find such institutions; we have some at home, not very bad, indeed, compared with many others, but bad enough. The institution of *domestic servitude*, for instance, which, as it is administered by hundreds and thousands of church-going Christians among us, has some of the worst features of southern slavery. Talk about whips! do we not wield one over our domestics that has more stings than all the nine tails of the cat — the stings of necessity? Talk about broiling men in the sun in fields of cotton or rice! do we not broil women down in our cellar-kitchens, far away from the bright sunlight and the fresh air, over fires of hard coal? Do we not make them delve and sweat below, while we drink iced champagne and smack ragouts above? What genteel Christian family would buy a house which had not a separate back entrance and a back staircase, for the servants? What mistress thinks them good enough to come in and go out at the front door? Do we not bind upon our domestics heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, and refuse to touch them with one of our fingers? Must they not work, work, work, — aching head or aching heart, — while we loll on couches, and cut the leaves of new books? Do we not make boot-jacks of our brothers, and slaves

of our sisters? Do we not make them do what we teach our children it is not *genteel* to do?

They may go away, may they? Oh yes, go from your house to your neighbour's, ring at the back gate, wait humbly awhile below, and then be carried up, inspected, examined, questioned, and at last admitted upon trial, to see whether they are strong and skilful enough to drudge in another domestic tread-mill.

They like it, do they? Oh yes! but why? They never have had an opportunity of knowing or liking any thing better. Why will they not read? say you; why have they not a taste for pictures? why do they not love music? why are they not refined and interesting, like your children? Because you never gave them time and opportunity for becoming what your children have become.

You give them time in the evening, do you? you let them go to church on Sunday, but still they *will* be low and vulgar! Well, try it on your own daughter; turn her out of bed before daylight in winter to make the fires, cook breakfast, dinner, and supper, and wash your dirty linen, and then tell her to sit down in the evening to read Goethe aloud to you, or sing a cavatina! Try this a few years, and you shall see of how much better stuff she is made than your cook and waiting woman. You form your children's ideas of gentility as did the Spartans; they made their Helots drunk, and pointing at them, said, Beware of drunkenness. You make your Helots vulgar, and cry to your children, Beware of vulgarity!

By all the toil, and sweat, and parsimony of years, your servants can seldom lay up enough to support themselves after you have thrown them out at the back door, with your squeesed lemons. Who ever hears of an old cook, or a venerable chambermaid, elsewhere than in the almshouse? But this scanty pittance of payment would be a small evil, were it not that they *cannot* do what you require them to do upon the pains and penalties of losing the nine shillings a week, the fortieth part of your income, (we suppose you to be a clergyman's lady,) — unless they neglect the culture of their intellect and their tastes. Allow for the exceptions; allow for kind mistresses; still, as a general thing, the terms and conditions of domestic servitude among us are such as to forbid the mental culture and training which every human being has a right to demand of society. Our domestics are not members of our families; they are among us, but not of us; they

know this, and we know it; and families and society are all ajar in this respect.

Most of the arguments and considerations urged in defence of this iniquitous distribution of the labors and the enjoyments of life are urged by those who uphold institutions the wickedness of which is more apparent. The cultivated and refined master, who holds his fellow-creatures in bondage, to minister to his own physical well-being, and supply him with the luxuries and refinements of life, will tell you that his slaves are quite as happy, and enjoy life quite as much as his own children; but oh! not for worlds would he so brutalize his son as enable him to dance with fetters on his limbs, and to laugh aloud the live-long day because his intellect is so stunted and his moral nature so undeveloped that he does not even feel the impulses of humanity which urge men upwards towards the angels.

There is yet another institution, by which the rich man uses the whip and spur of necessity, to make the poor always ready to work for him. He gathers together hundreds and thousands of men, women, and children, and matching their living muscles against his tireless machines, from the rising to the setting sun, and even far into the night, exacts of them an amount of physical labor, which, while it barely feeds and clothes their bodies, starves their souls.

It is an appalling fact, that Christian gentlemen have been known to call together little children; to shut them up in their mills, and work them so long and so severely, that they could hardly toddle home on their tiny feet; and when they came home their parents had to shake them while they ate their suppers, *lest they should fall asleep with the victuals in their mouths!*

It is very probable that these and other like abuses have ceased since the evidences of them were obtained, for such monstrosities perish when dragged into the light of day; nevertheless, it is unquestionably true that even now, in Christian countries, a few men, for the unnecessary increase of their own wealth and luxury, do hold hundreds and thousands of operatives to such severe and ceaseless labor all day that their souls are virtually stunted, blighted, and killed. It is said, in defence of such employers, that their workmen were quite as ignorant and degraded before, and are better off now, inasmuch as they are kept from starving. But if the employer can release them from their toil one hour in the day, and if he fail to do

so, he cannot be held guiltless; no matter though the workmen will not at first use the hour for their own moral and intellectual improvement, — the master should free himself from guilt by giving them the chance for improvement.

These remarks may seem to have little to do with our subject, but in reality they have much, for we are not dealing with single cases of total idiocy, but with causes which lead to the moral idiocy of whole classes of men; and doubtless slavery as practised in this country, and the factory system as practised in England and elsewhere, do tend to brutalize and to make moral idiots of whole classes. The deep and damp gorges of the Alps do not more certainly produce goitres, cretinism, and idiocy, than do the factories and plantations of some refined and Christian gentlemen produce depravity, imbecility, and crime. They do verily use up and destroy the bodies and souls of human beings in the production of calico and sugar, just as certainly as though they should knock a man in the head every morning, and use his fat to feed the furnace, and his blood to refine the sugar.

It is a saddening and sickening sight for him who loves the beauties of nature, but who loves his race more, to wander in the mountain regions of Savoy and Switzerland, and when he comes to a valley of peculiar beauty, where the quaint village upon the green seems in danger of being pushed forward by the advancing glacier, — it is a sad sight for the traveller upon entering that village, to meet at every step men and women with great tumors hanging like dewlaps from their chins, and to see the sickly *cretins* lying in the doorways, supporting their distorted heads with their shrivelled hands; — their stony eyes rolling with a stupid stare, and their tongues half protruded from their ever drivelling mouths. But a sadder sight awaits him who leaves, what is perhaps the most perfect specimen of social refinement and luxury that the world ever saw, — the elegant hospitalities of an English mansion, — and seeks the neighbouring streets and lanes where congregate the poor and overworked operatives. In that mansion he is as if in a fairy palace, where the attendant sprites are ever about him with noiseless tread, anticipating his slightest wish, but never a moment in his way; — where the lower pleasures of sense are all refined away and hidden in the feast of reason and the flow of soul, at the banquet which is prolonged to the midnight hour. But even at that hour, as he leaves the blaze of light which flashes from that mansion far

into the surrounding darkness, he shall find the cellars and gin-shops near at hand, thronged with poor wretches who have not where to lay their heads, or having, perhaps, a hole to lie down in, are too wretched to sleep, and seek in the excitement of gin and the stupefaction of tobacco a temporary forgetfulness of their want and their miseries. Yes! you may see at midnight in the streets of English towns, sadder sights than that of slavering idiots basking at noon-day, in the villages of Switzerland; — you may see staggering up from cellars filled with clouds of smoke, and reeking with fumes of spirit, young creatures of twelve or thirteen years old, who importune you to buy what was never to them a virtue, at the price of a wretched pittance which may serve to procure more of the poison which is to them bread and meat. Oh God! Thou wilt forgive and afterwards bless these thy wretched children, who sought not this lot of sin and wretchedness, but were born to it; but Thou wilt not forgive *us*, if we neglect the lesson and the duty we there learn; for even there, the hand of thy love is visible! Thus far Thou permittest thy creatures to abuse thy gifts, and to wander from their sphere, but no farther; and by the same law which arrests the comet when it seems flying away from the centre, and threatening ruin to the universe — by the law which lessens the power with the distance of divergence, Thou stoppest the downward course of humanity, and preventest the utter degradation of the race!

Nothing can be more striking than the principle developed by the course of degradation which the overworked and underfed population have been running. Want of physical enjoyments, and the hope of offspring to share and lighten their labor, drives them into early marriage, and Nature gives the increase, but in the shape of a feeble and unhealthy generation; this one grows up and calls upon Nature for a successor, and it comes, but still feebler and more unhealthy, and so on, till Nature shrinks back aghast, and refuses to the fourth generation further power of procreation. She will not permit her fair earth to be filled with monsters in any shape.

There can be no manner of doubt that those social institutions which require that great classes of men shall spend their whole time and their whole energies in bodily labor, are radically wrong. We have seen that, when pushed to their extreme, such institutions cause a great degeneracy of the race, and great frequency of moral and mental idiocy.

The doctrine that is now continually preached to profession-

al men, to students and to merchants, is, *rest*— rest for your minds, exercise for your bodies; and it is a good one. But the doctrine we would preach to the working class is, "rest, rest for your bodies, and exercise for your minds." We hold this doctrine to be a most important one, and it may be expressed simply by saying, NATURE REQUIRES AN HARMONIOUS EXERCISE AND DEVELOPMENT BOTH OF BODY AND MIND. Let us try to illustrate it.

The system, when in healthy action, generates a certain quantity of nervous fluid, matter, essence, electricity, — call it what we may. This nervous fluid is generated mainly during the hours of sleep; hence it is that we are so full of vigor after a good night's rest, and so feeble after a sleepless one. Now it is just as much a law of God as though it were written in the decalogue, that this nervous fluid should be expended in *due proportion*, by the performance of various functions; part in digestion, part in muscular action, part in intellectual exercise, and the like; and that man *sins every day* who fails in any way of obedience to this law, which is almost the same thing as saying that every man is sinning all the time.

Let us express this in language that will be clear to every banker's clerk. The sources of this nervous fluid in the system may be considered as a capital stock. This capital makes a daily dividend, which is deposited in the nervous system *to the credit of the various organs*, the individual being the agent of all of them, with full power; that is, so much is due to the muscles, and should be expended for their benefit in exercise; so much to the stomach, and should be expended in digestion; so much to the brain, and should be expended in thought, feeling, and affection, and so on with the other organs of the body. Now, if the individual, the agent, that is, expends the sum due to one account for the benefit of another; if, for instance, he deprives the muscles of the amount necessary for exercise, and gives it to the stomach to be expended in digestion, he is not only unfaithful to the muscles, and does them a wrong, but he does a wrong to the stomach also, and to himself, and the whole system. So, also, if he takes that part which is due to the brain, and deprives himself of the power of thinking, in order to expend the nervous fluid upon the muscles, and to keep hard at work all day long, he does wrong then, also, to the muscles, the brain, and the whole system.

There is this difference, however, between the account kept by the man as agent for the various organs of his body, and

that kept by an individual for different persons — that the individual may let income accumulate to the credit of his different employers, and they will be perhaps no worse for it; the income may be added to the capital, but the man must expend daily the whole amount of nervous energy that accumulates daily, *neither more nor less*, for if he expend more *he encroaches upon the capital;* if he expend less it will be sure to expend itself, in mischief if he be young, in peevishness or discontent if he be old, or *in some hurtful manner* be his age what it may.

There is yet another difference in the two cases. The man who is agent for other individuals may be negligent or unfaithful, and his employers may never find it out, or, finding it out, may fail to punish him; but no man ever yet cheated any of the organs of his body of the amount of nervous fluid fairly due to them without being punished for it; because God never forgives a sin, that is, He never lets a man escape without paying the penalty which He ordained should be paid for every violated law, when He made the law and created man subject to it.

The doctrine that God ever forgives a sin, that is, in the ordinary sense of forgiveness, is one which has done incalculable mischief to mankind. Even if God *could* have any change of purpose, his love for his children would not let him weaken our trust in the certitude of his laws by a single instance of "variableness or shadow of turning," in the whole history of our race.

Let moralists convince men, if they can, that no sin of omission or commission was ever forgiven without payment of the uttermost farthing of the penalty, and there will then be more hesitation about present gratification and less reliance upon future repentance; and let physiologists teach people that every debauch, or excess, or neglect, is surely followed by evil consequences, and men will be more cautious about present indulgences and less reliant upon future temperance and physic.

It will be impossible to make young persons, or persons of any age, who are, or think they are, perfectly healthy, believe in this doctrine of the necessity of exact distribution of nervous fluid, unless they have studied physiology very carefully. In order to make men free agents, God has given them bodies which will bear a great deal of abuse, not, indeed, without indirect injury, but still without loss of life, or imme-

diate suffering. It is amazing to see what wrecks of men; what feeble, half-developed beings; what inwardly diseased bodies, dress themselves in coats and gowns, and go about and answer, with the greatest simplicity, "Pretty well, I thank you" to the daily "How d' ye do" of other persons, who are perhaps as far removed as themselves from the normal state of vigorous health, without at all suspecting it. It is still more amazing to see how such persons are surprised and shocked to hear that Mr. Such-a-one has dropped down dead; Mrs. Such-a-one has been found lifeless in her bed, or that during the year a dozen persons of their acquaintance sicken and die very long before arriving at old age. There is great marvel about such cases, and much talk about sudden and unexpected calamities, mysterious dispensations of Providence, and the like, as if the deceased had not all died in consequence of some law which had been ever at work, and which at last brought them to the earth, just as surely as gravitation brings an apple to the ground.

The tailors and mantuamakers have much to do with creating these marvels; they so make the crooked straight, and the lean fat: they pad out men's coats, and give them nether garments "a world too wide for their shrunk shanks," so that when they walk abroad you cannot guess their true proportions; and when the wig-maker and the dentist have lent their aid, their subjects appear such youthful Adonises upon the parade, that you would assure their lives for a score of years, upon a small premium, and therefore you are astonished, on missing them from their morning walks, to hear that they have suddenly *caved in*, — died, and made no sign. The inhabitants of this goodly city are a pretty temperate and healthy race, and there are, upon a rough estimate, five thousand persons of the non-laboring classes between the ages of forty and sixty. Most of these dress after the fashion of the day, and go about and show tolerably robust surtouts and well whiskered faces; and if you inquire about their health they say, "Oh, very hearty, never better in my life." Now, how many of these could walk thirty miles in a day; or go forty-eight, or even twenty-four hours without food, or swim across a moderate sized river in cold weather without great fatigue, and perhaps consequent sickness and death? A thousand? No! hardly a hundred. We hold this matter to be of the greatest consequence, and at the risk of being tedious we shall dwell still more upon it.

If we wish to train an individual or a nation to great intellectual power, we should look first to the stock, and next to bringing them up to the highest standard of physical health, sure that then there will be the greatest amount of mental energy. Only we must not set up a false standard of health: the burly Hercules is a wider departure from it than the graceful Apollo. Men were not made for athletes any more than they were for Ganymedes. To be in perfect health is not merely to have the strength of the ox, the fleetness of the deer, the digestion of the ostrich, the sleep of the sloth; the possession of these rather shows that the nervous fluid has been drawn from the brain and appropriated to the muscles; that the mind has been starved to feed the body. But to be healthy is to have all the organs of the body, those that serve more immediately for the manifestation of the mind, (namely, the brain and nervous system,) as well as the organs of nutrition and locomotion, in perfect order. This is not the case with the laboring class. The brawny blacksmith will hold out firmly at arm's-length for several minutes a heavy hammer that the pale student can hardly raise with both his hands; but address an argument to the reason of the two, and that slender man shall grasp it with his mind, and hold on to it through all its course, and his flashing eye shall mark the unwearied zeal with which he carries it to its conclusion; while the attention of his swarthy antagonist soon flags, he loses his hold, and his drowsy features tell you that he is dropping to sleep, he cannot keep his attention on the stretch any more than the student can hold out the hammer at arm's-length. Now, why is this? The soul, the immaterial principle that animates those two organized bodies, is, for aught we know, the same; but the machinery by which it works and manifests itself, in this state of existence, is very different. If the smith had worked his arms less, and his brain more; if the student had thought less, and exercised his arms more, both would have been nearer to the normal standard of health. Both have sinned, both have gone out of the way; and it is not at all certain that the laboring class sin less against the laws of health than the non-laboring class. Perhaps, indeed, they sin more, if the tables of mortality tell a true tale. They sin, however, in ignorance, or from dire necessity; the other class from less excusable reasons.

It is true, that the real nobles, the class of veritable leaders of mankind, has to be recruited every now and then by de-

scending into the great bosom of the people, and fetching up from thence fresh spirits full of native energy, to supply its own exhaustion; and it rises from every fall to the earth, Anteus-like, fresher and stronger than ever. But it will always be seen that the mighty men who rise up from among the laboring class are not born of parents who were overworked, and that they have not been overworked themselves; that circumstances have favored the exercise of a brain and nervous system which were naturally vigorous, and that often they have preserved the happy mean of moderate exercise of mind and body.

Surely, the millennium will never come on earth; surely, mankind will never display a hundredth part of its vigor, its goodness, its capacity for almost indefinite improvement, until the laboring class, which composes such an immense majority, is redeemed from the degrading thraldom under which it actually lies.

The doctrine that should now be preached in every workshop, in every field of our favored land, is, — make not *haste* to be rich; do not starve the mind by overworking the body; remember that muscles move not without the exercise of volition; that any exercise of volition exhausts the brain, and that if you work off all your nervous energy through the muscles, your brain can do nothing but go to rest until the reservoir of nervous fluid is filled up again.

What a spectacle of injustice and cruelty does the history of the world reveal in the unequal distribution of labor which has ever prevailed! Millions of men doing nothing but work, work, work, from the dawn of day till the shades of night; millions of women doing nothing but drudge, drudge, drudge, from their uprising in the morning to their lying down at night, as wearied and as stupid as the tired cattle! Who shall wonder at the slow progress of humanity, with such a dead weight to drag it back as ninety-nine hundredths of its members whose spiritual and intellectual nature is undeveloped? Who shall despair of its more rapid advance, when he sees the dawn of that day when the doctrines of Christ shall be practised as well as preached; when the brotherhood of mankind shall be established; when the burden of labor shall be shared by all; when the antagonism of nations and of trade shall be fused into friendly coöperation for mutual good, based upon the principle that to love one's neighbour and strive for his good is not only to fulfil the moral law but the law of self-interest.

That day is nearer or more remote according to the success of the measures for teaching the common people to take their case in their own hands. They have become measurably independent as to abstract political rights; let them become really so as to the means of exercise for intellectual faculties and social affections, and we shall make something of a heaven upon this dirty planet, in spite of all preachers of total depravity.

We have dwelt upon the sad necessity which causes the overworked laboring class to neglect their mental culture; let us add a word upon the effects upon the moral sentiments. We will illustrate it by reference to a fact observed in idiots.

It has been remarked by writers upon idiocy, that many of those unfortunate creatures dread the sound of the human voice, especially if expressing words to which they are not accustomed. Mr. Seguin explains this by supposing that they have a dislike to any new idea; that the human voice is something which expresses an idea; that the hearer is forced to make an effort to understand it, and all mental efforts are disagreeable to idiots.

With some modifications, the fact and the explanation are true. There are certain conditions of the brain in which mental effort is painful. Whoever has suffered with nervous headache knows, that if he is forced to use his brain in thinking, the pain is increased to intensity, just as pain would be increased in a sore arm by exercise of the muscles.

There is another condition of the mind, arising from long disuse of certain faculties, in which exercise of those faculties is very disagreeable, not only to idiots, but to all of us. In childhood we delight in the exercise of the perceptive faculties; we love to learn the names and minute qualities of all the individual things arouud us; we master the forty or eighty thousand words of our native tongue as though it were delightful sport; and forty — sixty — a hundred thousand are mastered by children who, with a little pains, learn three or four languages. We have seen children in Malta, not more than ten years old, who spoke fluently four different languages; two of which, the Italian and Maltese, they had learned in the streets and at their play, without any special instruction, and the others from their parents, who were French and English, without any painful effort. Now, if these very children had learned only one language in childhood, and should afterwards, at the age of fifty or sixty, be required to learn three new ones, they would sit down and die in despair. How is this?

Does the *mind* grow old and stiff? Are its innate powers rusted and impaired? We are forced rather to believe that the brain, the only material organ by which the mind can act in this stage of our existence, becomes stiff and unhandy from long disuse, and in old age is as inapt and clumsy an instrument for picking up words, as our fingers would be for working at mosaic or at embroidery.

But the mind has not grown altogether sluggish and lame in old persons. They do not like to pick up the pins of detail, but they do love to grasp general principles. As children, they loved to see the fact of an apple falling to the ground, and to know whether it was red or green, ripe or rotten. As men, they love to consider the principle of gravitation which brought that apple down, and to extend that principle to the rise of the tide, and the course of the planets. What care they whether the apple was a russet or a pippin?

There are two lesons to be learned from this, both important, and one awful. The first is, that the different mental faculties have each their proper period for exercise and activity, — a principle all important in education; the second is, that by long disuse of any faculty we come to dislike to use it at all, perhaps to be unable to use it. If we apply this principle to the mere intellectual faculties, it seems unimportant; because we care not to learn anew the multiplication table, and we do not need to study a new language; but, is it not even so with our benevolence? If it has been long inactive, do we not dislike to have it called into play to pity and help a suffering brother. Is it not so with our conscience, — do we not dislike to have it called upon to obey long unobserved rules of right? Is it not so with our veneration, — do we not stiffly bend the knee of homage to a long-neglected God? Let us take heed to this: there is a time for all things; once past it comes not back again. No repentance, however long and however bitter, can entirely remove the consequences of sins of omission or commission. Time lost, opportunities neglected, abuses committed, are sins both of omission and of commission; some faculties have been unused, some have been abused; in the ledger of life the balance is struck upon the page of every day, and the account closed for ever; for even God himself cannot make that which has been, not to have been.

The second great truth or law which has been developed and illustrated by these researches into the physical condition

of idiots, is that of the hereditary transmission of morbid and vicious tendencies, whether of body or mind.

We do not mean that this truth has not been before observed; it is now generally admitted in theory, but we have never seen it so fully demonstrated as in the case of idiocy.

The idiotic child is just as much the result of some organic weakness or vice in the constitution of the parent, as the sour and crabbed apple is the necessary product of a wild and bad stock. Do men look for grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles, or healthy children from diseased parents?

Truth is most apparent in extreme cases, but it is not less real in common ones. From the bottom of the scale — from idiocy up to common stupidity, from utterly wicked and vicious children up to the passionate and perverse ones, the same influence of the progenitors is seen; the fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge.

Our limit will not allow us to enter largely into this important subject; there is one part of it, however, that we must touch upon. Putting aside all squeamishness, we address young wives and mothers, and earnestly recommend to their attention the laws which govern the production of the race; — laws, the knowledge of which is more important to mankind and to individual happiness than knowledge of those which govern the planets.

You all know the general principles of physiology; you know how the condition of your own bodily health affects that of your future offspring. But it is not merely of bodily health and condition that we speak. You know the immense influence of the emotions and passions upon the whole physical system, and the mutual action and reaction between them, and can you suppose your unborn babe to be unaffected by any commotion within you?

While the warm tide of your own blood is filling every vein and vessel of its tiny frame, think you it matters not whether your heart be moved by the sweet spirit of love or the dark spirit of hate?

You know that sudden fears, and violent anger, have sometimes stricken dead the infant in the womb; or, what is worse, blighted the spirit in its bosom, and left but a growing body to come forth in time, and cumber the earth with a drivelling idiot. And if *excess* of emotion bring these awful consequences, must not a less degree of it have corresponding effects? We speak not to those who will not hear; to those poor

creatures who in their ignorance seek comfort from stimulating drinks, and thus actually force the liquid poison with every systole of their heart, into the heart of their babe; nor to those who make their condition an excuse for pampering every appetite of the body, and who from their own veins turgid with rich blood formed from high-seasoned and luscious food, pour into their infant's system the seeds of disease or early decay; — such will not heed any words of caution; but there are redeeming spirits of our race who are ready to give their very lives for their children's good. Let all such consider that there is a principle, as irresistible as that of gravitation, ever at work, by which the emotions and feelings of the mother are exercising an influence for good or for evil, over the disposition and capacity of the unborn babe which she bears within her. Let them remember that the prevalence of feelings of love, of kindness, and conscientiousness, bring not only the reward of cheerful sunshine to their own souls, but increase the chances of happiness for their offspring; let them remember that indulgence in melancholy, in peevishness, in envy, and ill-will, not only makes the passing hours more dark and cheerless, but may cloud the whole horizon of their child long after their own sun has gone down in death. Can there be a doubt about this? Does God care less for the soul than for the body, or fail to fix its laws? You know that a high and healthy condition of the muscular system of the parent will ensure great capacity for muscular vigor in the offspring: and is the feeling of benevolence or of conscientiousness less important than the muscular system? As surely as want of exercise on your part will give flabbiness of muscle to your offspring, so surely will inactivity of benevolence or neglect of conscientiousness in you render him less disposed to active and vigorous action of those faculties.

This principle is not new; but it is generally overlooked even by the intelligent few. There are so many other modifying influences; there are so many apparent exceptions; so much depends upon the subsequent training of children, that the principle, though admitted in the abstract, is not acted upon. But, the mother may exclaim, is all this awful responsibility thrown upon me; is this weight to be added to the already unequal burden of parental duties and pains? Oh no, — the father, too, is there, with his influence for good or evil, an influence more remote, indeed, but still powerful, and which is made better or worse by every year and by every day of

his previous life, accordingly as they were spent virtuously or viciously. And your parents too,—and your grandparents even, had their part in fitting the embryo heart of your unborn babe for the favorable growth of goodness, or the rank luxuriance of evil.

There may seem to be no thread running through these disjointed remarks, but here it is. Men are made for action, usefulness, and happiness. Now as the activity, the usefulness, and the happiness of an individual,—his intellectual power, and his moral excellence, even, are greatly dependent upon the original structure and the actual condition of his bodily organization, so is it with classes and nations of men. This structure and condition are to a very great extent capable of being modified by means entirely under our control. Intelligent and virtuous parents strive to give to their children the best possible organization, and to teach them how to keep it in the best condition. So it should be with the virtuous and intelligent classes; they should look upon less favored classes as their children;—strive to improve their condition, and above all to give them that knowledge which will enable them to dispense with all aid. The frightful number of those unfortunates whose numbers encumber the march of humanity;—the insane, the idiots, the blind, the deaf, the drunkards, the criminals, the paupers, will dwindle away as the light of knowledge makes clear the laws which govern our existence. But, in the mean time, let none of them be lost; let none of them be uncared for; but whenever the signal is given of a man in distress—no matter how deformed, how vicious, how loathsome, even, he may be; let it be regarded as a call to help a brother.

ART. IV.—*A Discourse occasioned by the Death of John Quincy Adams, delivered at the Melodeon, in Boston, March 5th*, 1848. By THEODORE PARKER, Minister of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Church in Boston.

WITHIN a few days one of the most distinguished statesmen of the age has passed away; a man who has long been before the public, familiarly known in the new world and the old. He was one of the prominent monuments of the age. It becomes us to look at his life, works, and public character,

with an impartial eye; to try him by the Christian standard. Let me extenuate nothing, add nothing, and set nought down from any partial love or partial hate. His individuality has been so marked in a long life, his good and evil so sharply defined, that one can scarcely fail to delineate its most important features.

God has made some men great and others little. The use of great men is to serve the little men; to take care of the human race, and act as practical interpreters of Justice and Truth. This is not the Hebrew rule, nor the Heathen, nor the common rule, only the Christian. The great man is the servant of mankind, not they of him. Perhaps greatness is always the same thing in kind, differing only in mode and in form, as well as degree. The great man has more of human nature than other men, organized in him. So far as that goes, therefore, he is more ME than I am myself. We feel that superiority in all our intercourse with great men,—whether Kings, Philosophers, Poets, or Saints. In kind we are the same; different in degree.

In nature we find individuals, not orders and genera: but for our own convenience in understanding and recollecting, we do a little violence to nature and put the individuals into classes. In this way we understand better both the whole and each of its parts. Human Nature furnishes us with individual great men; for convenience we put them into several classes, corresponding to their several modes or forms of greatness. It is well to look at these classes before we examine any one great man; this will render it easier to see where he belongs and what he is worth. Actual service is the test of actual greatness; he who renders, of himself, the greatest actual service to mankind, is actually the greatest man. There may be other tests for determining the potential greatness of men, or the essential; this is the Christian rule for determining the actual greatness. Let us arrange these men in the natural order of their work.

First of all, there are great men who DISCOVER general truths, great ideas, universal laws, or invent methods of thought and action. In this class the vastness of a man's genius may be measured, and his relative rank ascertained by the transcendency of his ideas, by the newness of his truth, by its practical value, and the difficulty of attaining it in his time, and under his peculiar circumstances. In Literature it is such men who originate thoughts, and put them into original forms,

— they are the great men of letters. In Philosophy we meet with such, — and they are the great men of science. Thus Socrates discovered the philosophical method of minute analysis which distinguished his school, and led to the rapid advance of knowledge in the various and even conflicting Academies, which held this method in common, but applied it in various ways, well or ill, and to various departments of human inquiry; thus Newton discovered the law of gravitation, universal in Nature, and by the discovery did immense service to mankind. In Politics we find similar, or analogous men, who discover yet other Laws of God, which bear the same relation to men in society that Gravitation bears to the orbs in heaven, or to the dust and stones in the street; men that discover the First Truths of Politics, and teach the true Method of Human Society. Such are the great men in Politics.

We find corresponding men in Religion; men who discover an idea so central that all sectarianism of parties or of nations seems little in its light; who discover and teach the universal law which unifies the Race, binding man to man, and man to God; who discover the true method of Religion conducting to natural worship without limitation, to free Goodness, free Piety, free Thought. To our mind such are the greatest of great men, when measured by the transcendency of their doctrine and the service they render to all. By the influence of their idea, Letters, Philosophy, and Politics become nobler and more beautiful, both in their forms and their substance.

Such is the class of DISCOVERERS,— men who get truth at first hand — truth pertaining either especially to Literature, Philosophy, Politics, Religion, or at the same time to each and all of them.

The next class consists of such as ORGANIZE these Ideas, Methods, Truths, and Laws; they concretize the abstract, particularize the general; they apply philosophy to practical purposes, organizing the discoveries of science into a railroad, a mill, a steam-ship, and by their work an idea becomes Fact. They organize Love into Families, Justice into a State, Piety into a Church. Wealth is power, Knowledge is power, Religion power; they organize all these powers — wealth, knowledge, religion — into common life, making Divinity Humanity, and that Society.

This organizing genius is a very great one, and appears in various forms. One man spreads his thought out on the soil,

whitening the land with bread-corn; another applies his mind to the rivers of New England, making them spin and weave for the human race; this man will organize a thought into a machine with his Idea, joining together fire and water, iron and wood, animating them into a new creature, ready to do man's bidding; while that with audacious hand steals the lightning of Heaven, organizes his plastic thought within that pliant fire, and sends it of his errands to fetch and carry tidings between the ends of the earth.

Another form of this mode of greatness is seen in Politics, in organizing men. The man spreads his thought out on mankind, puts men into true relations with one another and with God; he organizes Strength, Wisdom, Justice, Love, Piety; balances the conflicting forces of a nation so that each man has his natural liberty as complete as if the only man, yet, living in society, gathers advantages from all the rest. The highest degree of this organizing power is the genius for legislation, which can enact Justice and Eternal Right into treaties and statutes, codifying the divine thought into human laws, making Absolute Religion common life and daily custom, and balancing the centripetal power of the mass, with the centrifugal power of the individual, into a well proportioned State, as God has balanced these two conflicting forces into the rhythmic ellipses above our heads. It need not be disguised, that Politics are the highest business for men of this class, nor that a great statesman or legislator is the greatest example of constructive skill. It requires some ability to manage the brute forces of Nature, or to combine profitably nine and thirty clerks in a shop: how much more to arrange twenty millions of intelligent, free men, not for a special purpose, but for all the ends of universal life!

Such is the second class of great men — the ORGANIZERS; men of constructive heads, who form the institutions of the world, the little and the great.

The next class consists of men who ADMINISTER the institutions after they are founded. To do this effectually and even eminently, it requires no genius for original organization of truths freshly discovered, none for the discovery of truths, outright. It requires only a perception of those truths, and an acquaintance with the institutions wherein they have become incarnate; a knowledge of details, of formulas, and practical methods, united with a strong will and a practised understand-

ing, — what is called a turn for affairs, tact, or address; a knowledge of routine and an acquaintance with men. The success of such men will depend on these qualities; they "know the ropes" and the soundings, the signs of the times; can take advantage of the winds and the tides.

In a shop, farm, ship, factory, or army, in a church or a state, such men are valuable; they cannot be dispensed with; they are wheels to the carriage; without them cannot a city be inhabited. They are always more numerous than both the other classes; more such are needed, and therefore born; the American mind, just now, runs eminently in this direction. These are not men of theories, or of new modes of thought or action, but what are called practical men, men of a few good rules, men of facts and figures, not so full of ideas as of precedents. They are called common-sense men; not having too much common-sense to be understood. They are not likely to be fallen in with far off at sea; quite as seldom out of their reckoning in ordinary weather. Such men are excellent statesmen in common times, but in times of trouble, when old precedents will not suit the new case, but men must be guided by the nature of man, not his history, they are not strong enough for the place, and get pushed off by more constructive heads.

These men are the ADMINISTRATORS, or managers. If they have a little less of practical sense, such men fall a little below, and turn out only Critics, of whom I will not now stop to discourse.

To have a rail-road, there must have been first the Discoverers, who found out the properties of wood and iron, fire and water, and their latent power to carry men over the earth; next, the Organizers, who put these elements together, surveyed the route, planned the structure, set men to grade the hill, to fill the valley, and pave the road with iron bars; and then the Administrators, who, after all that is done, procure the engines, engineers, conductors, and ticket-distributors and the rest of the "hands"; they buy the coal and see it is not wasted, fix the rates of fare, calculate the savings, and distribute the dividends. The Discoverers and Organizers often fare hard in the world, lean men, ill-clad and suspected, often laughed at, while the Administrator is thought the greater man, because he rides over their graves and pays the dividends, where the Organizer only called for the assessments, and the Discoverer told what men called a dream. What happens in a rail-road happens also in a Church, or a State.

Let us for a moment compare these three classes of great men. The Discoverers are the greatest of all measured by the test referred to. They anticipate the human race, with long steps, striding before their kind. They learn not only from the history of man, but man's nature; not by empirical experience alone, but by a transcendent intuition of truth, now seen as a Law, now as an Idea. They are wiser than experience, and by divination through their nobler nature know at once what the human race has not learned in its thousands of years, kindling their lamp at the central fire, now streaming from the sky, now rushing broad-sheeted and terrible as ground-lightning from the earth. Of such men there are but few, especially in the highest mode of this greatness. A single one makes a new world, and men date the ages after him.

Next in order of greatness comes the Organizer. He, also, must have great intellect, and character. It is no light work to make thoughts things. It requires mind to make a mill out of a river, bricks, iron, and stone, and set all the Connecticut to spinning cotton. But to construct a State, to harness fittingly twenty million men, animated by such divergent motives, possessing interests so unlike — this is the greatest work of constructive skill. To translate the ideas of the Discoverer into institutions, to yoke men together by mere "abstractions," universal laws, and by such yoking save the liberty of all and secure the welfare of each — that is the most creative of poetry, the most constructive of sciences. In modern times, it is said, Napoleon is the greatest example of this faculty; not a Discoverer, but an Organizer of the highest power and on the largest scale. In human history he seems to have had no superior, perhaps no equal.

Some callings in life afford little opportunity to develop the great qualities above alluded to. How much genius lies latent no man can know; but he that walks familiarly with humble men often stumbles over masses of unsunned gold, where men, proud in emptiness, looked only for common dust. How many a Milton sits mute and inglorious in his shop, how many a Cromwell rears only corn and oxen for the world's use, no man can know. Some callings help to light, some hide and hinder. But there is none which demands more ability than Politics; they develop greatness if the man have the germ thereof within him. True, in Politics, a man may get along with a very little ability, without being a Discoverer or an Organizer; were it otherwise we should not be blest with a very

large House, or a crowded Senate. Nay, experience shows that in ordinary times one not even a great Administrator may creep up to a high place and hang on there a while. Few able administrators sit on the thrones of Europe at this day. But if power be in the man, the hand of Politics will draw out the spark.

In America, Politics more than elsewhere demand greatness, for ours is, in theory, the government of all, for all and by all. It requires greater range of thought to discover the law for all than for a few; after the discovery thereof it is more difficult to construct a democracy than a monarchy, or an aristocracy, and after that is organized it is more difficult to administer. It requires more manhood to wield at will "the fierce democratie" of America than to rule England or France; yet the American institutions are germane to human nature, and by that fact are rendered more easy, complicated as they are.

In Politics, when the institutions are established, men often think there is no room for Discoverers and Organizers; that Administrators alone are needed, and choose accordingly. But there are ideas well known not yet organized into institutions: that of Free-trade, of Peace, of Universal Freedom, Universal Education, Universal Comfort, in a word, the idea of Human Brotherhood. These wait to be constructed into a State without injustice, without war, without slavery, ignorance, or want. It is hardly true that infinity is dry of truths unseen as yet; there are truths enough waiting to be discovered; all the space betwixt us and God is full of ideas waiting for some Columbus to disclose new worlds. Men are always saying there is no new thing under the sun, but when the Discoverer comes they see their mistake.

Now, it is quite plain where we are to place the distinguished person of whom I speak. Mr. Adams was not a Discoverer; not an Organizer. He added no truth to mankind not known before, and even well known; he made no known truth a fact. He was an Administrator of political institutions. Taking the whole land into consideration, comparing him with his competitors, measuring him by his apparent works, at first sight he does not seem very highly eminent in this class of political Administrators. Nay, some would set him down not as an Administrator so much as a Political Critic.

Here there is danger of doing him injustice, by neglecting a

fact so obvious that 't is seldom seen. Mr. Adams was a Northern man with Northern habits, methods, and opinions. By the North I mean the free states. Now, the chief business of the North is to get empire over Nature; all tends to that. Young men of talents become merchants, merchant-manufacturers, merchant-traders. The object directly aimed at is Wealth; not wealth by plunder, but by productive work. Now, to get dominion over Nature, there must be Education, universal education, otherwise there is not enough intelligent industry, which alone ensures that dominion. With wide-spread intelligence property will be widely distributed, and of course suffrage and civil power will get distributed. All is incomplete without religion. I deny not that these peculiarities of the North come, also, from other sources, but they all are necessary to attain the chief object thereof — dominion over the material world. The North subdues Nature by thought, and holds her powers in thrall. As results of this, see the increase in wealth which is signified by Northern rail-roads, ships, mills, and shops; in the colleges, schools, churches, which arise; see the skill developed in this struggle with Nature, the great enterprises which come of that, the movements of commerce, manufactures, the efforts — and successful, too — for the promotion of education, of religion. All is democratic, and becomes more so continually, each descendant founding institutions more liberal than those of the parent state. Men designedly, and as their business, become merchants, mechanics, and the like; they are politicians by exception, by accident, from the necessity of the case. Few Northern men are politicians by profession; they commonly think it better to be a Collector or a Postmaster than a Senator, estimating place by money, not power. Northern politicians are bred as lawyers, clergymen, mechanics, farmers, merchants. Political life is an accident, not an end.

In the South the aim is to get dominion over men; so the whole working population must be in subjection — in slavery. While the North makes brute Nature half intelligent, the South makes Human Nature half brutal, the man becoming a thing. Talent tends to politics, not trade. Young men of ability go to the army, navy, to the public offices, to diplomatic posts, — in a word, to politics. They learn to manage men. To do this they not only learn what men think, but why they think it. The young man of the North seeks a fortune; of the South, a reputation and political power. The politician of the

South makes politics the study and work of his whole life; all else is accidental and subordinate. He begins low but ends high; he mingles with men, has bland and agreeable manners, is frank, honorable, manly, and knows how to persuade.

See the different results of causes so unlike. The North manages the commercial affairs of the land, the ships, mills, farms, and shops; the spiritual affairs, literature, science, morals, education, religion; — writes, calculates, instructs, and preaches. But the South manages the political affairs, and has free-trade or tariff, war or peace, just as she will. Of the eight presidents who were elected in fifty years, only three were Northern men. Each of them has retired from office at the end of a single term, in possession of a fortune, but with little political influence. Each of the five Southern presidents has been twice elected; only one of them was rich. There is no accident in all this. The state of Rhode Island has men that can administer the Connecticut or the Mississippi; that can organize Niagara into a cotton factory; yes, that can get dominion over the ocean and the land: but the state of South Carolina has men that can manage the Congress, can rule the North and South, and make the nation do their bidding.

So the South succeeds in politics, but grows poor, and the North fails in politics, but thrives in commerce and the arts. There the chief men turn to politics, here to trade. It is so in time of peace, but in the day of trouble, of storms, of revolution like the old one, men of tall heads will come up from the ships and the shops, the farms and the colleges of the North, born Discoverers and Organizers, the aristocracy of God, and sit down in the nation's councils to control the State. The North made the Revolution, furnished the men, the money, the ideas, and the occasion for putting them into form. At the making of the Constitution the South out-talked the North; put in such claims as it saw fitting, making the best bargain it could, violating the ideas of the Revolution, and getting the North not only to consent to slavery, but to allow it to be represented in Congress itself. Now, the South breaks the Constitution just when it will, puts Northern sailors in its jails, and the North dares not complain, but bears it "with a patient shrug." An Eastern merchant is great on a Southern exchange, makes cotton rise or fall, but no Northern politician has much weight at the South, none has ever been twice elected president. The North thinks it a great thing to get an inoffensive Northern man as Speaker in the House of Represent-

atives. The South is an aristocracy which the democracy of the North would not tolerate a year were it at the North itself. Now it rules the land, has the Northern masses, democrats and whigs, completely under its thumb. Does the South say "go," they hasten; "come," they say "here we are"; "do this," they obey in a moment; "whist," there is not a mouse stirring in all the North. Does the South say "annex," it is done; "fight," men of the North put on the collar, lie lies, issue their proclamations, enrol their soldiers, and declare it is moral treason for the most insignificant clergyman to preach against the war.

All this needs to be remembered in judging of Mr. Adams. True, he was regularly bred to politics, and "to the manner born"; but he was a New England man, with Northern notions, Northern habits, and though more than fifty years in public life, yet he seems to have sought the object of New England far more than the object of the South. Measure his greatness by his service, but that is not to be measured by immediate and apparent success.

In a notice so brief as this, I can say but little of the details of Mr. Adams's life, and purposely pass over many things, dwelling mainly on such as are significant of his character. He was born at Quincy, the 11th of July, 1767; in 1777, went to Europe with his father, then Minister to France. He remained in Europe most of the time — his powers developing with rapidity and promise of future greatness — till 1785, when he returned and entered the junior class in Harvard College. In 1787, he graduated with distinguished honors. He studied law at Newburyport, with Judge Parsons, till 1790, and was a lawyer in Boston, till 1794.

That may be called the period of his education. He enjoyed the advantages of a residence abroad, which enabled him to acquire a knowledge of foreign languages, modes of life, and habits of thought. His father's position brought the son in contact with the ablest men of the age. He was Secretary of the American minister to Russia at the age of fourteen. He early became acquainted with Franklin and Jefferson, men who had a powerful influence on his youthful mind. For three years he was a student with Judge Parsons, a very remarkable man. These years, from 1767 to 1794, form a period marked by intense mental activity in America and in Europe. The greatest subjects which claim human attention, the laws

that lie at the foundation of society, the state, the church, and the family, were discussed as never before. Mr. Adams drew in liberty and religion from his mother's breast. His cradle rocked with the Revolution. When eight years old, from a hill-top hard by his house he saw the smoke of Charlestown, burning at the command of the oppressor. The lullaby of his childhood was the roar of cannon at Lexington and Bunker Hill. He was born in the gathering of the storm, of a family that felt the blast, but never bent thereto; he grew up in its tumult. Circumstances like these make their mark on the character.

His attention was early turned to the most important matters. In 1793, he wrote several papers in the "Centinel," at Boston, on neutral rights, advising the American government to remain neutral in the quarrel between France, our ally, and others; the papers attracted the attention of Washington, who appointed the author Minister to Holland. He remained abroad in various diplomatic services in that country, in Russia, and England till, 1801, when he was recalled by his father, and returned home. It was an important circumstance, that he was abroad during that time when the nation divided into two great parties. He was not called on to take sides with either; he had a vantage ground whence he could overlook both, approve their good and shun their evil. The effect of this is abundantly evident in all his life. He was not dyed in the wool by either political party, — the moral sense of the man drowned in the process of becoming a federalist or a democrat.

In 1802, he was elected to the Senate of Massachusetts, yet not wholly by the votes of one party. In 1803, he was chosen to the Senate of the United States. In the Massachusetts Legislature he was not a strict party man; he was not elected to the Senate by a strictly party vote. In 1806, he was inaugurated as Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard University, and continued in that office about three years. In 1808, he resigned his place in the Senate. In 1809, he was sent by Mr. Madison as Minister to Russia, and remained abroad in various ministries and commissions, till 1817, when he returned, and became Secretary of State under Mr. Monroe. This office he filled till he became President, in 1825. In 1829, failing of reëlection, he retired to private life. In 1831, he was elected as one of the Representatives to Con-

gress from Massachusetts, and continued there till his death, the first president that ever sat in an American Congress.

It will be fifty-four years the thirtieth of next May, since he began his public career. What did he aim at in that long period? At first sight, it is easy to see the aim of some of the conspicuous men of America. It has obviously been the aim of Mr. Clay to build up the "American System," by the establishment of protective duties; that of Mr. Calhoun to establish Free-trade, leaving a man to buy where he can buy cheapest and sell where he can sell dearest. In respect to these matters the two are exactly opposite to one another — antithetic as the poles. But each has also, and obviously, another aim, — to build up the institution of slavery in the South. In this they agree, and if I understand them aright, this is the most important political design of each; for which Mr. Calhoun would forego even free-trade, and Mr. Clay would "compromise" even a tariff. Looked at in reference to their aims, there is a certain continuity of action in both these gentlemen. I speak not now of another object which both have equally and obviously aimed at; not of the personal, but the political object.

Now, at first sight, it does not appear that Mr. Adams had any definite scheme of measures which he aimed to establish; there is no obvious unity of idea, or continuity of action, that forces itself upon the spectator. He does not seem to have studied the two great subjects of our political economy — Finance and Trade — very deeply, or even with any considerable width of observation or inquiry: he had no financial or commercial hobby. He has worked with every party, and against every party; all have claimed, none held him. Now he sides with the federalists, then with the democrats; now he opposes France, showing that her policy is that of pirates; now he contends against England; now he works in favor of General Jackson, who put down the nullification of South Carolina with a rough hand; then he opposes the General in his action against the Bank; now he contends for the Indians, then for the Negroes; now attacks Masonry, and then Free-trade. He speaks in favor of claiming and holding "the whole of Oregon," then against annexing Texas.

But there is one sentiment which runs through all his life — an intense love of freedom for all men; one idea, the idea that each man has Unalienable Rights. These are what may be called the American sentiment, and the American idea; for

they lie at the basis of American Institutions, — except the "patriarchal," — and shine out in all our history — I should say, our early history. These two form the golden thread on which Mr. Adams's jewels are strung. Love of human freedom in its widest sense is the most marked and prominent thing in his character. This explains most of his actions. Studied with this in mind, his life is pretty consistent. This explains his love of the Constitution. He early saw the peculiarity of the American government, — that it rested in theory on the Natural Rights of man, not on a compact, not on tradition, but on somewhat anterior to both; on the unalienable rights universal in man, and equal in each. He looked on the American Constitution as an attempt to organize these rights; resting, therefore, not on force, but natural law; not on power, but right. But with him the Constitution was not an idol; it was a means, not an end. He did more than *expound* it; he went back of the Constitution, to the Declaration of Independence, for the ideas of the Constitution; yes, back of the Declaration to human nature and the laws of God, to legitimate these ideas. The Constitution is a compromise between those ideas, and institutions and prejudices existing when it was made; not an idol, but a servant. He saw that the Constitution is "not the work of eternal justice, ruling through the people," but the work "of man; frail, fallen, imperfect man, following the dictates of his nature and aspiring to be perfect."* Though a "constitutionalist," he did not worship the Constitution. He was much more than a "defender of the Constitution," — a defender of Human Rights.

Mr. Adams had this American sentiment and idea in an heroic degree. Perhaps no political man now living has expressed them so fully. With a man like him, not very genial or creative, having no great constructive skill, and not without a certain pugnacity in his character, this sentiment and idea would naturally develop themselves in a negative form, that of opposition to wrong, more often than in the positive form of direct organization of the Right; would lead to criticism oftener than to creation. Especially would this be the case if other men were building up institutions in opposition to this idea. In him they actually take the form of what he called "the unalienable right of resistance to oppression." His life furnishes abundant instances of this. He thought the Indians were un-

* See *Social Compact*, &c. Providence. 1848. p. 31, et al.

justly treated, cried out against the wrong; when President, endeavoured to secure justice to the Creeks in Georgia, and got into collision with Governor Troup. He saw, or thought he saw, that England opposed the American idea both in the new world and the old. In his zeal for freedom he sometimes forgot the great services of England in that same cause, and hated England, hated her with great intensity of hatred, hated her political policy, her monarchy, and her aristocracy — mocked at the madness of her King — for he thought England stood in the way of freedom.* Yet he loved the English name and the English blood, was "proud of being himself descended from that stock," thinking it worth noting, "that Chatham's language was his mother tongue, and Wolf's great name compatriot with his own." He confessed no nation had done more for the cause of human improvement. He loved the Common Law of England, putting it far above the Roman Law — perhaps not without doing a little injustice to the latter.† The common law was a rude and barbarous code. But human liberty was there; trial by jury was there; the Habeas Corpus was there. It was the law of men "regardful of human rights."

This sentiment led him to defend the Right of Petition in the House of Representatives, as no other man had dared to do. He cared not whether it was the petition of a majority, or a minority; of men or women, free men or slaves. It might be a petition to remove him from a committee, to expel him from the House, a petition to dissolve the Union — he presented it none the less. To him there was but one nature in all — man or woman, bond or free,— and that was Human Nature, the most sacred thing on earth. Each human child had unalienable rights, and though that child was a beggar or a slave, had rights, which all the power in the world, bent into a single arm, could not destroy nor abate, though it might ravish away. This induced him to attempt to procure the right of suffrage for the colored citizens of the District of Columbia.

This sentiment led him to oppose tyranny in the House of

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* Reference is made to his speech in the House of Representatives, May 8th and 9th, 1840. (Boston, 1840.) It is a little remarkable, that the false principle of the common law, on which Mr. Adams was commenting, as laid down by Blackstone, is corrected by a writer, M. Pothier, who rests on the civil law for his authority. See pp. 6–8, and 20, 21.

† See Address at Washington, 4th of July, 1821. Second Edition, Cambridge, *passim.*

Representatives — the tyranny of the majority. In one of his juvenile essays, published in 1791, contending against a highly popular work, he opposed the theory that a State has the right to do what it pleases, declaring it had no right to do wrong.* In his old age he had not again to encounter the empty hypothesis of Thomas Paine, but the substantial enactment of the "Representatives" of the people of the United States. The hypothesis was trying to become a fact. The South had passed the infamous Gag-Law, which a symbolical man from New Hampshire had presented, though it originated with others.† By that law the mouth of the North was completely stopped in Congress, so that not one word could be said about the matter of slavery.

The North was quite willing to have it stopped, for it did not care to speak against slavery, and the Gag did not stop the mouth of the Northern purse. You may take away from the North its honor, if you can find it; may take away its rights; may imprison its free citizens in the jails of Louisiana and the Carolinas; yes, may invade the "sacred soil of the North," and kidnap a man out of Boston itself, within sight of Faneuil Hall, — and the North will not complain; will bear it with that patient shrug, waiting for yet further indignities. Only when the Northern Purse is touched is there an uproar. If the Postmaster demands silver for letters there is instant alarm; the repeal of a tariff rouses the feelings, and an embargo once drove the indignant North to the perilous edge of rebellion! Now Mr. Adams loved his dollars as well as most New England men; he looked out for their income as well; guarded as carefully against their outgo; though conscientiously upright in all his dealings, kind and hospitable, he has never been proved generous, and generosity is the commonest virtue of the North; — is said to have been "close," if not mean. He loved his dollars as well as most men — but he loved justice more; honor more; freedom more; the Unalienable Rights of man far more.

He looked on the Constitution as an instrument for the defence of the Rights of man. The government was to act as the people had told how. The Federal government was not sover-

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* *Answer to Paine's Rights of Man*, London, 1793, originally published in the Columbian Centinel. The London edition bears the name of *John Adams* on the title-page.

† Mr. Atherton.

eign; the State government was not sovereign;* neither was a court of ultimate appeal; — but the PEOPLE was sovereign; had the right of Eminent Domain over Congress and the Constitution, and making that, had set limits to the government. He guarded therefore against all violation of the Constitution, as a wrong done to the people; he would not overstep its limits in a bad cause; not even in a good one. Did Mr. Jefferson obtain Louisiana by a confessed violation of the Constitution, Mr. Adams would oppose the purchase of Louisiana, and was one of the six senators who voted against it. Making laws for that territory, he wished to extend the trial by jury to all criminal prosecutions, while the law limited that form of trial to capital offences. Before that Territory had a representative in Congress, the American government wished to collect a revenue there. Mr. Adams opposed that too. It was "assuming a dangerous power;" it was government without the consent of the governed, and therefore an unjust government. "All exercise of human authority must be under the limitation of right and wrong." All other power is despotic, and "in defiance of the laws of nature and of God."†

This love of freedom led him to hate and oppose the tyranny of the strong over the weak, to hate it most in its worst form — to hate American Slavery, doubtless the most infamous form of that tyranny now known amongst the nations of Christendom, and perhaps the most disgraceful thing on earth. Mr. Adams called slavery a vessel of dishonor so base that it could not be named in the Constitution with decency. In 1805, he wished to lay a duty on the importation of slaves, and was one of five senators who voted to that effect. He saw the power of this institution — the power of money and the power of votes which it gives to a few men. He saw how dangerous it was to the Union; to American liberty, to the cause of Man. He saw that it trod three millions of men down to the dust, counting souls but as cattle. He hated nothing as he hated this; fought against nothing so manfully. It was the Lion in the pathway of freedom, which frightened almost all the politicians of the North and the East and the West — so that they forsook that path; a Lion whose roar could well-nigh silence the Forum and the Bar, the Pulpit and the Press; a Lion who

* See Oration at Quincy, 1831, p. 12, et seq. (Boston, 1831.)
† The *Social Compact*, &c., &c. Providence. 1842. p. 24.

rent the Constitution, trampled under foot the Declaration of Independence, and tore the Bible to pieces. Mr. Adams was ready to rouse up this Lion, and then to beard him in his den. Hating slavery, of course he opposed whatever went to strengthen its power, — opposed Mr. Atherton's Gag-Law; opposed the annexation of Texas; opposed the Mexican war; and — wonderful to tell — actually *voted* against it, and never took back his vote.

When Secretary of State, this same feeling led him to oppose conceding to the British the right of searching American vessels supposed to be concerned in the slave-trade, and when Representative to oppose the repeal of the law giving "protection" to American sailors. It appeared also in private intercourse with men. No matter what was a man's condition, Mr. Adams treated him as an equal.

This devotion to freedom and the unalienable rights of man, was the most important work of his life. Compared with some other political men, he seems inconsistent, because he now opposes one evil, then its opposite evil. But his general course is in this direction, and, when viewed in respect to this idea, seems more consistent than that of Mr. Webster, or Calhoun, or Clay, when measured by any great principle. This appears in his earlier life. In 1802, he became a member of the Massachusetts Senate. The majority of the General Court were federalists. It was a time of intense political excitement — the second year of Mr. Jefferson's administration. The custom is well known — to take the whole of the Governor's Council from the party which has a majority in the General Court. On the 27th of May, 1802, Mr. Adams stood up for the rights of the minority. He wanted some anti-federalists in the Council of Governor Strong, and as Senator threw his first vote to secure that object. Such was the first legislative action of John Quincy Adams. In the House of Representatives, in 1831, the first thing he did was to present fifteen petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, though, from constitutional scruples, opposed to granting the petitions. The last public act of his life was this: — The question was before the House on giving medals to the men distinguished in the Mexican war; the minority opposing it wanted more time for debate; the previous question was moved, Mr. Adams voted for the last time, — voted "No," with unusual emphasis; the great loud No of a man

going home to God full of "the unalienable right of resistance to oppression," its emphatic word on his dying lips. There were the beginning, the middle, and the end, all three in the same spirit — all in favor of mankind; a remarkable unity of action in his political drama.

Somebody once asked him, What are the recognized principles of politics? Mr. Adams answered that there were none: the recognized precepts are bad ones, and so not *principles*. But, continued the inquirer, is not this a good one, — To seek "the greatest good of the greatest number"? No, said he, that is the worst of all, for it looks specious while it is ruinous. What shall become of the minority, in that case? This is the only principle to seek, — "the greatest good of all."

I do not say there were no exceptions to this devotion to freedom in a long life; there are some passages in his history which it is impossible to justify, and hard to excuse. In early life he was evidently ambitious of place, and rank, and political power. I must confess, it seems to me, at some times, he was not scrupulous enough about the means of attaining that place and power. He has been much censured for his vote in favor of the Embargo, in 1807. His vote, howsoever unwise, may easily have been an honest vote. To an impartial spectator at this day, perhaps it will be evidently so. His defence of it I cannot think an honest defence, for in that he mentions arguments as impelling him to his vote which could scarcely have been present to his mind at the time, and, if they were his arguments then, were certainly kept in silence — they did not appear in the debate,* they were not referred to in the President's message.†

I am not to praise Mr. Adams simply because he is dead; what is wrong before is wrong after death. It is no merit to die — shall we tell lies about him because he is dead? No, the

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* See Pickering's *Letter to Governor Sullivan, on the Embargo.* Boston. 1808. John Quincy Adams's *Letter to the Hon. H. G. Otis*, &c. Boston. 1808. Pickering's *Interesting Correspondence.* 1808. *Review of the Correspondence between the Hon. John Adams and the late William Cunningham*, &c. 1824. But see, also, Mr. Adams's "Appendix" to the above letter — published *sixteen* years after the vote on the Embargo. Baltimore. 1824. Mr. Pickering's *Brief Remarks on the Appendix.* August. 1824.

† Reference is here made to British "Orders in Council" of Nov. 22d, 1807 They were not officially made known to the American Congress till Feb. 7, 1808. They were, however, published in the National Intelligencer, the morning on which the Message was sent to the Senate, Dec. 18th, 1807, but were not mentioned in that document, or in the debate.

Egyptian people scrutinized and judged their kings after death —much more should we our fellow-citizens, intrusted with power to serve the State. "A lavish and undistinguishing eulogium is not praise." I know what coals of terrible fire lie under my feet, as I speak of this matter, and how thin and light is the coat of ashes deposited there in forty years; how easily they are blown away at the slightest breath of "Hartford Convention," or the "Embargo," and the old flame of political animosity blazes forth anew, while the hostile forms of "federalists" and "democrats" come back to light. I would not disquiet those awful shades, nor bring them up again. But a word must be said. The story of the embargo is well known: the President sent his message to the Senate recommending it, and accompanied with several documents. The message was read and assigned to a committee; the ordinary rule of business was suspended; the bill was reported by the committee; drafted, debated, engrossed, and completely passed through all its stages, the whole on the same day, in secret session, and in about four hours! Yet it was a bill that involved the whole commerce of the country, and prostrated that commerce, seriously affecting the welfare of hundreds of thousands of men. Eight hundred thousand tons of shipping were doomed to lie idle and rot in port. The message came on Friday. Some of the senators wanted yet further information and more time for debate, at least for consideration,—till Monday. It could not be! Till Saturday, then. No; the bill must pass now, no man sleeping on that question. Mr. Adams was the most zealous for passing the bill. In that "debate," if such it can be called, while opposing a postponement for further information and reflection, he said, "The President has recommended the measure on his high responsibility; I would *not consider*, I would *not deliberate;* I would *act.* Doubtless the *President possesses such further information as will justify the measure!*"* To my mind, that is the worst act of his public life; I cannot justify it. I wish I could find some reasonable excuse for it. What had become of the

* I copy this from the first letter of Mr. Pickering. Mr. Adams wrote a letter (to H. G. Otis) in reply to this of Mr. Pickering, but said nothing respecting the words charged upon him; but in 1824, in an appendix to that letter, he denies that he expressed the "sentiment" which Mr. Pickering charged him with. But he *does not deny the words themselves.* They rest on the authority of Mr. Pickering, his colleague in the Senate, a strong party man, it is true, perhaps not much disposed to conciliation, but a man of most unquestionable veracity. The "sentiment" speaks for itself.

"sovereignty of the people," "the unalienable right of resistance to oppression"? Would *not consider;* would *not deliberate;* would *act* without doing either; leave it all to the "high responsibility" of the President, with a "doubtless" he has "further information" to justify the measure! It was a shame to say so; it would have disgraced a senator in St. Petersburg. Why not have the "further information" laid before the Senate? What would Mr. Adams have said, if President Jackson, Tyler, or Polk, had sent such a message, and some senator or representative had counselled submissive action, without considering, without deliberation! With what appalling metaphors would he describe such a departure from the first duty of a statesman; how would the tempestuous eloquence of that old patriot shake the Hall of Congress till it rung again, and the nation looked up with indignation in its face! It is well known what Mr. Adams said in 1834, when Mr. Polk, in the House of Representatives, seemed over-laudatory of the President: "I shall never be disposed to interfere with any member who shall rise on this floor and pronounce a panegyric upon the chief magistrate.

> "No, LET the candied tongue lick absurd pomp,
> And crook the pregnant hinges of the knee
> Where THRIFT may follow fawning."

Yet the future of Mr. Polk was not so obvious in 1834, as the reward of Mr. Adams, in 1808.

This act is particularly glaring in Mr. Adams. The North often sends men to Washington who might have done it without any great inconsistency; men, too, not so remarkable for infirmity in the head, as for that less pardonable weakness — in the knees and the neck; men that bend to power "right or wrong." Mr. Adams was not afflicted with that weakness, and so the more to be censured for this palpable betrayal of a trust so important. I wish I could find some excuse for it. He was forty years old; not very old, but old enough to know better. His defence made the matter worse. The Massachusetts Legislature disapproved of his conduct; chose another man to succeed him in the Senate. Then Mr. Adams resigned his seat, and soon after was sent Minister to Russia, as he himself subsequently declared,* "in consequence of the support he had for years given to the measures of Mr.

* *Adams's Remarks in the House of Representatives*, Jan. 5, 1846.

Jefferson's administration against Great Britain." But his father said of that mission of his son, "Aristides is banished because he is too just."* It is easy to judge of the temper of the times, when such words as those of the father could be said on such an occasion, and that by a man who had been President of the United States! When a famine occurs, disease appears in the most hideous forms; men go back to temporary barbarism. In times of political strife, such diseases appear of the intellectual and moral powers. No man who did not live in those times can fully understand the obliquity of mind and moral depravity which then displayed themselves amongst those otherwise without reproach. Says Mr. Adams himself, referring to that period, "Imagination in her wildest vagaries can scarcely conceive the transformations of temper, the obliquities of intellect, the perversions of moral principle, effected by junctures of high and general excitement." However, it must be confessed that this, though not the only instance of injustice, is the only case of servile compliance with the Executive to be found in the whole life of the man. It was a grievous fault, but grievously did he answer it; and if a long life of unfaltering resistance to every attempt at assumption of power is fit atonement, then the expiation was abundantly made.

About the same time, Mr. Adams was chairman of a committee of the Senate appointed to consider the case of a senator from Ohio. His conduct on that occasion has been the theme of violent attack, and defence as violent. To the calm spectator at this day, his conduct seems unjustifiable, inconsistent with the counsels of Justice, which, though moving with her "pace of snail," looks always towards the Right, and will not move out of her track though the heavens fall.

While Mr. Adams was President, Hayti became free; but he did not express any desire that the United States should acknowledge her independence, and receive her minister at Washington, — an African plenipotentiary. In his message† he says, "There are circumstances that have hitherto forbidden the acknowledgment," and mentions "additional reasons for withholding that acknowledgment." In the instructions to the American functionary sent to the celebrated congress of Pana-

* *Correspondence between the Hon. John Adams and the late Wm. Cunningham, Esq.* Boston. 1823. Letter xliii. p. 150.

† March 15th, 1826.

ma, it is said, the President "is not prepared now to say that Hayti ought to be recognized as an independent sovereign power;" he "does not think it would be proper at this time to recognize it as a new state." He was unwilling to consent to the independence of Cuba, for fear of an insurrection of her slaves and the effect at home. The duty of the United States would be, "to defend themselves against the contagion of such near and dangerous examples," that would "constrain them . . . to employ all means necessary to their security." That is, the President would be constrained to put down the blacks in Cuba, who were exercising "the unalienable right of resistance to oppression," for fear the blacks in the United States would discover that they also were men, and had "unalienable rights"! Had he forgotten the famous words, "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to God"? The defence for such language on such an occasion is, that Mr. Adams's eyes were not yet open to the evil of slavery. That is a good defence, if true. To me it seems a true defence. Even great men do not see every thing. In 1800, Fisher Ames, while delivering the eulogy on General Washington, censured even the British government because "in the wilds of Africa it obstructed the commerce in slaves"! No man is so wise as mankind. It must be confessed that Mr. Adams, while Secretary of State, and again while President, showed no hostility to the institution of slavery. His influence all went the other way. He would repress the freedom of the blacks in the West Indies, lest American slavery should be disturbed and its fetters broke; he would not acknowledge the independence of Hayti, he would urge Spain to make peace with her descendants, for the same reason — "not for those new republics," but lest the negroes in Cuba and Porto Rico should secure their freedom. He negotiated with England, and she paid the United States more than a million of dollars* for the fugitive slaves who took refuge under her flag during the late war. Mr. Adams had no scruples about receiving the money during his administration. An attempt was repeatedly made by his Secretary, Mr. Clay, through Mr. Gallatin, and then through Mr. Barbour, to induce England to restore the "fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in the Canadian provinces," who, escaping from the area of freedom, seek the shelter of the British crown.† Nay, he

* See Mr. Adams's Message, Dec. 2, 1828. The exact sum was $1,197.422.18.
† See Mr. Clay's letter to Mr. A. H. Everett, April 27th, 1825; to Mr. Mid-

negotiated a treaty with Mexico, which bound her to deliver up fugitive slaves escaping from the United States — a treaty which the Mexican Congress refused to ratify! Should a great man have known better? Great men are not always wise. Afterwards, public attention was called to the matter; humble men gave lofty counsel; Mr. Adams used different language and recommended different measures. But long before that, on the 7th of December, 1804, Mr. Pickering, his colleague in the Senate of the United States, offered a resolution for the purpose of amending the Constitution so as to apportion representatives and direct taxes among the states according to their free inhabitants.

But there are other things in Mr. Adams's course and conduct which deserve the censure of a good man. One was, the attempt to justify the conduct of England in her late war with China, when she forced her opium upon the barbarians with the bayonet. To make out his case, he contended that "in the celestial empire . . . the patriarchal system of Sir Robert Filmer flourished in all its glory," and the Chinese claimed superior dignity over all others; they refused to hold equal and reciprocal commercial intercourse with other nations, and "it is time this enormous outrage upon the rights of human nature and the first principles of the laws of nations should cease."* It is true, the Chinese were "barbarians;" true, the English carried thither the Bible and Christianity, at least their own Christianity. But even by the law of nations, letting alone the law of nature, the barbarians had a right to repel both Bible and Christianity, when they came in a contraband shape — that of opium and cannon-balls. To justify this outrage of the strong against the weak, he quite forgets his old antipathy to England, his devotion to human freedom and the sovereignty of the people, calling the cause of England "a righteous cause."

He defended the American claim to the whole of Oregon, up to 54° 40′. He did not so much undertake to make out a title either by the law of nature or of nations, but cut the matter short, and claimed the whole of Oregon on the strength of the first chapter of Genesis. This was the argument: God

dleton, respecting the intervention of the Emperor of Russia, May 10th and Dec. 26th, 1825; to Mr. Gallatin, May 10th and June 19th, 1826, and Feb. 24th, 1827. Executive Documents, Second Session of the Twentieth Congress, Vol. I.

* Report of Mr. Adams's lecture on the Chinese War, in the Boston Atlas for Dec. 4th and 5th, 1841.

gave mankind dominion over all the earth.* "Between Christian nations, the command of the Creator lays the foundation of all titles to land, of titles to territory, of titles to jurisdiction." Then in the Psalms,† God gives the "uttermost parts of the earth for a possession" to the Messiah, as the Representative of all mankind, who held the uttermost parts of the earth *in chief*. But the Pope, as Head of the visible church, was the Representative of Christ, and so, holding under him, had the right to give to any king or prelate authority to subdue barbarous nations, possess their territory, and convert them to Christianity. In 1493, the Pope, in virtue of the above right, gave the American continent to the Spanish monarchs, who in time sold their title to the people of the United States. That title may be defective — as the Pope may not be the Representative of Christ, — and so the passage in the Psalms will not help the American claim, but then the United States will hold under the first clause in the Testament of God, that is, in Genesis. The claim of Great Britain is not valid, for she does not want the land for the purpose specified in that clause of the Testament, to "replenish the earth and subdue it." She wants it "that she may keep it open as a hunting-ground," while the United States want it that it may grow into a great nation and become a free and sovereign Republic.‡

This strange hypothesis, it seems, lay at the bottom of his defence of the British in their invasion of China. It would have led him, if consistent, to claim also the greater part of Mexico. But as he did not *publicly* declare his opinion on that matter, no more need be said concerning it.

Such was the most prominent Idea in his history; such the departures from it. Let us look at other events in his life. While President, the most important object of his administration was the promotion of internal improvements, especially the internal communication between the states. For this purpose the government lent its aid in the construction of roads and canals, and a little more than four millions of dollars were devoted to this work in his administration. On

* Genesis i., 26 – 28.

† Psalms ii., 6 – 8.

‡ See Mr. Adams's speech on Oregon, Feb. 9th, 1846. Arguments somewhat akin to this may be found also in the oration delivered at Newburyport, before cited.

the 4th of July, 1828, he helped break ground for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, thinking it an important event in his life. He then said there were three great steps in the progress of America. The first was the Declaration of Independence and the achievement thereof; the second, the union of the whole country under the Constitution; but the third was more arduous than both of the others: "It is," said he, "the adaptation of the powers, physical, moral, and intellectual, of the whole Union, to the improvement of its own condition; — of its *moral* and *political* condition, by wise and liberal institutions,— by the cultivation of the understanding and the heart, — by academies, schools, and learned institutes,— by the pursuit and patronage of learning and the arts; of its *physical* condition, by associated labor to improve the bounties and supply the deficiencies of nature; to stem the torrent in its course; to level the mountain with the plain; to disarm and fetter the raging surge of the ocean."* He faithfully adhered to these words in his administration.

He was careful never to exceed the powers which the Constitution prescribed for him. He thought the acquisition of Louisiana was "accomplished by a flagrant violation of the Constitution,"† and himself guarded against such violations. He revered the God of Limits, who, in the Roman mythology, refused to give way or remove, even for Jupiter himself. No man was ever more conscientious on that ground. To him the Constitution meant something; his oath to keep it meant something.

No great political events occurred in his administration; the questions which now vex the country had not arisen. There was no quarrel between Freedom and Slavery; no man in Congress ventured to denounce slavery as a crime; the African slave-trade was thought wrong, not the slavery which caused it. Party lines, obliterated under Mr. Monroe's administration, were *viewed* and marked with a good deal of care and exactness; but the *old* lines could not be wholly restored. Mr. Adams was not the President of a section of the country; not the President of a party, but of the nation. He favored no special interest of a class, to the injury of another class. He did not reward his friends, nor punish his foes; the Party of the Spoils — patent or latent at all times — got no spoils

* Address on breaking ground for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.
† Jubilee of the Constitution, p. 99.

from him. He never debauched his country by the removal and appointment of officers. Had he done otherwise, done as all his successors have done — used his actual power to promote his own ambition — no doubt he might have been re-elected. But HE could not stoop to manage men in that way. No doubt he desired a reëlection, and saw the method and means to effect that, but Conscience said, "It is not right." He forbore, lost his election, and gained — we shall soon see what he gained.

On the 19th of July, 1826, at a public dinner at Edgefield Court House, South Carolina, Mr. Mc'Duffie said, "Mr. Adams came into power upon principles utterly subversive of the republican system; substituting the worst species of aristocracy — that of speculating politicians and office-hunters — in the place of a sound and wholesome republican democracy." When Mr. Adams retired from office, he could remember, with the virtuous Athenian, that no man had put on mourning for him because unjustly deprived of his post. Was an office-holder or an office-wanter a political friend of Mr. Adams, that did not help him; — a foe, that did not hinder. He looked only to the man's ability and integrity. I wish it was no praise to say these things,— but it is praise I dare not apply to any other man since Washington. Mr. Adams once said, "There is no official act of the chief-magistrate, however momentous, or however minute, but it should be traceable to a dictate of duty pointing to the welfare of the people." That was his executive creed.

As a public servant he had many qualities seldom united in the same person. He was simple and unostentatious; he had none of the airs of a great man; seemed humble, modest, and retiring; caring much for the substance of manhood, he let the show take care of itself. He carried the simplicity of a plain New England man into the President's house, spending little in its decorations — about one fourth, it is said, of the amount of his successor. In his housekeeping, public or private, there was only one thing much to be boasted of and remarked upon: strange to say, that was the master of the house. He was never eclipsed by his own brass and mahogany. He had what are called democratic habits, and served himself in preference to being served by others. He treated all that were about him with a marked deference and courtesy, carrying his respect for human Rights into the minutest details of common life.

He was a model of diligence, though not, perhaps, very systematic. His State papers, prepared while he was Minister, Secretary, or Member of Congress, his numerous orations and speeches, though not always distinguished for that orderly arrangement of parts which is instinctive with minds of a high philosophical character — are yet astonishing for their number and the wide learning they display. He was well acquainted with the classic and most modern languages; at home in their literature. He was surprisingly familiar with modern history; perhaps no political man was so thoroughly acquainted with the political history of America, and that of Christian Europe for the last two hundred years. He was widely read and profoundly skilled in all that relates to diplomacy, and to international law. He was fond of Belles Lettres, and commented on Shakspeare more like a professor than a layman in that department. Few theologians in America, it is said, were so widely read in their peculiar lore as he. He had read much, remembered much, understood much. However, he seems to have paid little attention to physical science, and perhaps less to metaphysical. His speeches and his conversation, though neither brilliant, nor rich in ideas, astonished young men with an affluence of learning which seemed marvellous in one all his life devoted to practical affairs. But this is a trifle: to achieve that nothing is needed but health, diligence, memory, and a long life. Mr. Adams had all these requisites.

He had higher qualities: he loved his country, perhaps no man more so; he had patriotism in an heroic degree, yet was not thereby blinded to Humanity. He thought it a vital principle of human society, that each nation should contribute to the happiness of all; and, therefore, that no nation should "regulate its conduct by the exclusive or even the paramount consideration of its own interest."* Yet he loved his country, his whole country, and when she was in the wrong he told her so, because he loved her. This, said he, would be a good sentiment: "Our Country! May she be always successful; but, whether successful or not — may she be always in the right." He saw the faults of America — saw the corruption of the American government. He did not make gain by this in private — but set an honest face against it.

He was a conscientious man. This peculiarity is strongly marked in most of his life. He respected the limit between

* Lecture on China.

right and wrong. He did not think it unworthy of a statesman to refer to moral principles — the Absolutely Right. I do not mean to say, that in his whole life there was no departure from the strict rule of duty. I have mentioned already some examples, but kept one more for this place: he pursued persons with a certain vindictiveness of spirit. I will not revive again the old quarrels, nor dig up his hard words, long ago consigned to oblivion; it would be unjust to the living. He was what is called a good hater. If he loved an idea, he seemed to hate the man who opposed it. He was not content with replying; he must also retort, though it manifestly weakened the force of the reply. In his attacks on persons he was sometimes unjust, violent, sharp, and vindictive; sometimes cruel, and even barbarous. Did he ever forgive an enemy? Every opponent was a foe, and he thrashed his foes with an iron hoof and winnowed them with a storm. The most awful specimens of invective which the language affords can be found in his words — bitter, revengeful, and unrelenting. I am sorry to say these things; it hurts my feelings to say them, yours not less to hear them. But it is not our fault they are true; — it would be mine, if, knowing they were true, I did not on this occasion point them out in warning words. Mr. Adams says that Roger Williams was conscientious and contentious; it is equally true of himself. Perhaps Mr. Adams had little humor, but certainly a giant's wit; he used it tyrannously and like a giant. Wit has its place in debate; in controversy, it is a legitimate weapon, offensive and defensive. After one has beaten the single barley-corn of good sense out of a whole wagon-load of chaff, the easiest way to be rid of the rubbish is to burn it up with the lightning of wit; the danger is, that the burning should begin before the separation is made; that the fire consume the good and bad indifferently. When argument is edged and pointed with wit, it is doubly effective; but when that edge is jagged with ill-will, poisoned, too, with personal spleen, then it becomes a weapon unworthy of a man. Sometimes Mr. Adams used his wit as fairly as his wisdom; and bags of wind, on which Hercules might have stamped and beaten a twelvemonth, but in vain — at a single puncture from that keen wit gave up their ghost and flattened into nothing; a vanity to all men, but a vexation of spirit to him who had blown them so full of his own soul. But sometimes — yes, often, Mr. Adams's wit performs a different part: it sits as a judge — unjust and unforgiving — "often deciding wrong, and

when right from wrong motives." It was the small dagger with which he smote the fallen foe. It is a poor praise for a famous man — churchman, or statesman — to beat a blackguard with his own weapons. It must be confessed, that in controversy Mr. Adams's arrows were sharp and deftly delivered; but they were often barbed, and sometimes poison.

True, he encountered more political opposition than any man in the nation. For more than forty years he has never been without bitter and unrelenting enemies, public and private. No man in America, perhaps, ever had such provocations; surely, none had ever such opportunities to reply without retorting. How much better would it have been, if, at the end of that long life and fifty years war, he could say he had never wasted a shot; had never sinned with his lips, nor once feathered his public arrow with private spleen! Wise as he was, and old, he never learned that for undeserved calumny, for personal insult and abuse, there is one answer, Christian, manly, and irrefutable — the dignity of silence. A just man can afford to wait till the storm of abuse shall spend its rage and vanish under the rainbow, which itself furnishes and leaves behind. The retorting speech of such a man may be silvern or iron, — his silence, victorious and golden.

It is easy to censure Mr. Adams for such intemperance of speech and persecution of persons; unfortunately, too easy to furnish other examples of both. We know what he spoke — God only what he repressed. Who knows out of how deep a fulness of indignation such torrents gush? Tried by the standard of other men — his fellow politicians of America and Europe, he was no worse than they — only abler. The mouse and the fox have as great a proportionate anger as the lion, though the one is ridiculous and the other terrific. Mr. Adams must be tried by his own standard — the rule of right, the standard of Conscience and of Christianity, — then surely he did wrong. For such a man the vulgarity of the offence is no excuse.*

With this and the other exceptions he appears a remarkably conscientious man in his public life. He may often have erred — as all men — without violating his own sense of right.

While he was President he would not consent to any "public manifestation of honors personal to himself." He would

* See his defence of this in his Address to his constituents at Braintree, Sept. 17th, 1842. (Boston, 1842.) P. 56 et seq.

not accept a present, for his Bible taught him what experience continually enforced, that a gift blinds the eyes of wise men and perverts their judgment. While at St. Petersburg, the Russian Minister of the Interior, then an old man, felt uneasy on account of the presents accepted during his official service, and, calculating the value of all gifts received, returned it to the imperial treasury. This fact made an impression on Mr. Adams, and led to a resolution which he faithfully kept. When a bookseller sent him a costly Bible, he kept the book, but paid its full value. No bribes, no pensions in any form, ever soiled justice in his hands. He would never be indebted to any body of men, lest they might afterwards sway him from the right path.

Because he was a conscientious man he would never be the servant of a party, and never was. It was of great advantage to him that he was absent while the two great parties were forming in the United States. He came into the Massachusetts Legislature as a federalist, but some anti-federalists also voted for him. His first vote showed he was not limited by the common principles of a party. He was chosen to the Senate of the United States, not by a party vote. At first he acted mainly with the federalists, though not always voting with his colleague, but in 1807 acted with the administration in the matter of the Embargo. This was the eventful crisis of his life; this change in his politics, while it gave him station and political power, yet brought upon him the indignation of his former friends; it has never been forgotten nor forgiven. Be the outward occasion and inward motive what they may, this led to the sundering of friendships long cherished and deservedly dear; it produced the most bitter experience of his life. Political men would naturally undertake to judge his counsel by its probable and obvious consequences — the favor of the executive — rather than attribute it to any latent motive of patriotism in his heart.

While at the head of the nation he would not be the President of a Party, but of the People; when he became a Representative in Congress he was not the delegate of a party, but of Justice and the eternal Right, giving his constituents an assurance that he would hold himself in allegiance to no party, national or political. He has often been accused of hatred to the South: I can find no trace of it. "I entered Congress," says he, "without one sentiment of discrimination between the North and South." At first he acted with Mr. Jackson, to

arrest the progress of nullification, for the democracy of South Carolina was putting in practice what the federalists of New England have so often been alleged to have held in theory, and condemned on that allegation. Here he was consistent. In 1834, he approved the spirit of the same president in demanding justice of France; but afterwards he did not hesitate to oppose, and perhaps abuse him.

He had a high reverence for religion; none of our public men more. He aimed to be a Christian man. Signs of this have often been sought in his habits of church-going, of reading the Bible,—they may be found rather in the general rectitude of his life, public and private, and in the high motives which swayed him, in his opposition to slavery, in the self-denial which cost him his reëlection. In his public acts he seems animated by the thought that he stood in the presence of God. Though rather unphilosophical in his theology, resting to a great degree on the authority of tradition and the letter, and attaching much value to forms and times, he yet saw the peculiar excellence of Christianity,—that it recognized "Love as the paramount and transcendent Law of human nature." I do not say that his life indicates the attainment of a complete religious repose, but that he earnestly and continually labored to achieve that. You shall find few statesmen, few men, who act with a more continual and obvious reference to religion as a motive, as a guide, as a comfort. He was, however, no sectarian. His devotion to freedom appeared —where it seldom appears—in his notions about religion. He thought for himself, and had a theology of his own, rather old-fashioned, it is true, and not very philosophical or consistent, it may be—and in that he was not very singular—but he allowed others to think also for themselves, and have a theology of their own. Mr. Adams was a Unitarian. It is no great merit to be a Unitarian, or a Calvinist, or a Catholic, perhaps no more merit to be one than the other. But he was not ashamed of his belief when Unitarianism was little, despised, mocked at, and called "infidelity" on all sides. When the Unitarian church at Washington, a small and feeble body, met for worship in an upper room—not large, but obscure, over a public bathing-house—John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State and expecting to be President, came regularly to worship with them. It was not fashionable; it was hardly respectable, for the Unitarians were not then, as now, numerous and rich: but he went and worshipped. It

was no merit to think with any sect, it was a great merit to dare be true to his convictions. In his theology, as in politics, he feared not to stand in a minority. If there ever was an American who loved the praise of God more than the praise of men, I believe Mr. Adams was one.

His devotion to freedom, his love of his country, his conscientiousness, his religion, are four things strong and noticeable in his character. You shall look long amongst our famous men before you find his equal in these things.*

Somebody says, no man ever used all his intellectual faculties as far as possible. If any man is an exception to this rule, it is Mr. Adams. He was temperate and diligent; industrious almost to a fault, though not orderly or systematic. His diplomatic letters, his orations, his reports and speeches, all indicate wide learning, the fruit of the most remarkable diligence. The attainments of a well-bred scholar are not often found in the American Congress, or the President's house. Yet he never gives proof that he had the mind of a great man. In his special department of politics he does not appear as a master. He has no great ideas with which to solve the riddles of commerce and finance; has done little to settle the commercial problems of the world, — for that work there is needed not only a retrospective acquaintance with the habits and history of men, but the foresight which comes from a knowledge of the nature of things and of man. His chief intellectual excellence seems to have been Memory; his great moral merit, a conscientious and firm Honesty; his practical strength lay in his Diligence. His counsels seem almost always to have come from a knowledge of human history, seldom to have been prompted by a knowledge of the nature of man. Hence he was a critic of the past, or an administrator of the present, rather than a prophetic guide for the future. He had many facts and precedents, but few ideas. Few examples of great political foresight can be quoted from his life; and therein — to his honor be it spoken — his heart seems to have

* In a public address, Mr. Adams once quoted the well-known words of Tacitus, Annal VI., 39, — *Par negotiis neque supra*, — applying them to a distinguished man lately deceased. A lady wrote to inquire whence they came. Mr. Adams informed her, and added, they could not be adequately translated in less than seven words in English. The lady replied that they might be well translated in five — *Equal to not above duty*, but better in three — JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

outtravelled his head. The public affairs of the United States seem generally to be conducted by many men of moderate abilities, rather than by a few men of great genius for politics.

Mr. Adams wrote much. Some of his works are remarkable for their beauty, for the graceful proportions of their style, and the felicity of their decoration. Such are his celebrated lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, which are sufficiently learned and sagacious, not very philosophical, but written in an agreeable style, and at the present day not wholly without value. His review of the works of Fisher Ames — I speak only of the rhetoric — is, perhaps, the finest of his compositions. Some of his productions are disorderly, ill-compacted, without "joints or contexture," and homely to a fault: this oration is a growth out of a central thought, marked by an internal harmony; that, a composition, a piece of carpentry distinguished by only an outward symmetry of members; others are neither growth nor composition, only a mass of materials huddled and lumped together. Most of his later productions, with the exception of his congressional speeches, are hard, cold, and unfinished performances, with little order in the thoughts, and less beauty in the expression. His extemporaneous speeches have more of both; they are better finished than his studied orations. He could judge and speak with fury, though he wrote with phlegm. His illustrations are usually drawn from literature, not from nature or human life; his language is commonly cold, derived from the Roman stream which has been filtered through books, rather than from the deep and original well of our Saxon home. His published letters are compact, written in a cold style, without playfulness or wit, with no elegance, and though mostly business letters, they are not remarkable for strength or distinctness. His diligence appears in verse as well as prose. He wrote much that rhymed tolerably; little that was poetical. The same absence of nature, the same coldness and lack of inspiration, mark his poetry and prose. But in all that he wrote, with the exceptions mentioned above, though you miss the genial warmth, the lofty thought, the mind that attracts, embraces, warms, and inspires the reader, you find always a spirit of Humanity, of Justice, and Love to God.

Mr. Adams was seldom eloquent. Eloquence is no great gift. It has its place among subordinate powers, not among the chief. Alas for the statesman or the preacher who has

only that to save the State withal! Washington had none of it, yet how he ruled the land! No man in America has ever had a political influence so wide and permanent as Mr. Jefferson; yet he was a very indifferent writer, and never made a speech of any value. The Acts of Washington, the Ideas of Jefferson, made eloquence superfluous. True, it has its value: if a man have at command the electricity of Truth, Justice, Love, the sentiments and great ideas thereof, it is a good thing to be able with Olympian hand to condense that electric fire into bolted eloquence; to thunder and lighten in the sky. But if a man have that electric Truth it matters little whether it is Moses that speaks, or only Aaron; whether or not Paul's bodily presence be weak and his speech contemptible, — it is Moses' thought which thunders and lightens out of Sinai; it is Paul's idea that is powerful and builds up the church. Of true eloquence, the best thoughts put in the best words, and uttered in the best form, Mr. Adams had little, and that appeared mainly in the latter part of his life. Hundreds have more. What passes for eloquence is common in America, where the public mouth is always a-going. His early orations are poor in their substance and faulty in their form; his ability as an orator developed late; no proofs of it appear before he entered the House of Representatives, at a good old age. In his manner of speaking there was little dignity and no grace, though sometimes there was a terrible energy and fire. He was often a powerful speaker — by his facts and figures, by his knowledge, his fame, his age, and his position, but most of all by his independent character. He spoke worthily of great men, of Madison or Lafayette, kindling with his theme, and laying aside all littleness of a party. However, he was most earnest and most eloquent not when he stood up the champion of a neglected truth, not when he dwelt on great men now venerable to us all, but when he gathered his strength to attack a foe. Incensed, his sarcasm was terrific; colossal vanity aspiring to be a Ghenghis Khan, at the touch of that Ithuriel spear shrank to the dimensions of Tom Thumb. His invective is his masterpiece of oratoric skill. It is sad to say this, and to remember, that the greatest works of ancient or of modern rhetoric, from the thundering Philippics of Demosthenes down to the sarcastic and crazy rattle of Lord Brougham, are all of the same character, are efforts against a personal foe! Men find hitherto the ablest acts and speech in the same cause, — not positive and creating, but critical and combative — in war.

If Mr. Adams had died in 1829, he would have been remembered for a while as a learned man; as an able diplomatist, who had served his country faithfully at home and abroad; as a President spotless and incorruptible, but not as a very important personage in American history. His mark would have been faint and soon effaced from the sands of time. But the last period of his life was the noblest. He had worn all the official honors which the nation could bestow; he sought the greater honor of serving that nation, who had now no added boon to give. All that he had done as Minister abroad, as Senator, Secretary, and President, is little compared with what he did in the House of Representatives; and while he stood there, with nothing to hope, with nothing to fear, the hand of Justice wrote his name high up on the walls of his country. It was surprising to see at his first attendance there, men who, while he was President, had been the loudest to call out "Coalition, Bargain, Intrigue, Corruption," come forward and express the involuntary confidence they felt in his wisdom and integrity, and their fear, actual though baseless, that his withdrawal from the Committee on Manufactures would "endanger the very Union itself."* Great questions soon came up — Nullification was speedily disposed of; the Bank and the Tariff got ended or compromised, but Slavery lay in the consciousness of the nation, like the one dear but appalling sin in a man's heart. Some wished to be rid of it — Northern men and Southern men. It would come up; to justify that, or excuse it, the American sentiment and idea must be denied and rejected utterly; the South, who had long known the charms of Bathsheba, was ready for her sake to make way with Uriah himself. To remove that monstrous evil, gradually but totally, and restore unity to the nation, would require a greater change than the adoption of the Constitution. To keep slavery out of sight, yet in existence, unjustified, unexcused, unrepented of, a contradiction in the national consciousness, a political and deadly sin — the sin against the Holy Spirit of American Liberty, known but not confessed, the public secret of the people — that would lead to suppressing petitions, suppressing debate in Congress and out of Congress, to silencing the pulpit, the press, and the people.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Adams went to Congress, an old man, well known on both sides the water, the presi-

* Remarks of Mr. Cambreleng.

dential laurels on his brow, independent and fearless, expecting no reward from men for services however great. In respect to the subject of slavery, he had no ideas in advance of the nation; he was far behind the foremost men. He "deprecated all discussion of slavery or its abolition, in the House, and gave no countenance to petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or the territories." However, he acquired new ideas as he went on, and became the congressional leader in the great movement of the American mind towards universal freedom.

Here he stood as the champion of human rights; here he fought, and with all his might. In 1836, by the celebrated resolution forbidding debate on the subject of slavery, the South drove the North to the wall, nailed it there into shameful silence. A "Northern man with Southern principles," before entering the President's chair, declared, that if Congress should pass a law to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, he would exercise his veto to prevent the law. Mr. Adams stood up manfully, sometimes almost alone, and contended for freedom of speech. Did obstinate men of the North send petitions relative to slavery, asking for its abolition in the District or elsewhere — Mr. Adams was ready to present the petitions. Did women petition — it made no difference with him. Did slaves petition — he stood up there to defend their right to be heard. The South had overcome many an obstacle, but that one fearless soul would not bend and could not be broken. Spite of rules of order he contrived to bring the matter perpetually before Congress, and sometimes to read the most offensive parts of the petitions. When Arkansas was made a state, he endeavored to abolish slavery in its domain; he sought to establish international relations with Hayti, and to secure the right of suffrage for the colored citizens of the District of Columbia. The laws which forbid blacks to vote in the Northern states he held "in utter abhorrence."

He saw from afar the plots of Southern politicians, plots for extending the area of slavery, for narrowing the area of freedom, and exposed those plots. You all remember the tumult it excited when he rose in his place holding a petition from slaves — that the American Congress was thrown into long and disgraceful confusion; you cannot have forgotten the uproar which followed his presenting a petition to dissolve the

Union!* I know few speeches more noble and manly than his on the right of petition, — occasioned by that celebrated attempt to stifle debate, — and on the annexation of Texas. Some proposed to censure him, some clamored, "expel him," some cried out, "burn the petitions," and "him with them," screamed yet others. Some threatened to have him indicted by the Grand Jury of the District, "or be made amenable to *another tribunal*," hoping to see "an incendiary brought to condign punishment." "My life on it," said a Southern legislator, "if he presents that petition from slaves, we shall yet see him within the walls of the penitentiary." Some in secret threatened to assassinate him in the streets. They mistook their man; with Justice on his side he did "not fear all the grand juries in the universe." He would not curl nor cringe, but snorted his defiance in their very face. In front of ridicule, of desertion, obloquy, rage, and brutal threats, stood up that old man, bold and audacious, and the chafed rock of Cohasset stands not firmer mid the yesty waves, nor more triumphant spurns back into the ocean's face the broken billows of the storm. That New England knee bent only before his God. That unpretending man — the whole power of the nation could not move him from his post.

Men threatened to increase the slave power. Said one of the champions of slavery with prophetic speech — but fatal as Cassandra's in the classic tale, Americans "would come up in thousands to plant the lone star of the Texan banner on the Mexican capitol. . . . The boundless wealth of captured towns and rifled churches, and a lazy, vicious, and luxurious priesthood, would soon enable Texas to pay her soldiery and redeem her state debt; and push her victorious arms to the very shores of the Pacific. And would not all this extend the bounds of slavery? Yes, the result would be, that before another quarter of a century the extension of slavery would not stop short of the western ocean." Against this danger Mr. Adams armed himself, and fought in the holiest cause — the cause of human rights.

I know few things in modern times so grand as that old man standing there in the House of Representatives, the compeer

* See the Debates of the House, January 23d and following, 1837; or Mr. Adams's own account of the matter in his letters to his constituents, &c. (Boston, 1837.) See, too, his series of speeches on the Right of Petition and the Annexation of Texas, Jan. 14th and following, 1838. (Printed in a pamphlet. Washington, 1838.)

of Washington, a man who had borne himself proudly in kings' courts, early doing service in high places, where honor may be won; a man who had filled the highest office in any nation's gift; a President's son, himself a President, standing there the champion of the neediest of the oppressed: the conquering cause pleased others; him only, the cause of the conquered. Had he once been servile to the hands that wielded power? no thunderbolt can scare him now! Did he once make a treaty and bind Mexico to bewray the wandering fugitive who took his life in his hand and fled from the talons of the American Eagle? — Now he would go to the stake sooner than tolerate such a deed! When he went to the Supreme Court, after an absence of thirty years, and arose to defend a body of friendless negroes torn from their home and most unjustly held in thrall; when he asked the judges to excuse him at once both for the trembling faults of age and the inexperience of youth, the man having labored so long elsewhere that he had forgotten the rules of Court; when he summed up the conclusion of the whole matter, and brought before those judicial but yet moistening eyes the great men whom he had once met there — Chase, Cushing, Martin, Livingston, and Marshal himself; and while he remembered them that were "gone, gone, all gone," remembered also the eternal justice that is never gone, — why the sight was sublime. It was not an old patrician of Rome who had been Consul, Dictator, coming out of his honored retirement at the Senate's call, to stand in the Forum to levy new armies, marshal them to victory afresh, and gain thereby new laurels for his brow; — but it was a plain citizen of America, who had held an office far greater than that of Consul, King, or Dictator, his hand reddened by no man's blood, expecting no honors, but coming in the name of justice to plead for the slave, for the poor barbarian negro of Africa, for Cinque and Grabbo, for their deeds comparing them to Harmodius and Aristogeiton, whose classic memory made each bosom thrill. That was worth all his honors, — it was worth while to live fourscore years for that.

When he stood in the House of Representatives, the champion of the rights of a minority, of the rights of man, he stood colossal. Frederick the Great seems doubly so, when, single-handed, "that son of the Dukes of Brandenburgh" contended against Austria, France, England, Russia, kept them all at bay, divided by his skill, and conquered by his might. Surely he seems great when measured merely by his

deeds. But in comparison, Frederick the Great seems Frederick the little: for Adams fought not for a kingdom nor for fame, but for justice and the eternal right; fought, too, with weapons tempered in a heavenly stream!*

He had his reward. Who ever missed it? From mythological Cain who slew his brother, down to Judas Iscariot and Aaron Burr; from Jesus of Nazareth down to the least man that dies or lives — who ever lost his reward? None. No; not one. Within the wicked heart there dwells the avenger, with unseen hands to adjust the cord, to poison the fatal bowl. In the inpenetrable citadel of a good man's consciousness, unseen by mortal eyes, there stands the Palladium of Justice, radiant with celestial light; mortal hands may make and mar, — this they can mar not, no more than they can make. Things about the man can others build up or destroy; but no foe, no tyrant, no assassin, can ever steal the man out of the man. Who would not have the consciousness of being right, even of trying to be right, though affronted by a whole world, rather than conscious of being wrong and hollow and false, have all the honors of a nation on his head? Of late years no party stood up for Mr. Adams, "the madman of Massachusetts," as they called him on the floor of Congress; but he knew that he had, and in his old age, done one work, — he had contended for the unalienable rights of man, done it faithfully. The government of God is invisible, His justice the more certain, — and by that Mr. Adams had his abundant reward.

But he had his poorer and outward rewards, negative and positive. For his zeal in behalf of freedom he was called "a monarchist in disguise," "an alien to the true interests of his country," "a traitor." A slave-holder from Kentucky published to *his* constituents that he "was sincerely desirous to check that man, for if he could be removed from the councils of the nation, or silenced upon the exasperating subject to which he seems to have devoted himself, none other, I believe, could be found hardy enough or bad enough to fill his place." It was worth something to have an enemy speak such praise as that: but the slave-holder was wrong in his conjecture; the North has yet other sons not less hardy, not more likely to

* "Acer et indomitus, quo spes, quoque ira vocasset,
Ferre manum, et nunquam temerando parcere ferro;
Successus urgere suos; instare favori
Numinis; impellens quicquid sibi summa petenti
Obstaret, gaudensque viam fecisse ruina."

be silenced. Still more praise of a similar sort: — at a fourth of July dinner at Walterborough, in South Carolina, this sentiment was proposed and responded to with nine cheers, — "May we never want a democrat to trip up the heels of a federalist, or a hangman to prepare a halter for John Quincy Adams." Considering what he had done and whence those rewards proceeded, that was honor enough for a yet greater man.

Let me turn to things more grateful. Mr. Adams, through lack of genial qualities, had few personal friends, yet from good men throughout the North there went up a hearty thanksgiving for his manly independence, and prayers for his success. Brave men forgot their old prejudices, forgot the "embargo," forgot the "Hartford convention," forgot all the hard things which he had ever said, forgot his words in the Senate, forgot their disappointments, and said — For this our hearts shall honor thee, thou brave old man! In 1843, when, for the first time, he visited the West, to assist at the foundation of a scientific institution, all the West rose up to do him reverence. He did not go out to seek honors, they came to seek him. It was the movement of a noble people, feeling a noble presence about them no less than within. When Cicero, the only great man whom Rome never feared, returned from his exile, all Italy rose up and went out to meet him; so did the North and the West welcome this champion of freedom, this venerable old man. They came not to honor one who had been a president, but one who was a Man. That alone, said Mr. Adams, with tears of joy and grief filling his eyes, was reward enough for all that he had done, suffered, or undertaken. Yes, it was too much; too much for one man as the reward of one life!

You all remember the last time he was at any public meeting in this city. A man had been kidnapped in Boston, kidnapped at noon-day, "on the high road between Faneuil Hall and old Quincy," and carried off to be a slave! New England hands had seized their brother, sold him into bondage for ever, and his children after him. In the presence of Slavery, as of arms, the laws are silent, — not always men. Then it appears who *are* men, who not! A meeting was called to talk the matter over, in a plain way, and look in one another's faces. Who was fit to preside in such a case? That old man sat in the chair in Faneuil Hall; above him was the image of his father, and his own; around him were Han-

cock and the other Adams — Washington, greatest of all; before him were the men and women of Boston, met to consider the wrongs done to a miserable negro slave; the roof of the old Cradle of Liberty spanned over them all. Forty years before, a young man and a senator, he had taken the chair at a meeting called to consult on the wrong done to American seamen, violently impressed by the British from an American ship of war — the unlucky Chesapeake; some of you remember that event. Now, an old man, clothed with half a century of honors, he sits in the same hall, to preside over a meeting to consider the outrage done to a single slave; a greater outrage — alas, not done by a hostile, not by an alien hand! One was the first meeting of citizens he ever presided over, the other was the last; both for the same object — the defence of the eternal right.

But I would not weary you. His death was noble; fit ending for such a life. He was an old man, the last that had held a diplomatic office under Washington. He had uttered his oracles; had done his work. The highest honors of the nation he had worthily worn; but, as his townsmen tell us, — caring little for the president, and much for the man, — that was very little in comparison with his character. The good and ill of the human cup he had tasted, and plentifully, too, as son, husband, father. He had borne his testimony for freedom and the rights of mankind; he had stood in Congress almost alone; with a few gallant men had gone down to the battle-field, and if victory escaped him, it was because night came on. He saw others enter the field in good heart, to stand in the imminent deadly breach; he lived long enough for his own welfare, for his own ambition; long enough to see the seal broken, — and then, this aged Simeon, joyful in the consolation, bowed his head and went home in peace. *His* feet were not hurt with fetters; he died with his armor on; died like a Senator in the capitol of the nation; died like an American, in the service of his country; died like a Christian, full of immortality; died like a man, fearless and free!

You will ask what was the secret of his strength; whence did he gain such power to stand erect where others so often cringed and crouched low to the ground? 'T is plain to see: he looked beyond Time, beyond men; looked to the eternal God, and fearing him forgot all other fear. Some of his failings he knew to be such, and struggled with them though he

did not overcome. A man, perhaps not over modest, once asked him what he most of all lamented in his life, and he replied, My impetuous temper and vituperative speech; that I have not always returned good for evil, but in the madness of my blood have said things that I am ashamed of before my God! As the world goes, it needed some greatness to say that.

When he was a boy, his mother, a still woman, and capable, deep-hearted, and pious, took great pains with his culture; most of all with his religious culture. When, at the age of ten, he was about to leave home for years of absence in another land, she took him aside to warn him of temptations which he could not then understand. She bade him remember Religion and his God — his secret, silent prayer. Often in his day there came the earthquake of party strife; the fire, the storm, and the whirlwind of passion; he listened — and God was not there; but there came, too, the remembrance of his mother's whispered words; God came in that memory, and earthquake and storm, the fire and the whirlwind were powerless, at last, before that still small voice. Beautifully did she write to her boy of ten, "Great learning and superior abilities will be of little value . . . unless virtue, honor, truth, and integrity, are added to them. Remember that you are accountable to your Maker for all your words and your actions." "Dear as you are to me," says this more than Spartan, this Christian mother, "Dear as you are to me, I would much rather you should have found your grave in the ocean you have crossed, or that any untimely death cross you in your infant years, than see you an immoral, profligate, or graceless child. Let your observations and comparisons produce in your mind an abhorrence of domination and power — the parents of slavery, ignorance, and barbarism. May you be led to an imitation of that disinterested patriotism and that noble love of your country, which will teach you to despise wealth, titles, pomp, and equipage, as mere external advantages, which cannot add to the internal excellence of your mind, or compensate for the want of integrity and virtue." She tells him in a letter, that her father, a plain New England clergyman, of Braintree, who had just died, "left you a legacy more valuable than gold or silver; he left you his blessing, and his prayers that you might become a useful citizen, a guardian of the Laws, Liberty, and Religion of your country. . . . . Lay this bequest up

in your memory and practise upon it; believe me, you will find it a treasure that neither moth nor rust can destroy."

If a child have such a mother, there is no wonder why he stood fearless, and bore a charmed life which no opposition could tame down. I wonder more that one so born and by such a mother bred, could even once bend a servile knee; could ever indulge that fierce and dreadful hate; could ever stoop to sully those hands which hers had joined in prayer. It ill accords with teachings like her own. I wonder that he could ever have refused to "deliberate." Religion is a quality that makes a man independent; disappointment will not render such an one sour, nor oppression drive him mad, nor elevation bewilder; power will not dazzle, nor gold corrupt; no threat can silence and no fear subdue.

There are men enough born with greater abilities than Mr. Adams, men enough in New England, in all the walks of man. But how many are there in political life who use their gifts so diligently, with such conscience, such fearless deference to God? — nay, tell us ONE. I have not spared his faults; I am no eulogist, to paint a man with undiscriminating praise. Let his follies warn us, while his virtues guide. But look on all his faults, and then compare him with our "famous men" of the North or the South; with the great whigs or the great democrats. Ask which was the purest man, the most patriotic, the most honest; which did his nation the smallest harm and the greatest good; which for his country and his kind denied himself the most? Shall I examine their lives, public and private, strip them bare and lay them down beside his life, and ask which, after all, has the least of blemish and the most of beauty? Nay, that is not for me to do or to attempt.

In one thing he surpassed most men, — he grew more liberal the more he grew old, ripening and mellowing, too, with age. After he was seventy years old, he welcomed new ideas, kept his mind vigorous, and never fell into that crabbed admiration of past times and buried institutions which is the palsy of so many a man, and which makes old age nothing but a pity, and gray hairs provocative of tears. This is the more remarkable in a man of his habitual reverence for the past, in one who judged oftener by the history than by the nature of man.

Times will come when men shall look to that vacant seat. But the thunder is silent, the lightning gone; other men must

take his place and fill it as they can. Let us not mourn that he has gone from us; let us remember what was evil in him, but only to be warned of ambition, of party strife, to love more that large charity which forgives an enemy, and, through good and ill, contends for mankind. Let us be thankful for the good he has said and done, be guided by it and blessed. There is a certain affluence of intellectual power granted to some men, that provokes admiration for a time, let the man of myriad gifts use his talent as he may. Such merely cubic greatness of mind is matter of astonishment rather than a fit subject for esteem and praise. Of that, Mr. Adams had little, as so many of his contemporaries had more. In him what most commands respect is, his Independence, his love of Justice, of his country and his kind. No son of New England has been ever so distinguished in political life. But it is no great thing to be President of the United States; some men it only makes ridiculous. A worm on a steeple's top is nothing but a worm, no more able to fly than while creeping in congenial mud; a mountain needs no steeple to lift its head and show the world what is great and high. The world obeys its great men, stand where they may.

After all, this must be the greatest praise of Mr. Adams: — in private he corrupted no man nor woman; as a politician he never debauched the public morals of his country, nor used public power for any private end; in public and private he lived clean and above board; he taught a fearless love of Truth and the Right, both by word and deed. I wish I could add, that was a small praise. But as the times go, as our famous men are, it is a very great fame, and there are few competitors for such renown; I must leave him alone in that glory. Doubtless, as he looked back on his long career, his whole life, motives as well as actions, must have seemed covered with imperfections. I will seek no further to disclose his merits, or "draw his frailties from their dread abode."

He has passed on, where superior gifts and opportunities avail not, nor his long life, nor his high station, nor his wide-spread fame; where enemies cease from troubling, and the flattering tongue also is still. Wealth, honor, fame, forsake him at the grave's mouth. It is only the living soul, sullied or clean, which the last angel bears off in his arms to that world where many that seem first shall be last, and the last first; but where Justice shall be lovingly done to the great man full of power and wisdom who rules the State, and the

feeblest slave whom oppression chains down in ignorance and vice — done by the all-seeing Father of both president and slave, who loves both with equal love. The venerable man is gone home. He shall have his praise. But who shall speak it worthily? Mean men and little, who shrank from him in life, who never shared what was manliest in the man, but mocked at his living nobleness, shall they come forward and with mealy mouths, to sing his requiem, forgetting that his eulogy is their own ban! Some will rejoice at his death; there is one man the less to fear, and they who trembled at his life may well be glad when the earth has covered up the son she bore. Strange men will meet with mutual solace at his tomb, wondering that their common foe is dead, and they are met! The Herods and Pilates of contending parties may be made friends above his grave, and clasping hands may fancy that their union is safer than before; but there will come a day after to-day! Let us leave him to his rest.

The slave has lost a champion who gained new ardor and new strength the longer he fought; America has lost a man who loved her with his heart; Religion has lost a supporter; Freedom an unfailing friend, and Mankind a noble vindicator of our unalienable rights.

It is not long since he was here in our own streets; three winter months have scantly flown: he set out for his toil — but went home to his rest. His labors are over. No man now threatens to assassinate; none to expel; none even to censure. The theatrical thunder of Congress, noisy but harmless, has ended as it ought, in honest tears. South Carolina need ask no more a halter for that one Northern neck she could not bend nor break. The tears of his country are dropped upon his urn; the Muse of History shall write thereon, in letters not to be effaced, THE ONE GREAT MAN SINCE WASHINGTON, WHOM AMERICA HAD NO CAUSE TO FEAR.

To-day that venerable form lies in the Capitol, — the disenchanted dust. All is silent. But his undying soul, could we deem it still hovering o'er its native soil, bound to take leave yet lingering still, and loath to part, that would bid us love our country, love man, love Justice, Freedom, Right, and above all, love God. To-morrow that venerable dust starts once more to join the dear presence of father and mother, to mingle his ashes with their ashes, as their lives once mingled, and their souls again. Let his native state commu-

nicate her last sad sacrament, and give him now — 'tis all she can — a little earth for charity.

But what shall we say as the dust returns?

"Where Slavery's minions cower
Before the servile power,
He bore their ban;
And like the aged oak,
That braved the lightning's stroke,
When thunders round it broke,
Stood up a man.

"Nay, when they stormed aloud,
And round him like a cloud,
Came thick and black, —
He single-handed strove,
And like Olympian Jove,
With his own thunder drove
The phalanx back.

"Not from the bloody field,
Borne on his battered shield,
By foes o'ercome; —
But from a sterner fight,
In the defence of Right,
Clothed with a conqueror's might,
We hail him home.

"His life in labors spent,
That 'old man eloquent'
Now rests for aye; —
His dust the tomb may claim; —
His spirit's quenchless flame,
His 'venerable name,'*
Pass not away."†

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* Clarum et venerabile nomen.

† The above lines are from the pen of the Rev. John Pierpont.

Art. VI. — SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

1. — 1. *Histoire de la philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel.* Par J. Willm, Inspecteur de l'Academie de Strasbourg. Tomes I., II., et III. Paris. Ladrange. 1846–7.

2. *Essai sur l'histoire de la philosophie en France, au XVII^e^ siècle.* Par M. Ph. Damiron. Paris. Hachette. 1846. 2 vols.

3. *Geschichte der Naturphilosophie von Baco von Verulam bis auf unsere Zeit.* Von Dr. Julius Schaller. Th. I. und II. Leipzig. 1841–6.

We have brought together in this article three works of various character and aim; all coming, however, under the general head of "History of Modern Philosophy," — not with the intention of detailed criticism of any of them at present, but merely to bring them to the notice of our readers, with such general description as may give a view of the design of each, with an approximate notion of its execution.

M. Willm, although his name and his residence in the debatable land of Alsace would seem to indicate German blood, is very clearly a Frenchman in mind and education. He shows, in an eminent degree, the merits, and to a certain extent the defects, that distinguish the French metaphysicians of the present day: — the entire perspicuity, the neatness and precision of language, the enlightened toleration, the faithfulness of research, and the facility with which abstruse topics are penetrated to a certain depth.

On the other hand, we meet here also with the national defects of proneness to superficial analogies and connections, neglecting unity of idea; and a habit of judging philosophical systems by a reference to public opinion and established notions, instead of a philosophical standard.

As to our author's point of view, we should call him an eclectic, whose prevailing feeling is that the true philosophy is something not impossible, but as yet far distant — a structure that may once be completed, (though this rather as a hope than a belief, and with a tendency to prolong its genesis *ad infinitum*) — but for which as yet only materials have been furnished. "The various systems," he says, "are incomplete philosophies, which, even when true at bottom, are not so in the sense that they could be joined together into one; they are true only as so many homogeneous elements, which, when combined and united, form one organic whole. In this labor of fusion and reorganization, every thing personal, local, temporary, which has been mingled with the truth, must be separated from it. But this labor, which must be that of an absolute

criticism, producing the definitive philosophy, can be the work of time alone, and ages must pass before it is accomplished."

He does not belong to the class who consider the history of Philosophy as a random list of opinions, prevailing or obsolete, strung together by the casual succession of time, but regards the various philosophies as parts of one whole. "In this slow labor of the ages," he says, "no workman is useless, and no work thrown away. Each system, however imperfect, if only it be genuine, suffices for the want of its age. In it the human mind pauses and establishes itself for a while; then applies itself again to its work, and reconstructs its habitation more commodious, more certain, more vast, and more beautiful."

This habitation, however, is to M. Willm a temple, built by aggregation, and which is a shapeless mass until it is finished; not a living body, which is complete at every stage of its growth, *for* that stage, and whose subsequent progress is but a development from within.

These defects or shortcomings, however, do not very materially interfere with the particular task he has taken in hand in this work — namely, to give a detailed analysis of the later German systems, without much comment of his own. We cannot, indeed, allow this to be strictly "History of Philosophy," for we might go through it all without at the end coming any nearer to philosophy. There is, to be sure, something attractive at first sight in this cool, unprejudiced way, which merely states the doctrines in question, without mixing private opinions with them. But the main question after all is, Whether any particular doctrine is Philosophy or not, and what its relations are to Philosophy, — and this can be answered only by criticism. But we readily acknowledge it to be a labor highly important to the student of these systems, whether as an auxiliary or as a preparatory to the study of the works themselves.

The plan of the work is as follows: — After a brief general introduction, M. Willm gives a rapid, rather bibliographical review of German philosophy, from Leibnitz to Kant. The subsequent period, which forms the proper field of his undertaking, he divides into two periods: 1. Kant and Fichte, with the opposition, represented principally by Jacobi. 2. Schelling and Hegel, with the opposition, Herbart. The whole to be closed by an account of the present condition of philosophy in Germany.

Beginning with Kant, he gives a short sketch of his life, and then a careful analysis of all his writings, first theoretical and then practical, occupying in all about 575 octavo pages; in which, moreover, nothing is thrown away, and which comprises almost no criticism at all. These analyses are so full and minute as to amount almost to re-writing Kant, and writing him better. We consider this work of M. Willm's as the nearest approach to

a translation of Kant that we have seen. It is of little use in general to translate literally German philosophy, particularly Kant; for the original is mastered with about the same labor as the translation. A more difficult and a much more useful task, is to re-arrange the original matter, amplify in some places, but more often condense, and reproduce it with a strict regard to the original peculiarities of phraseology and method, so far as these are essential, and so far as they can be strictly rendered without certainty of being misunderstood by the uninitiated. A very delicate task, and one which M. Willm seems to us to have very well accomplished.

His criticisms, which, as already remarked, are very few, have this merit, that they distinguish accurately between what is *implied* in the writings of a philosopher, and what is actually expressed; and thus prevents that confusion which we sometimes see in criticisms of a higher order, in which the connection of the same idea through a series of systems leads to inaccuracy in the precise relations of the systems among themselves.

On the other hand, the fancied impartiality which will not judge from any one system is deceitful, and has bad results. For every one has his system, and the only question is what it is. The attempt to criticize freely *without* system, is, in fact, either to cite Philosophy before the bar of Common-Sense, (which is a trial of the judiciary by the mob,) or to test it by an arbitrary standard of some other system, without explaining its relation and connection. Thus, for instance, M. Willm says that "Kant's great defect, the source, at once, of all his errors and all his faults, was, that he had no proper psychological foundations for his philosophy;" and on the other hand, that "his great merit is, that he established the fact of Freedom, and Morality as its law." But Kant's first aim was to dispense with the "psychological foundations," or, in other words, the postulates, which were assumed by the dogmatic philosophy of his day. The other course, insisted on by M. Willm, supposes the result obtained ere the labor is undertaken. Evidently, if these "psychological foundations," or *primary facts*, as they have been called by others, are really prerequisite as the basis of Philosophy, they must themselves be unphilosophical. The only difference in this respect between these two methods, is this, — that the former starts knowingly and professedly with common-sense as the point of departure, or the germ which is to be *developed* into knowledge; whereas the latter takes this same common-sense (sometimes under the high-sounding names of "Intuition," "Consciousness," &c.) to be Philosophy itself, and thus, in fact, does not get started at all — never going beyond the point of departure.

Then, again, the merit of Kant, or any other philosopher, cannot consist in the mere establishment of a *fact*, however exalt-

ed and admirable. The highest religious and moral facts may be as truly felt by the peasant as by the philosopher; but the sole aim of philosophy is to *understand* the fact, — that is, to know it, not as a fact merely, but as a thought.

The same remarks will apply to the accounts of Fichte and Jacobi, which occupy the second volume, and of Schelling, which takes up most of the third. Shorter notices are given of the less important characters, such as Hamann, Herder, Fr. Schlegel, Novalis, &c. Hegel, who comes in at the latter part of the third volume, is only commenced, and moreover we have only been able to glance at this volume. The method, however, continues the same throughout, and thus does not leave much for us to say; for, being an analysis itself, the work does not admit of being analyzed. We understand that the remainder of the work will occupy two or three volumes.

M. Damiron, if we mistake not, is the successor of Jouffroy, at the College of France; and some of our readers may have listened to the even stream of never-ending eloquence, always attractive but never entrancing, which he pours forth to admiring audiences in the Paris lecture-rooms.

The same qualities that mark him as a speaker, the same elegance, fluency, and learning, we find in his book. The *narrative* manner that we remarked in M. Willm — the habit of talking *about* a system, and dwelling on superficial peculiarities instead of its relations to Thought in general — belongs, in a still greater degree, to M. Damiron, whose eloquence, moreover, is apt to become long-winded. In a spoken discourse this is more in place, and the repetition to which it gives rise less objectionable than where the attention is concentrated upon it in a book.

The arrangement of matter is as follows: — 1. A Preface, in which the advantages of a study of the History of Philosophy are discussed. These are: the aid derived from it in avoiding errors into which our predecessors have fallen; the removal of the attraction which novelty and the pride of discovery give to erroneous views; the support and advantage derived from the opinions of others, and from witnessing attacks upon and defences of various theories. Neither will this study hurt our originality, as is shown by the examples of Aristotle and Leibnitz. Then again the sympathy and communion of others is needed as much in Philosophy as in Religion. It is necessary also in order that we may be duly thankful, and have due respect for those who have preceded us. Nevertheless, we are not to depend too much on others, &c., &c.

Next, M. Damiron treats of the spirit of Philosophy, which he says is to be comprehended only in its relations to Faith. The difference between them is only in direction, or degree of growth;

Faith being undeveloped Reason. The nature of Reason and Faith, however, or the nature of Cognition in general, is not further traced back, but merely discussed at considerable length, as a matter well understood. Next comes an Introduction, consisting of the Report of a Committee of the Academy appointed to award the prize for a dissertation on Cartesian philosophy. Analyses are given of several papers, and the subject-matter somewhat discussed; yet as the gist of the discussion is repeated in the body of the work, we are unable to see the propriety of occupying eighty-four octavo pages with it in this place.

We now come to the Essay itself, which, commencing with Descartes, includes Hobbes, Gassendi, Rohault, De la Forge, Regis, Antoine le Grand, Tobias Andreæ, De Cordemoy, De la Chambre, Clauberg, Geulincx, Spinoza, Arnault, Du Tertre, Lami, Boursier, Bossuet, Fenelon.

Of each of these writers, except Antoine and Bossuet, is given a biographical sketch, longer or shorter according to his importance; and a narrative of his opinions, closing with a general critique. Indeed, the whole work may be considered as Biography; the philosophical views of each being stated as facts, merely, — as they might have appeared to an accurate, impartial, inquisitive neighbour. The object of the History of Philosophy, M. Damiron thinks, (Preface II.) "is not properly Truth, but what has been thought about Truth;" — "it is to inventory, rather than invent."

This method, as already remarked, is that generally adopted, to a greater or less extent, by the French writers on this subject, of the present day. In the case of M. Damiron, the advantage to be derived from this course is less than where, as in M. Willm's treatise, access to the originals is from any cause difficult. The work before us, therefore, is not so much a critique, or an auxiliary to the student of philosophy, as a convenient compendium for the general reader.

The following is extracted from his *resumé* of the philosophy of Descartes. "To give at once the gist of his philosophy, we must say that he gave it a true point of departure, an incontestable criterium of truth, a simple and sure method; — that he embraced in it a theory of the soul, which, if not unexceptionable in detail is irrefragable in principle; — a theory of God equally, at least in its fundamental arguments (and particularly in one of them), if not in all its points, above all objection; — a system of Physics and Physiology, not indeed without hypotheses and errors, but in which, nevertheless, besides important truths, is pointed out the way to many of the truths since recognized." This extract will give a notion of the general character of this Essay as a critique.

Dr. Schaller, the third on our list, undertakes his task to display

the progress of the Philosophy of Nature, from Bacon to the present day.

What is to be understood by a *philosophy of nature*, is a point about which there are very various views in the scientific world, the extremes of which are shown in the difference in acceptation of the terms *Natural Philosophy* among English, and *Natur-philosophie* among the Germans; — the former signifying empirical Physics; the latter inclining at least towards an *a priori* construction of Nature. These views Dr. Schaller considers equally one-sided. "Natural Science," he says, "seems to possess in observation, and the discoveries made thereby, a field entirely apart from and untouched by Philosophy." But — "Observation is necessarily thoughtful observation, and as such, only, has it any scientific value. As such only can it discover universal truth — the forces, the laws of Nature, and thus accomplish the task which it sets before itself. Nature may be spread before Man in all the fulness of her manifold forms, but it is Thought alone that opens his eyes and directs his attention to particular phenomena; — that contrives experiments and puts questions to Nature herself; — that comprehends what is discovered, and holds it fast as worthy of notice, and as an essential phenomenon. . . . Thus the unity of Empiricism and Speculation remains unbroken throughout the whole development of Natural Science: . . . these two forms of knowledge, from one stage to another, overcoming more and more their one-sided, limited nature, and approaching the complete truth."

These two elements are more widely separated in proportion as we go back towards the earlier period of Modern Philosophy. This history Dr. Schaller divides into two general divisions: — the mechanical view of Nature, from Bacon and Descartes to Kant; and the dynamic view, beginning with Kant. The two parts of his work which have been received by us, extend only through the immediate Kantian school. These two divisions are further subdivided as follows:

I. *First Stage of the Mechanical View.*

1. Empiricism.
   a. Bacon. *b.* Hobbes. *c.* Gassendi.
2. Idealism.
   a. Descartes. *b.* Geulincx, Malebranche. *c.* Spinoza.

II. *Second Stage of the Mechanical View.*

1. Empiricism.
   a. Locke. *b.* Newton. *c.* Materialism.
2. Idealism.
   a. Leibnitz. *b.* Wolf.

III. *Third Stage of the Mechanical View.*

A. Berkeley's Idealism.

B. Hume's Empiricism.

I. *The Dynamic View.*

1. Kant.

Descartes and Bacon, though so much opposed, yet both start from the same point, namely, the immediate perception of truth by the mind. The perception of truth implies a coincidence of the cognizant Subject and the Object of which the truth is known. They must be separate, else there is no reality in knowledge; and they must come together, else there is no truth. Hence arises an apparent contradiction, and a difficulty arises which can only be solved by a thorough understanding of the relation of Being and Thought, and which, meanwhile, must lead to Skepticism.

This difficulty is not felt, however, by Bacon nor by Descartes, and thus they do not advance to its solution.

Thus Bacon, although he demands a thoughtful consideration as well as observation of Nature, yet "does not elevate himself to the thought that the forms in Nature are of *absolute necessity, and implied in the very conception of Nature*, but contents himself with pointing them out as *existing* and general." And he does not perceive that Thought does not proceed gradually and by accumulation of facts, (though the *way* for thought may be thus prepared), but always *per saltum*;—and moreover, that Certainty could never be attained by any such accumulation, since we can never have *all* the facts, and a new fact might at any time destroy the best founded theory. Thus the Inductive system not only fails to explain the nature or *possibility* of knowledge, but also is at direct variance with the *fact* of knowledge, and with itself in demanding what it renders impossible.

Hobbes carries out Bacon's principles, and thus displays their results. Knowledge being the aggregate of observations, Thought is merely addition or subtraction, and nothing which cannot be added to, or subtracted from, can be known. Any thing simple and unsensuous is, therefore, unknowable. Thus of God, for instance, we can know nothing, but only believe, and this belief not resting by any possibility upon facts, is again a matter of belief. All first principles, therefore, are deduced *a priori*, without proof. What we know is not the essence, but depends upon something which we do not and cannot know.

Somewhat similar is Gassendi, who brought up again the philosophy of Epicurus, substituting God in the place of Chance, yet God is here also Chance. Nevertheless, Gassendi really belongs to Modern Philosophy, and his atomistic theory to the Empirical system. His *atoms* are products of reflection; without

weight, invisible and indivisible; thus approaching somewhat to an idealistic principle.

Descartes makes knowledge attainable through the idea of God, the Absolute. Having this, (by faith,) we know God will not deceive us, and thus we can trust to clear and definite notions, as being true. God is the only Substance, and the laws of Matter are secondary, being implanted by Him. Of secondary substances, all those are distinct which can be clearly conceived as distinct. Mind and Matter are, therefore, distinct substances: Mind purely active; matter purely passive — mere Being. Here, therefore, as in Bacon, the *nature* of Matter is uncomprehended, and no means or possibility pointed out for any comprehension. Natural Science is therefore necessarily empirical. And as Matter is purely passive, a force *belonging* to matter is inconceivable. There is no such thing, therefore, as Physics in the Cartesian philosophy, but only Mechanics. All force manifested in matter as Motion, must be given by *impulse* from without; and as matter does not change or vary in substance, but only in motion, Natural Science is destroyed. The interest begins just where the possibility of knowledge ends.

Geulincx carried out to its results this separation of mind and matter. It is impossible that Spirit should influence Body: the reason of their connection, or rather coincidence, lies in an (incomprehensible) harmony established by God, who must create perception of the outward world, for this could not become visible of itself.

Malebranche insists particularly on the mediation of God in our knowledge. General notions cannot be obtained through the limited faculties of the human mind, but only through God. They are not, however, immediately impressed on our minds, — for this would be a deception, — but through the medium of the outward world.

Spinoza. With Descartes the dependence of finite substances on the Infinite Substance is not fundamental, since they remain of different natures. They are dependent only as respects Existence, not in Essence. Spinoza makes this dependence essential. Mind and Matter (Thought and Extension) are indeed distinct, but only as different attributes of the one Substance.

Thus the diversity, the manifold variety of things, is only superficial. The only reality is Substance, and thus the only reality of the two attributes consists in their identity, that is, in Substance; so that their difference is an unreal one. The reality of Thought is not-Thought, and the reality of Extension non-extension. *Determinatio est negatio:* the reality of particular existence is negation. Thought, therefore, as that which is to discover reality, must consist in the negation of the facts of experience.

Locke shows consistency in abstaining from general principles.

He adheres to the view that only the Particular is real. He is thus the exact opposite of Spinoza. The application of his philosophy to Natural Science belongs principally to his followers, particularly Newton.

Newton imitates Locke in his caution in asserting general principles. In treating of the attraction of gravitation, as a force acting from the periphery towards the centre, he is careful to insist that it is to be considered as a mere mathematical, and not as an actual physical force. Otherwise, indeed, it would contradict the *vis inertiæ*, which he lays down as the first law of Bodies. He remarks that it cannot be physical, because the centres of bodies are only mathematical points. But this is inconsistent with his law of reaction; it is necessary to make of this another innate force. But if these forces were only mathematical, and the centres only mathematical points, then the different masses of bodies would make no difference in their gravitating force. And if gravitation were only attraction towards the centre, then it would act only between bodies related as centre and periphery, and not, for instance, between two planets.

The mathematical demonstration plays, therefore, altogether a secondary part here. These are only hypotheses supported empirically, and in reality supposing physical forces. The demonstration only makes clear what was found before. Newton, indeed, inclined to assume actual physical forces as existing in matter, and this was done by his successors, who called his system *dynamic*, in opposition to that of Descartes. This tendency of Newton may be seen, for example, in the Questions appended to his Optics.

Materialism (which is most distinctly presented in Miraband's *Système de la nature,*) is a necessary consequence from Locke's principles. No Truth being admitted, except that perceived by the senses, nothing but Matter can be real. All spiritual things, therefore, are imaginary; moral freedom is a delusion; to overcome the appetites and selfish impulses at the command of duty is quixotic enthusiasm. Nothing really exists except Matter and Motion, and these are necessarily connected; Matter moves by its own energy, motion being implied in its nature. It is not necessary, therefore, to have recourse to any foreign principle, as God, for instance, to explain the laws of Nature.

But it is not shown by Materialism that the so-called forces of Nature do really belong to Matter of itself. The idea of Matter is not shown to imply the existence of these forces; it is merely *passive* still, in this system as in the others, and must receive these forces from without. It may be true that organized Matter requires or shows inherent forces; — but why should it be organized? There is still something presupposed and unexplained, and whether we call it God, or chance, matters little.

Leibnitz objects to the mechanical and mathematical notions of Matter prevalent in his day. If Matter be considered as mere Extension, and having only mathematical qualities, then mass could make no difference, and the largest body could be impelled by the smallest; Extension being entirely indifferent to Motion. Forces of attraction, &c., in this case, are merely miracles. Material Being, he says, thus presupposes immaterial, simple substances, or Monads, having each an inward force, which he calls the power of Representation (*Vorstellung*);—not that each monad is conscious, and thus properly a soul—but that they differ only in degree, namely, in the clearness or confusion of their representation,—the highest degree belonging to the personal or conscious Monads, or souls, properly so called. Representation, therefore, is here to be understood not as *notion* or *conception*, but in the general sense of the representation of multiplicity in unity. As immaterial principles, and purely active, the monads cannot act upon each other, but each is a world by itself. The organization of the Universe is therefore a harmony preëstablished by God.

The monad is thus an ideal principle; yet being *created* with a certain amount of Being, it is thus far material; namely, in relation to the Absolute Substance, or God. As there is no reality other than the monads, and as they are immaterial, Matter cannot be material. They cannot be aggregated, and thus the notion of Matter, and of aggregation, must be a confused one, and the existence of matter must depend on the rudeness of the perceptive faculties. Leibnitz's Idealism, therefore, is incomplete. It does not dispose of Matter, but merely substitutes one kind of Matter for another. For the monads being *necessarily* in a degree passive, evidently involve a material nature. Thus he falls back into the atomistic theory, and allows the whole of the mechanical system to remain, under another name.

A more extreme Idealism is that of Berkeley. According to him, Spirit can be affected only by Spirit, and not by Matter. Ideas, therefore, cannot be derived from the material world. Yet they are not formed by the mind itself, since we do not produce images at will, and since there is an independent connection among them. They must therefore be immediately implanted in our mind by God. Generalization, or any *action* of the mind in cognition, is therefore impossible; we are merely passive to God's influence. This, however, does not explain the reality of knowledge; this remains an uncomprehended miracle and matter of faith.

Hume. As Berkeley makes knowledge mere passivity to the Absolute Spirit, or God, so Hume on the other hand dwells on the impossibility of discovering any necessity in our knowledge of outward things. Both unite in denying the connection of Subject and Object in one cognition.

Hume says that all knowledge resting on facts, and not on the

mere relations of ideas, must depend on the connection of cause and effect. It is thus only that we generalize. Now we cannot prove this relation *a priori*, since the idea of Cause does not include that of the Effect. It is only by experience, by long custom and the association of ideas, that we get the notion of Cause and Effect, as necessary antecedence and consequence. We can therefore only *believe*, but not *know* Reality, and this belief rests not on proof or reasoning, but only on habit and impression.

The dynamic conception of Nature; Kant. The former postulate, that the mind can know objects directly, is now no longer admitted. An antithesis has been formed between Thought and Being, as Subject and Object; and it is denied that these two can come together; that the mind is conversant with objective reality. Only subjective knowledge is conceded. Philosophy, at the time of Kant's Critique, was therefore Skepticism.

The question with which Kant opens his Critique of Pure Reason — "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" — that is, judgment in which the predicate is not involved in the idea of the subject — was equivalent to an inquiry as to the possibility of knowledge in general. That the mind cannot know any thing purely objective, absolutely foreign to itself, was now clearly felt. What things are in themselves, apart from our perception of them, Kant allows we can never know. Leaving such a consideration, then, out of the question, and considering objects only as *phenomena*, how is it possible to have any real knowledge? That we have such knowledge is evident as a matter of experience, for we form many judgments, for example, of mathematical truths, with a perfect conviction of their entire necessity, — which could not result from even the most extensive experience — and where experience is not possible. For instance, that all outward material things exist in Space and Time, is a truth that cannot have been *derived* from Experience, since Experience could not in the first instance have been possible without it; and, moreover, surpasses in certainty all results of Experience.

As to such truths, therefore, skepticism is not possible; — and the question is how they are possible? Kant answers this question by saying that all such truths relate to the constitution of the mind itself; to the *subjective forms*, under which objects appear to us. These forms are in so far objective that they are fitted for the perception of phenomena, which Kant does not doubt are really the *appearances* of actual things. On the other hand, Nature, *to us* is only the complex of sensuous phenomena, and thus penetrated by the action of the mind. In all real knowledge these must concide, — the Understanding, as the mind adapted to the perception of things; and phenomena, as the Object adapted to being perceived. Each of the various functions of the understand-

ing, accordingly, has always a relation to its employment in Experience, and corresponding to these functions are the *categories* in which all possible judgments as to phenomena are embraced. The understanding thus creates the laws of nature. Nature being to us only what it must appear according to the laws of the understanding.

There is thus no direct cognition of actual things by the mind, but only a knowledge of general rules. Reason does indeed form ideas as to what things are in themselves, apart from actual experience and above it; but these ideas give us no objective knowledge, and have no power to know concrete truth, — or, in Kant's language, they have no constitutive, but only a regulative power — and if sought to be applied to concrete or actual truth, they are illusive and transcend their sphere, causing contradictions.

In Nature, therefore, we can know only the abstract general rules that must govern phenomena *if* they are perceived. Thus our philosophical knowledge extends only to the *possibility* of nature, and not to actual nature. Particulars we can know only empirically.

When we come to specific, concrete things, then, we are left to the same skepticism as before. Thus, in Kant's Dynamics, for example, the two opposing forces acting in nature, and whose neutral unity he makes to be the essence of Matter, rest on a mere postulate; and in this, moreover, he is inconsistent with himself, since to know the essence of Matter would be to know things as they are in themselves.

The difficulty is, that Kant started with the supposition that Subject and Object must necessarily be synthetically and really distinct and opposite. Thus their union in knowledge is supposed in advance to be impossible. Philosophy is thus confined to the Subject, and the Object is rendered purely unknowable. All this is a mere postulate; he does not show, for example, why Space is necessarily merely subjective, and so on of the other subjective forms and functions. The Categories, again, and the forms of judgment in which the subjective and the objective come together, are merely postulated, and the possibility of such a union is not explained.

The second part of Dr. Schaller's work closes with a short review of Kant's school — of whom he says only Fries is of importance — and a few words on the relation of Kant's Philosophy of Nature to empirical science.

Fries attempted improvements upon Kant, but these improvements consist only of popularizing some of the difficult points — in which process they lose their meaning and importance. Thus he would consider phenomena as really the manifestation of things themselves: — he recommends self-examination, and a philosoph-

ical Anthropology, as the foundation of philosophy (coinciding here with M. Willm). Theory in Natural Science he thinks extends only to general principles, and is to be used practically by way of *hypotheses*, which are to be tested by experiment, &c.

The applications of Kant's philosophy by empirical naturalists, and others, Dr. Schaller says have been confined to a formal application of the categories and the like, without much understanding of the philosophy itself. In the form in which Kant left it, the philosophy of Nature was too abstract to be fit for immediate application.

On the other hand, the great importance which the law of Polarity has attained in empirical science, although perhaps not owing at all to any direct influence of Kant, yet shows a remarkable parallelism with his great principle of two opposite forces as constituting the essence of Matter; and the Physics of the present day stands in the same relation to that of the preceding period, as Kant's philosophy to the philosophy of that period.

We have thus hastily sketched the outline of the first two parts of Dr. Schaller's book, thinking to give the reader in this way a correcter notion of it than in any other. But it is not thus that any justice can be done to its merits, which consist not merely in the excellence of its general views, but also in the masterly precision and thoroughness of the details. It is not merely an elegant compendium, like M. Damiron's Essay, nor a thorough and able analysis, like that of M. Willm; — in a word, it is not the work of a learner or a disciple, but of a master. We await with impatience the appearance of the remainder of the work, as well as of his "*Naturphilosophie*," which he speaks of as in process of preparation.

2.—*Rest in the Church.* By the author of "From Oxford to Rome." — "*What resource hath the archer when in the hour of conflict he desireth to discharge the arrow, and findeth his bow-string broken?*" — [Arab Proverb.] London: Brown, Longman, Green, & Longmans. 1848.

THIS work seems to be written by a scholarly young woman, full of benevolence and piety. The first lines of the Preface contain the gist of the whole book: — "There are those who walk in their own way till the light that was in them has become darkness." The whole book is a call "to that Duty which is the first commandment of the Church, and the single law of Peace,—Obedience to External Authority." But it is less the author's purpose "to illustrate the curse of Independent Will, than to point out the blessedness of Reverence, and Patience, and Trust." The

authoress finds men demanding an ultimate authority, and looks on this as a Rainbow in the Heavens. But a new Idolatry, she thinks, has arisen — the worship of Intellect; and finds this in Rationalism, the Eclectic Philosophy, and in Transcendentalism — of which also she has heard sermons and read books; in short, in Protestantism itself. A battle takes place between the two tendencies — between Human Intellect and the Catholic Church. She looks for victory on the side of the Catholic Church; and says, what has been always reckoned a truism, — "In Theology invention is a crime, enterprise an irreverence, the notion of progress a mistake." She looks on Dr. Channing and Strauss as natural results of Protestantism. "The criterion is fair; — the *Leben Jesu* and its kindred literature and opinions are not the mere extreme phasis of Reasoning Religion, they cannot be thrown aside as its illegitimate effect, or repudiated as its scandal, or scorned as its weakness; — we have in them a specimen of able, the ablest, intellectual dealing with Christianity — (not skeptical, but) a specimen of the direction of the highest powers of the human mind to the history and doctrines of Revelation *with the intention of being religious* — and see its result. . . . Oh, the poor half-idiot Highland drover, who died murmuring over to himself the simple words,

'Three o' Ane,
And Ane o' Three,
And Ane o' Three
Will save me'—

was wiser in the eye of Heaven than the accomplished and lauded Strauss. 'Out of the mouth of babes He perfects His praise.' . . . The half-philosophy, half-protestantism of ever-anomalous America, is perhaps the strangest moral study of that strange land. So near to Truth, so ardently betrothed to Error. Hearing so clearly the voice of the Great Charmer, and flying to forget it into the drearest dreams of human independence and self-reliant power. Where the line lies nearest to Protestantism, congregate Channing and the preachers; these are their Orthodox! Where it silently links itself with European Rationalism, appear Emerson and the poets; and these they call Transcendentalists." Yet following, Channing's "saddest and most Christless pages appear passages of singular beauty, instinct with the love of God."

The work is a fictitious history — which has often been a real one, of a clergyman of the Church of England, Mr. Norman — benevolent and pious, passing gradually to the Catholic Church. Connected with this is the history of a young lady distinguished for birth, beauty, and wealth, whom all these cannot satisfy, and she also finds contentment in the same church. The fair authoress knows of no valuable restraint except an outward rule; no

ultimate authority except some finite institutions or powers; no sufficient obedience except to a command which is imposed arbitrarily from within. Her book, therefore, offers no reconciliation to mind or heart. She makes a solitude in the mind, a solitude in the affections, and then names it peace. It is a poor way to tune a harp by breaking off one half the strings.

We make a few extracts from the book:

"Music is an emblem of the Church, and an engine of her power, and an agent of her purest benediction. It is her emblem — like light, as discord represents darkness and error. It is her emblem — as subject to the minutest rules, not one of which must suffer even momentary infraction, and yet free to ten thousand ever-varied demonstrations of grandeur and of beauty, as the occasion or the place may ask. It is her emblem — as flinging wide its charms on every side, on every ear, but entering, savingly, soothingly only, into the desiring souls of the few. Great music and splendid pictures are among the few things of the past, whose mightiness abides undiminished. God-sent, it is enduring. More often consecrated than are the high energies of much other kindred genius, it gathers around itself pure and glorious associations, which the wicked cannot hide, which the vain can never break. He is not wholly lost who still loves music — the desire of moral may grow out of the delight in natural harmony. Nor is one utterly unhappy who remains susceptible to the power of music, — yielding it leave to do what it is well able, to correct suffering with a superior satisfaction, and comfort misfortune with the sense of a perfectness which passeth not away. The Church has constituted music a distinguished emissary of her blessing, — making it a chief feature of all her solemn services, and mingling it with all her sweetest offices; and they do a serious wrong who neglect her directions in this way; it seems to become a sort of other Sacrament, by which she implants feelings, and wins to herself wandering thoughts, and establishes an earnest oneness of many people, such as rites addressed to the separate man realize less vividly. The Sacramentality of the music of the Church will be comprehended best by any who have been the lonest and the longest sad on account of the sorrows of the world."

Here is a picture of modern civilization:

"In the crowded localities lying between the great artery of Oxford street and the parallel outlets of the parks, invisible to the regions where the enlightened and the civilized circulate, behind the Squares, in the interstices which connect or dissever the nobleman's mansion and his mews, there is a mass of misery and iniquity crying daily, like the blood of Abel from the ground, to the God whose children the poor are, and who knoweth the proud afar off. Cruelty and horrible sin are there; scenes that make the pure to veil their eyes, and words at which the pious would ask deafness

as a boon from heaven; pestiferous cellars crowded with human creatures, and attics where wretchedness has crept to hide itself in its expulsion from many a fairer place. The riot of a country rising, when the military are in requisition, and magistrates appear in their state, has certainly a very terrible effect on the imagination, but London, with its all things infernal, from the wail of the stricken infant to the suppressed rage of the hungered artizan, and the look of demon-malice in the eye of the wicked woman, is to us a more confounding spectacle. The English poor were once a strong, silent people; now they are weak, and cry out on every side, and their cries are bitter and full of vengeance. But ladies sit in their elegant upper rooms in London, receiving their elegant visiters, and doing their everlasting elegant work in german-wool, and they will tell you — they have told us — that they '*do not realize the idea of actual wickedness;*' and on this they no doubt congratulate themselves; — what would be thought of them were it supposed that they *could* 'realize the idea' of things passing within a short walk of their correct and peaceful residences! Surely, society would blush for them! How could they appear in the midst of the refined, supposed spotless as the robes they wear, if their minds had been clouded with the sight of sin, and those most discreditable streets which they know not even the names of, and from which, if their coachman ventures to take them as a 'cut' to some more authorized destination, they refrain their eyes by lowering the crimson silk of their carriage blinds? 'Ladies could not visit such places,'—'men might if duty called, but even for them it is hardly right.' They 'wonder how clergymen and medical men can penetrate there — it is really very benevolent — but it must be a dreadful sacrifice!' Could the lover approach to his lips the hand that had been known to rest for an instant in gentle benediction among the rough locks of the child of crime? Could he listen to the charming song breathed by the voice that but an hour before had expended its sweetness in whispering hope and Christianity by the death-pillow of the felon or the thief? It could not be; society has its boundary lines of doing good — subscriptions, and so on — within them we may work, but not beyond — it is improper! Yet once there walked upon this earth a Holy One, whose birthright was the eternal coronet of the universe, and HE was reviled as the 'FRIEND of publicans and sinners.'"

To some men this book will seem sad. Reason cries for bread of life; and this authoress offers shew-bread, — which, moreover, is drugged, and puts reason to sleep. To others it will be a rainbow, showing that the old storm which lowered so heavily on the English Church is passing over. For our own part, we do not believe that mankind will go back, not even "from Oxford to Rome," which is not so long a journey as some fancy. It will be as easy

to restore the Science of the Middle Ages, as their Theology — their States, as their Church. It would be a pretty sight to see the next British Association of scientific men undertake to revive the theories of the Dark Ages; and the British House of Peers try to bring back the legislation of that time. To us it is refreshing to see any real spiritual life in the English Church. Fifty years ago one looked merrily for good dinners, and carnal Latin quantity, in the church: — a serious and devout spirit has arisen there. Luxury and empty compliments give place to a sincerity and earnestness which, though often misdirected, are signs of life.

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3. — *Der Socinianismus nach seiner Stellung in der gesammtentwickelung des christlichen Geistes; nach seinem historischen Verlauf und nach seinem Lehrbegriff dargestellt von Otto Fock, &c.* Kiel. 1847. Two parts in one volume, 8vo. pp. XVI and 722.

THIS is a history of Socinianism, from its commencement to the present day. The work consists of an Introduction, and two Books. The Introduction treats of the development of the general spirit of Christianity in Catholicism and Protestantism, and of the relation which Socinianism bears to each. Book I. treats of the Historical Development of Socinianism, from Hetzer and Basseu, in Switzerland, who were executed for their heresy in 1529, down to the latest manifestations of Unitarianism in New England, in 1846. Book II. treats of the doctrines of Socinianism as they appear in the dogmatical writings and symbolical books of the continental Socinians. The work is written in a liberal spirit, by a man of high philosophical ability, of adequate learning, and of great impartiality; the style is pleasing, clear, and attractive, and the work one of great value, at the present time, not only in Germany but in America.

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4. — *Twenty-four Years in the Argentine Republic, &c., &c., &c.* By COLONEL Q. ANTHONY KING, an Officer in the Army of the Republic, and twenty-four years a resident of the country. New York: D. Appleton & Co. pp. 324.

WE once knew a man who used to tell the very vaguest stories about gold-mines and mountains in Peru; we have frequently seen a person who is said to have served a sunburnt campaign under Bolivar. Moreover, we have read, with some bewilderment, various books about Dr. Francia, once Dictator of Para-

guay. South America, nevertheless, remains to us the completest dream. Mr. Polk, we believe, is in the same case; — whose all-embracing benevolence wishes to comprehend the entire land of America. Too-easily deluded Polk! South America is any thing but a dream to those who meddle with its rottenness, as you shall see upon reading the volume we notice.

Col. Anthony tells his story by mouth, to "Thomas R. Whitney, Esq., author of 'The Ambuscade,' 'Evening Hours,' and other works of poetry and prose," who puts Anthony's gossip into writing.

Anthony lands, when a boy, at the city of Buenos Ayres, having left New York, his native city, with the Yankee love of adventure. He does not remain long in this new home, before Supreme Director Purzedon (unknown to fame) gives him a *bandero* (flag-bearer) commission, with these admirable comments: "Go now, young man, and make your own way up the ladder of fortune." Quite a heroic species of introduction to bull-lassos, and campaigns against General Artegas, against whom Anthony first carries himself, and who is in the habit of "sewing up his prisoners in raw hide, and leaving them to perish in the sun." Anthony conquers him entirely.

Anthony begins in the first chapter as *bandero*; — in the next page gets to be an ensign under General Ramarez, and commands a "flank." In the second chapter, Anthony surprises "old Flusk, Coquelet, and the good lady his wife," by conquering Purzedon, Supreme Director, in Buenos Ayres, now "suspected of treasonable correspondence with the Italian Duke of Lucca," and in the next paragraph is off in full pursuit over the pampas, of Carreve, a Chili man, whose family had been supplanted by the O' Higgins, in its authority, which Carreve is trying to get back again.

In the Carreve battle, Anthony gets his left wrist knocked to pieces, and rides about, holding the reins in his teeth. Here is such a fight as now occurs nowhere except in the Argentine Republic, and our hero is beaten most incomparably, pursued by Carreve, for five leagues, and out of 2200 men, "who marched in the morning against the Punta de St. Luis," but 1500 could be found at evening; and many of these with their skins full of bullets.

But this is only the first taste of the business. That evening, the balance (1500) of Anthony's Ramarez army, sat on the grass squeezing the dew from it, in place of *maté*, and frying "the flesh of such of our horses as had been disabled in the battle," for their nine-o'clock supper. Beds of course in the grass, with stars and sky for tent-canvass! At midnight, Carreve again claws them, and away goes the shiftless fraction of the Anthony-Ramarez army, and is reduced to great straits; — sucking like a swarm of

musquitoes at "small noisy pools, grown almost fetid in the sunlight," "and even this was a luxury." They get within two leagues of the Villa De Ranchos, with 700 men, and can now have a drop of *matè*, and a sleep. Not so, however, for in this same villa, is a certain unexpected Carreve leader, named Echagua, who has just revolted from Anthony, and who is before, while Carreve himself is coming up behind. Over seven hundred fight it over again behind some carts Paris-fashion, and finally, when Echagua begins to starve them to death, send a flag of truce by "the brave and beloved Capt. Boedo," whom Echagua ties instantly before their eyes and shoots. Finally, the carts get on fire; they must run or fight, hand to hand. Anthony gets "a blow upon my breast from the butt-end of a musket, which fractured my ribs, and felled me." Right after, he sees his General Ramarez marched out, shot, and his head severed from his body;—afterwards sent about for view, as a trophy.

Such is the fulfilment of some part of Supreme Director Purzedon's sentence: "Go now, young man, and make your own way up the ladder of fortune." For our part, looking at it from these very Unsouth-American climes, we should think the notion might have entered Anthony's head, (who in a page or two on gets freed from Echagua, by a new general, Bustes, who instantly offers Anthony a new commission, which he reluctantly declines, without wrist or ribs,) — that this Purzedon ladder was not at all a Jacob's ladder.

He does, however, accompany Bustes on an expedition against his old friend Carreve, on the sick list; and having encamped at a farm house, is again surprised, and retreats with some companions to a *corál*, or cattle-yard, with nothing but a low fence around it,—the heads of Carreve's horses actually over the fence, and the horsemen pouring their fire into them, till at last he had to give in;—"*thirteen* of our number lay dead in the *corál*, literally piled up in a heap in the centre." Anthony is again a prisoner, but with not the least notion of kicking over the Purzedon ladder yet. Carreve's people turned him, and his "friend Crosby," off in a state of nudity, they being obliged to find "a remnant of scorched calico, of which we made a covering for our bodies."

So it goes. Our people is the most singular people under the heavens. They are ready to run anywhere, and to run through every thing. This Anthony, gyrating about those pampas, now exhibiting a magic-lantern, to keep himself from starving, with "my friend Crosby," at another moment in a retreat like a whirlwind, with whole hordes of South American Tartars after his emaciated skeleton; next thing, slumping into a dirty dungeon; to-morrow strapping it across the dizzy Heaven-kissing Cordilleras;—what nameless frenzy, what insatiable spirit drove this Anthony, no doubt an actual man of flesh and blood, into these

sackeos, and stampedes, — what was it? Is man a coffee-mill, his crank turned by an invisible demon, the powder of which he shall never boil?

We cannot follow up Anthony's ways further, with the particulars. Let us, however, get a daguerreotype look of him, when he has risen to the pitch of Captain.

By this time our Anthony had got sour. He had a terrible way of drawing his "*garro* (cap) over my brow," and of wrapping himself "in my own miserable thoughts." It is a little tragic, at that outpost, six leagues from Humaguaca, where General Urdemini had stuck Anthony, — to have that elegant Spanish gentleman riding by, and coming in to have his passport signed: — "Now, señor," says Anthony, "if you will tell me what you thought of me as you rode past, I will sign your passport."

"He hesitated.

"'Speak out, señor; I think I know your thoughts. Speak truly.'

"'To tell the truth, then,' he replied, 'I thought you were a *beggar.*'"

They furnish captains there with nothing but "jerked beef" and "*maiz molido,*" (cracked corn.)

That Argentine Republic is of all republics the most confused. Its cities are in one continual apprehension of being taken, and no man can change his opinions half often enough, to keep on the right side. To-day, Cordova may be governed by General Bustes, or Buenos Ayres by Governor Dorango, and to-morrow Paz and Lavalia may be at the top of this revolutionary beer. And next day comes Quiroga and Rosas.

If any regular account or Day-Book has been opened for these whirligig performances, we have never seen it. Our hero Anthony does his best, and in his way (by no means a teleologist,) does erect Paz, or depose him, as he best can, ever and anon himself being flapped over by Fortune's paw, and is no sooner fairly crept out of one prison, than he is at once pitched, like a lock of hay, into another.

His marriage to the lovely Dona Juana, by whom he gets house and land, and after the proper time, a boy, keeps him in a sort of subordinate fermentation. Nevertheless, he feels the inactivity of his merchant life, for it seems he turns out trader, in the end.

But of all parts of this Argentine-republic book, that about Rosas is so appalling, that were it not related with an air of apparent truth, we should deem it a mere Blue Beard fiction. A certain Don José Rivera Idarte, (who indeed undertook a fatal task), published at Montevideo, in 1843, a table with the names of the people this man Rosas had killed, and how he killed them.

Thus, Poisoned,	4
Throats cut,	3,765
Shot,	1,393
Assassinated,	722
Total,	5,884

It seems, according to Anthony, that in 1829 "Rosas had recently become conspicuous." We can present no further details of this man, except one, which for its barbarity perhaps all history cannot equal. "It was in the market-place that Rosas hung the bodies of many of his victims; sometimes decorating them, in mockery, with ribbons of the Unitarian color (blue), and even attaching to the corses labels, on which were inscribed the revolting words, "*Beef with the hide.*" And this man is *Supreme Dictator* there, *to-day!* with his *Massorca murder-Club*, who wear a cross of honor, or a riband with this pious motto —

LIFE TO THE FEDERALS, DEATH TO THE UNITARIANS.

Over the door of all the chief buildings in Buenos Ayres is inscribed "*Death to the savage Unitarians.*" So says our Colonel. Our head runs dizzy with murder at this part of the book.

We trust our philanthropic Polk has received a copy of this Argentine book, or if not, that some benevolent person will provide our not too luminous friend with the proper copy. Polk, in his magnificent soul, would fold all North and South America under his broad wing-feathers. We advise him to pause. Those itching fingers are now desirous of picking their plums out of Yucatan. After we have taken all *Mexico*, with its copper-colored *mestizos*, next we are to do the business of Yucatan: patch up the monstrous Yucatanese rips between white and black, and copper-colored and no-color; set these once more on their feet, and then who knows but we shall next undertake for that admirable country, the Argentine republic. Afterwards we can turn our attention to Brazil, or tunnelt he Cordilleras. It 's all too plain, that some Supreme Director Purzedon (Walker, Buchanan, Woodbury, or other) has been whispering in President Polk's ears those excellent Argentine republic words, "Go now, young man, and make your *own* way up the ladder of fortune."

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5. — *Legal Bibliography, or a Thesaurus of American, English, Irish, and Scotch Law-Books.* By J. G. MARVIN. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson. 1847. 8vo. pp. 800.

THIS is a catalogue of law-books, alphabetically arranged, giving sufficient bibliographical descriptions of the best editions of all,

and short accounts and critiques of the more important works of the class designated by the title-page. The critiques are, in general, extracted from books of standard authority, judiciously selected, and, above all, concise; giving as much as is wanted, but no more, and often consisting mostly of mere references without quotations, — affording the student the means of readily ascertaining the standing of the book sought, without overflowing him with "opinions of the press." The author, Mr. Marvin, was for some time Librarian at the Cambridge Law School, and seems to have made good use of the advantages afforded him by that excellent library. Of course nothing but long use can fully test the value of a work like this, the main virtue of which is exactness; but after many trials, by looking up the rarest and most out-of-the-way books that occurred to us, we have not been able to find Mr. Marvin anywhere at fault. Besides the alphabetical list, there is at the end of the volume an index of subjects, and at the beginning a table of abbreviations, the most complete we know of, extending over forty-six pages, and forming not the least valuable part of the work — which, as a whole, we recommend to our readers as an important book of references not only for lawyers, but for general readers whose studies extend into the regions of politics or English history. Mr. Marvin's expressed plan, indeed, includes only "practical" books; but happily he has not confined himself very strictly to his plan, but admitted many works bearing upon the general questions of Government and Politics. In the event of a second edition, we should recommend a still greater relaxation in this direction — though, considering the already considerable extent of the list, and the almost indefinable expansiveness of the field so soon as the strict limit is passed, we do not wonder at his caution. Every law-book that cannot be cited in court is an experiment, in a pecuniary point of view, and we hope that in this instance it will not be an unsuccessful one to Mr. Marvin.

LIST OF NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

Sixteenth Annual Report of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society, Jan. 26, 1848. With an Appendix. Boston: Andrews & Prentiss. 1848. 8vo. pp. 94.

Three Lectures in Defence of Neurology. By Joseph R. Buchanan, M. D. Cincinnati. 1848. 8vo. pp. 48.

The Church as it is: or the Forlorn Hope of Slavery. By Parker Pillsbury. 2d ed. Boston: B. Marsh. 1847. 12mo. pp. 90.

The Bible, its History and Inspiration. By Parker Pillsbury. Boston: B. Marsh. 1848. 12mo. pp. 36.

Speech of Mr. Giddings, of Ohio, on the Appropriation Bill, Feb. 28, 1848. Washington: J. & G. S. Gideon. 1848. 8vo. pp. 15.

The General Features of the Moral Government of God. By A. B. Jacocks, M. A. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1848. 8vo. pp. 90.

A Letter to the Right Rev. L. Silliman Ives, Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the State of North Carolina, occasioned by his late Address to the Convention of his Diocese. By William Jay. New York. 3d ed. 1848. pp. IV and 32.

First-day Sabbath not of Divine Appointment, with the opinions of Calvin, Luther, &c., &c., addressed to Rev. Justin Edwards, D. D. By H. C. Wright. Boston: 1848. 12mo. pp. 48.

Pious Frauds, or the Admissions of the Church against the Inspiration of the Bible. By Parker Pillsbury. Boston. 12mo. pp. 36.

The Modern Pulpit: a Sermon at the Ordination of Samuel L. Longfellow, &c. By John Weiss, &c. Fall River. 8vo. pp. 36.

Conscience the best Policy: a Fast-day Sermon, &c. By John Weiss, &c. New Bedford: 1840. 12mo. pp. 16.

The Pioneers of New York, an Anniversary Discourse before the St. Nicholas Society of Manhattan, &c., &c. By C. F. Hoffman. New York: 1848. 8vo. pp. 56.

The Church as it is, was, and ought to be: a Discourse at the Dedication of the Chapel, &c. By James Freeman Clarke. Boston: 1848. 8vo. pp. 36.

MASSACHUSETTS QUARTERLY REVIEW.

NO. IV.—SEPTEMBER, 1848.

ART. I.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANCIENT HINDOOS.

MINGLED with the theogonies and myths of the Hindoos are many fragments of a speculative character, which, though not properly amounting to a system, yet manifest an attempt to theorize on the Universe;—to *understand* what is presented in their religious writings under the form of dogmas and tradition.

There seem, at least to us who know the Hindoo literature only at second hand—to be three very distinct epochs in the history of their sacred writings.

The first, the age of the Vedas, (or of certain portions of them,) is that of a simple, original people, of agricultural habits, standing on the first step of civilization. The literature of this period consists of hymns, invocations, and prayers, displaying the first simple relation of the finite mind to the Infinite. There is little trace of reflection, or of intense religious consciousness. The deities which at a later period appear as distinct personalities, are here only personifications of the elements;—Indra is still the firmament; Agni, fire, &c. The prayers are for abundance of cows and of corn, for rain, for protection against enemies and wild beasts. The worshipper calls upon the Deity "from day to day, as a milch-cow to the milker." God is the friend of the husbandman; "the giver of horses, cows, and corn; lord and keeper of wealth;"—and he is worshipped with libations of milk, butter, and honey. The figures of speech throughout are taken from an agricultural life, particularly the herds-

man's.* Hence, perhaps, by tradition, the subsequent religious importance of the cow.

The second, the age of the Puranas and the Bhagavat Gita, is a meditative, mystical period, during which speculation among the Hindoos reached its highest point.

Then comes the third period, extending to the present time, — the age of commentators, of subtile distinctions, and of polemics; the Indian Scholastic Age.†

Mr. Colebrooke and others who have treated of the Hindoo philosophy, distinguish several systems, with their subdivisions, — finding also parallels between them and the earlier Greek schools. They make us acquainted even with a good deal of controversy on metaphysical points, and sharp polemics, among the adherents of the various opinions. The arguments consist of appeals to the authority of the more ancient writings, together with some rather superficial, though often acute reasoning, and illustration by comparisons with familiar objects. But if we look at the texts themselves which are cited on opposite sides, we find them substantially in harmony with each other, and their apparent opposition only the diversity of various sides of one idea, successively made prominent, according to the habit of the Oriental mind.

This division of systems is evidently the product of later ages. "All the Indian schools," says Creuzer, "acknowledge three ways to knowledge: sensuous perception (Experience); Inference; Revelation (Tradition). . . . But it is agreed by all that true knowledge is not to be obtained through the senses. Nor can discursive thought and inference conduct us to the knowledge of the supreme Deity; — this is only to be obtained by tradition (doctrine) and hearing (of discourses); the teacher imparting to the disciple the true exposition of the sacred writings, handed down by tradition." ‡ All this is evidently of later origin. The essence of the Hindoo metaphysics, so far as they are of importance in the

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* *Rigveda-Sanhita:* ed. Fr. Rosen. London, (Oriental Trans. Fund.) 1838. 4to. See Hymns 4, 7, 23, et passim. — *Sanhita of the Sáma Veda:* Translated by the Rev. J. Stevenson, D. D. London, (Oriental Trans. Fund.) 1842. 8vo.

† The Hindoo chronology remains in utter and probably hopeless confusion. Creuzer places the age of the Puranas 1600 years before the Christian era, (*Symbolik*, i. p. 386.) The Vedas are undoubtedly much older, but the whole reckoning is so often founded on mythical and fantastic data that any precision is at present impossible.

‡ *Symbolik:* ed. 1837, i., p. 528.

history of Philosophy, may be expressed in few words: It is the reduction of all Reality to pure, abstract Thought.

In the following pages we have brought together some extracts from the more important original sources, so far as they are known to us in translations.* As the works from which they are taken are most of them costly, and thus not often met with, we have made these extracts copious, in order to afford our readers the means of forming a general notion of this interesting phase of thought; the more interesting to us, as the Hindoos are intellectually, as well as physically, our antipodes, and their peculiar tone of thought, their *common-sense*, the opposite and complement of our own. Such, however, is the simplicity and abstractness of its principle, on the one hand; and such the profuseness and indistinctness of the forms in which it is presented, on the other, — that a development of the view from a central idea, or even a methodical arrangement of propositions, is scarcely possible. One might almost as well attempt a topographical survey of a wreath of mist. This may excuse the repetition and want of perspective in the following exposition.

The main principle of the Hindoo Idealism — that Reality is equivalent to pure abstract Soul or Thought, unexistent and thus simple and unformed; in a word, pure Negation — is presented especially under the aspect of the unity and identity of all things in the Deity. This is the constant theme of the ancient writings, and in every form of often sublime imagery, fills a great portion of the sacred books. Even in the grammatical forms of speech this idea is not overlooked; the most absolute expression for the Deity (*Brăhm*) being a neuter word: —

Laws of Menu, (Sir William Jones's translation, Calcutta, 1794) ch. 1, § 2. "From THAT WHICH IS, the first cause, not the object of sense, existing, not existing, without beginning or end, was produced the divine male, famed in all worlds under the appellation of Brahmá."

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* Others, not cited, are Vans Kennedy's *Researches into Ancient and Hindoo Mythology*, London, 1831, in which, it is said, are many extracts from the Puranas. — Anquetil du Perron: *Upnekhata*. Strasbourg. 1804. 2 vols. 4to. (Which, however, according to v. Bohlen and others, "is without critical value.") — Windischmann: *Sancara, Sive de theologumenis Vedanticorum*. Bonn. 1833. — Görres: *Mythengeschichte*. — Niklas Müller: *Wissen, Glauben, und Kunst d. alt. Hindus*, — none of which we have been able to consult. See also Rammohun Roy: *Translation of several Books, &c., of the Veds*. 2d ed. London. 1832. — P. F. Stuhr: *D. Religions-Systeme d. heidn. Völker d. Orients*.

Bhagavat Gita, p. 103.* "I will now tell thee what is *Gnea*, or the object of wisdom, from understanding which thou wilt enjoy immortality. It is that which hath no beginning, and is supreme, even *Brahm*, who can neither be called *Sat* (ens) nor *Asat* (non ens). It is all hands and feet; it is all faces, heads, and eyes; and, all ear, it sitteth in the midst of the world, possessing the vast whole. Itself exempt from every organ, it is the reflected light of every faculty of the organs. Unattached, it containeth all things; and without quality, it partaketh of every quality."

Ib. p. 85. Vishnu says, "I am the soul which standeth in the bodies of all beings. I am the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things."

Ib. p. 70. "I am the creation and the dissolution of the whole universe; . . . . . and all things hang on me even as precious gems upon a string."

Vishnu Purana,† p. 94. "All the world is derived from thee. As the wide-spreading Indian fig-tree is compressed in a small seed, so, at the time of dissolution, the whole universe is comprehended in thee as its germ. . . . As the bark and leaves of the Plantain tree are to be seen in its stem, so thou art the stem of the Universe, and all things are visible in thee."

Ib. p. 215. "He is primary nature; he, in a perceptible form, is the world; and in him all finally melts; through him all things endure. He is the performer of the rites of devotion; he is the rite; he is the fruit it bestows; he is the implements by which it is performed. There is nothing besides the illimitable Hari."

Bhag. Gita, p. 80. "I am generation and dissolution; the place where all things are reposited, and the inexhaustible seed of all nature. I am sunshine, and I am rain; I now draw in, and now let forth. I am death and immortality; I am entity and non-entity."

Vedas: (cited in *Comm. to Sánkhya Kárikú*,‡ XVII.) "One only soul is distributed in all beings; it is beheld collectively or dispersedly, like the reflection of the moon in still or

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* *Bhágvát-Gèeta, or Dialogues of Krèèshnà and Arjòòn.* In 18 Lectures. With notes. Translated by Charles Wilkins. London. 1785. 4to.

† *The Vishnu Purana:* Translated by H. H. Wilson, F. R. S. (Oriental Trans. Fund.) 1840. 4to.

‡ *Sánkhya Kárikú:* Translated by H. T. Colebrooke. Edited by H. H. Wilson. Oxford, (Orient. Trans. Fund.) 1837. 4to.

troubled water. Soul, eternal, omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied by the power of delusion, not of its own nature."

Laws of Menu, ch. 12, § 124. "It is He, who, pervading all beings in five elemental forms, causes them by the gradations of birth, growth, and dissolution, to revolve in this world like the wheels of a car."

Ib. ch. 1, § 52. "When that power wakes, then has this world its full expansion; but when he slumbers with a tranquil spirit, then the whole system fades away."

Vishnu Pur., p. 132. "This whole world is but a manifestation of Vishnu, who is identical with all things; and it is therefore to be regarded by the wise as not differing from, but as the same with themselves."

The distinctness of things from God being unreal, God, or Reality, is the negation or transience of the Finite: — Time.

Ib. p. 335. "Glory to thee, O lotus-eyed, who art one with Time, the form that devours, without remorse, all created things."

Ib. p. 12. "The two forms which are other than the essence of unmodified Vishnu, are Pradhana (Matter) and Purusha (Spirit); and his other form, by which those two are connected or separated, is called Kâla (Time)."

Ib. p. 519. "At the end of all, the universe disappears in thee; upheld by thee, this earth sustains living and inanimate things: in the character of uncreated time, with its divisions of ages, developed from an instant, thou devourest the world."

Not only all positive qualities, all virtues and powers, but also weakness, imperfection, and foulness are embraced in the One Soul, since otherwise independent Reality must be attributed to them: —

Vishnu Pur., p. 154. "He (Vishnu) is the creator, who creates the world; he, the eternal, preserves it in existence; and he, the destroyer, destroys it; invested severally with the attributes of foulness, goodness, and gloom."

Ib. p. 139. "Thou (Vishnu) art knowledge and ignorance, truth and falsehood, poison and ambrosia."

Ib. p. 335. "Glory to thee, Govinda (Vishnu), who art all demons, whose essence is arrogance and want of discrimination, unchecked by patience or self-control. Glory to thee, who art the Yaksas, whose nature is charmed with sounds, and whose frivolous heart perfect knowledge cannot pervade. Glory to thee who art all fiends, that walk by night, sprung

from the quality of darkness; fierce, fraudulent, and cruel. . . Glory to thee who art one with the saints, whose perfect nature is ever blessed, and traverses, unobstructed, all permeable elements. Glory to thee who art one with the serpent race, double-tongued, impetuous, cruel, insatiate of enjoyment, and abounding in wealth. Glory to thee who art one with the Rishis, whose nature is free from sin or defect, and is identified with wisdom and tranquillity."

Here, very evidently, a *subsistence* of all things in God is not meant, but merely an absorption of all in him. The power and greatness of God is not shown as embracing and upholding the vast variety of the Universe, but as reducing it to his own undivided essence. God is the whole of Reality, and thus all that is not God is unreal. All distinction, therefore, is unreal. All diversity of things, and all finite existence, is a delusion. The outward world has only the reality conferred on it by human imagination, which in its blindness so conducting itself as if the Outward were real, confers upon it a subjective reality, an existence *for* Man, by making it an object and motive for action.

Vishnu Pur., p. 242. "How can reality be predicated of that which is subject to change, and reassumes no more its original character? Earth is fabricated into a jar; the jar is divided into two halves; the halves are broken to pieces; the pieces become dust; the dust becomes atoms. Say, is this reality? though it be so understood by man, whose self-knowledge is impeded by his own acts. Hence, Brahman, except discriminative knowledge, there is nothing anywhere, or at any time, that is real."

Ib. p. 258. "Even as the same sky is apparently diversified as white or blue, so Soul, which is in truth but one, appears to erroneous vision distinct in different persons."

Ib. p. 251. "As one diffusive air, passing through the perforations of a flute, is distinguished as the notes of the scale, so the nature of the great spirit is single, though its forms be manifold, arising from the consequences of acts. When the difference of the investing form, as that of good, or the rest, is destroyed, then there is no distinction."

Moral distinctions also, as appertaining to individuality, and thus to bodily existence, belong merely to the sphere of Nature, which it is the aim of the wise man to transcend. His aim, therefore, is not action, whether virtuous or otherwise, but liberation from existence, since as long as he exists, as

long as he is under the dominion of Nature, he is necessarily impure: —

Vishnu Pur., p. 335. "As long as man lives he is immersed in manifold afflictions, like the seed of the cotton amidst its down."

Sánkh. Kár., XX. "By reason of union with it (soul,) insensible body seems sensible; and though the qualities be active, the stranger (soul) appears as the agent."

Ib. XLII. "For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it), like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequences, with the aid of nature's influence."

Ib. LIV. et seq. "Above there is prevalence of goodness; below, the creation is full of darkness; in the midst is the predominance of foulness, from BRAHMA to a stock. There does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person; wherefore pain is of the essence (of bodily existence)."

Bhag. Gita, p. 59. "The Almighty createth neither the powers nor the deeds of mankind, nor the application of the fruits of action: nature prevaileth. The Almighty receiveth neither the vices nor the virtues of any one."

Ib. p. 105. "He who beholdeth the Supreme Being alike in all things, whilst corrupting, itself uncorrupting; and conceiving that God in all things is the same, doth not of himself injure his own soul, goeth the journey of immortality. He who beholdeth all his actions performed by *Prakriti* (nature), at the same time perceiveth that the *Atma* or soul is inactive in them."

Vishnu Pur., p. 649. "The ill-judging embodied being, bewildered by the darkness of fascination, situated in a body composed of the five elements, loudly asserts, 'This is I:' but who would ascribe spiritual individuality to a body in which soul is distinct from the ether, air, fire, water, and earth? What man of understanding assigns to disembodied spirit corporeal fruition, or lands, houses, and the like, that it should say, 'These are mine?' Man performs all acts for the purpose of bodily fruition, and the consequence of such acts is another body; so that their result is nothing but confinement to bodily existence. In the same manner as a mansion of clay is plastered with clay and water, so the body, which is of earth, is perpetuated by earth and water. The

body, consisting of the five elements, is nourished by substances equally composed of those elements; but since this is the case, what is there in this life that man should be proud of? Travelling the path of the world for many thousands of births, man attains only the weariness of bewilderment, and is smothered by the dust of imagination. When that dust is washed away by the bland water of real knowledge, then the weariness of bewilderment sustained by the wayfarer through many births is removed. When that weariness is relieved, the internal man is at peace, and he obtains that supreme felicity which is unequalled and undisturbed. This soul is pure, and composed of happiness and wisdom. The properties of pain, ignorance, and impurity, are those of nature, not of soul. There is no affinity between fire and water, but when the latter is placed over the former in a cauldron, it bubbles and boils, and exhibits the properties of fire. In like manner, when soul is associated with nature it is vitiated by Egotism and the rest, and assumes the qualities of grosser nature, although essentially distinct from them, and incorruptible."

Ib. p. 137. "He who inflicts pain upon others, in act, thought, or speech, sows the seed of future birth, and the fruit that awaits him after birth is pain."

Ib. p. 139. "Let him who covets the goods of fortune be assiduous in the practice of virtue;—let him who hopes for final liberation learn to look upon all things as equal and the same."

Bhag. Gita, p. 47. "The man whose mind is led astray by the pride of self-sufficiency, thinketh that he himself is the executor of all those actions which are performed by the principles of his constitution. But the man who is acquainted with the nature of the two distinctions of cause and effect, having considered that principles will act according to their natures, giveth himself no trouble."

Ib. p. 48, et seq. "But the wise man also seeketh for that which is homogeneous to his own nature. All things act according to their natures, what then will restraint effect? In every purpose of the senses are fixed affection and dislike. A wise man should not put himself in their power, for both of them are his opponents. A man's own religion, though contrary to, is better than the faith of another, let it be ever so well followed. It is good to die in one's own faith, for another's faith beareth fear. . . . *Arjŏŏn:* 'By what, O

Krĕĕshnă, is man propelled to commit offences? He seems as if, contrary to his wishes, he was impelled by some secret force.' *Krĕĕshnă:* 'Know that it is the enemy lust, or passion, offspring of the carnal principle, insatiable and full of sin, by which this world is covered as the flame by the smoke, as the mirror by rust, or as the fœtus by its membrane. The understanding of the wise man is obscured by this inveterate foe in the shape of desire, who rageth like fire, and is hard to be appeased.'"

Soul being the only reality, material existence is possible only so far as it is established by the soul. Thus the body is a product of the action of the soul. But as the finite soul is again unreal, its action is not properly its own, but God's; being conformed by him to the disposition manifested by the individual in his imaginary action:—

Brahme-Sútra. (Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*,* I., 354.) "Blind in the darkness of ignorance, the soul is guided in its actions and fruition, in its attainment of knowledge, and consequent liberation and bliss, by the supreme ruler of the Universe, who causes it to act conformably with its previous resolves; . . . . The supreme soul makes the individuals act relatively to their virtuous or vicious propensities, as the same fertilizing rain-cloud causes various seeds to sprout multifariously, producing diversity of plants according to their kind."

The cares and interests of the world are therefore ridiculous to one who has attained true wisdom:—

Vishnu Pur., p. 487. "How great is the folly of princes, who are endowed with the faculty of reason, to cherish the confidence of ambition, when they themselves are but foam upon the wave. Before they have subdued themselves, they seek to reduce their ministers, their servants, their subjects, under their authority: they then endeavour to overcome their foes. 'Thus,' say they, 'will we conquer the ocean-encircled earth;' and intent upon their project, behold not death, which is not far off. But what mighty matter is the subjugation of the sea-girt earth to one who can subdue himself. Emancipation from existence is the fruit of self-control. It is through infatuation that kings desire to possess me (the earth), whom their predecessors have been forced to leave, whom their fa-

* *Miscellaneous Essays.* By H. T. Colebrooke. 2 vols. London. 1837.

thers have not retained. . . . The valiant Prithu traversed the universe, everywhere triumphant over his foes; yet he was blown away, like the light down of the Simal tree, before the blast of Time. . . . Aware of this truth, a wise man will never be influenced by the principle of individual appropriation; and regarding them as only transient and temporal possessions, he will not consider children and posterity, lands and property, or whatever else is personal, to be his own."

Bhag. Gita, p. 35. "The wise neither grieve for the dead nor for the living. I myself never *was not*, nor thou, nor all the princes of the earth; nor shall we ever cease *to be*. As the soul in this mortal frame findeth infancy, youth, and old age; so, in some future frame, will it find the like. One who is confirmed in this belief, is not disturbed by any thing that may come to pass. The sensibility of the faculties giveth heat and cold, pleasure and pain; which come and go, and are transient and inconstant. Bear them with patience, O son of Bhărăt; for the wise man, whom these disturb not, and to whom pain and pleasure are the same, is formed for immortality. A thing imaginary hath no existence, while that which is true is a stranger to nonentity. By those who look into the principles of things, the design of each is seen. Learn that he by whom all things were formed is incorruptible, and that no one is able to effect the destruction of this thing which is inexhaustible. . . . The man who believeth that it is the soul which killeth, and he who thinketh that the soul may be destroyed, are both alike deceived; for it neither killeth, nor is it killed. It is not a thing of which a man may say, it hath been, it is about to be, or is to be hereafter; for it is a thing without birth; it is ancient, constant, and eternal, and is not to be destroyed in this its mortal frame. . . . As a man throweth away old garments, and putteth on new, even so the soul, having quitted its old mortal frame, entereth into others which are new. . . . But whether thou believest it of eternal birth and duration, or that it dieth with the body, still thou hast no cause to lament. Death is certain to all things which are subject to birth, and regeneration to all things which are mortal; wherefore it doth not behove thee to grieve about that which is inevitable. The former state of beings is unknown; the middle state is evident, and their future state is not to be discovered. Why, then, shouldst thou trouble thyself about such things as these? Some regard

the soul as a wonder, whilst some speak, and others hear of it with astonishment; but no one knoweth it, although he may have heard it described."

Ib. p. 41. "The wisdom of that man is established, who in all things is without affection; and, having received good or evil, neither rejoiceth at the one, nor is cast down by the other. His wisdom is confirmed, when, like the tortoise, he can draw in all his members, and restrain them from their wonted purposes. The hungry man loseth every other object but the gratification of his appetite, and when he is become acquainted with the Supreme, he loseth even that."

Ib. p. 46. "But the man who may be self-delighted and self-satisfied, and who may be happy in his own soul, hath no occasion. He hath no interest either in that which is done, or that which is not done; and there is not, in all things which may have been created, any object on which he may place dependence. Wherefore, perform thou that which thou hast to do, at all times, unmindful of the event; for the man who doeth that which he hath to do, without affection, obtaineth the Supreme."

Ib. p. 60. "The enjoyments which proceed from the feelings are as the wombs of future pain."

Ib. p. 99. "He my servant is dear unto me, who is free from enmity, the friend of all nature, merciful, exempt from pride and selfishness, the same in pain and pleasure, patient of wrongs, contented, constantly devout, of subdued passions and firm resolves, and whose mind and understanding are fixed on me alone. He also is my beloved of whom mankind are not afraid, and who of mankind is not afraid; and who is free from the influence of joy, impatience, and the dread of harm. He my servant is dear unto me who is unexpecting, just and pure, impartial, free from distraction of mind, and who hath forsaken every enterprise. He also is worthy of my love, who neither rejoiceth nor findeth fault, who neither lamenteth nor coveteth, and, being my servant, hath forsaken both good and evil fortune. He also is my beloved servant, who is the same in friendship and in hatred, in honor and in dishonor, in cold and in heat, in pain and in pleasure; who is unsolicitous about the event of things; to whom praise and blame are as one; who is of little speech, and pleased with whatever cometh to pass; who owneth no particular home, and who is of steady mind."

Brahme-Sútra. (Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays*, I., 354.) "As

the carpenter having his tools in hand, toils and suffers, and laying them aside, rests and is easy, so the soul in conjunction with its instruments is active, and quitting them reposes."

Bhag. Gita, p. 111. "The incorruptible being is likened unto the tree *Aswăttha*, (the Banyan,) whose root is above and whose branches are below, and whose leaves are the *Vēds*. He who knoweth that, is acquainted with the *Vēds*. Its branches growing from the three qualities, whose lesser shoots are the objects of the organs of sense, spread forth some high and some low. The roots which are spread abroad below, in the regions of mankind, are restrained by action. Its form is not to be found here, neither its beginning, nor its end, nor its likeness. When a man hath cut down this *Aswăttha*, whose root is so firmly fixed, with the strong axe of disinterest, from that time that place is to be sought from whence there is no return for those who find it."

Vishnu Pur., p. 130. "The simpleton, in his inexperience, fancies that the alleviation of hunger, thirst, cold, and the like, is pleasure; but of a truth it is pain; for suffering is pleasure to those whose eyes are darkened by ignorance; whose limbs, exceedingly benumbed, desire pleasure by exercise. . . . The agreeableness of fire is caused by cold; of water, by thirst; of food, by hunger; by other circumstances their contraries are equally agreeable."

Ib. p. 132. "Let us therefore lay aside the angry passions of our race, and so strive that we obtain that perfect, pure, and eternal happiness, which shall be beyond the power of the elements or their duties, . . . which shall be uninterrupted by men or beasts, or by the infirmities of human nature; by bodily sickness and disease, or hatred, envy, malice, passion, or desire; which nothing shall molest, and which every one who fixes his whole heart on Kesáva shall enjoy. Verily I say unto you, that you shall have no satisfaction in various revolutions through this treacherous world, but that you will obtain placidity for ever by propitiating Vishnu, whose adoration is perfect calm."

Ib. p. 210. "Heaven is that which delights the mind; hell is that which gives it pain: hence vice is called hell, virtue is called heaven. The self-same thing is applicable to the production of pleasure or pain, of malice or of anger. Whence then can it be considered as essentially the same with either? That which at one time is a source of enjoyment, becomes at another the cause of suffering: and the same thing may at

different seasons excite wrath or conciliate favor. It follows, then, that nothing is in itself either pleasurable or painful; and pleasure and pain, and the like, are merely definitions of mind."

Ib. p. 568. "O Lord, I have been whirled round in the circle of worldly existence for ever, and have suffered the three classes of affliction, and there is no rest whatever. I have mistaken pains for pleasures, like sultry vapors for a pool of water: and their enjoyment has yielded me nothing but sorrow. The earth, dominions, forces, treasures, friends, children, wife, dependants, all the objects of sense, have I possessed, imagining them to be sources of happiness; but I found that in their changeable nature, O Lord, they were nothing but vexation. . . . Where, then, is everlasting repose? Who without adoring thee, who art the origin of all worlds, shall attain, O supreme deity, that rest which endures for ever? . . . Addicted to sensual objects, through thy delusions I revolve in the whirlpool of selfishness and pride: and hence I come to thee, as my final refuge, . . . desiring the fulness of felicity, emancipation from all existence."

Action is not to be avoided, since this also would be to make a motive, and thus a reality, of the Outward. We are not to seek favorable circumstances even for study or devotion, but to hold ourselves passive, whether our position determine us to act, or not: —

Bhag. Gita, p. 57. "Both the desertion and the practice of works are equally the means of extreme happiness; but of the two the practice of works is to be distinguished above the desertion."

Ib. p. 40. "Let the motive be in the deed, and not in the event. Be not one whose motive for action is the hope of reward. Let not thy life be spent in inaction. Depend upon application, perform thy duty, abandon all thought of the consequence, and make the event equal, whether it terminate in good or evil."

Ib. p. 131. "The duties of a man's own particular calling, although not free from faults, are far preferable to the duty of another, let it be ever so well pursued. A man by following the duties which are appointed by his birth, doeth no wrong. A man's own calling, with all its faults, ought not to be forsaken. Every undertaking is involved in its faults, as the fire in its smoke."

Ib. p. 44. "The man enjoyeth not freedom from action,

from the non-commencement of that which he hath to do; nor doth he obtain happiness from a total inactivity. No one ever resteth a moment inactive. Every man is involuntarily urged to act by those principles which are inherent in his nature. The man who restraineth his active faculties, and sitteth down with his mind attentive to the objects of his senses, is called one of an estrayed soul, and the practiser of deceit. So the man is praised, who, having subdued all his passions, performeth with his active faculties all the functions of life, unconcerned about the event. Perform the settled functions; action is preferable to inaction. The journey of thy mortal frame may not succeed from inaction. This busy world is engaged from other motives than the worship of the Deity. Abandon then, O son of *Kŏŏntĕĕ*, all selfish motives, and perform thy duty for him alone."

Ib. p. 58. "The man who, performing the duties of life, and quitting all interest in them, placeth them upon *Brăhm*, the Supreme, is not tainted by sin; but remaineth like the leaf of the lotus unaffected by the waters. Practical men, who perform the offices of life but with their bodies, their minds, their understandings, and their senses, and forsake the consequence for the purification of their souls; and although employed, forsake the fruit of action, obtain infinite happiness: whilst the man who is unemployed, being attached to the fruit by the agent desire, is in the bonds of confinement. The man who hath his passions in subjection, and with his mind forsaketh all works, his soul sitteth at rest in the nine-gated city of its abode, neither acting nor causing to act."

Ib. p. 110. "He, O son of *Pāndŏŏ*, who despiseth not the light of wisdom, the attention to worldly things, and the distraction of thought, when they come upon him, nor longeth for them when they disappear, . . . such a one hath surmounted the influences of the qualities."

Ib. p. 53. "Wise men call him a *Pāndĕĕt*, whose every undertaking is free from the idea of desire, and whose actions are consumed by the fire of wisdom. He abandoneth the desire of a reward of his actions; he is always contented and independent; and although he may be engaged in a work, he, as it were, doeth nothing. He is unsolicitous, of a subdued mind and spirit, and exempt from every perception; and, as he doeth only the offices of the body, he committeth no offence. He is pleased with whatever he may by chance obtain; he hath gotten the better of duplicity, and he is free from envy.

He is the same in prosperity and adversity; and although he acteth, he is not confined in the action. The work of him who hath lost all anxiety for the event, who is freed from the bonds of action, and standeth with his mind subdued by spiritual wisdom, and who performeth it for the sake of worship, cometh altogether unto nothing."

Ib. p. 116. [The evil and foolish] "trust to their carnal appetites, which are hard to be satisfied; are hypocrites, and overwhelmed with madness and intoxication. Because of their folly they adopt false doctrines, and continue to live the life of impurity. They abide by their inconceivable opinions, even unto the day of confusion, and determine within their own minds that the gratification of the sensual appetites is the supreme good. Fast-bound by the hundred cords of hope, and placing all their trust in lust and anger, they seek by injustice the accumulation of wealth, for the gratification of their inordinate desires. 'This, to-day, hath been acquired by me. I shall obtain this object of my heart. This wealth I have, and this shall I have also. This foe have I already slain, and others will I forthwith vanquish. I am *Eeswăr*, and I enjoy; I am consummate, I am powerful, and I am happy; I am rich, and I am endued with precedence amongst men; and where is there another like unto me? I will make presents at the feasts and be merry.' In this manner do those ignorant men talk, whose minds are thus gone astray. Confounded with various thoughts and designs, they are entangled in the net of folly; and being firmly attached to the gratification of their lusts, they sink at length into the hell of impurity."

Bodily existence and individuality being unreal, the individual is in reality a part of the Infinite: there is no qualitative distinction:—

Brahme-Sútra. (Colebrooke's *Essays*, I., 354.) "The soul is a portion of the supreme ruler, as a spark is of fire. The relation is not as that of master and servant, ruler and ruled, but as that of whole and part. . . . He does not, however, partake of the pain and suffering of which the individual soul is conscious, through sympathy, during its association with body; so solar or lunar light appears as that which it illumines, though distinct therefrom. As the sun's image reflected in water is tremulous, quaking with the undulations of the pool, without, however, affecting other watery images, nor the solar orb itself; so the sufferings of one individual affect not another, nor the supreme ruler."

In truth, however, there is no real distinctness, even quantitative. The individual, then, is God:—

Vishnu Pur., p. 258. "Do thou, O king, who knowest what duty is, regarding equally friend and foe, consider yourself as one with all that exists in the world. . . . That One, which here is all things, is Achyuta (Vishnu); than whom there is none other. He is I: he is thou: he is all: this universe is his form. Abandon the error of distinction."

Ib. p. 255. "Man (the soul of man) goeth everywhere, and penetrates everywhere, like the ether; and is it rational to inquire where it is? or whence or whither thou goest? I am neither going nor coming; nor is my dwelling in any one place; nor art thou, thou; nor are others, others; nor am I, I."

Ib. p. 247. "The pure, imperishable soul, tranquil, void of qualities, preëminent over nature, is one, without increase or diminution, in all bodies."

Ib. p. 139. "Gods, men, animals, birds, reptiles, all are but forms of one eternal Vishnu, existing as it were detached from himself. . . . It were idle to talk of friend or foe in Govinda (Vishnu), who is the supreme soul, lord of the world, consisting of the world, and who is identical with all beings. The divine Vishnu is in thee, father, in me, and in all everywhere else; hence how can I speak of friend or foe, as distinct from myself? . . . By him who knows this, all the existing world, fixed or movable, is to be regarded as identical with himself, as proceeding alike from Vishnu, assuming a universal form. When this is known, the glorious god of all, who is without beginning or end, is pleased; and when he is pleased, there is an end of affliction."

Ib. p. 251, et seq. "The great end of all is Soul: One, pervading, uniform, perfect, preëminent over nature, exempt from birth, growth and decay, omnipresent, undecaying, made up of true knowledge, independent, and unconnected with unrealities, with name, species, and the rest, in time present, past, or to come. The knowledge that this spirit, which is essentially one, is in one's own and in all other bodies, is the great end, or true wisdom, of one who knows the unity and the true principles of things."

By study and devotion the wise man may arrive at the truth of this identity with God, and then, all the reason of his finiteness being removed, he becomes in truth God.

Ib. p. 139, et seq. [A young man, son of the king of the Daityas, a race of Titans continually at war with the gods,

became devoted to the worship of Vishnu. His father, after trying various expedients to detach him from the hostile faith, at last becoming excessively enraged, commanded them to bind him with strong bands and cast him into the ocean. This being done,] "as he floated on the waters, the ocean was convulsed throughout its whole extent, and rose in mighty undulations, threatening to submerge the earth." [Then the king ordered them to pile rocks upon him. Accordingly they hurled upon him] "ponderous rocks, and piled them over him for many thousand miles; but he still, with mind undisturbed, thus offered daily praise to Vishnu. . . . 'Glory to that Vishnu from whom this world is not distinct. May he, ever to be meditated upon as the beginning of the Universe, have compassion upon me; may he, the supporter of all, in whom every thing is warped and woven, have compassion on me; . . . glory to him who is all; to him whom I also am; for he is everywhere, and through whom all things are from me. I am all things; all things are in me, who am everlasting. I am undecaying, ever enduring, the receptacle of the spirit of the supreme. Brahma is my name; the supreme soul, that is before all things, that is after the end of all.' — Thus meditating upon Vishnu, Prahláda became as one with him, . . . he forgot entirely his own individuality, and was conscious of nothing else than his being the inexhaustible, eternal, supreme soul. . . . As soon as, through the force of his contemplation, Prahláda had become one with Vishnu, the bonds with which he was bound burst instantly asunder; the ocean was violently uplifted; the monsters of the deep were alarmed; earth with all her forests and mountains trembled; and the prince, putting aside the rocks which the demons had piled upon him, came forth out of the main."

Thus the whole duty of man, all philosophy, both practical and theoretical, is embraced in the single requirement of absolute Skepticism; a skepticism which does not doubt, but is absolutely certain of the unreality of all things; which recognizes only pure negation, and seeks only liberation from existence: —

Vishnu Pur., p. 658. "Liberation, which is the object to be effected, being accomplished, discriminative knowledge ceases. When endowed with the apprehension of the nature of the object of inquiry, then there is no difference between it and supreme spirit; difference is the consequence of the absence of true knowledge. When that ignorance which is the

cause of the difference between individual and universal spirit is destroyed, finally and for ever, who shall ever make that distinction between them which does not exist?"

Vishnu Pur., p. 654. "Until all acts which are the causes of notions of individuality, are discontinued, spirit is one thing, and the universe is another, to those who contemplate objects as distinct and various; but that is called true knowledge, or knowledge of Brahma, which recognizes no distinctions, which contemplates only simple existence, which is undefinable by words, and is to be discovered solely in one's own spirit."

Bhag. Gita, p. 55 et seq. "In wisdom is to be found every work without exception. Seek then this wisdom, . . . which having learnt, thou shalt not again, O son of *Pāndŏŏ*, fall into folly; by which thou shalt behold all nature in the spirit; that is, in me. Although thou wert the greatest of all offenders, thou shalt be able to cross the gulf of sin with the bark of wisdom. As the natural fire, O *Arjŏŏn*, reduceth the wood to ashes, so may the fire of wisdom reduce all moral actions to ashes. . . . Children only, and not the learned, speak of the speculative and the practical doctrines as two. They are but one, for both obtain the self-same end. . . . That man seeth, who seeth that the speculative doctrines and the practical are but one. . . . Mankind are led astray by their reasons being obscured by ignorance; but when that ignorance of their souls is destroyed by the force of reason, their wisdom shineth forth again with the glory of the sun, and causeth the Deity to appear."

Vishnu Pur., p. 251. "Best of all is the identification of soul with the supreme spirit. . . . The knowledge that this spirit, which is essentially one, is in one's own and in all other bodies, is the great end, or true wisdom, of one who knows the unity and the true principles of things."

Ib. p. 139. "That is active duty, which is not for our bondage; that is knowledge, which is for our liberation: all other duty is good only unto weariness: all other knowledge is only the cleverness of an artist."

The object of creation, and the end of existence, is the exclusion and negation of the Outward. By relinquishing and casting off his false being, Man attains again his true state.

Ib. p. 649. "The mind of man is the cause both of his bondage and his liberation: its addiction to the objects of sense is the means of his bondage; its separation from the objects of sense is the means of his freedom."

Vedas: (cited in Colebrooke's *Essays*, I., 287.) "Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again."

Sánkh. Kár., LVI. et seq. "This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake as for self. As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul. Generous Nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself) the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities. Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than Nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul. Verily not any soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates; but Nature alone, in relation to various beings, is bound, is released, and migrates. By seven modes Nature binds herself by herself; by one, she releases (herself) for the soul's wish. So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist. Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease Nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change, and consequently precluded from those seven forms. He desists, because he has seen her; she does so because she has been seen. In this (mere) union there is no motive for creation. By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains awhile invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effects of the impulse previously given to it. When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished."

Commentary to Sánkh. Kár., LVI. "Nature is like a utensil; having fulfilled soul's object it ceases."

Bhag. Gita, p. 106. "They who, with the eye of wisdom, perceive the body and the spirit to be thus distinct, and that there is a final release from the animal nature, go to the Supreme."

In this all-absorbing nihilism we have the first attempt at speculation. It cannot be called the earliest philosophical system, for it does not get as far as a system; but it is the earliest distinct endeavour to grasp the idea of the Universe.

The antithesis of Thought and Being, of the Mind and Nature, about which all philosophy turns, first presents itself in a one-sided form, one or the other factor being neglected. If we consider Being alone, or principally, then Reality is to us contained in the Outward; and as we do not see its true relation to Thought, it is an uncomprehended *something*, the highest attribute of which is Being; a pure abstraction of the Outward, and thus altogether unideal, rude, — Matter. This is the natural position of the Occidental mind.

The Orientals, on the other hand, are prone to consider Reality as pure Thought. The highest Reality to them is Mind, from which all trace of the Material is removed, — abstract Soul. The most important theological dogma to us is that God exists. But to the Hindoos the highest description of God is as the One Soul which does not admit of incarnation, and to whom Existence is the illusive show with which He disports himself. The Deity is here pure introversion; mere homogeneousness and equality with himself, that is, pure, abstract Thought. This is the earliest and the simplest conceivable form of speculation, and it must be acknowledged that these writings display an earnestness and intensity of abstraction that would seem to indicate a great depth of philosophical genius.

There is something irresistibly commanding in the terrible simplicity of this Idealism; partially typified, also, in the colossal sculptures of Ellora and Elephanta. But like its opposite, Materialism, it rests on an extreme abstraction, and is thus altogether one-sided and incomplete; and although as speculation it stands higher than Materialism, since it demands a comprehension of the relation of Nature to the mind, — yet, on the other hand, it cuts off the solution of the problem, by a mere negation, which does not dispose of Nature, but merely forbids any further consideration of it.

The Hindoo Idealism might seem at first sight the most thoroughgoing possible; — yet such is not the case. The *reality* of the Outward, of Nature, is denied, yet it remains, as an *existing unreality*. It is actual existence, only not the existence of God. But, then, whence does it derive its power to exist? The answer is, from God, who created and sustains it *as* an unreality, an illusion. Then Soul, the One Principle, which is Reality, does not embrace the whole Universe, — but there is, moreover, something unreal and material, which is yet existent, and created by God — who, how-

ever, is identical with the One Soul, and thus pure Reality. Evidently, therefore, a qualification of the principle is necessary. Soul is no longer pure soul, but also material: Reality not purely real, but also, in some relations, unreal; namely, *as to Man*. So also the Material is no longer pure negation, but qualified. It is nothing as to God, but something as to Man. Nor is this to be avoided by saying that Man is an unreality, and his supposed knowledge, the relation of Nature to his mind, mere deception. For the illusion by which he is deceived must be real, else it is no *illusion*, and then our knowledge is real. In other words, the relation between the mind and Nature being established by God, must be a reality, and thus our perception a reality also, — whether we perceive correctly or not; a subjective reality, at least, though, perhaps, not objective.

In spite of all, then, Nature remains *something*, which, according to the principle, it should not. It is something unspiritual, and, though created by God, foreign to him, existing properly only in the minds of created beings, not in his own. This is Evil, Impurity, that which ought not to be, but is.

It is interesting to observe in passing, the resemblance of this view to Fichte's, in whose system also Nature is merely the Unspiritual and Evil. In the Hindoo view, as in his, moreover, Nature, though mere negation, is yet necessary, as the *pièce de résistance*, by the negation of which its opposite is affirmed.

Skepticism, then, is here possible only as to the reality of *things in themselves*, out of our perception of them — (Kant's and Fichte's *Dinge an sich*); whether, apart from the phenomenal and perceptible world there be a super-phenomenal reality in nature, *distinct from God*. This skepticism, therefore, does not apply to all belief in existence — to Nature as presented to the senses — but only to a dogmatic conception of Nature as an independent supersensuous reality. Matter is an independent reality to the senses, because the senses partake of its nature, and thus do not transcend it. Sensuous perception is a relation established by God, and thus that which is perceived is independent of the finite mind. To God, however, or the mind unencumbered by personality, Matter is only this relation, and in itself, apart from this relation, it is nothing. An illusion is the substitution of an idea, formed in one's mind, for an outward reality. Creation, therefore, may be called a Divine illusion, since in it what was contained in

the mind of the Creator becomes an outward reality for the creature. The expression, however, is an improper one, since the word *illusion* implies deceit, and such indeed is its general acceptation in the Hindoo writings. Here the same erroneous notion shows itself, which we saw in the ethical view of the Outward as Evil and Impurity. Both postulate that Matter is in itself a reality independent of Mind; that Nature is independent of God. For illusion is such only by contrast with Reality and real knowledge. If the illusiveness of the phenomenal world, therefore, be held to consist in its transcience, Reality must be a permanence of the phenomenal, as something separate from Spirit, from the Creator. In that case Creation would be the substitution of a shadowy and transient existence for a solid reality; and would thus be a deception; — and Nature would be an eternal undivine existence, and (being independent of the Creator) an eternal negation of God, or eternal Evil.

The main peculiarities of the Hindoo view, therefore, do not come from its Idealism, but from its Materialism. It is an essentially incomplete Idealism, because it does not dispose of Matter by reducing it to an idea, but only ignores it; — hence a reaction, and a passage to its opposite, Materialism, was unavoidable. Nature not being shown to be included in Spirit, but merely excluded by it, remained as its opposite, mere negation; and Spirit also was thus degraded into the mere opposite of Nature, — mere immateriality, or unembodied soul. Skepticism was the necessary result.

It would be interesting, did our limits allow, to show the development of this principle in the institutions and character of the Hindoos. It would also be of the highest interest to contrast with it (and thereby illustrate the same great truth,) its opposite, Materialism, and show how it in turn, by the same necessity of symmetry, passes into Idealism, and at last to the common meeting-point of Skepticism; — how from Locke to Berkeley and Hume there is a progress not at all accidental, but necessary, and involved in the very principles started with.

ART. II. — *Memoir of William Ellery Channing; with Extracts from his Correspondence and Manuscripts.* In three volumes. Boston. 1848. 12mo. pp. 427, 459, 494.

IT is now nearly six years since William Ellery Channing, ceasing to be mortal, passed on to his rest and his reward. We have waited impatiently for the publication of his memoirs, that we might "beg a hair of him for memory." They are now before us — three well printed volumes, mainly filled up with his own writings, letters, extracts from journals, sermons, and various papers hitherto kept from the press. As a public speaker and popular writer he was well known before; these volumes show us not merely the minister and the author, but the son, husband, father, and friend. If they reveal nothing new in his character, we have yet in them ample materials for ascertaining whence came his influence and his power. What estimate shall we make of the man, and what lesson draw from his life and works? These are matters worth considering, but, before answering the question, let us look a little at the opportunities afforded him by his profession.

The Church and State are two conspicuous and important forms of popular action. The State is an institution which represents man in his relations with man; — the Church, man in his relations with man and God. These institutions, varying in their modifications, have always been and must be, — as they represent two modes of action that are constant in the Human Race, and come from the imperishable nature of man. In each of these modes of action, the People have their servants, — Politicians, the servants of the State, and Clergymen, the servants of the Church.

Now the clergyman may be a Priest, or a Minister — the choice depending on his character and ability. The same distinctions are noticeable in the servants of the State, where we have the Priest of Politics and the Minister of Politics. We will pass over the Priest.

The business of the minister is to become a spiritual guide to men, to instruct by his wisdom, elevate by his goodness, refine and strengthen by his piety, to inspire by his whole soul — to serve and to lead by going before them all his days with all his life, a pillar of cloud by day, of fire by night. The good shepherd giveth his life to his sheep as well as for them.

The minister aims to be, to do, and to suffer, in special for his own particular parish, but also and in general for mankind at large. He proposes for himself this end: the elevation of mankind, — their physical elevation to health, comfort, abundance, skill, and beauty; their intellectual elevation to thought, refinement, and wisdom; their moral and religious elevation to goodness and piety, till they all become sons of God also, and prophets. However, his direct and main business is to promote the Spiritual Growth of men, helping them to love one another, and to love God.

His means to this end are, in general, the common weapons of the church. To him the Sunday is a high day, for it is the great day of work, when he comes into close relations with men, to instruct the mind, to warn in the name of conscience, gently arousing the affections, kindling the religious emotions, and so continuing his Father's work; the Meeting-house, chapel, or church, is the great place for his work, and so, like the Sunday, it is holy to him; — both invested with a certain sanctity, as to the pious farmer or smith, the Plough or the Hammer seems a sacred thing. The Bible, the service-books, the traditions he appeals to, the sacramental ordinances he uses, all are means but not ends, helps to whom they help, but nothing more, their sanctity derivative, not of them but of the use they serve. In our day, the Press offers him its aid, and stands ready to distribute his thought among the millions of mankind. By means of that he gradually gets beyond the bounds of his parish, rural or metropolitan, and, if God has so gifted him, has whole nations for his audience, and, long after his death, his word will circulate among the nations — a word of power and blessedness.

The minister finds a certain respect paid to the clergyman. This is not a thing that is new, but old, hallowed, and slowly fading out of the consciousness of the nations. This traditional respect gives him a certain position and influence, and enables him at once to anticipate and claim a place which is granted to other classes of men only as the result of long life and faithful work. He finds a pulpit erected for him, an audience gathered, respectful and disposed to listen and gratefully to receive whatever good he has to offer. While the priest uses this position and traditional respect to elevate himself, to take his ease in his inn — to keep men still, the minister uses it to help men forward; not to elevate himself, but them. The pulpit is his place to stand on and move the

world. It is not to be denied that even now, in incredulous America, the calling of a clergyman gives a man a good opportunity for power, for a real, serious, and lasting influence, or it gives him the best chance for a sleep, silent and undisturbed, and deep and long.

Such are the general means of the minister towards his great end — means which belong to all clergymen, and vary in efficiency only with the number, the wealth, the talent, and social position of his audience. His particular and personal means are his talents, little or great; his skill acquired by education and self-discipline; his learning, the accumulated thought which has come of his diligence, as capital is accumulated by toil and thrift; his eloquence — the power of speaking the right thing, at the right time, with the right words, in the right way; his goodness and his piety, — in a word, his whole character, intellectual, moral, and religious. These are the means which belong to the man, not the clergyman; means which vary not with the number, wealth, talent, and social position of his audience, but only with the powers of the man himself. His general means are what he has as servant of the church — his special, what he is as a man.

Say what men will, the pulpit is still a vantage ground, an eminence; often a bad eminence, it may be, still one of the places of public power. If a man would produce an immediate effect, and accomplish one particular work, let him storm awhile in Congress, if he will. But if he aims to produce a long and lasting influence, to affect men deeply, and in many ways promote the progress of mankind, he may ascend the pulpit, and thence pour forth his light and heat on youth and age, distil his early and his latter rain; he is sure to waken the tender plants at last, and sure to strengthen the tallest and most strong. Yet for all that, say what we may of the power of that position, the Man is more than the pulpit, more than the church, — yes, more than all pulpits and all churches, and if he is right and they wrong, he sets them a-spinning around him as boys their tops. Yet 't is a great mistake to suppose it is the spoken word merely that does all; it is the mind, the heart, the soul, the character, that speaks the word. Words — they are the least of what a man says. The water in some wide brook is harmless enough, loitering along its way, nothing but water; the smallest of fishes find easy shallows for their sport; careless reptiles there leave their unattended young; children wade laughing along its course, and

sail their tiny ships. But raise that stream a hundred feet — its tinkle becomes thunder, and its waters strike with force that nothing can resist. So the words of a man of no character, though comforting enough when they are echoed by passion, appetite, and old and evil habits of our own — are powerless against the might of passion, habit, appetite. What comes from nothing comes to nothing. I know IN WHOM I have believed, said the Apostle — not merely WHAT.

It is the minister's business to teach men Truth and Religion, not directly all forms of truth — though to help so far as he may even in that — but especially Truth which relates to man's spiritual growth. To do this he must be before men, superior to them in the things he teaches: we set a grown woman to take care of children, a man to teach boys. There is no other way; in mathematics and in morals the leader must go before the men he leads. To teach Truth and Religion the minister must not only possess them, but must know the obstacles which oppose both in other minds — must know the intellectual errors which conflict with Truth, the practical errors which contend with Religion, and so be able to meet and confront the falsehoods and the sins of his time. He must therefore be a Reformer, — there is no help for it. He may have a mystical turn, and reform only sentiments; a philosophical turn, and reform ideas — in politics, philosophy, theology; or a practical turn, and hew away only at actual concrete sins; but a Reformer must he be in one shape, or in all, otherwise he is no minister, serving, leading, inspiring, but only a priest; a poor miserable priest, — not singing his own psalm out of his own throat, but grinding away at the barrel-organ of his sect — grating forth tunes which he did not make and cannot understand.

The minister is to labor for mankind, for the noblest end, in one of the highest modes of labor, and its fairest form. He does not ask to rule, but to serve; not praise, but perfection. He seeks power over men not for his sake, but theirs. He is to take the lead in all works of education, of moral and social reform. If need is, he must be willing to stand alone. The qualities which bind him to mankind for all eternity are qualities which may sever him from his class and his townsmen; yes, from his own brothers, and that for his mortal life. The distinctions amongst men must be no distinctions to him. He must honor all men, become a brother to all — most brotherly to the neediest. He must see the man in the beggar, in the felon, in the outcast of society, and labor to separate that

diamond from the rubbish that hides its light. In a great city, the lowest ranks of the public should be familiar to his thoughts and present in his prayers. He is to seek instruction from men that can give it — and impart of himself to all that need and as they need. He must keep an unbroken sympathy with man; above all, he must dwell intimate with God. It is his duty to master the greatest subjects of human thought: to know the Nature of Man, his wants, appetites, exposures, — his animal nature, his human nature, and his divine; man in his ideal state of wisdom, abundance, loveliness, and religion; man is his actual state of ignorance, want, deformity, and sin. He is to minister to man's highest wants; to bring high counsel to low men, and to elevate still more the aspirations of the loftiest. He must be a living rebuke to proud men and the scorner; a man so full of heart and hope that drooping souls shall take courage and thank God, cheered by his conquering valor.

To do and to be all this, he must know men, not with the half-knowledge which comes from reading books, but by seeing, feeling, doing, and being. He must know history, philosophy, poetry — and life he must know by heart. He must understand the Laws of God, be filled with God's thought, animated with His feeling — be filled with Truth and Love. Expecting much of himself he will look for much also from other men. He asks men to lend him their ears, if he have any thing to teach, knowing that then he shall win their hearts; but if he has nothing to offer, he bids men go off where they can be fed, and leave the naked walls sepulchral and cold, to tell him "Sir, you have nothing to say; you had better be done!" But he expects men that take his ideas for Truth to turn his words to life. He looks for corn as proof that he sowed good seed in the field; he trusts men will become better by his words — wiser, holier, more full of faith. He hopes to see them outgrow him, till he can serve them no more, and they come no longer to his well to draw, but have found the fountain of immortal life hard by their own door; — so the good father who has watched and prayed over his children, longs to have them set up for themselves, and live out their own manly and independent life. He does not ask honor, nor riches, nor ease — only to see good men and good works as the result of his toil. If no such result comes of a long life, then he knows either that he has mistaken his calling or failed of his duty.

We have always looked on the lot of a minister in a coun-

try town as our ideal of a happy and useful life. Not grossly poor, not idly rich, he is every man's equal, and no man's master. He is welcome everywhere, if worthy, and may have the satisfaction that he is helping men to wisdom, to virtue, to piety, to the dearest joys of this life and the next. He can easily know all of his flock, be familiar with their thoughts, and help them out of their difficulties by his superiority of nature, or cultivation, or religious growth. The great work of education — intellectual and spiritual — falls under his charge. He can give due culture to all; but the choicer and more delicate plants, that require the nicest eye and hand — these are peculiarly his care. In small societies eloquence is not to be looked for, as in the great congregations of a city, where the listening looks of hundreds or thousands would win eloquence almost out of the stones. The ocean is always sublime in its movements, but the smallest spring under the oak has beauty in its still transparence, and sends its waters to the sea. In cities the lot of the minister is far less grateful — his connection less intimate, less domestic. Here, in addition to the common subjects of the minister's discourse, everywhere the same, the great themes of Society require to be discussed, and peace and war, freedom and slavery, the public policy of states, and the character of their leaders, come up to the pulpits of a great city to be looked on in the light of Christianity and so judged. With a few hearers, we see not how a man can fail to speak simply, and with persuasive speech; before many, speaking on such a theme as Religion, which has provoked such wonders of art out of the sculptor, poet, painter, architect — we wonder that every man is not eloquent. Some will pass by the little spring, nor heed its unobtrusive loveliness, — all turn with wonder at the ocean's face, and feel for a moment awed by its sublimity, and lifted out of their common consciousness.

In the nineteenth century the clergy have less relative power than ever before in Christendom; it is partly their own fault, but chiefly the glory and excellence of the age. It has other instructors. But there was never a time when a great man rising in a pulpit could so communicate his thoughts and sentiments as now; a man who should bear the same relation to this age that Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Bernard of Clair-Vaux bore to their age, so far overtopping men — would have more influence, not less than theirs. Nations wait for noble sentiments, for generous thoughts; wait for the

Discoverer and Organizer. The machinery of the age is ready to move for him, — the steam-horses, the steam-press. His audience has no limit. Even now the position of a minister gives him great advantages. He has a ready access to men's souls, a respectful hearing from week to week, and constant dropping will wear the stones — how much more the hearts of men. The children grow up under his eye and influence.

All ministers stand on the same level, and nothing lifts one above another but his genius, his culture, his character, and his life. In the pulpit, the most distinguished birth avails nothing; the humblest origin is no hindrance. In New England, in America, everywhere in the world money gives power, never more than to-day; a rich lawyer or merchant finds himself more respected for his wealth, and listened to with greater esteem by any audience. Wealth arms him with a golden weapon. It is so in politics, — power is attracted towards gold. With the minister it is not so. If a clergyman had all the wealth of both the great cardinals Wolsey and Richelieu, did he dwell in a palace finer than the Vatican — all his wealth would not give him a whit the more influence in his pulpit, in sermon or in prayer. Henry Ware moved men none the less because he had so little of this world's goods. In this way, therefore, the minister's influence is personal, not material. The more he is a man, the more a minister.

In virtue of his position he has the best chance to know men. He overrides all distinctions of life, associates with the humblest man as brother, with the highest as their equal. If well trained, his education places him in the circle of the most cultivated minds, while his sympathies and his duty attract him to the lowest sphere of rudeness, want, and perhaps of crime. He sees men in joy and in grief, at a wedding and a funeral, and when flushed with hope, when wrung with pain, when the soul bids earth farewell. If a true man, the most precious confidence is reposed in him. He looks into men's eyes as he speaks, and in their varying faces reads their confession, what they could oft conceal, both ill and good, — reads sometimes with astonished eyes. Reader, you have seen an old coin, worn smooth so that there was no mark on it, not a letter; you know not whence it came nor whose it is; but you heat it in the fire, and the stamp of the die is plain as when the coin was minted first; you see the image, read the superscription. So the excitement of a sermon reveals the man's character in his oft-unwilling face, and the

preacher, astonished, renders unto Cæsar the things that are his, and unto God His own. Sometimes one is saddened to see the miser, satyr, worldling in his many forms, under a disguise so trim and neat; but oftener, perhaps, surprised to find a saint he knew not of before; surprised at the resurrection of such a soul from such a tomb. The minister addresses men as individuals, the lawyer must convince the whole jury, the senator a majority of the senate, or his work is lost; while if the minister convinces one man, or but half convinces him — he has still done something, which will last. The merchant deals with material things, the lawyer and the politician commonly address only the understanding of their hearers, sharpening attention by appeals to interest; while the minister calls upon the affections, addresses the conscience, and appeals to the religious nature of man — to faculties which bind man to his race, and unite him with his God. This gives him a power which no other man aspires to; which neither the lawyer nor the merchant, nor yet the politician attempts to wield; nay, which the mere writer of books leaves out of sight. In our day we often forget these things, and suppose that the government or the newspapers are the arbiters of public opinion, while still the pulpit has a mighty influence. All the politicians and lawyers in America could not persuade men to believe what was contrary to common-sense and adverse to their interest; but a few preachers, in the name of Religion, made whole millions believe the world would perish on a certain day, and, now the day is past, it is hard for them to believe their preachers were mistaken!

Now all this might of position and opportunity may be used for good or ill, to advance men or retard them; so a great responsibility rests always on the clergy of the land. Put a heavy man in the pulpit, ordinary, vulgar, obese, idle, inhuman, and he overlays the conscience of the people with his grossness; his Upas breath poisons every spiritual plant that springs up within sight of his church. Put there a man of only the average intelligence and religion — he does nothing but keep men from sliding back; he loves his people and giveth his beloved — sleep. Put there a superior man, with Genius for Religion, nay, a man of no genius, but an active, intelligent, human, and pious man, who will work for the Human Race with all his mind and heart — and he does wonders; he loves his people and giveth his beloved his own life. He looks out on the wealth, ignorance, pride, poverty, lust, and sin

of the world, and blames himself for their existence. This suffering human race, poor blind Bartimæus, sits by the wayside, crying to all men of power — "Have mercy on me;" the minister says, "What wilt thou," he answers, "Lord, that I might receive my sight." No man may be idle, least of all the minister; he least of all in this age, when Bartimæus cries as never before.

Dr. Channing was born at Newport in Rhode Island, the 7th of April, 1780, and educated under the most favorable circumstances which the country then afforded; employed as a private teacher for more than a year at Richmond, and settled as a clergyman in Boston more than five and forty years ago. Here he labored in this calling, more or less, for nearly forty years. He was emphatically a Christian Minister, in all the high meaning of that term. He has had a deep influence here; a wide influence in the world. For forty years, though able men have planned wisely for this city, and rich men bestowed their treasure for her welfare, founding valuable and permanent institutions, yet no one has done so much for Boston as he — none contributed so powerfully to enhance the character of her men for Religion and for Brotherly Love. There is no charity like the inspiration of great writers. There were two excellent and extraordinary ministers in Boston contemporary with Dr. Channing, whose memory will not soon depart — we mean Buckminster and Ware. But Dr. Channing was the most remarkable clergyman in America; yes, throughout all lands where the English tongue is spoken, in the nineteenth century, there has been no minister so remarkable as he; none so powerful on the whole. No clergyman of America ever exercised such dominion amongst men. Edwards and Mayhew are great names in the American churches, men of power, of self-denial, of toil, who have also done service for mankind; but Channing has gone deeper, soared higher, seen further than they, and set in motion forces which will do more for mankind.

What is the secret of his success? Certainly his power did not come from his calling as a clergyman: there are some forty thousand clergymen in the United States. We meet them in a large city; they are more known by the name of their church than their own name; more marked by their cravat than their character. Of all this host, not ten will be at all well known, even in their own city or village, in a hundred

years; perhaps not one. Nay, there are not twenty who are well known in America, now even, out of their denomination — they, perhaps, known by the unlucky accident of some petty controversy, rather than by any real eminence of character and work. Who of them is otherwise known to Europe, or even to England? But Dr. Channing is well known in Germany and France; his writings more broadly spread in England than in his native land; his power widens continually, and deepens too.

His eminence came from no extraordinary intellectual gifts born with him. Truly his was a mind of a high order. Yet it is not difficult to find men of far more native intellectual force, both here and everywhere; and throughout all his life, in all his writings, you see the trace of intellectual deficiencies — his deficiencies as a writer, as a scholar, and still more as an original and philosophical thinker. Nor did it come any more from his superior opportunities for education. True, those were the best the country afforded at that time, though far inferior in many respects to what is now abundantly enjoyed with no corresponding result. In his early culture there were marked deficiencies — the results of which appear in his writings, even to the last, leading him to falter in his analysis, leaving him uncertain as to his conclusion, and timid in applying his ideas to practice. His was not the intellect to forego careful and laborious and early training; not an intellect to cultivate itself, browsing to the full in scanty pastures, where weaker natures perish for lack of tender grass and careful housing from the cold.

His signal success came from no remarkable opportunity for the use of his gifts and attainments. He was one minister of the forty thousand. His own pulpit was only higher than others, his audience larger and more influential, because he made it so. His clerical brothers in his last years hindered more than they helped him; his own parish gave him no remarkable aid, and in his best years showed themselves incapable of receiving his highest instructions — and in the latter part of his life proved quite unworthy of so great a man.

He had none of the qualities which commonly attract men at first sight. He was little of stature, and not very well favored; his bodily presence was weak; his voice feeble, his tone and manner not such as strike the many. Beauty is the most popular and attractive of all things — a presence that never tires. Dr. Channing was but slightly favored by the Graces; his gestures, intonations, and general manner would

have been displeasing in another. He had nothing which at first sight either awes or attracts the careless world. He had no tricks and made no compromises. He never flattered men's pride nor their idleness — incarnating the popular religion; he did not storm or dazzle; he had not the hardy intellect which attracts men with only active minds, nor the cowardly conservatism which flatters Propriety to sleep in her pew; he never thundered and lightened — but only shone with calm and tranquil though varying light. He had not the social charm which fascinates and attaches men; though genial, hospitable, and inviting, yet few came very near him.

He was not eminently original, either in thought or in the form thereof; not rich in ideas. It is true, he had great powers of speech, yet he had not that masterly genius for eloquence, which now stoops down to the ground and moulds the very earth into arguments, till it seems as if the stones and trees were ordained his colleagues to preach with him, obedient to his Orphic enchantment; — not that genius which reaches up to the Heavens, pressing sun and moon and each particular star into the service of his thought; which proves by a diagram, illustrates by a picture, making the unwilling listeners feel that he had bribed the universe to plead his cause; — not that rare poetic power, which is born Genius and bred Art, which teems with sentiments and ideas, clothes and adorns them with language gathered from letters, nature, art, and common life, grouping his family of thoughts as Raphael in a picture paints the Madonna, Joseph, Baby, Ass, Angel, Palm-tree, those incongruous things of earth and Heaven, all unified and made harmonious by that one enchanting soul. He had not that intellectual, wealthy eloquence, beautiful as roses yet strong as steel. Nor had he the homely force of Luther, who in the language of the farm, the shop, the boat, the street, or nursery, told the high truths that Reason or Religion taught, and took possession of his audience by a storm of speech, then poured upon them all the riches of his brave plebeian soul, baptizing every head anew — a man who with the people seemed more mob than they, and when with kings the most imperial man. He had not the blunt terse style of Latimer, nor his beautiful homeliness of speech, which is more attractive than all rhetoric. He had not the cool clear analysis of Dr. Barrow, his prodigious learning, his close logic, his masculine sense; nor the graceful imagery, the unbounded imagination of Jeremy Taylor, "the Shakspeare of divines," nor

his winsome way of talk about piety, elevating the commonest events of life to classic dignity. He had not the hard-headed intellect of Dr. South, his skilful analysis, his conquering wit, his intellectual wealth: — no, he had not the power of condensing his thoughts into the energetic language of Webster — never a word wrong or too much — or of marshalling his forces in such magnificently stern array; no, he had not the exquisite rythmic speech of Emerson, that wonderful artist in words, who unites manly strength with the rare beauty of a woman's mind.

His eminence came from no such gifts or graces. His power came mainly from the predominating strength of the Moral and Religious element in him. He loved God with his mind, his conscience, his affections, and his soul. He had Goodness and Piety, both in the heroic degree. His intellectual power seemed little, not when compared with that of other men, but when measured by his own religious power. Loving Man and God, he loved Truth and Justice. He would not exaggerate; he would not undervalue what he saw and knew — so was not violent, was not carried away by his subject. He was commonly his own master. He said nothing for effect; he never flattered the prejudice of his audience; respecting them, he put his high thought into simple speech, caught their attention, and gradually drew them up to his own elevation.

He was ruled by conscience to a remarkable degree; almost demonized by conscience — for during a part of his life the moral element seems despotic, ruling at the expense of intellect and of natural joy. But that period passed by, and her rule became peaceful and harmonious. He loved Nature, the sea, the sky, and found new charms in the sweet face of Earth and Heaven as the years went by him, all his life. He had a keen sense of Beauty — beauty in Nature, in art, in speech, in manners, in man and woman's face. He loved science, he loved letters, and he loved art; but all of these affections were overmastered by his love of Man and God, — means to that end, or little flowers that bordered the pathway where Goodness and Piety walked hand in hand. This supremacy of the moral and religious element was the secret of his strength, and it gave him a peculiar power over men, one which neither Luther nor Latimer ever had, — no, nor Barrow, nor Taylor, nor South, nor Webster, nor Emerson.

He had a large talent for Religion, and so was fitted to

become an exponent of the higher aspirations of mankind in his day and in times to come. He asked for Truth, for Religion. He was always a seeker, his whole life "a process of conversion." Timid and self-distrustful, slow of inquiry and cautious to a fault, always calculating the effect before fraternizing with a cause, he had the most unflinching confidence in Justice and in Truth, — in Man's power to perceive and receive both.

Loving Man and God, he loved Freedom in all its legitimate forms, and so became a champion in all the combats of the day where Rights were called in question. He hated the chains of old bondage, and moved early in the Unitarian Reformation; but when the Unitarian party became a sect, and narrow like the rest — when it also came to stand in the way of mankind, he became "little of a Unitarian," and cared no more for that sect than for the Trinitarians. He could not be blind to the existence of Religion in all sects, and did not quarrel with other men's Goodness and Piety, because he could not accept their theology. He was not born or bred for a Sectarian; such as were he did not hate, but pity. He engaged in the various reforms of the day, — he labored for the cause of Peace, for Temperance, for the Improvement of Prisons, for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt, for Education; for the General Welfare of men by elevating the most exposed classes of society. He was an eminent advocate for the Abolition of Slavery.

We do not mean to say that he committed no errors, that he never faltered. He had his imperfections and weaknesses, which we shall presently consider; sometimes he was overtimid, and seems to have allowed meaner men to prevail over him with their counsels, their littleness, and their fears. A sick body often enfeebled his mind and sometimes his courage. So he never stood in the foremost rank of any reform, speculative or practical. This is partly owing to the causes just hinted at; in part, also, to his want of originality.

He was, we think, the fairest model of a good minister known to the public or his age. He preached what he knew, and he lived what he preached. He had a profound confidence in God; not in God merely as an abstraction — the abstract Power, Wisdom, and Love — but as that abstraction becomes concrete through Providence, and reveals itself in the course of nature, men, nations, and the world. He had also, and accordingly, a profound respect for Man and profound

confidence in Man; not for great men, rich men, and cultivated men alone, but for Man as Man, for all men: he did not despise the proud, the ignorant, the wicked. He had a deep reverence for God and for Man; this gave him eloquence when he spoke — gave him his name amongst men, and gave him his power.

A good deal of his earlier preaching, it is said, related to abstract matters — to ideas, to sentiments, to modes of mind. Men complained that he did not touch the ground. He spoke of God, of the soul, the dignity of Human Nature; of love to God, to men; of justice, charity, of freedom, and holiness of heart; he spoke of sin, of fear, of alienation from God. Years ago we remember to have heard murmurs at his abstract style of thought and speech — it went over men's heads, said some. But his abstractions he translated into the most concrete forms. Respect for God became obedience to His laws; faith in God was faith in keeping them; Human Nature was so great and so dignified, the very noblest work of God, — and therefore Society must respect that dignity and conform to that nature: there must be no Intemperance — and men who grow rich by poisoning their brothers must renounce their wicked craft; there must be no War, for its glory is human shame, and its soldiers only butchers of men; there must be Education for all — for Human Nature is a thing too divine for men to leave in ignorance, and therefore in vice, and crime, and sin; there must be no pauperism, no want — but Society must be so reconstructed that Christianity becomes a fact, and there are no idle men who steal their living out of the world, none overburdened with excessive toil, no riot, no waste, no idleness, and so no want; there must be no oppression of class by class — but the strong are to help the weak, the educated to instruct the rude; there must be no Slavery — for that is the consummation of all wrongs against the dignity of Human Nature. So his word became incarnate, and the most abstract preacher in the land, the most mystical in his piety, and, as it seemed at first, the furthest removed from practice, comes down to actual sins and toils for human needs.

Then came the same grumblers, murmuring to another tune, and said — "When Dr. Channing used to preach about God and the soul, about holiness and sin, we liked him — that was Christianity. But now he is always insisting on some reform; talking about Intemperance, and War, and Slavery, or telling us that we must remove the evils of Society and educate all men: we wish Dr. Channing would preach the Gospel." Thus rea-

soned men, for their foolish hearts were darkened. The old spirit of bondage opposed him when with other good men he asked of Calvinism — "Give us freedom, that we may go in and out before the Lord, and find Truth." But the new spirit of bondage opposed him just as much when he came up with others, and asked for the same thing. Each reform he engaged in got him new foes. The Tories of the Church hated him — because he asked for more Truth; the Tories of the State hated him — because he asked for more Justice; the Tories of Society hated him — because in the name of Man and God he demanded more Love! Yet he silently prevailed — against all these; new Truth, new Justice, new Love, came into the churches, into the State, into Society, and now those very Tories think him an honor to all three — and claim him as their friend! Such is the mystery of Truth!

We have just said he never stood in the van of any reform — his lack of originality, his feeble health, his consequent caution and timidity hindering him from that: yet there was scarcely a good work or a liberal thought in his time, coming within his range, which he did not aid, and powerfully aid. True, he commonly came late, but he always came and he never went back. He was one of the leaders of new thought in the new world and the old.

How strange is the progress of men on their march through time — a Democracy! how few are the leaders! So a caravan passes slowly on in the Arabian wilderness — the men and the women, the asses and the camels. There is dust, and noise, and heat, the scream of the camels and the asses' bray, the shouts of the drivers, the songs of the men, the prattle of the women, the repinings and the gossip, the brawls and the day-dreams, the incongruous murmur of a great multitude. There are stragglers in front, in flank, in rear. But there are always some who know the land-marks by day, the sky-marks by night, the Special Providence of the pilgrimage, who direct the march, giving little heed to the brawls or the gossips, the scream, or the bray, or the song. They lift up a censer, which all day long sends up its column of smoke, and all the night its fiery pillar, to guide the promiscuous pilgrimage.

The work before us is well named "Memoirs" of Dr. Channing. It is not a life — it is almost wholly autobiographical; we learn, however, from the book, a few facts relating to his life not related by himself. It appears, that when a

boy he was "a remarkable wrestler," fond of "adventurous sports"; that he once "flogged a boy larger than himself" for some injustice; that in boyhood he was called "little King Pepin," and "the Peacemaker"; that he was distinguished for courage, and once offered to go and sleep on board a ship at Newport which was said to be haunted. He was studious and thoughtful, naturally pious, a lover of Truth and Justice. At college he was studious, yet mirthful, and excelled in the athletic sports of his companions. He soon became disgusted with the gloomy doctrines of Calvinism.

He early saw some of the contradictions in society. "When I was young," says he, "the luxury of eating was carried to the greatest excess. My first notion, indeed, of glory, was attached to an old black cook, whom I saw to be the most important personage in town." He was grave and reflective, fond of lonely rambles by the sea-shore. His early life was sad, and each year of his course seemed brighter than the last. His character was shaped more by his own solitary thought than the influence of companions. In body, when a child, "he was small and delicate, yet muscular and active, with a very erect person, quick movement, a countenance that while sedate was cheerful;" — "an open, brave, and generous boy." He was eminent at college, and graduated at Cambridge in his nineteenth year, with distinguished honors.

He served for one or two years as a private tutor in a family at Richmond, and lost his health, which he never fully recovered. He seriously set himself about the work of self-improvement at an early age, and diligently continued it all his life. At the age of twenty-three he began to preach. "His preaching at once attracted attention for its power, solemnity, and beauty." On the first of June, 1803, he was ordained as minister of the church in Federal street, Boston, — "a pale, spiritual-looking young man."

At that time he was serious in his deportment to a degree that seemed oppressive.

"He had the air of one absorbed in his own contemplations, and looked care-worn, weary, and anxious. Society seemed distasteful; he joined but little in conversation; took his meals in haste; was retired in his ways; lived mostly in his study; appeared rather annoyed than pleased with visiters; seldom went abroad, —declining, when possible, all invitations; and, in a word, was most content when left uninterruptedly to himself. There was sweetness in his looks and words, however; solemn counsels were gently

given, and an atmosphere of holiness threw a winning charm over his conversation and conduct." — *Memoirs*, Vol. I., pp. 175, 176.

He says himself —

"In the early years of my ministry, ill health and a deep consciousness of unworthiness took away my energy and hope, and I had almost resolved to quit my profession. My brother Francis begged me to persevere, to make a fairer trial; and to his influence I owe very much the continuance of labors which, I hope, have not been useless to myself or to others." — *Memoirs*, Vol. I., p. 177.

High expectations were naturally formed of such a man.

"The devoutly disposed in the community looked to him with the hope that he might be a means of fanning once more to flame the smouldering ashes on the altars of piety. The seriousness of his deportment, the depth and sweetness of his voice, the pathos with which he read the Scriptures and sacred poetry, the solemnity of his appeals, his rapt and kindling enthusiasm, his humble, trustful spirit of prayer, his subdued feeling, so expressive of personal experience, made religion a new reality; while his whole air and look of spirituality won them to listen by its mild and somewhat melancholy beauty. The most trifling saw in him a man thoroughly in earnest, who spoke not of dreams and fictions, but of facts with which he was intimately conversant; and the serious gladly welcomed one who led the way and beckoned them nearer to the holy of holies which they aspired to enter. Intellectual people, too, were attracted by the power and grace of his pulpit addresses. He opened to them a large range of thought, presented clear, connected, and complete views of various topics, roused their faculties of discernment by nice discriminations and exact statements, and gratified their taste by the finished simplicity of his style. But the novelty, perhaps, that chiefly stirred his audiences was the directness with which he even then brought his Christian principles to bear upon actual life. With no flights of mystic exaltation, forgetful in raptures of the earth, with no abstract systems of metaphysical theology, with no coldly elegant moral essays, did he occupy the minds of his hearers, but with near and sublime objects made evident by faith, with lucid truths approved alike by Scripture and by conscience, and with duties pressed urgently home upon all as rules for daily practice. He saw, and made others see, that life was no play-place, but a magnificent scene for glorifying God, and a rich school for the education of spirits. He showed to men the substance, of which surrounding appearances are the shadow; and behind transient experiences revealed the spiritual laws which they express. Thus he gathered round him an enlarging circle of devoted friends, who

gratefully felt that they drank in from him new life. The old members of the Society, too, for the most part simple people of plain manners, took the heartiest delight in his services, while feeling just pride in his talents. And the few distinguished persons of the congregation knew well how to appreciate his rare gifts, and to extend his fame." — *Memoirs*, Vol. I., pp. 205, 206.

"Thus passed the first ten years and more of Mr. Channing's ministerial life. They were uneventful, but inwardly rich in results; and many good seeds then planted themselves, which were afterward to bear abundant fruits. Inherited errors, too, not a few, in thought and practice, had been slowly outgrown, — so slowly, that he was perhaps unconscious of the change which had been wrought in his principles. Above all, he had learned the lesson of keeping true to his purest, highest self, or, to express the same fact more humbly and justly, of being obedient to the Divine will, however revealed to his inmost reason. Goodness had firmly enthroned itself as the reigning power in his nature. He lived the life communicated from above. He was becoming yearly and daily more and more a child of God.

"From his very entrance on a public career, he produced upon all who came into his presence the impression of matured virtue and wisdom, and inspired reverence though young. He wore an air of dignity and self-command, of pure elevation of purpose, and of calm enthusiasm, that disarmed familiarity. Careful of the rights of others, courteous and gentle, he allowed no intrusions upon himself. He was deaf to flattery, turned at once from any mention of his own services or position, paid no compliments, and would receive none; but, by constant reference to high standards of right, transferred the thoughts of those with whom he held intercourse from personal vanity to intrinsic excellence, and from individual claims to universal principles. He gave no time to what was unimportant, made demands upon the intellect and conscience of those he talked with, and inspired them with a sense of the substantial realities of existence. In his treatment of others there was no presumption nor partiality. He was deferential to old and young; listened without interruption, and with patience, even to the dull and rude; spoke ill of none, and would hear no ill-speaking; tolerated no levity, but at once overawed and silenced it by wise and generous suggestions; was never hasty, rash, nor impetuous in word or act, and met these weaknesses in others with an undisturbed firmness that disarmed passion while rebuking it. Above all, he recognized in his fellows no distinctions but those of character and intelligence, and, quietly disregarding capricious estimates and rules of mere etiquette, met rich and poor, learned and ignorant, upon the broad ground of mutual honor and kindness. Thus his influence was always sacred and sanctifying." — *Memoirs*, Vol. I., pp. 239, 240.

But we must pass rapidly where we would gladly delay our readers. His health became feebler; he visited Europe in 1822, and was but little better in 1824. A colleague was settled with him; then, freed from the necessity of producing one or two sermons a week, he was enabled to devote more time to other concerns, to direct all his efforts to objects of great importance. Hereafter his position was highly favorable to literary activity and extensive influence. He became "less ministerial and more manly." His interest in the great concerns of mankind continued to increase. All his important works were written after this period. Yet he was still deeply interested in the ministry, though he did not accept the popular views of that profession.

"I consider my profession as almost infinitely raised above all others, when its true nature is understood, and its true spirit imbibed. But as it is too often viewed and followed, it seems to me of little worth to him who exercises it, or to those on whom it ought to act. But when taken up for its respectability, for reputation, for a support, and followed mechanically, drudgingly, with little or no heartiness and devotion, or when seized upon fanatically and with a blind and bigoted zeal, I think as poorly of it as men of the world do, who, I grieve to say, have had too much reason for setting us ministers down among the drones of the hive of society.

. . . . . .

"My mind turns much on the general question, What can be done for the scattering of the present darkness? I think I see, more and more, that the ministry, as at present exercised, though, on the whole, a good, is sadly defective. What would be the result of a superior man, not of the clergy, giving a course of lectures on the *teaching* of *Jesus*, just as he would give one on the philosophy of Socrates or Plato? Cannot this subject be taken out of the hands of ministers? Cannot the higher minds be made to feel that Christianity belongs to them as truly as to the priest, and that they disgrace and degrade themselves by getting their ideas of it from 'our order' so exclusively? Cannot learned men come to Christianity, just as to any other system, for the purpose of ascertaining what it is?"— *Memoirs*, Vol. II., pp. 257 – 259.

"At the present day, there is little need of cautioning ministers against rashness in reproving evil. The danger is all on the other side. As a class, they are most slow to give offence. Their temptation is to sacrifice much to win the affections of their people. Too many satisfy themselves with holding together a congregation by amenity of manners, and by such compromises with prevalent evils as do not involve open criminality. They live by the means of those whose vices they should reprove, and thus are

continually ensnared by a selfish prudence. Is it said, that they have families dependent upon them, who may suffer for their fidelity? I answer, Let no minister marry, then, unless the wife he chooses have such a spirit of martyrdom as would make her prefer to be stinted in daily bread rather than see her husband sacrifice one jot or tittle of his moral independence. Is it said, that congregations would be broken up by perfect freedom in the ministers? Better far would it be to preach to empty pews, or in the meanest halls, and there to be a fearless, disinterested witness to the truth, than to hold forth to crowds in gorgeous cathedrals, honored and courted, but not daring to speak one's honest convictions, and awed by the world." — *Memoirs*, Vol. II., p. 269.

"The erroneous views which doomed the Catholic clergy to celibacy are far from being banished from Protestantism. The minister is too holy for business or politics. He is to preach creeds and abstractions. He may preach ascetic notions about pleasures and amusements; for his official holiness has a tinge of asceticism in it, and people hear patiently what it is understood they will not practise. But if he 'come down,' as it is called, from these heights, and assail in sober earnest deep-rooted abuses, respectable vices, inhuman institutions or arrangements, and unjust means of gain, which interest, pride, and habit have made dear, and next to universal, the people who exact from him official holiness are shocked, offended. 'He forgets his sphere.' Not only the people, but his brother-ministers, are apt to think this; and they do so not mainly from a timeserving spirit, not from dread of offending the people, — though this motive too often operates, — but chiefly from false notions about the ministry, its comprehensive purpose, its true spirit, which is an all-embracing humanity. Ministers in general are narrow-minded and superstitious, rather than servile. Their faults are those of the times, and they are more free from these, perhaps, than most of the people. And are they not becoming less and less ministers, and more and more men?" — *Memoirs*, Vol. II., pp. 324, 325.

He continued to preach from time to time during the greater part of his life.

All Dr. Channing's most important writings may be arranged in three classes, — Reviews, Essays, and Sermons or Addresses. His Reviews, however, are not so much accounts of books as of men. The articles on Milton, Fénélon, and Bonaparte comprise the most important part of the first class. They were published in 1826 and the three subsequent years, and are valuable specimens of this kind of composition. They established his fame as a writer both at home and abroad.

But for ability of thought, for strength and beauty of expression, they will not bear comparison with the best pieces of Carlyle, or even of Macaulay, not to mention other and humbler names. Milton and Fénélon he appreciates justly, and these two articles are perhaps the most finished productions of his pen, when regarded merely as pieces of composition. They indicate, however, no very great depth of thought or width of observation: the style is clear, pleasing, and in general beautiful. The article on Napoleon has certainly great merits; considering the time and circumstances under which it was written, its defects are by no means so numerous as might reasonably have been looked for. In his later years he felt its imperfections, but it is still, we think, the fairest estimate of the man in the English language, though full justice is not done to Napoleon as a statesman and a lawgiver. In some passages the style is elevated and sublime, in others it becomes diffuse, wordy, and tedious. The peculiar charm of these three articles consists in the beautiful sentiment of Religion which pervades them all. This, indeed, as a golden thread, runs through all his works, giving unity to his reviews, essays, sermons, letters, and conversation.

His Essays are more elaborate compositions. They treat of the subject of Slavery and its kindred themes, the Abolitionists, Annexation of Texas, Emancipation, the Duty of the Free States in regard to Slavery.* Several of these essays are in the form of letters. They are his most important and valuable productions. They have been extensively read in America and Europe, and have brought him more enemies than all his other writings. Here Dr. Channing appears as a Reformer. His biographer says —

"Temperament and training, religious aspirations and philosophical views, above all, the tendencies of the times, conspired to make Dr. Channing a Social Reformer; although the loftiness of his desires and aims, the delicacy of his feelings, the refinement of his tastes, his habits of contemplative thought, and his reverence for individual freedom, enveloped him in a sphere of courteous reserve and guarded him from familiar contact with all rude radicalism." — *Memoirs*, Vol. III., p. 3.

We shall never forget the remarks made by men of high social standing, at the publication of the Essay on Slavery.

* The date of the first Essay on Slavery is not given in the edition of Dr. Channing's works. It was first published in December, 1835.

They condemned both it and its author. He was "throwing firebrands;" "meddling with matters which clergymen had no right to touch;" — as all important matters, we suppose, belong to pettifogging lawyers, who can never see through a precedent or comprehend a principle, or to politicians, who make "regular nominations" and adhere to them; or else to editors of partisan newspapers; — "he will make the condition of the slaves a great deal worse," "and perhaps produce an insurrection." This offence was never forgiven him in Boston, and he continued to increase it till the very period of his death. His anti-slavery views struck a death blow to his popularity here. His zeal for the poor, the intemperate, the criminal, the ignorant, extraordinary as it was, could be suffered; it was not wholly unministerial, and was eminently scriptural, — but zeal for the slave, that was too much to be borne. The first publication, in 1835, has had a wide influence and a good one. The essay is not very philosophical in its arrangement, but the matter is well treated, with clearness and force, — the wrong of slavery is ably shown. High motives are always addressed in this, as in all his productions. But we have one word of criticism to make on Dr. Channing as an abolitionist. In his first essay* and his subsequent writings, he distinctly separates himself from the abolitionists who contend for "Immediate Emancipation." He passed severe censures upon them; censured their motto of "Immediate Emancipation," their method of acting by "a system of affiliated societies," gave countenance to the charge that they were exciting the slaves to revolt. He condemned their "denunciations." This was at a time when the abolitionists were not a hundredth part so numerous as now; when the pulpit, the press, and the parlor rang with denunciations against them; when their property, their persons, and their lives were not safe in Boston. Now we have no fault to find with criticism directed against the abolitionists; no fear of severity. But at a time when they were few in number, a body of men whom many affected to despise because they hated, and hated because they feared; when they were poor and insulted, yet manfully struggling against oppression, equal to either fate; when the Church only opened her mouth to drown the voice of the fugitive crying to God for Justice; when the State, which had had but one president who spoke against slavery, and he a man who sold the children of his own

* *Works*, Vol. II.

body, riveted the fetters still closer on the slave's limbs; at a time when the Press of the South and the North, political or sectarian — but always commercial, low, corrupt, and marketable — said not one word for the millions of slaves whose chains the State made and the Church christened; when no man in Congress either wished or dared to oppose slavery therein, and no petitions could get a hearing; when the Governor even of Massachusetts could recommend to her legislature inquiries for preventing freedom of speech on that subject; at a time when the abolitionists were the only men that cared or dared to speak; at a time, too, when they were mobbed in the streets; when an assembly of women was broken up by "respectable" violence, and the authorities of the city dared not resist the mob; when a symbolical gallows was erected at night in front of the house of the leading abolitionist of America, "by the order of Judge Lynch," and a price of five thousand dollars set on his head by the Governor of Georgia,— why, such criticism was at least a little out of season! Had the abolitionists been guilty of denunciations? — in 1817, when a minister preaching in Boston "actually vilified the character of the Liberal clergy in the most wholesale manner," Dr. Channing "directed all his remarks to softening the feelings of those who were aggrieved. . . . . 'I cannot blame this stranger so severely,' said he; 'these harsh judgments never originated from himself. . . . . How sad is controversy, that it should thus tempt our opponents to misrepresent men when they might and should know better.'"* Yet here the difference between the stranger and the Liberal clergy related only to a matter of theological opinion, not to the freedom of millions of men. We dislike denunciation as much as most men, but we wish it was peculiar to the abolitionists; denunciation is the commonest thing in politics, the weapon of Democrats and Whigs; the pulpits ring with its noise; the Unitarians are denounced as "infidels" to this day; and who does not know it is the fashion of whole churches to denounce mankind at large as "totally depraved," "capable of no good thing," "subject to the wrath of God," and "deserving eternal damnation." If these terms mean any thing they amount to denunciation. If by denunciation is meant violent speech, exaggeration, and ill temper, then it is an infirmity, and is always out of place. Yet such is the weakness of strong men that we meet with it in all the

* *Memoirs*, Vol. II., p. 89 et seq.

great movements of mankind, in the Christian Reformation and the Protestant Reformation, and in all great revolutions. The American Revolution was the effort of a nation to free itself from tyranny — the very mild tyranny of the British crown. The denunciations, violence, and bloodshed which followed are well known. Yet now, there are none but the abolitionists who think the Revolution was not worth what it cost. But in the case which Dr. Channing complained of, a population greater than that of all the colonies in 1775 were entirely deprived of all their rights and reduced to abject slavery, and the abolitionists — Ultra-Peace men and Non-Resistants almost all of them — attempted no violence, and used nothing harder than hard words. For our own part we confess their language has not always been to our taste, but we know of no revolution of any importance that has been conducted with so little violence and denunciation. When Dr. Channing wrote about Milton and the stormy times of the English commonwealth, he thought differently, and said —

"In regard to the public enemies whom he assailed, we mean the despots in church and state, and the corrupt institutions which had stirred up a civil war, the general strain of his writings, though strong and stern, must exalt him, notwithstanding his occasional violence, among the friends of civil and religious liberty. That liberty was in peril. Great evils were struggling for perpetuity, and could only be broken down by great power. Milton felt that interests of infinite moment were at stake, and who will blame him for binding himself to them with the whole energy of his great mind, and for defending them with fervor and vehemence? We must not mistake Christian benevolence, as if it had but one voice, that of soft entreaty. It can speak in piercing and awful tones. There is constantly going on in our world a conflict between good and evil. The cause of human nature has always to wrestle with foes. All improvement is a victory won by struggles. It is especially true of those great periods which have been distinguished by revolutions in government and religion, and from which we date the most rapid movements of the human mind, that they have been signalized by conflict. Thus Christianity convulsed the world and grew up amidst storms; and the Reformation of Luther was a signal to universal war; and Liberty in both worlds has encountered opposition over which she has triumphed only through her own immortal energies. At such periods, men, gifted with great power of thought and loftiness of sentiment, are especially summoned to the conflict with evil. They hear, as it were, in their own magnanimity and generous aspirations, the voice of a

divinity; and thus commissioned, and burning with a passionate devotion to truth and freedom, they must and will speak with an indignant energy, and they ought not to be measured by the standard of ordinary minds in ordinary times. Men of natural softness and timidity, of a sincere but effeminate virtue, will be apt to look on these bolder, hardier spirits as violent, perturbed, and uncharitable; and the charge will not be wholly groundless. But that deep feeling of evils, which is necessary to effectual conflict with them, and which marks God's most powerful messengers to mankind, cannot breathe itself in soft and tender accents. The deeply moved soul will speak strongly, and ought to speak so as to move and shake nations." — *Works*, Vol. I., pp. 23 – 25.

There are not many things in Dr. Channing's life which we could wish otherwise, but his relation to the abolitionists is one of that number. In 1831, Mr. Garrison, a printer in the office of the Christian Examiner, at Boston, issued the first number of the "Liberator," making the declaration — "I am in earnest, I will not equivocate, I will not excuse, I will not retreat a single inch, *and I will be heard.*" He borrowed the type and press of the office he worked in. He could not get trusted for fifty dollars' worth of paper, "because he was opposed to the Colonization Society." So he waited till a negro in Philadelphia sent him that sum. He was obscure and destitute, but "had a determination to print the paper as long as he could live on bread and water, or his hands find employment." He was reviled, insulted, mobbed; a price set on his head; he lived in the same city with Dr. Channing, struggling with poverty, obscurity, and honorable disgrace for twelve years, and Dr. Channing afforded him no aid, nor counsel, nor sympathy, not a single "God bless you, my brother," and did not even answer his letter! This we find it difficult to understand, as it is painful to relate. We gladly hasten away from the subject, which we could not pass by in silence, but have spoken of in sorrow.

His public Sermons and Addresses — we speak now only of such as he wished to preserve — treat of a large variety of subjects: Temperance, Education, Christ, Christianity, the Evidences of Religion, the Ministry, and kindred subjects. These are somewhat unequal, but all are marked by the qualities mentioned above, by a profound reverence for Man, and most unhesitating confidence in God. None of those sermons indicates a mind of a very high order; as works of intellect they

will not compare with the great sermons of the best English preachers; but we know none of which the effect is more ennobling. His analysis of a subject is seldom final, he usually halts short of the ultimate fact; his arrangement is frequently unphilosophical, his reasoning often weak, unsatisfactory, various parts of the argument not well connected, his style diffuse and verbose. We know diffuseness is the old Adam of the pulpit. There are always two ways of hitting the mark, one with a single bullet, the other with a shower of small shot. Each has its advantages; Dr. Channing chose the latter, as most of our pulpit orators have done. It is commonly thought men better understand a truth when it is told two or three times over, and in two or three different ways; be that as it may, it is certain that a small quantity of metal will cover the more space the thinner it is beaten, and when a man must write one or two sermons in a week, never to be used again, perhaps he may be forgiven if the depth be less as the surface becomes greater. Dr. Channing was not very diffuse for a preacher, but certainly for a great man. His vocabulary was not copious; there is no idiomatic freshness in his style; his illustrations are trite, often commonplace. Neither Literature nor Nature gets reflected in his style. His thought and feeling are American in the best sense of the word; but the form, the coloring, the tone are wholly destitute of nationality — there is no American image in his temple; no American flowers in his garden. We think this a defect. In all his writings you see that he had lived alone, not much among books, not much with Nature you would fancy, but with his own thoughts.

As a speaker his style of eloquence was peculiar. He stands alone. His powers of reasoning were certainly not very great, by no means to be compared to the many able men of his country or his age; he had not that great power of demonstration which at once puts the pointed thought into your mind, and then drives it home with successive blows. He had not that creative force which attracts, conquers, and then directs; nor that energy of feeling, which, making an impression almost magical, carries the audience away with its irresistible tide. He commanded attention by presenting numerous minute particulars — trusting little to the effect of any one great argument. His eloquent warfare was a guerilla war. He carried the hearer's understanding little by little, never taking it by storm. He did not represent a great Reason, a great

Imagination, or a great Passion; but a great Conscience and a great Faith. In this lay the power of his eloquence, the charm of his preaching, the majesty of his character.

As a public speaker, at first sight he did not strongly impress his audience, he did not look the great man; his body was feeble and unusually small; his voice not powerful — though solemn, affectionate, and clear. How frail he seemed! Yet look again, and his organization was singularly delicate — womanly in its niceness and refinement. When closely viewed he seemed a Soul very lightly clad with a body — and you saw the soul so clearly that you forgot the vesture it wore. He began his sermon simply, announced the theme, spoke of its importance, glanced over the surface for a moment — then sketched out his plan, as the farmer *lands* out his field which he is to plough up inch by inch. He began simply, calmly, and rose higher and higher as he went on, each thought deeper and nobler than the last. His Conscience and his Faith went into the audience till he held them breathless, entranced, lifted out of their common consciousness — till they forgot their own littleness, forgot the preacher, soul and body, and thought only of his thought, felt only his feeling.

There was never such preaching in Boston; never such prayers. His word sunk into men as the sun into the ground in summer to send up grass and flowers. Did he speak of sin, the ingenuous youth saw its ugliness with creeping hate; — of the dignity of Human Nature, you longed to be such a man; — of God, of His goodness, his love, you wondered you could ever doubt or fear. It was our good fortune in earlier years to hear him often, in his noblest efforts; often, too, on the same day have we listened to the eloquence of another good minister, now also immortal, a man of rare piety and singular power in the pulpit — we mean the younger Ware. More sentimental than Channing, more imaginative, with an intellect less capacious and a range of subjects by no means so broad, he yet spoke to the native soul of man with a sweet persuasion rarely equalled. Ware told you more of Heaven — Channing more of earth, that you might make it heaven here. It was his Conscience and his Trust in God that gave him power. What strength there is in gentleness, what force in Truth, what magic in Religion! That voice so thin and feeble, a woman's word — it was heard above the roar of the street and the clatter of legislation; it went beyond the Alleghanies; it passed over the din of the Atlantic waves, and became a winning and familiar

sound in our mother-land; that hand, so thin and ghostly it seemed a moonbeam might shine through — it held a power which no sceptred monarch of our time could wield, — the power of Justice, of all-controlling Faith; that feeble form, that man with body frailer than a girl's — he had an influence which no man that speaks the English tongue now equals. He spoke not to men as members of a party, or a sect, or tribe, or nation, but to the universal nature of man, and that "something that doth live" everlastingly in our embers answered to his call.

He became conscious of his power. It could not be otherwise when his word thus came echoed back from the heights and depths of society. But this only made him yet more humble. A name in both hemispheres gave him no pleasure but as a means of usefulness and increase of power; but made him more zealous and more powerful to SERVE. Laudations he put aside without reading, and abuse had small effect on him. Did proud men scorn his humanity, and base men affect to pity — it was only the pity which he returned. Yet when a letter from a poor man in England came to thank him for his words of lofty cheer, he could well say "This is honor." When a nursery-man forgot his plants and his customers to express an interest in him, or a retired Quaker family was moved by his presence, then he could say "This is better than fame a thousand times." Forgive him if that made him proud. We remember well his lecture on the Elevation of the Laboring Classes, and the sneers with which it was received by some that heard it at the time; and we shall not soon forget the feelings it brought to our heart, when one day, in a little town in a Swiss valley, we saw in the shop of an apothecary, who was also the bookseller, a copy of that lecture in the German tongue. It was printed at that place, and was the second edition! The word which some sneered at here was gone "to the Gentiles," to comfort the poor laborers under the shadow of the Alps.

We know that men sneer at the pulpit, counting it a low place and no seat of power; we know why they sneer, and blame them not. But if there is a Man in the pulpit, with a man's Mind, Heart, Soul, the pulpit is no mean place, it shall go hard if his power is not felt. In Boston there are well nigh fivescore of clergymen: out of these were there fifty like Dr. Channing, fifty more in New York, and yet another fifty in the pulpits of Philadelphia; let them be of all ways of thinking, — Catholic, Calvinistic, or Quaker, — only let them

love God as much and Man as well; only let them love Truth and Righteousness as well as he, and labor with as much earnestness to reform Theology, Society, Church, and State: what cities should we have; what Churches, what a Society, what a State! Would there be the Intemperance, the Pauperism, the Ignorance among the people, the Licentiousness — the sheer and utter Lust of Gain which now takes possession of the most influential men of the nation? Oh no! — there would have been no annexation of Texas for a new slave-garden, no war against Mexico, no "Holy Alliance" in America between Democrats and Whigs to secure the "partition" of our sister republic; there would not be three millions of slaves in the United States, and a slave-holder on the throne of the nation — for 't is a throne we speak of, and the people only subjects of a base aristocracy, no longer citizens. Did we speak of fifty Channings in Boston? — were there only ten, they would make this city, as we think, too good to hope for. But there are not ten such men — nay, there are not, — but we will not count them. There are still good men in pulpits, here — only rare and few — floating amid the sectarianism, wealth, and pride which swim round in this whirlpool of modern society. They never wholly failed in Boston. Nay, when the oil has run low and the meal was almost spent, some Prophet came along, to cheer this poor Widow of the Church with his blessing, and the oil held out in the cruse, and the meal was not spent, so that her children did not wholly starve and die outright, saying "Who is the Lord?" True, there has always been some rod, a scion from the tree of life, that held its own amid the drought, and kept obstinately green, and went on budding and blossoming — a memory and a hope; always some sacramental portion of the manna which fed our fathers, a fragrant reminiscence of the old pilgrimage, and a promise of the true Bread which shall one day be given from Heaven; — at least, there is always some heap of stones to remind us that our fathers passed over Jordan, and, though sorely beset and hunted after, they could yet say, even in their extremity, "Hitherto hath the Lord helped us!" These do not fail — "thanks to the human heart by which we live"; but a powerful ministry in any denomination we have not. Yet the harvest truly is plenteous. How white are all the fields — only the laborers are few, feeble, faint in heart and limb, and while wrangling about names have so long left their sickles idle in the sun that their very tools have lost their tem-

per, and ring no longer, as when of old they cut the standing corn.

Why does not the Church save us from Slavery, Party-Spirit, Ignorance, Pauperism, Licentiousness, and Lust of Gain? It has no salvation to give. Why not afford us great teachers, like the old and venerable names — Edwards, Chaunceys, Mayhews, Freemans, Buckminsters, Channings? The Church has nothing to teach which is worth the learning of grown men, and even the Baby-Virtue of America turns off from that lean, haggard, and empty breast, yet cries for food and mother's arms. But there is a Providence in all this. Taking the churches as they are, ecclesiastical religion as *it* is, it is well that able men do not stand in the pulpits; well that men of superior ability and superior culture flee from it to Law, Politics, the Farm, and the Shop. If the Church has nothing better to teach than the morality of the market-place and the theology of the dark ages, if she is the foe to pure Goodness, pure Piety, and pure Thought, then parson Log is the best parson. Let us accept him with thankfulness. But it will not always be so; no, not long. A better day is coming, when the Real church shall be the actual; when Theology, the queen and mother of Science, shall assert her ancient rule, driving off Superstition and priestly Unbelief; when a Real ministry in Religion's name shall rebuke that Party-Spirit which makes a monarch out of a president, a miserable oligarchy out of a republic, and transforms the citizens of New England into the subjects of slave-holders, and makes our free men only the servants of gain. Pandora has opened her box, Sectarianism and Party-rage have flown out; see the anarchy they make in Church and State! But there is yet left at the bottom — Hope. When the lid is lifted next that also will appear, and a new Spring come out of this Winter, and we shall wonder at the White-Sunday on all the hills, at the Pentecost of Inspiration and tongues of heavenly truth.

But we have wandered from our theme. In the midst of Boston, so penny-wise and so pound-foolish, — worldly Boston, which sent to the heathens more Rum and more Bibles than all the states — the one to teach them our Christianity, and the other to baptize the converts, making their calling and election sure; which sent sleek men to Congress, ambassadors to lie in the capitol for the benefit of their party and themselves; in the midst of Boston, where men set up the hay-scales of their virtue, and on one side put their dollars and on the other

set Patriotism, Democracy, Freedom, Christianity, while the Dollar weighed them all down: in the midst of this stood Dr. Channing, liberal, wise, gentle, pious without narrowness, democratic and full of hope. Shall we wonder that he wrought so little; that he could not get an Anti-slavery notice read in his own pulpit, nor the door open to preach a funeral sermon on his Anti-slavery friend — the lamented Follen? Rather wonder that he did so preach. No sailing vessel can stem the Mississippi, nor the stoutest steamboat go up the falls of St. Anthony, and it takes time to go round.

Here was one great man in Boston who did not seek wealth, nor want place, nor ask for fame; one man who would not sell himself. He only asked, sought, and coveted the power to serve. He was afraid he should give too little and take too much. So he took only his living, and gave men the toil of his genius, his prayers, and his life. There is no charity so great as this. See, now, the effect of such a life; — here in America there is one great man, with broad brows, a colossal intellect, and the most awful presence the world has seen for some centuries, it is said; one who would seem an Emperor in any council, even of the Kings by nature; with understanding so great that Channing's mind would seem but a baby in his arms; a senator, who for many years has occupied important public posts, — and yet in New England, in the United States, Channing has far more influence than Webster. He was never in his life greeted with the shout of a multitude, and yet he has swayed the mind and heart of the best men, and affected the character and welfare of the nation far more than the famous statesman. In our last number we spoke of that venerable man who breathed his last breath in the capitol: John Quincy Adams had held high offices for fifty years, — been minister to courts abroad, had made treaties, had been Representative, Senator, Secretary of State, — been President; he had lived eighty years — a learned man, always well, always at work, always in public office, always amongst great men and busied with the affairs of the nation, — and yet, which has done the most for his country, for mankind, and most helped men to wisdom and Religion, man's highest welfare? The boys could tell us that the effect of Adams and Webster both is not to be named in comparison with the work done for the world by this one feeble-bodied man. Yet there are forty thousand ministers in the United States, and Channing stood always in the pulpit, owing nothing to any eminent

station that he filled. In this century we have had two presidents who powerfully affected the nation, — one by his Mind, by Ideas; his public acts were often foolish: the other by his Will, his Deeds, ideas apparently of small concern to him; — we mean Jefferson and Jackson. But, with the exception of Jefferson, no president in this century has ever had such influence upon men's minds as that humble minister. No, not all together — Madison, Monroe, Adams, Jackson, Van Buren and Harrison and Tyler and Polk. Some of them did good things, yet soon they will be gone, all but one or two; their influence, too, will pass away, and soon there will be left nothing but a name in a book — for they were only connected with an office, not an Idea — while Channing's power will remain long after his writings have ceased to be read and his name is forgot; of so little consequence is it where the man stands, if he be but a Man, and do a man's work.

The one great Idea of Dr. Channing's life was Respect for Man. He was eminent for other things, but preëminent for this. His eminent piety became eminent philanthropy, in all its forms. This explains his action as a Reformer, his courage, and his inextinguishable hope. Dr. Channing was one of the few Democrats we have ever known. Born and bred amongst men who had small confidence in the people, and who took little pains to make them better, he became intensely their friend. The little distinctions of life, marked by wealth, fame, or genius, were of small account to him. He honored all men; saw the man in the beggar, in the slave. He never desponded; he grew more liberal the more he lived, and seemed greenest and freshest when about to quit this lower sphere. His youth was sad though hopeful; in the middle period of his life he seems saddened and subdued, in part by the restraints of his profession, in part by ill health, and yet more by austere notions of life and duty, imposed by a gloomy theory of religion, but which in his latter days he escaped from and left behind him. He is a fine example of the power of one man, armed only with Truth and Love. By these he did service here, and spoke to the best minds of the age, giving hope to famous men, and cheering the hearts of such as toiled all day in the dark mines of Cornwall. By these he sympathized with men, with Nature, and with God. Hence he grew younger all his life, and thought the happiest period was "about sixty." In 1839 he thus wrote: —

"Indeed, life has been an improving gift from my youth; and one reason I believe to be, that my youth was not a happy one. I look back to no bright dawn of life which gradually 'faded into common day.' The light which I now live in rose at a later period. A rigid domestic discipline, sanctioned by the times, gloomy views of religion, the selfish passions, collisions with companions perhaps worse than myself, — these, and other things, darkened my boyhood. Then came altered circumstances, dependence, unwise and excessive labors for independence, and the symptoms of the weakness and disease which have followed me through life. Amidst this darkness it pleased God that the light should rise. The work of spiritual regeneration, the discovery of the supreme good, of the great and glorious end of life, aspirations after truth and virtue, which are pledges and beginnings of immortality, the consciousness of something divine within me, then began, faintly indeed, and through many struggles and sufferings have gone on. . . . . .

"I love life, perhaps, too much; perhaps I cling to it too strongly for a Christian and a philosopher. I welcome every new day with new gratitude. I almost wonder at myself, when I think of the pleasure which the dawn gives me, after having witnessed it so many years. This blessed light of heaven, how dear it is to me! and this earth which I have trodden so long, with what affection I look on it! I have but a moment ago cast my eyes on the lawn in front of my house, and the sight of it, gemmed with dew and heightening by its brilliancy the shadows of the trees which fall upon it, awakened emotions more vivid, perhaps, than I experienced in youth. I do not like the ancients calling the earth *mother*. She is so fresh, youthful, living, and rejoicing! I do, indeed, anticipate a more glorious world than this; but still my first familiar home is very precious to me, nor can I think of leaving its sun and sky and fields and ocean without regret. My interest, not in outward nature only, but in human nature, in its destinies, in the progress of science, in the struggles of freedom and religion, has increased up to this moment, and I am now in my sixtieth year." — *Memoirs*, Vol. III., pp. 412–414.

His life was eminently useful and beautiful. He died in good season, leaving a memory that will long be blessed.

It remains for us to say a word of the "Memoirs." The work is well done, by a kindred and a loving hand. The Memoirs only are published, however, the Life yet remains to be written. Some things are passed over rather hastily by the Editor; we should have been glad if he had told us more of Dr. Channing's relations to the theological parties of his

time, especially to his own sect in his later years; if he had shown us more in detail with what caution and slowness he came to his liberal conclusions. As a whole, the picture wants a background, and also shadow. But, on the whole, the work is well and faithfully done, though it does not give us so complete and thorough a view of the man as the Memoir of Henry Ware offered of that lamented and sainted minister. An index would be a welcome addition, but, as one seldom finds that in an American book, we will not make a special complaint.

ART. III. — *Principles of Zoölogy: with numerous illustrations. For the use of Schools and Colleges.* Part I. *Comparative Physiology.* By Louis Agassiz and Augustus A. Gould. Boston: Gould, Kendall, and Lincoln. 1848. 12mo. pp. 216.

"As the spirit of language," says Oken, "is not to be understood from ordinary Grammar, and a natural system of words and of language can be attained only in *Philosophical Grammar*, so called, — so, also, the present natural method in Zoölogy is not the true system. It only arranges materials, as an architect, before commencing a building, piles stones on stones, mortar on mortar, sand on sand, beams on beams, laths on laths, and bricks on bricks, in order afterwards, by separation and new combination of the various elements, to form a habitable dwelling. In the same way Zoölogy must proceed, in order really to arrange animals as Nature has arranged them; that is, besides their structure, it must comprehend the laws of their affinities, and their rank, which is possible only by tracing the history of their development. The true natural system must, therefore, be a system of development, a genetic or physiological one, a problem on which many are now at work, the solution of which, however, is not to be expected as yet." It is a great point gained when naturalists of the standing of Agassiz and Owen in empirical science acknowledge the importance of this principle. It is necessary, certainly, first of all, that facts be collected, and there will perhaps always be men, and not the least intelligent and devoted, who will apply themselves exclusively to

this, and see no interest beyond it. But at the same time it is not less true that the whole value of the facts for Science consists in their ulterior meaning and application; and that one fact is as good as another and as good as a thousand, if we do not go beyond the facts and determine what their value, their position, and their affinities are.

The importance of this higher application is acknowledged at the outset, in the work before us. Thus, § 2: — "Animals are worthy of our regard, not only when considered as to the variety and elegance of their forms, or their adaptation to the supply of our wants; but the Animal Kingdom, as a whole, has also a still higher signification. It is the exhibition of the divine thought, as it is carried out in one department of that grand whole which we call Nature; and, considered as such, it teaches us the most important lessons." It is (§ 501 et seq.) the development of a divine plan in the Universe, by which all the classes and divisions of animals are connected together and to the rest of the world, — not by material ties only, by descent, or as the necessary condition for supporting life, — but by a "link of a higher and immaterial nature." And we are warned (§ 16) to bear in mind the distinction between the *analogies* of animal organs or parts, — the external resemblances of function or purpose, as it were, necessitated by similarity of the outward circumstances in which animals of various classes are placed, — and *affinities* or *homologies*, which are the inward relationships caused by identity of plan, but often obscured by dissimilarity of form or use. Thus there is an analogy between a bird's wing and that of a butterfly, both serving for flight. But no affinity, since they differ entirely in their anatomical relations. "On the other hand, there is an affinity between the bird's wing and the hand of a monkey, since although they serve for different purposes, yet they are constructed on the same plan." This plan is pointed out in the parallelism and universal connection shown in the development of the various animal systems; of the individual animal, in his growth from the egg; and of the animal kingdom in its distribution and geological succession.

The nervous system, as the grand characteristic of animals, is the first developed in the embryo, and is the invariable accompaniment of animal life. The lower animals, which, throughout, we shall find characterized by a feebler individuality, show this also in their nervous system, which is scarcely divided into separate nerves. All the special senses, except

Touch, are wanting in the Radiates and Mollusks; some of them have rudimentary eyes, which, however, do not see, and are *homologous* but not at all *analogous* to the eyes of higher animals. As we ascend in the scale the other senses successively appear in parallel perfection. The ear, from a single expansion of the auditory nerve on a sac excavated in the cartilage of the head, as in the cuttle-fish, — or even placed on the legs, as in the grasshopper, — becomes more and more complicated in its apparatus. No organ of Smell has been found in any of the Invertebrate animals, and Taste scarcely exists except in the Mammals. Voice is confined to the Mammals, the Birds, and the Frogs. The power of voluntary motion, belonging also to the nervous system, is common to all animals, but there is the same gradation in the perfection of the apparatus. The lower animals in general employ the whole body in locomotion; in some, organs belonging to other systems are employed, as those of Respiration. It is only among the Vertebrates that locomotion is accomplished by special organs. Among them there is but one plan, the *idea* of all the members, as it were, being introduced at once, though at first as a germ, progressively developed. Thus, the pectoral fin of Fishes is a hand at the shoulder, the arms being withdrawn into the body, just as it is in the embryonic state of higher classes. The hand, however, is not yet distinctly organized, but broken into an irregular multitude of rays instead of fingers.

Connected with the nervous system is its support, the skeleton, which properly exists only in the Vertebrates, — the hard parts in the lower animals being homologous only to the skin, hair, &c., of the higher, and not appropriated to the nervous system. The whole of the vertebral skeleton is reducible to one type — a central cavity enclosing the central nervous mass, and various processes which, in some cases, form members. This type is represented by the single vertebræ, each of which combines all the essential parts of the whole frame, though only in rudiment. Thus the skull is only a collection of expanded vertebræ; the ribs, highly developed spinal processes, and the limbs free ribs.

In the lower animals, Nutrition, Respiration, and Circulation are confounded together. (Ch. 6.) The Polyps have only a single cavity for digestion, &c., and the circulation of the water and the substances which it contains, within this cavity, is nutrition, respiration, and circulation at once. From

these there is the same progression to the Mammals, which alone, (§ 218) properly speaking, masticate their food; — showing in other respects, also, the highest complication and perfection of apparatus and function. The harmony of each organ with the whole animal is strikingly displayed in the teeth, a single molar being sufficient to determine the animal.

Circulation, where it begins to be distinct, that is, where there is a heart, is at first irregular, the heart contracting only occasionally; the heart itself being a mere sinus in the artery. At first, in the embryo, and in some lower animals, there are no veins, the blood finding its way back to the heart without vessels. Afterwards, in the Crustaceans, there is a double set of vessels, but the blood is mixed as soon as it enters the heart. In the Reptiles there is the beginning of a separation of the heart, but still the venous and arterial blood are not kept separate. *Respiration* is oxygenation of the blood. This in the Polyps is accomplished by the circulation of water into the body. In Insects air pervades the body in minutely ramified vessels, Respiration being still somewhat confounded with Circulation. Possibly allied to this, though with other functions also, is the penetration of water, in minute vessels, to every part of the body of aquatic animals, — a curious arrangement recently observed in various of our fishes by Professor Agassiz. A trace of it is seen in the great degree to which air penetrates the bodies (even the feathers and bones,) of Birds. As we rise in the scale from the Polyps, we find a special organ devoted to Respiration; at first outside, as in some Worms and Mollusks, then covered, as in Fishes, and finally within the body.

Reproduction in the Animal kingdom normally takes place through means of eggs, though some of the lowest types, not entirely distinct from the Vegetable kingdom, propagate by means of buds, (gemmiparous generation,) or by divisions, (fissiparous generation,) which resemble the *suckers* of plants, only that the individualizing tendency of the animal is shown in the separation from the stock. The *egg* is formed on the same plan in all animals, from the highest to the lowest, only that in the latter it is more simple, — the outward covering, the albumen, being wanting. There is a wonderful identity in essentials between the eggs of the most different animals, and the development of all is the same as far as it goes, though arrested at an earlier stage in some than in others. Yet, in the earliest epochs, each class is appropriately marked. Thus,

in the Radiates the germ forms around the yolk, as it were, by a sort of crystallization; in the Mollusks the whole of the yolk is changed into the substance of the embryo, whilst in Vertebrates a part is reserved to be used as food for it till a later period. Again, at first the embryo of a Salmon, for instance, is only a vertebrate animal in general; by degrees characters appear which successively distinguish it. Its transient states are the abiding condition of lower types; its cartilaginous backbone, for instance, resembles that of the adult sturgeon, as does its unequally forked tail, and its mouth placed underneath the snout. The Robin in the egg has been frequently observed by Professor Agassiz to have webbed feet. This parallelism of embryonic states with types lower in the scale may be extended indefinitely, and is highly important in a scientific classification. Some of the lower Mammals, the Marsupials, approach the inferior Vertebrates in bringing forth their young in a very undeveloped state, and bearing them about in a pouch, forming an intermediate step to the incubation of Birds, &c.

Connected with this subject is the remarkable phenomenon of *alternate* generation, which displays in the most interesting manner the want of individualization in the lowest types. In this, several stages elapse between the perfect animal and the appearance of the perfect young. The animal produces offspring not at all resembling itself, which in time produce the species of their parent, so that the immediate offspring do not resemble the parent, but this resemblance is found only when they again bring forth. In some cases several generations are interposed, and in some the second generation are mere living *cases* in which the true young are enclosed. For particulars on this most interesting matter we must refer to the work itself, only calling attention to the important principle illustrated by it. "It would seem (§ 351) that the individual life of the lower animals has not force enough to pass continuously, and, as it were, with one stride, through all the phases of its development."

In the geographical distribution of animals we see also law and not accident. At the poles species are few, and a great uniformity prevails: "their forms are regular and their tints as dusky as the northern heavens." (§ 420) As we proceed southward variety of type, of form, color, &c., increase in parallel progression; the tropical types are the highest in each class. Each grand division of the globe has its peculiar

animals; their difference is not in proportion to the distance that separates them, but forms certain definite districts, called *Faunæ*, within which the animals resemble each other, and which they do not overpass. These districts may be traced in the former ages of the earth corresponding to those now existing, for instance, in New Holland, which has a very remarkable and definite fauna, traceable also in its fossils.

Finally, if we take the geological succession of animals on the earth's surface, we find a remarkable coincidence between the historical succession of the strata and that of the animals inhabiting them. The most ancient fossiliferous rocks display the entire type of the Animal Kingdom in all four of its great divisions; all is there, as it were, in the germ. But the types by which they are represented are the lowest in each division, and very generally are to be found at present only in the embryonic forms of higher classes of the same type. For instance, the trilobites so common in the limestone of New York precisely resemble the embryonic forms of the crab and lobster. The paleozoic Echinoderms are principally Crinoids, whose form is an early or embryonic one of our present species, &c. There seems, however, to be not so much a weakness of animal life itself, as of direction. Thus the *number* of species is in many instances much greater than at present, but their organization is lower, their geographical distribution not so distinct, the different types not so definitely characterized, and their forms more irregular and fantastic.

Hence it is concluded "that there is a manifest progress in the succession of beings on the surface of the earth," consisting "in an increasing similarity to the living faunas, and among the Vertebrates, especially, in their increasing resemblance to Man." This connection "is to be sought in the view of the Creator himself, whose aim, in forming the earth, in allowing it to undergo the successive changes which Geology has pointed out, and in creating successively all the different types of animals which have passed away, was to introduce Man upon the surface of our globe."

We must remark that the connection of plan throughout the Animal Kingdom has been made more prominent in our *resumé* than it will be found in the work itself. Indeed, after the importance given to a purely scientific principle in Mr. Agassiz' lectures, we must confess ourselves somewhat disappointed not to find it penetrating the details somewhat more

than it does here. Perhaps it will be said that this would not be advisable for a work intended for beginners. But on the one hand, facts are much easier and better learned when we have a principle to string them on, and an interest is thus given to some who would not otherwise be attracted, — and on the other, if students are to learn by rote, they may as well and better learn principles than bare facts.

Considered as mere empirical Natural History the work before us has immense advantages over most similar ones in having been executed and superintended by thoroughly scientific men, and not by smatterers, as is generally the case.

In some passages we trace the marks of a foreign idiom, indicating that they were conceived in another language from that in which they are written: hence occasional obscurities; for example, p. 107 — "Wheat taken from the catacombs of Egypt has been made to sprout and grow *in some well-authenticated cases.*" Page 73, Life is made to consist in the *equilibrium* of nourishment and waste — the opposite of the truth. Death, and not Life, being equilibrium. What is meant is antagonism. Some expressions are too technical: e. g., p. 169, familiar animals will not be recognized under the names of *Limulus* and *Bassaris;* — p. 171, "paved teeth" would not be intelligible to the beginner; — p. 16, *Incessores* is translated "Birds of Prey"; — p. 135, instead of *groups* of individuals, should stand *parts*, &c. There are some uncertainties of orthography, &c., e. g., *polypi* and *polyps;* and the commas might be somewhat reformed in another edition. The work has, we believe, been somewhat delayed, and therefore probably hurried at the close. Prefaces in this way are apt to show marks of haste, as one of which we presume the very slight mention of Mr. E. Desor must be considered, as, if we are rightly informed, the elaboration of a large part of the work is due to him. This is doubtless owing merely to want of consideration of the force of phrases in this comparatively unimportant part of the work.

Art. IV. — CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY.

Of the great questions which are now agitating the community not one deserves a more careful and earnest investigation, not one involves higher considerations of duty than this: Does the Constitution of the United States, when rightly interpreted, support Slavery? We propose to consider the question as briefly as is consistent with clearness.

Of course only that slavery which is legal can be constitutional. But it is argued that all slavery is illegal. Law is defined to be a "natural, permanent, *unalterable* principle;" "any rule," it is said, "not existing in the nature of things, or that is not permanent, universal, and inflexible in its application, is no law." The civil rights of men, it is contended, are defined by the "*immutable* and overruling principle of natural justice."

Justice must be either absolute or relative. An absolutely just act is just at all times, in all places, and under all circumstances. A relatively just action is just only at some particular time and place, and under some particular circumstances. Consequently, the rule of relative justice is constantly changing with time, place, and circumstances. Therefore it cannot be unalterable. On this theory, therefore, it cannot be law, because law *is* unalterable. Law, on this theory, then, must be synonymous with absolute justice. Without denying that it is possible for the human race ultimately to acquire a knowledge of the test of that which is absolutely just and right, it is sufficient for the purposes of our argument that it is evident that no such test at present exists.* But if law is synonymous with absolute justice, if we cannot tell what is absolute justice we cannot tell what is law; and, consequently, cannot prove even slave-holding to be unlawful. But law is a practical science. To remain so, we cannot take our notions

* It seems unnecessary to argue this point. The author of this theory, strangely enough, admits the present non-existence of a test of what is naturally just. He says, "whenever the natural law is sufficiently certain to all men's minds to justify its being enacted, it is sufficiently certain to need no enactment. On the other hand, *until it be thus certain*, there is danger of doing injustice by enacting it; it should, therefore, be left open to be discussed by any body who may be disposed to question it, and to be judged of by the proper (?) tribunal, the judiciary." He therefore admits that in some cases we cannot now tell what natural justice demands of us. But if we had a test of natural justice we could decide *all* cases *now*.

of relative justice as its test, and declare not to be law every rule which we believe to be unjust; because if we do this law will necessarily be constantly changing, like our notions of relative justice, with time, place, and circumstances, and it needs no argument to show that a law which is thus constantly changing, with whatever name we may please to dignify it, is only another word for despotism. We would not, however, be misunderstood. Every legislator should endeavour to make the laws carry out the highest present idea of justice. But if, as has always hitherto been the case, every legislator fails in the attempt, the laws are none the less laws although they prescribe a rule at variance with the requirement of relative justice.

This fundamental objection being disposed of, we proceed to state briefly the law of England specially bearing upon the question before us.

The common law of England (1 *Black. Comm.*, 67,) "is properly distinguishable into three kinds. 1. General customs; which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law, in its stricter and more usual signification. 2. Particular customs; which for the most part affect only the inhabitants of particular districts. 3. Certain particular laws," (the civil and canon law) "which by custom are adopted and used by some particular courts."

The existence and validity of general customs are determined by the courts. To be valid a general custom must have existed beyond the memory of man. In England this time of legal memory extends back to the commencement of the reign of Richard I. (1189.) The existence of a particular custom is proved as a question of fact, unless the court recognizes its existence. To make it valid certain things are required. Among these it is necessary that it should have existed beyond the memory of man Thus, to establish a title by prescription to an easement, a man must be able to show that he and those under whom he claims have immemorially used to enjoy it.

The remark, "Law is a progressive science," was frequently made by the late Judge Story. It is eminently true of the common law, for it is not true that the common law has existed ever since the close of the twelfth century. Many exceedingly important portions of it, as the English law of the Road, (1 Ib., p. 74, note,) the presumption of a lost grant from twenty years adverse possession of an easement, very promi-

nent portions of the law of bailments, insurance, &c., &c., have been introduced in comparatively modern times by the force of usage alone. In other words, the rule of legal memory has been practically abandoned, even in England, in very many instances; and customs notoriously originating in modern times are admitted by the courts to form as much a part of the common law as those which can be traced back to the time of Richard I. And it is well worthy of remark, that if only such principles as can be traced back thus far form part of the common law, then the rule of legal memory itself forms no part of the common law, for it was not even dreamed of until about a century after that time.

As early as the Norman Conquest, a class of slaves existed in England, called Villeins. This system of servitude was not wholly extinct at so late a period as the 12th year of Charles II. (1661) (2I b., 96; *Lloft's Rep.*, 8), though at this time we are told "there was hardly a pure villein left in the nation." Blackstone thus describes the condition of these slaves (2 *Comm.*, p. 93): "Villeins belonging principally to lords of manors, were either villeins *regardant*, that is, annexed to the manor or land; or else they were *in gross*, or at large, that is, annexed to the person of the lord, and transmissible by deed from one owner to another. They could not leave their lord without his permission; but if they ran away or were purloined from him, might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or other chattels. They held, indeed, small portions of land by way of sustaining themselves and families, but it was at the mere will of the lord, who might dispossess them whenever he pleased." "A villein, in short, was in much the same state with us, as Lord Molesworth describes to be that of the boors in Denmark, and which Stiernhook attributes also to the traals, or slaves in Sweden." The slavery extended to the issue if both parents were villeins, or if the father only was a villein.

"Villenage of both kinds," says Sir William Scott, "had no other origin than ancient custom." It was not established by legislation. It was lawful solely because sanctioned by general custom. None of the requisites for a valid custom were deemed inconsistent with its complete establishment. For six centuries, therefore, slavery existed in England solely in virtue of CUSTOM, UNAIDED BY LEGISLATION. But it was a relation of master and slave which the common law sanctioned. Now, if general custom alone was a sufficient legal basis for

property in white men, it was also a sufficient legal basis for property in black men. If, by the law of England, general custom, unaided by legislation, had sufficient legal power to make and keep white men and their descendants slaves, by the same law general custom, unaided by legislation, had sufficient legal power to make and keep black men and their descendants slaves. The fact that the child of the villein followed the condition of the father, whilst the child of the negro slave follows the condition of the mother, makes no difference, for the legality of villanage is not based at all upon this difference. Therefore, by the law of England, general custom unaided by legislation constituted a sufficient legal basis for slavery generally. The principle in its actual application only supported villein slavery, but it was legally capable of being applied to the support of negro slavery.

The well known case of Somerset (*Lloft's Rep.*, 1, &c.) is sometimes alluded to as conflicting with this view of the law, and even as settling that no legal slavery ever existed in England. In delivering the opinion of the Court of King's Bench, Lord Mansfield uses the following language: "The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It's so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law."

By "positive law," as here used, is sometimes understood statute law, and hence the inferences that custom, unaided by legislation, is not a legally sufficient basis for slavery, and consequently that villanage was a mere wrong, unsupported by law. It may well be doubted, however, whether by the expression "positive" law Lord Mansfield really meant "statute" law. Positive law, he says, "preserves its force long after the time itself from whence it was created is erased from memory," but we can always tell the time when a statute was passed. Besides, as Chief-Justice Shaw says, (18 *Pick. Rep.*, 212) "by positive law, in this connection, may be as well understood customary law as the enactment of a statute." Thus Blackstone, speaking of a provision of the common law, says, (1 *Comm.*, 70) "now this is positive law, fixed and established by custom." But the conclusive answer is this. If the court really intended to say that custom unaided by legislation was an insufficient legal basis for slavery, and that no le-

gal slavery ever existed in England, the decision on these points is of no binding authority as law even in England, because these points were not legitimately before the court for decision. The decision of a court of common law upon the point necessarily involved in the case before it is an authoritative declaration of the law, but its decision upon any other collateral points is wholly extra-judicial, and does not settle the law. We cannot do better than to lay before our readers the following extract from an opinion of Sir William Scott. (2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.*, 106.)

"The real and sole question which the case of Somerset brought before Lord Mansfield, as expressed in the return to the mandamus, was whether a slave could be taken from this country in irons and carried back to the West Indies, to be restored to the dominion of his master? And all the answer, perhaps, which that question required, was that the party who was a slave could not be sent out of England in such a manner, and for such a purpose, stating the reasons of that illegality. It is certainly true that Lord Mansfield, in his final judgment, amplifies the subject largely. He extends his observations to the foundation of the whole system of the slavery code; for in one passage he says that slavery is so odious that it cannot be established without positive law. Far from me be the presumption of questioning any *obiter dictum* that fell from that great man upon that occasion; but I trust that I do not depart from the modesty that belongs to my situation, and I hope to my character, when I observe that ancient custom is generally recognized as a just foundation of all law; that villenage of both kinds, which is said by some to be the prototype of slavery, had no other origin than ancient custom; that a great part of the common law itself, in all its relations, has little other foundation than the same custom, and that the practice of slavery as it exists in Antigua and several other of our colonies, though regulated by law, has been in many instances founded upon a similar authority."

By the decision in Somerset's case the unlawfulness of negro slavery in England may be considered as virtually settled. So far, however, was the court from even intimating its unlawfulness in the colonies, that its lawfulness is explicitly admitted both by the counsel and the court. Francis Hargrave, the eminent counsel for Somerset, said (1 *Juris. Exerc.*, 6) — "The case before the court, when expressed in few words, is this: — Mr. Steuart purchases a negro slave in

Virginia, where, by the laws of the place, negroes are slaves, and saleable as other property." Lord Mansfield said, (*Lloft's Rep.*, 17) "The now question is, whether any dominion, authority, or coercion can be exercised in this country on a slave, according to the American laws." Negro slavery was deemed unlawful in England, not because general custom unaided by legislation was legally insufficient to support it, but because it was in fact supported neither by such custom nor by legislation.

We deem it unnecessary to examine into the legality of slavery in all the states. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, about two thirds of all the slaves were found in the four Southern states. (*Census of* 1790.) Very nearly all of these slaves were negroes and their descendants. The legality of negro* slavery in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia is, therefore, the question to which we shall confine our remarks.

The first settlers did not bring with them the whole body of the English common law, but "only that portion which was applicable to their situation." "No one will contend," says Mr. Justice Mc'Lean, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, (8 *Pet. Rep.*, 658, 659) "that the common law, as it existed in England, has ever been in force, in all its provisions, in any state in this Union. It was adopted so far only as its principles were suited to the condition of the colonies; and from this circumstance we see what is common law in one state is not so considered in another. The judicial decisions, the usages and customs of the respective states, must determine how far the common law has been introduced and sanctioned in each."

The colonists in their discretion could reject any portion of the common law which they deemed unsuited to their condition. This discretion was unlimited, so far as the question of negro slavery is concerned. The English courts could not control this discretion in any case, for they had no appellate jurisdiction over the colonial courts. If Parliament could, it never attempted to control it, but, as we shall see, actually fostered negro slavery in the colonies. And though the king in council could reverse a decision of the highest colonial court, yet in no instance has any such decision been reversed

* By this expression we mean not only Africans, but their descendants by the mother's side.

because it sanctioned negro slavery. Therefore, if any part of the common law of England is found to be inconsistent with "the judicial decisions, usages, and customs" of the colonies, even though these decisions and customs go to support negro slavery, we must conclude that all such parts of the English common law did not form part of the colonial common law, but were rejected as unsuited to the condition of the colonies.

The English rule of legal memory was established in accordance with the equitable construction of that statute (13 Edw. I., c. 39,) which provided that no writ of right should be maintained, except on a seizin, from the time of Richard I. It was deemed reasonable that the same length of time which was sufficient to give a title to land itself should also be sufficient to give a title to an easement over land. Upon the same principle, when the limitation of a writ of right was reduced by the statute of 32 Henry VIII., c. 2, to sixty years, a similar reduction should have been made in the limitation of the time of legal memory. This was the opinion of several eminent legal writers. The English rule being intrinsically unreasonable, as well as not conformable to the very principle on which it was originally made, was also unsuited to the condition of a new country, and consequently the colonists might reject it. In doing this they were not obliged to reject other parts of the law with which it was associated. But they might reject the rule of legal memory and adopt the law of prescription. Thus the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts say, (8 *Pick. Rep.*, 510.) "The question then is, whether the courts of this country were not at liberty to adopt the English law of prescription, with a modification of the unreasonable rule adhered to by the English courts in regard to the limitation of the time of legal memory. Certainly the law without the rule of limitation might have been adopted, and the courts here had competent authority to establish a new rule of limitation suited to the situation of the country. They had the same authority in this respect that the courts in England had to establish the English rule of limitation."

If the colonists had the right thus to adopt the law of prescription, (which is nothing but a particular custom,) and change the time of legal memory, — if they had the right to declare that a particular custom of sixty or forty years' standing was legally sufficient, a fortiori, they had the right to declare that a general custom of sixty or forty years' standing was legally sufficient; or, in other words, they had a legal

right to make a general custom of sixty or forty years' standing form part of their common law. But if they had the legal right to do this, they had the legal right to *add* to their common law the legal right to do that which the courts in England have, in fact, done without lawful right; that is, incorporate into the common law customs of modern growth. The legality of this proceeding has been admitted by Parliament. By Act 7 and 8, Wm. III., c. 22, it is provided that all usages and customs in practice in any of the Plantations shall be void if "repugnant to any law made or to be made in this kingdom relative to the said plantations," thereby clearly admitting their validity if not so repugnant. That customs of modern growth have thus been legally incorporated into the common law of all the states is a fact beyond controversy. Thus many English statutes are in force in this state, solely because we have adopted them as part of our common law. (8 *Pick. Rep.*, 317.) And, if the colonists had pleased to rely on this legal right, negro slavery in the Southern colonies might now be lawful for the same reason.

From the simple fact that negro slavery was contrary to the common law of England, it is obvious that we cannot infer it was contrary to that portion of the common law which was in force in the colonies. The colonists did, however, *at first* rely wholly upon the common law principle, that general custom unaided by legislation constitutes in itself a sufficient legal basis for the relation of master and slave. They only applied the principle to their circumstances. The principle which in England was the basis of white slavery, in the colonies became the basis of black slavery. The principle remained the same, the application only was different.

It is well known that the colonists claimed the writ of Habeas Corpus* and Trial by Jury as their birthright; and it is urged that these rights are necessarily inconsistent with the existence of negro slavery. But both of them coexisted in England for centuries, legally, and, in fact, with slavery. Therefore neither of them is necessarily destructive to slavery.

The writ of Habeas Corpus was designed to put an end to *unlawful* restraint. To constitute an unlawful restraint it must be "without sufficient authority." (3 *Black. Comm.*, 127, 128.)

* The Habeas Corpus Act (Stat. 31 Charles II., c. 2) leaves all cases of unlawful imprisonment except commitments for criminal charges to the writ at common law. (3 *Black. Comm.*, 131, &c., 137, &c.) As slaves are not criminals they would be set free, if at all, by the common law writ.

This sufficient authority, says Blackstone, "may arise either from some process from the courts of justice, or from some warrant from a legal officer having power to commit, under his hand and seal, and expressing the cause of such commitment, *or from some other special cause warranted* for the necessity of the thing *either by common law or act of parliament.*" Villanage was a special cause, warranted by the common law. Villeins could not leave their lord without his permission, and if they ran away or were purloined from him they might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts and other chattels. A villein slave could not, then, be set free on this writ. The same law which provided this writ as a remedy for unlawful restraints, by declaring lawful the restraint of the villein by his lord, also declared that in the case of the villein the writ was inoperative. In like manner, wherever the general law recognizes the lawfulness of negro slavery, a negro slave cannot be set free on a writ of habeas corpus, because his restraint is lawful.

It is also urged, that if this writ does not necessarily deny the right of property in man "it would be perfectly impotent in all cases whatsoever, because it is a principle of law, in regard to property, that simple possession is prima facie evidence of ownership; and, therefore, any man who was holding another in custody could defeat the writ by pleading that he owned his prisoner, and by giving, as proof of ownership, the simple fact that he was in possession of him." This is evidently a mistake. Possession of a negro in any free state is not even prima facie evidence of ownership; consequently, if a claimant relied on possession alone, the writ would be always operative. In the slave states actual possession may possibly amount to prima facie evidence of ownership. But even where this is the case, if a negro can prove his freedom he is always set at liberty. The writ, therefore, does not necessarily deny the right of property in man. It is inoperative only in those cases where the restraint is recognized as lawful, it matters not whether this legality arises from servitude or any other cause.

The province of a jury at the common law is the decision of questions of fact. If the evidence is clear that A. B. is a slave, will not the verdict be in favor of slavery? How, then, can this mode of trial necessarily destroy the institution of slavery? If it is said that, in questions of freedom, the jurors will disregard their oaths and the instructions of the court as

to the law, and find a verdict in favor of freedom against evidence, the answer is, we cannot infer, from the abuse of an institution, its true character.

It is further urged, "And what (in criminal cases,) is the trial by jury? It is a trial both of the law and the fact by the peers or equals of the persons tried. Who are the peers of a slave? None, evidently, but slaves. If, then, the Constitution recognizes any such class of persons in this country as slaves, it would follow, that for any crime committed by them against the United States, they must be tried, both on the law and the facts, by a jury of slaves." Merely suggesting that slaves are not held as criminals, we would ask, have vilein slaves been tried during so many centuries by juries composed of slaves, or does Magna Charta, in securing this mode of trial, say only "nullus *liber* homo capiatur," &c., "nisi per legale judicium *parium* suorum"? Only *free* and lawful men can be summoned as jurymen, says Blackstone, and if a juryman should happen to be "a *slave* or bondman" he may be challenged, because "this is defect of liberty, and he cannot be *liber et legalis homo*." (3 *Black. Comm.*, 352, 362.)

The English common law, therefore, modified as the colonists had a legal right to modify it, by the alteration and rejection of some old customs, and by the introduction of such new ones as, in their opinion, were suited to their situation, might have constituted, in itself alone, a sufficient legal basis for negro slavery. But the colonists did not please to rely on this ground. They relied at first on general custom, but afterwards established and sanctioned the custom by legislative acts, clearly constitutional, clearly valid. This it is which constitutes an amply sufficient basis for negro slavery in the Southern states.*

The first negro set foot in Virginia in 1620, whilst the last charter was in existence. This charter authorized the passage of laws, "so always as the same be not contrary to the laws and statutes of this our realm of England." Neither of the Carolina charters contained any such clause. They only required the laws passed by the Assembly to be "consonant to reason,

* It seems unnecessary to consider how far the English rule of legal memory has been adhered to, abandoned, or modified in the Southern states, because, in order to prove the legality of negro slavery, we do not rely upon the legal efficacy of general *custom*, but on the *incontestable* validity of the provincial *legislative acts*, which establish and sanction the custom and stamp it with the character of law.

and, as near as may be conveniently, agreeable to the laws and customs" of England. The only charter granted to Georgia provided that the colonial legislation should be "not repugnant to the laws and statutes of England." In 1624 the Virginia charter was vacated. In 1729 the last Carolina charter was surrendered. The charter of Georgia was surrendered in 1751. With the fall of their charters all the colonies became royal provinces. If, therefore, the Charters constituted, while they lasted, the constitutions of the colonies, inasmuch as royal provinces had no charters, they had no constitutions; and, consequently, it was perfectly constitutional for the legislatures of these four provinces to establish negro slavery. Such an act was equally constitutional in Carolina, even under the charters, because the laws passed by the colonial assemblies were not obliged to conform to those of England.

Being thus unrestrained by any written constitution,* the legislature of a royal province could pass *any laws whatsoever which seemed expedient*, subject only to the negative of the king, and *possibly* that of Parliament.

In 1774 it was asserted by the Continental Congress, (*Declaration of Rights*, *Act* 4, 1 *Story's Comm.*, 180, note) that the colonists "are entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, subject only to the negative of their sovereign in such manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed." This ground was not, however, always maintained by the colonists. On the contrary, as late as 1761, the General Court of Massachusetts declared that "every

* The commission of the king to his governor is sometimes spoken of as forming the constitution of a royal province, (1 *Story's Comm. Const.*, 143, § 159.) Such commission usually contained the same clause as that relied on in the colonial charters. Hence, it may possibly be argued, that any law which would be deemed unconstitutional under a charter, would also be deemed unconstitutional under a commission which contained such clause.

But such a commission cannot be deemed a constitution, because a constitution which exists only at the pleasure of the ruler is really no constitution at all. Yet such was exactly the character of these commissions. They were issued and revoked at the will and pleasure of the king. As often as it might suit his whim, he could revoke one already granted, and annul "every clause, article and thing therein contained." He might issue a new one every month, if, of his "especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion" he deemed it expedient. (*Stokes' View of the Constitutions of the British Colonies*, &c., 150.) He might vary the provisions of an existing commission by special instructions under his sign manual. To say, therefore, that such commissions were in any just sense of the word constitutions, or were the fundamental constitutions of the provinces, as much so as our national and state constitutions are now the fundamental laws of our government, would be to misuse language.

act we make, repugnant to an act of Parliament, extending to the plantations, is ipso facto null and void." If this parliamentary negative really existed, it constituted the *only* exception to the otherwise *exclusive* legislative power possessed by the provincial assemblies over *all* matters of *internal polity*. So far as the question under discussion is concerned, it is of no consequence whether this power existed in Parliament or not, because, so far from Parliament ever having declared negro slavery to be unlawful in these provinces, it has, on the contrary, positively sanctioned and fostered the system in all the colonies.* *Consequently, it was clearly*

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* "An Act to settle the trade to Africa" (9 William III., c. 26) was passed in 1697–8. The first section recites as follows:—

"Whereas the trade to Africa is highly beneficial and advantageous to this Kingdom and to the Plantations and Colonies thereunto belonging," &c. Sect. 7, after imposing a duty "of ten pounds *per centum ad valorem*," "at the place of importation upon all *goods and merchandize* (*negroes excepted*) imported, in (into) England or any of his majesty's plantations or colonies in America from the coast of Africa, between Cape Blanco and Cape Mount," . . . provides, that "all *goods and merchandize* (*negroes excepted*) that shall be laded or put on board any ship or vessel on the coast of Africa, between Cape Blanco and Cape Mount, and shall be imported into England, or into any of his majesty's Plantations or Colonies aforesaid, shall answer and pay the duties aforesaid, and that the master or chief-officer of every such ship or vessel that shall lade or receive any *goods or merchandize* (*negroes excepted*) on board of his or their ship or vessel between Cape Blanco and Cape Mount, shall upon making entry at any of his majesty's Custom-houses aforesaid of the said ship or vessel; or before any *goods or merchandize* be landed or taken out of the said ship or vessel (*negroes excepted*) shall deliver in a manifest or particular of his cargo, and take the following oath, viz.;" In this oath the expression occurs "goods, wares, and merchandizes (negroes excepted.)"

Sect. 8 speaks of "the *owner* or importer *of all goods and merchandize* (*negroes excepted*) which shall be brought to England or any of his majesty's plantations," &c.

Sect. 9 speaks of "all *goods or merchandize* (*negroes excepted*)."

Sect. 20 forbids the governors, deputy governors, and judges in the colonies and all persons acting in their behalf, serving as factors "for the *sale or disposal of any negroes*."

Trade between Africa and the American colonies was the object of this act. It is clear from sections 7 and 8 that the importation into the colonies of negroes as property was contemplated by this act. In seven instances negroes are mentioned in the same connection with "goods and merchandise." Sect. 8 obliges the owner regularly to enter at the custom-house all his GOODS EXCEPT NEGROES; and Sect. 20, by providing that certain high dignitaries in the colonies should not be concerned either directly or indirectly as factors, "in the sale or disposal of any negroes," necessarily implies, that all other persons in the colonies might be concerned in such business. This act, therefore, clearly sanctioned the importation of negroes into the American colonies, and the sale of them in the colonies as goods and merchandise.

It is said "that this statute implies that these negroes were to be imported into England, as well as into the plantations and Colonies in America, and that it therefore no more implies that they were to be slaves in the Plantations and Colonies than in England, where we know they could not be slaves." But

competent for a provincial legislature to pass laws establishing negro slavery; and any such law, formally passed by a provincial assembly, and formally approved by the governor

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it has never yet been decided by any English court that a negro imported into England from Africa under the provisions of this act, and during its continuance, was not a slave even in England. This question is left wholly untouched by the decision in Somerset's case.

In 1732 an act, 5 Geo. II., c. 7, entitled "an act for the more easy recovery of debts in his majesty's Plantations and Colonies in America," was passed.

Sect. 4 reads as follows. "And be it further enacted, &c., that from and after the said twenty-ninth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and thirty-two, the houses, lands, *negroes*, and other hereditaments and real estates situate or being within any of the said Plantations *belonging to any person indebted shall be liable to and chargeable with all just debts*, duties, and demands of what nature or kind soever, owing by any such person to his majesty, or any of his subjects, and shall and may be *assets for the satisfaction thereof*, in like manner as real estates are by the law of England liable to the satisfaction of debts due by bond or other speciality, and shall be subject to the like remedies, proceedings and process in any court of law or equity, in any of the said plantations respectively, for seizing, extending, *selling* or disposing of any such houses, lands, *negroes*, and other hereditaments and real estate, *towards the satisfaction of such debts*, duties, and demands, and in like manner as personal estates in any of the said plantations respectively are seized, extended, sold, or disposed of for the satisfaction of debts."

This act recognizes and sanctions as lawful, the right of property in negroes in the colonies, and makes provision for seizing and selling such negroes for the payment of the debts of their owners.

In 1749 was passed the act 23 Geo. II., c. 31, entitled "an act for extending and improving the trade to Africa." The preamble recites: "*Whereas the trade to and from Africa is very advantageous to Great Britain, and necessary for the supplying the Plantations and Colonies thereunto belonging, with a sufficient number of* NEGROES AT REASONABLE RATES; and for that purpose, the said trade ought to be free and open to all his majesty's subjects, therefore be it enacted," &c.

Sect. 20 provides, "But it shall not be lawful for the said Committee to carry or cause to be carried or exported from Africa any NEGROES OR OTHER GOODS, in return for the said goods they shall so export from Great Britain, or in any other manner to carry on any trade to or from Africa."

A writer in this Review says (p. 165) "negroes are nowhere in these acts spoken of as slaves." Sect. 28 authorizes "any of his majesty's subjects trading to Africa for the security of their GOODS OR SLAVES, to erect houses and warehouses under the protection of the said forts, or elsewhere in any part of Africa within the limits aforesaid, for the better carrying on of his or their trade there." The avowed object of this act was trade in negroes.— Sect. 28, in order to prosper the trade, authorizes the traders to erect buildings for the security of their "goods or slaves." Consequently this section contemplates "goods or slaves" as the objects of the trade. But as negroes were the only persons contemplated by the act as objects of the trade, this section necessarily contemplated the trade in negro slaves. Therefore the object had in view by Parliament was the supplying the colonies with negro slaves at reasonable rates. But the right to trade in slaves necessarily implies the right to buy, sell, and to hold them as slaves in the places where the trade is lawful. Therefore Parliament sanctioned in the colonies the right to buy, sell, and hold negro slaves.

Sect. 29 is relied on as showing conclusively an intent not thus to legalise the slave-trade. But this section only provides "that no commander or master

as the king's representative, until disallowed by the king, (1 *Chitty on Prerog.*, 34, 1 *Story's Comm.*, 126, § 139) was the binding law of the province, to all intents and purposes; and no court, either provincial or English, had jurisdiction to declare it void. The courts in England had no authority over the provincial courts. Appeals from the provincial courts lay directly to the king in council. In the king alone, was, therefore, centred the ultimate power over both the common and statute law of a province. His decision upon both was final. Not a single instance can be produced in which the king has reversed a decision of a provincial court, or annulled a provincial law, simply because it established negro slavery. And no power now exists capable of adjudging void a provincial law not thus annulled, even though it establishes negro slavery.

A writer in this Review, (p. 164,) however, asserts that the colonial legislatures could not make any acts contrary to the great principles of the English law; and that conformity to the law of England was still more strictly demanded in the royal than in the chartered provinces. As an example of the limits of colonial legislative authority, he refers to the act passed by the Assembly of South Carolina in 1704, by which dissenters were deprived of civil rights, and says that Queen Anne issued a proclamation declaring the act void, "because it violated that clause in the charter which required the laws of the colony not to contradict those of England."

No authority or reason is or can be given by this writer for the assertion that a more strict conformity to English law was required of royal than of chartered colonies. Notwithstanding his assertion, *it is an undoubted principle of law that, with the concurrence of the king, the assembly of a royal province was as completely unlimited in its powers of legislation over all matters of internal polity as Parliament itself*

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of any ship trading to Africa shall by fraud, force, or violence, or by any other indirect practice whatsoever take on board, or carry away from the coast of Africa, any negro or native of the said country, or commit or suffer to be committed any violence on any natives, *to the prejudice of the said trade.*" Any amount of fraud or violence might be used, and, provided it did not prejudice the legal slave-trade, the party using it would not come within the provision of this section. That the object of this section was to prevent only acts prejudicial to the trade of the company established by the act, is apparent from the consideration, that the company was to receive one half of the penalties inflicted under this section, evidently by way of compensation for an act done to their prejudice.

was in England; for no English or provincial court had jurisdiction to declare a provincial act thus approved void, and Parliament can pass no law without the consent of the king. If, therefore, the king saw fit to approve a provincial law directly contrary to the law of England, no power existed, either in England or the province, capable of adjudging that law void. The law to which the writer refers was passed by the assembly of a *chartered* province, and, consequently, it cannot serve as any illustration of the power of the assembly of a *royal* province. Neither could it have been declared void by the Queen, "because it violated that clause in the charter" to which the writer refers, for the simple reason that no such clause exists. The charter authorized the proprietaries, without the concurrence of the freeholders, to make ordinances "not repugnant or contrary" to the law of England. But no such restriction is imposed upon the making of laws like this of 1704, passed with the consent of the freeholders. Nor was the act of the Queen at all relied upon as being a repeal, because the obnoxious act was repealed by the colonial assembly the same year it was enacted. (2 *Cooper's Stat.*, 232, 281.) The true reason of the act of the Queen seems to be that given by the Commissioners of trade in their report to her, namely, (2 *Grah. Hist.*, 145, 146, 3 *Banc. Hist.*, 18, 19) "that the making of such laws was an abuse of the powers granted by the charter, and inferred a forfeiture of the same." In a colony where not only the most wealthy and respectable inhabitants, but at least two thirds of the whole population were dissenters, improper means were resorted to to elect Churchmen, and in an assembly in which, with all this management, the Churchmen had a majority of one only, this act, with another equally obnoxious, was passed. Such being the facts, the Queen was advised and promised to institute a *quo warranto* to obtain a judgment that the charter was forfeited, and, in the meantime, declared the act void. But, if she had pronounced it good, no power existed legally capable of declaring it void.

By invariable usage, all negroes imported into the four Southern colonies were deemed to be slaves for life, and as such were bought and sold. By similar long continued usage, the rule of the negro slave-code, that the child follows the condition of the mother, was adopted. We propose to show that these customs have been established and sanctioned in all these colonies by clearly valid statute laws. Want of room will compel us to pass over all but the more prominent of them.

In Virginia, as late as 1650, the number of negroes was so inconsiderable that to one black there were fifty whites. "An act for the Dutch and all other strangers, for tradeing to this place" was passed in 1659. This act provides, (1 *Hening's Stat.*, 540) "that if the said Dutch or other forreiners shall import any *negro slaves*, they, the said Dutch or others, shall for the tobacco really produced by the sale of the said negro, pay only the impost of two shillings per hogshead, the like being paid by our owne nation." In 1662 this act was passed: (2 Ib., 170.) "Negro women's children to serve according to the condition of the mother." "Whereas some doubts have arrisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a negro woman should be slave or ffree. Be it therefore enacted and declared by this present grand assembly, that all children borne in this country shall be held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother."

In 1671 an act is passed, (2 Ib., 288) "providing how negroes, belonging to orphans of intestates, shall be disposed of." The government of negro slaves is provided for by acts passed in 1680, 1682, and 1691. (2 Ib., 481, 490; 3 Ib., 86, 87.) In 1699 a duty is laid on the importation of negro slaves; and in 1705, "negro, mulatto, and Indian slaves" are declared "to be real estate." (3 Ib., 193, 333.) By the act 9 George I., c. 4, § 17, (4 Ib., 132) it is enacted "*That no negro, mulatto, or Indian slaves shall be set free upon any pretence whatsoever*, except for some meritorious services, to be adjudged and allowed by the governor and council, for the time being, and a license thereupon first had and obtained," &c. Stealing negro slaves is made felony in 1732. (4 Ib., 324.) "An Act concerning servants and slaves" was passed in 1748. (5 Ib., 547.)

Sect. 2 provides "That all persons who have been or shall be imported into this colony by sea or land, and were not Christians in their native country, except Turks and Moors in amity with his majesty, and such who can prove their being free in England, or any other Christian country, before they were shipped for transportation hither, shall be accounted and be slaves, and as such be here bought and sold, notwithstanding a conversion to Christianity after their importation."

Sect. 15 provides "that every negro or other person taken up and brought before a Justice of the Peace, and who cannot or will not declare the name of his or her owner, shall be committed to the goal of the county where taken," &c.

Sect. 25 makes it felony for any person "to steal any negro, mulatto, or Indian slave."

In 1753 "An act for the better government of servants and slaves" was passed. (6 Ib., 356.) Sections 2, 18, and 28 of this act are precisely the same as sections 2, 15, and 25 of the act of 1748. The fourth section declares "that all children shall be bond or free according to the condition of their mothers and the particular directions of this act."

Negroes were persons imported by sea or land; they were not Christians in Africa, neither were they Turks or Moors in amity with the King. None of them could prove being free in England or any other Christian country, before being shipped for transportation. Consequently, negroes were by this act declared to be legally slaves in Virginia.

The first charter of Carolina, including North and South Carolina, was granted in 1663. In 1669 the proprietaries adopted the well-known constitution of John Locke, which was not abrogated until 1693. Article 110 reads thus: — "Every freeman of Carolina shall have *absolute* power and authority over his *negro slaves*, of what opinion or religion soever."

In 1741 the provincial legislature of North Carolina passed "An act concerning servants and slaves. (*Iredell's Stat.*, 62 — 66.) This act provides,

Sect. 27, "That if any person or persons whatsoever shall, directly or indirectly, at any time after the ratification of this act, tempt or persuade any *negro or negroes, or other slave or slaves* to leave his, her, or their master or mistress's service," &c.

Sect. 29, "That if any negro or other person who shall be taken up as a runaway, and brought before any Justice of the Peace, and cannot speak English, or, through obstinacy will not declare the name of his or her owner, such justice shall, in such case," &c.

Sect. 56, "That *no negro or mulatto slaves shall be set free upon any pretence whatsoever*, except for meritorious services to be adjudged and allowed of by the county court, and license thereupon first had and obtained," &c.

Negro slavery is sanctioned also by stat. 1741, c. 8, s. 10, and stat. 1753, c. 6. (1 Ib., 50, 104.)

Five years after the abrogation of Locke's Constitution, in 1698, the colonial legislature of South Carolina passed "an act to prevent deceits by double mortgages and conveyances of lands, negroes, and chattels," &c. (1 *Grimke's Laws*, 3.)

A provincial act to prevent trading with "negroes and other slaves" was passed in 1737–8.* (1 Ib., 152.) "An act for the better ordering and governing negroes and other slaves" in this province, was passed in 1740. (1 Ib., 163.)

"Whereas in his majesty's plantations in America, slavery has been introduced and allowed, and the people commonly called *negroes*, indians, mulattoes and mestizos *have been deemed absolute slaves*, and the subjects of property in the hands of particular persons; &c. &c."

Be it enacted, "that *all negroes*, Indians (free Indians in amity with this government, and negroes, mulattoes, and mestizos who are now free, excepted,) mulattoes and mestizos, *who now are or shall hereafter be in this province, and all their issue and offspring born or to be born shall be and they are hereby declared to be and remain forever hereafter absolute slaves, and shall follow the condition of the mother*, and shall be deemed sold, taken, reputed, and adjudged in law to be chattels personal in the hands of their owners and possessors, and their executors, administrators, and assigns to all intents, constructions, and purposes whatsoever." The act then points out the method to be pursued in case of a suit for freedom, and it specially provides, "that in any action or suit to be brought in pursuance of the direction of this act, the burthen of the proof shall lay upon the plaintiff, and it shall be always presumed that every negro, Indian, mulatto, and mestizo is a slave unless the contrary can be made to appear, (free Indians in amity with this government excepted,) in which case the burthen of the proof shall lie on the defendant."

"An act to prevent the inveigling, stealing, and carrying away negroes and other slaves in this province," &c., &c., was passed in 1754. (1 Ib., 235.) The preamble reads:

"Whereas by the laws of this province negroes and other slaves are deemed to be chattels personal, and are in *every respect as much the property of their owners as any other goods or chattels are*," &c., &c.

It is, however, objected to the act of 1740 that "in reality it defined nothing; for the whole purport of it was, to declare that all negroes, Indians, mulattoes, and mestizos, except those who were then free, should be slaves. Inasmuch as no prior

* Other acts passed in 1695–6, 1711, 1712, might be cited, which were passed whilst the charter subsisted. But negro slavery, as we have seen, was perfectly allowable under the charter.

statute had ever been passed declaring who should be slaves, all were legally free; and therefore all came within the exception in favor of free persons."

The answer is obvious, without relying at all on the legal presumption of slavery provided for by this act, all were not legally free, because prior statutes had recognized and sanctioned the custom of holding negroes in slavery, and consequently all negroes then held in slavery in accordance with this custom were declared to be legally slaves by this act.

The provincial legislature of Georgia, in 1755, passed "An act to prevent fraudulent deeds of conveyances." (*Prince's Digest*, 158.) The act reads thus: —

"Whereas many inconveniences may attend the want or neglect of recording, in the public offices of this Province, all conveyances of lands, *negroes, and other chattels*, or mortgages of the same —

"Sect. 1. Be it enacted, that all conveyances of lands, tenements, *negroes, and other chattels* or hereditaments whatsoever, or mortgages of the same, that were made before the passing of this act, shall be registered, &c.

"Sect. 2. Be it enacted, that if any vender or mortgager of lands, tenements, *negroes, or other chattels* or hereditaments within this Province, shall presume to execute a second or other deed of conveyance or sale of the same lands, tenements, negroes, or other chattels," &c.

Laws were also passed in 1765 and 1768, sanctioning the slavery of negroes. (*Prince's Digest*, 772 — 776, 160, 161.) The act approved May 10th, 1770, (Ib., 777) — entitled an "Act for ordering and governing slaves within this Province, and for establishing a jurisdiction for the trial of offences committed by such slaves and other persons," &c., —

Sect. 1 provides "that *all negroes*, Indians, mulattoes, or mestizoes *who now are or hereafter shall be in this Province*, (free Indians in amity with this government, and negroes, mulattoes, or mestizoes who now are or hereafter shall become free, excepted,) *and all their issue and offspring born, or to be born, shall be and they are hereby declared to be and remain forever hereafter absolute slaves, and shall follow the condition of the mother*, and shall be taken and deemed in law to be chattels personal, in the hands of their respective owners or possessors, and their executors, administrators, and assigns, to all intents and purposes whatsoever." After pointing out the method to be pursued in a case of suit for freedom, the act

goes on, "Provided always that in any action or suit to be brought in pursuance of the direction of this act, the burthen of the proof shall lie on the Plaintiff, and it shall always be presumed that every negro, Indian, mulatto, or mestizoe, (except as before excepted,) is a slave, unless the contrary can be made appear."

With the exception of the South Carolina act of 1698, all the laws which we have quoted were passed by the assembly of a royal province. These laws were all formally passed and formally approved by the royal governors. Many other similar laws might be cited. It seems, therefore, clear that the general custom of holding negroes in slavery has been established and sanctioned in each province by clearly valid laws. Negro slavery in the four Southern states was, therefore, lawful at the commencement of the Revolution; and up to the time of the adoption of their state constitutions.

It is urged that the Declaration of Independence was the constitutional law of the country, for the purpose of recognizing and establishing as law the natural and inalienable rights of individuals to liberty. If so, it abolished slavery.

In 1796, the Supreme Court of the United States (3 *Dall. Rep.*, 199, 231, 232) had occasion to consider the jurisdiction of Congress prior to 1781. We extract from the opinion of Mr. Justice Chace,— "It has been inquired what powers Congress possessed, from the first meeting in September, 1774, until the ratification of the articles of confederation on the first of March, 1781. It appears to me that the powers of Congress, during that whole period, were derived from the people they represented, expressly given through the medium of their state conventions or state legislatures; or that after they were exercised they were impliedly ratified by the acquiescence and obedience of the people. . . . I entertain this general idea, that the several states retained all internal sovereignty, and that Congress properly possessed the great rights of external sovereignty."

It is clear, therefore, that prior to 1781 Congress possessed no power which was not derived from the people, either by express or implied grant. Now, it is certain that the people never *expressly* granted to Congress the power to abolish negro slavery. Consequently, if such a power existed it must have been derived from *implied* grant. But the grant of a power can be implied only when the people, by acquiescence and

obedience have ratified the exercise of such power. Even if, therefore, Congress had undertaken, not by inuendo merely, but in terms, to abolish negro slavery, inasmuch as no such abolition was acquiesced in, or ratified, or indeed even suspected by the people, the act of abolition would be clearly void. The Declaration of Independence, therefore, did not abolish negro slavery in these four provinces.

This brings us down to the time of the adoption of the first state constitutions, and in order that the remainder of our discussion may be exact, we proceed to state two of the ordinary legal rules of interpretation, which are applicable alike to the interpretation of the state and national constitutions. We style them legal rules merely because sanctioned by the courts, but in these particulars law agrees with the dictates of reason.

The first rule is thus stated by Judge Story (1 *Story's Comm.*, § 451): "*Every* word employed in the Constitution is to be expounded in its *plain, obvious, and common* sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it." In case, however, it appears from the context that the words are used in this or that particular sense, a regard for truth necessarily requires of us a departure from the obvious and common meaning. Chief-Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, (4 *Wheat. Rep.*, 202) says, "where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an instrument bear upon each other and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be varied, construction becomes necessary; and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is justifiable. But if in any case the plain meaning of a provision *not* contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application."

It is clear from these authorities, and the reason of the thing, that the meaning commonly attached to the words of the Constitution at the time of its adoption,* unless contradicted or controlled by the context, is to be deemed the true

* As we are to be understood to mean just what our words commonly mean *now*, so the people of 1787 are to be understood to mean by their words *then* used just what their words *then* meant.

meaning. When thus controlled or contradicted we must depart from the common meaning. But when not thus contradicted, if we are at liberty in any case to conclude that the common meaning of the words is not the true meaning, (which is very doubtful,) it must be a case where the absurdity and injustice to result from the adoption of the common meaning is so monstrous that all must unite in rejecting it. But the system of slavery itself is not yet deemed by the people of this country at large to be monstrously absurd and unjust. Consequently we have no legal right to reject the common meaning of the words, when not contradicted by the context, even though such common meaning makes the Constitution support slavery.

Two consequences legitimately follow from this first rule. Where the same word possesses a technical and a common meaning, (to use the words of Judge Story, 1 *Story's Comm.*, § 453,) "the latter is to be preferred unless some attendant circumstance points *clearly* to the former," and "where technical words are used the technical meaning is to be applied to them unless it is repelled by the context," because in each case such meaning is the common meaning of the word.

Our second rule is this. In order to ascertain the true meaning of the Constitution we are legally entitled to go into any evidence or examination which will place clearly before us the true condition of the people, their social, political, and religious institutions at the time the Constitution was adopted.

In perfect consistency with the rule of law which requires us to find the meaning of the parties to any written instrument from their words alone, this second rule allows the introduction of evidence which is simply explanatory of the words themselves, but not evidence to prove intention itself as an independent fact. The distinction is palpable. The former kind of evidence still leaves the meaning to be drawn from the words, the latter undertakes to prove that meaning as a fact without regard to the words.

This rule is practised upon by the courts constantly in the construction of wills. In the case of *Shore* vs. *Wilson*, (9 *Clark & Finnelly's Rep.*, 555) before the House of Lords, Mr. Baron Parke says: "I apprehend that there are two descriptions of evidence which are clearly admissible in every case for the purpose of enabling a court to construe *any* written instrument and to apply it practically. . . ." (p. 556.) "For the purpose of applying the instrument to the facts and

determining what passes by it and who take an interest under it, a second description of evidence is admissible, namely, every material fact that will enable the court to identify the person or thing mentioned in the instrument, and to place the court, whose province it is to declare the meaning of the words of the instrument, *as near as may be in the situation of the parties to it.*"

It applies also to the construction of contracts. (*Addison on Contr.*, 147.) "To enable us also to arrive at the real intention of the parties, and to make a correct application of the words and language of the contract to the subject matter thereof, and the objects professed to be described, all the surrounding facts and circumstances may be taken into consideration. The law does not deny to the reader the same light and information that the writer enjoyed, he may acquaint himself with the persons and circumstances that are the subjects of the allusions and statements in the written instrument, and is entitled to place himself in the same situation as the party who made the contract, to view the circumstances as he viewed them, and so judge of the meaning of the words and of the correct application of the language professed to be described."

It also applies to the constitution of laws. In the case of *Aldridge et al.* vs. *Williams*, (3 *How's S. C. Rep.*, 24) Chief-Justice Taney says: "The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it when any ambiguity exists with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed."

And lastly, it applies to the construction of the Constitution. "In examining the Constitution," says Mr. Justice Story, (1 *Story's Comm.*, § 405) the antecedent situation of the country and its institutions, the existence and operations of the state governments, the powers and operations of the confederation, in short, all the circumstances which had a tendency to produce or to obstruct its formation and ratification deserve a careful attention. Much also may be gathered from contemporary history and contemporary interpretation to aid us in just conclusions."

It seems clear from these authorities, that to aid in attaining the true construction of any written instrument, whether it be a will, a contract, a law, or a constitution, the law, following

the dictates of sound reason, allows the admission of such evidence as will place the court or party construing the instrument *as nearly as possible in the same situation as that in which the parties to this instrument were at the time of its execution.* We are at liberty, therefore, to take into view the social, political, and religious institutions of the people of the four Southern states at the times of the adoption of their state and the national constitutions.

It is, however, argued, "that where words are susceptible of two meanings, one consistent and the other inconsistent with liberty, justice, and right, that sense is always to be adopted which is consistent with right, unless there be something in other parts of the instrument sufficient to prove that the other is the true meaning. . . . The rule of law, (it is said,) therefore, is imperative that they must be regarded in the sense consistent with liberty and right."

The only authority which is adduced in support of this position is an extract from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *United States* vs. *Fisher et al.*, 2 *Cranch's Rep.*, 390; and in order that the question may be presented clearly, the whole paragraph is here inserted, the extract being enclosed in brackets:

"That the consequences are to be considered in expounding laws, where the intent is doubtful, is a principle not to be controverted; but it is also true that it is a principle which must be applied with caution, and which has a degree of influence dependent on the nature of the case to which it is applied. [Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.] But where only a political regulation is made, which is inconvenient, if the intention of the legislature be expressed in terms which are sufficiently intelligible to leave no doubt in the mind when the words are taken in their ordinary sense, it would be going a great way to say that a constrained interpretation must be put upon them to avoid an inconvenience which ought to have been contemplated in the legislature when the act was passed, and which in their opinion was probably overbalanced by the particular advantages it was calculated to produce."

The court is evidently speaking with reference to the construction of a statute; consequently its language, even if cor-

rectly understood, is properly applicable only to the construction of statutes, and has no necessary bearing on the construction of the Constitution. A rule may be perfectly applicable in the construction of one and not at all applicable in the construction of the other; owing to the difference in character between a statute and a constitution. In construing the latter only one question can arise; namely, What is its meaning? whilst in construing the former we are obliged not only to find out what is its meaning, but also whether this meaning is conformable to that standard which the people have declared to be the ultimate test of legality, that is, the "fundamental principles" of the Constitution. Without, however, relying at all upon this circumstance, and supposing that the language of the court is properly applicable to the construction of the Constitution, it is sufficient for our purpose that the meaning of the court has been misunderstood.

The question is, Did the court mean to be understood as saying that where the words of the Constitution are susceptible of two meanings, that meaning which is consistent with right must be always taken unless repelled by the context; even though the other meaning is the more common meaning of the words?

The people have declared their Constitution to be "the supreme law of the land." To be this it must necessarily be uniform. It must on the same subject mean one and the same thing for ever. A protective tariff cannot be constitutional now and unconstitutional ten years hence, or war constitutional now and the reverse centuries hence. If, therefore, in any case the meaning of the Constitution is to be determined by simple reference to that which is right and just, there must be a standard which will, at least as long as the Constitution may last, proclaim one and the same rule of right and justice, otherwise the Constitution must declare different rules at different times on the same subject, and consequently cease to be the supreme law. But there is not any such fixed standard; for (as we have already seen,) absolute right and justice, if attainable, is yet unattained on earth, and the standard of relative right and justice is continually changing. This interpretation of the meaning of the court really, therefore, makes the court declare that the Constitution is not the supreme law of the land. Not only this, but it makes the court go counter to its own acknowledged and well settled principle of law; namely, that courts consider only the legal standard of morality.

The courts constantly reject the idea that they are at liberty judicially to act upon any notions of right and justice which are not sanctioned by the fundamental laws of their respective countries. Thus Lord Stowell, (2 *Dodson's Adm. Rep.*, 247) speaking of the slave-trade, says:

"I must remember that in discussing this question I must consider it not according to any *private moral apprehensions* of my own, (if I entertained them ever so sincerely,) but as the *law* considers it." . . . (p. 249.) An act must be "*legally* criminal, because neither this court nor any other can carry its private apprehensions, independent of law, into its public judgments, on the quality of actions. It must conform to the judgment of the law upon that subject, and acting as a court, in the administration of law, it cannot attribute criminality to an act where the law imputes none. It must look to the *legal* standard of morality."

In the recent case of *Jones* vs. *Van Zandt*, 5 *Howard's Rep.*, 231, the Supreme Court was urged in the argument to disregard Act 4, Sect. 2, of the Constitution and the act of Congress in relation to fugitive slaves, on account of the "invalidity of all laws recognizing slavery or any right of property in man." But the court said —

"Whatever may be the theoretical opinions of any as to the expediency of some of those compromises, or of the right of property in persons which they recognize, this court has no alternative while they exist but to stand by the Constitution and laws with fidelity to their duties and their oaths. Their path is a strait and narrow one, to go where that Constitution and the laws lead and, not to break both by travelling without or beyond them."

It seems, therefore, clear that the interpretation of the meaning of the court in the case of *United States* vs. *Fisher* is incorrect.

We have seen that negro slavery legally existed in the Southern states up to the time of the adoption of their first constitutions. Consequently, unless abolished by these constitutions either expressly or by reasonable implication, it remained legally existing. It matters not whether its legality is asserted in these constitutions or not, or whether the subject of slavery is even alluded to or not. Unless these constitutions declared slavery to be unlawful it necessarily remained as lawful after their adoption as it was before.

It was not expressly abolished by either of them. Neither

was it impliedly abolished, since they all more or less recognized its existence.

The constitution of Virginia was adopted in 1776. Among other acts of misrule recited in the preamble, George the Third is charged with "prompting *our negroes* to rise in arms among us, those very negroes whom, by an inhuman use of his negative, he hath refused us permission to exclude by law."

But King George never refused permission to exclude free negroes. He only checked the attempts of Virginia to put a stop to the introduction of negro slaves. That he did this is undoubtedly true (3 *Banc. Hist.*, 415); consequently, if the negroes thus prompted to rise in rebellion were the "very negroes" whom the king would not suffer to be excluded, they were negro slaves and not free negroes whom the king incited to insurrection. By negroes, in this clause, we must therefore understand negro slaves, and read it accordingly.

Section 7 provides "that the right of suffrage in the election of members of both houses shall remain as exercised at present."

By the ordinance of the Convention, July, 1775, (9 *Hen. Stat.*, 54) the freeholders in the different countries by law properly qualified to vote for Burgesses enjoyed this right of suffrage, except in the County of Fincastle and District of West Augusta, in which places no one but a "free white man" could be an elector. The provincial act of 1769 (8 Ib., 307) defines the qualifications necessary to entitle a freeholder to vote for Burgesses. The fifth section of this act provides that not "any free negro, mulatto, or Indian, although such persons be freeholders, shall have a vote or be permitted to poll at any election of Burgesses, or capable of being elected." This section in the constitution, therefore, is to be construed as if it had in terms declared that no "free negro, mulatto, or Indian, although a freeholder, shall enjoy the right of suffrage." It therefore not only explicitly recognizes that some negroes were slaves, but also that even those who were free could not vote.

The writer before alluded to (p. 275,) refers to only one clause in this constitution. It is a very singular circumstance, but no such clause exists in the constitution. The writer quotes from a simple ordinance. (9 Ib., 127.) What makes the mistake more singular is the fact that the constitution really provides (Sect. 9) that the governor "shall not under any pretence exercise any power or prerogative by virtue of any law, statute, or custom of England;" whereas this ordinance

recognizes to some extent, at least, the common law of England. He also alludes to an article in the bill of rights which declares "that all men are by nature equally free," &c., and afterwards alluding to the similar clause in our bill of rights which provides that "all men are born free," &c., seems to ask why, if the latter clause has been held to be sufficient to abolish slavery in Massachusetts, (18 *Pick. Rep.*, 210) the former clause is not equally efficacious in Virginia. The answer is obvious: our constitution *nowhere* recognizes slavery. *All* its provisions accord with the noble principle in its bill of rights. No clause in the least degree limits or controls this principle. But with the Virginia constitution the case is different. Its declaration of rights starts with the enunciation of an equally noble principle, but the constitution declares that notwithstanding all negroes are by *nature* free, by *law* some of them shall be slaves; that notwithstanding negroes "cannot by compact" deprive themselves of the enjoyment of freedom, yet still their freedom may be kept from them legally without such compact. The clauses in the two declarations cannot be compared. One is unrestricted, the other is restricted almost into nothing. It hardly means as much as the clause in the same declaration which says, "that government *is or ought to be* instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people," &c.

A declaration of rights made by the representatives of the *freemen* of North Carolina was ratified Dec. 17th, 1776. It provides —

Sect. 8, "that no *freeman* shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by indictment, presentment, or impeachment;"

Sect. 9, "that no *freeman* shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court as heretofore used;"

Sect. 12, "that no *freeman* ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land;"

Sect. 13, "that every *freeman* restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy, to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the same if unlawful, and that such remedy ought not to be denied or delayed."

The constitution was adopted the next day, also, by the representatives "of the *freemen*" of the state. It provides—

Sect. 7, "that all *freemen* of the age of twenty-one years who have been inhabitants of any one county within the state twelve months immediately preceding the day of any election, and possessed of a freehold within the same county of fifty acres of land, for six months next before and at the day of election, shall be entitled to vote for a member of the Senate;"

Sect. 8, "that all *freemen* of the age of twenty-one years who have been inhabitants of any county within this state twelve months immediately preceding the day of any election, and shall have paid public taxes, shall be entitled to vote for members of the house of commons for the county in which he resides;"

Sect. 9, "that all persons possessed of a freehold in any town in this state having a right of representation, and also all *freemen* who have been inhabitants of any such town twelve months next before and at the day of election, and shall have paid public taxes, shall be entitled to vote for a member to represent such town in the house of commons," &c.

The twelfth section of the Declaration of Rights is obviously taken from Magna Charta, (c. 29,) which also begins, "no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned," &c. But the expression in Magna Charta has always been held as against his owner to exclude a villein slave. Without, however, relying at all on this circumstance, according to the rule of interpretation before stated, the word *freeman* in this constitution is to be understood according to its common meaning, the context not pointing clearly to its technical meaning. Consequently, by prescribing rules for one part of the inhabitants as freemen, the constitution recognizes another portion to be slaves. Still, however, we shall not rely at all on this rule. Section 40 is said to prove the technical to be the true meaning of the word *free* or *freeman*. This section reads thus: "Every foreigner who comes to settle in this state, having first taken an oath of allegiance to the same, may purchase or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate, and after one year's residence shall be deemed a *free citizen*." According to its technical meaning this word *free* or *freeman* is said to describe "citizens or persons possessed of franchises as distinguished from aliens or persons not possessed of the same franchises." In Section 40 it obviously cannot mean citizen, because it is used in connection with citizen, and the expression *citizen citizen* is without meaning. If it is urged that it signifies a person possessed of some franchises as distinguished from one

not possessed of them, we are at a loss, for the constitution nowhere tells us what these franchises are, the possession of which entitled a man to the appellation of free. We have no right to *surmise* "the right of suffrage and eligibility to office." But suppose these to be the franchises. It is evident that the word *freeman* did not mean a man entitled to the right of suffrage, because this right (Sections 7, 8, and 9,) was enjoyed only by that portion of the freemen which possessed certain qualifications as to residence, property, &c. If the word means a man eligible to office, we are again at a loss to know what office, the highest or the lowest, or all? But different, if not contradictory, qualifications are required for different offices. What are we to do? Suppose we understand by it eligibility to the senate or house of commons; these being offices for the choice of which the right of suffrage is most generally exercised. But the word does not signify eligibility to either of these offices. Section 5 provides that each senator shall own in his county "not less than three hundred acres of land in fee," and Section 6 provides that each member of the house shall own "in the county which he represents not less than one hundred acres of land in fee, or for the term of his own life." Now, if the word *freeman* signifies eligibility to the office of senator, it also means that the person owns in his county "not less than three hundred acres of land in fee." Putting this latter meaning in Section 7, it will speak of persons owning in their own county "not less than three hundred acres of land in fee," and who are "possessed of a freehold, within the same county, of fifty acres of land." But as the latter clause is evidently inconsistent with the former, the former cannot truly express the definition of a freeman. A similar result will be obtained if we consider the word *freeman* to mean a man eligible to the house of commons. The technical meaning of the word is, therefore, clearly repelled by the context, and the constitution, when truly interpreted, recognizes the existence of slavery.

The first constitution of South Carolina was adopted March 26th, 1776. In the preamble, among other grounds of complaint, it is alleged that the royal governors and others bearing the royal commission had "excited domestic insurrections, proclaimed freedom to servants and *slaves*, enticed or stolen them from and armed them against their masters." The same writer just alluded to states (p. 277,) that neither this constitution nor the one adopted in March, 1778, "contains a single

word attempting to legalize slavery, nor even any clause continuing in force the old colonial acts." Singular mistake! Section 29 provides "that the resolutions of this or any former congress of this colony and all laws now of force here (and not hereby altered,) shall so continue until altered or repealed by the legislature of this colony, unless where they are temporary, in which case they shall expire at the times respectively limited for their duration." But by the laws not only actually but legally in force at this time, negro slavery existed. Consequently, (these laws not being altered,) in virtue of this clause negro slavery is "continued" until abolished by the legislature.

Section 11, providing for the election of members to the general assembly, declares that "the qualifications of electors shall be the same as required by law," and "the qualification of the elected to be the same as mentioned in the election act, and construed to mean clear of debt." But by the provincial act of April 7th, 1759, (4 *Coop. Stat.*, 98, Sect. 1,) a "FREE *white* man and NO OTHER person," even though otherwise qualified, can be a voter. By Section 3, to entitle a man to a seat in the general assembly he is required to "have in this province a settled plantation or freehold estate of at least five hundred acres of land and *twenty slaves* over and above what he shall owe, or shall have in his own proper person and in his own right to the value of one thousand pounds proclamation money in houses, buildings," &c. Consequently this clause in the constitution is to be construed as if it declared in so many words that only *free* white men could vote, and that, to be a member of the assembly, a man must own *twenty slaves* or their equivalent in value, than which no recognition of slavery can be clearer.

The second constitution was adopted March 19th, 1778. By Section 13, a "free white man and no other person" can be an elector. This expression, "free white man," implies that some men were free who were not white, consequently the existence of free negroes. But if it implies the existence of some free negroes, it also implies the existence of some negro slaves. In confirmation of this, it should be noticed that the same expression is used in the provincial act of 1759 just alluded to, and in the same connection, that is, in defining the qualifications of voters. In this act, as we have seen, the word *free* is used as the opposite of *slave*. It is, however, urged, that the implication is equally strong that some white men were slaves. Be it so. We have not argued the legal question, but the fact

is undoubted that slaves exist at the South technically called negroes, who have as pure white complexion, straight hair, and blue eyes as any Northern woman possesses. From this class of slaves it is that many "*fancy*" girls of sixteen and eighteen years of age are culled for the New Orleans market! Judging from similar well-known historical facts, it is by no means impossible that some of the white slaves of South Carolina can trace their descent from a framer of this very constitution.*

Section 34 provides "that the resolutions of the late Congress of this State and all laws now of force here (and not hereby altered,) shall so continue until altered or repealed by the legislature of this State, unless where they are temporary, in which case they shall expire at the times respectively limited for their duration." This section has the same effect as Section 29 of the first constitution, and for the same reason, and consequently the laws establishing negro slavery are continued by this constitution until such time as they may be altered or repealed by the legislature.

The constitution of Georgia was adopted Feb. 5th, 1777. Section 9 provides that "all male *white* inhabitants of the age of twenty-one years, and possessed in his own right of ten pounds value, and liable to pay tax in this State, or being of any mechanic trade and shall have been resident six months in this State, shall have a right to vote at all elections for representatives or any other officers herein agreed to be chosen by the people at large," &c.

By this section all inhabitants not white are declared incapable of voting. The only reason which can be assigned for this denial of a right which in the preamble to this constitution is alluded to as one of the fundamental rights of a freeman, is because these persons were deemed unfit to enjoy the right. But why unfit? They are not excluded because of the presence or absence of any mental or moral qualities, but solely because they are not white. The difficulty lies in the color. This color may be in itself the impediment, or else it may imply a certain station or condition in society, which station or condition is the impediment. In itself alone it does not neces.

* Our friend Wendell Phillips, to whom we are indebted for several valuable suggestions, points out to us this case:— Salome Muller, the German woman whose suit for freedom on the ground of her not being of African blood excited so much interest some time since, has at last established her freedom in the New Orleans courts, and is now sueing John F. Miller for the freedom of her children. Notwithstanding *she was white, three* trials were had before she succeeded in proving her freedom!

sarily imply the presence or absence of any mental or moral qualities. We can see no reason for excluding a man solely because he is not white, if this circumstance does not prevent his standing in other respects on terms of perfect equality with whites. We can, however, see a reason for excluding a man on account of his color, if his color necessarily dooms him to a condition unfit to be the lot of a voter. Now this was precisely the state of things in Georgia. All the inhabitants who were not white were either negro or mulatto slaves or freemen. No slave is fit to be a voter; and the exclusion of free negroes in a slave state is obviously based upon the slavery of their fellows. We can see a reason for excluding minors, but for excluding all persons not white solely because they are not white, we can see no reason which is not based upon the fact of the existence of negro slavery. If this fact is not implied we cannot account for the provisions of this section. If it is, the provision and the reasons for it become clear. Therefore we say this section implies the existence of negro slavery.

In Section 11 the expression "*free* citizen" occurs. It seems unnecessary, however, to examine this section, for if the common meaning of the word is adopted, our argument on Section 9 is strengthened, whilst if the technical meaning is adopted, our reasoning is not affected at all.

Under the articles of confederation Congress had no power which was not *expressly* given (Act 2); consequently negro slavery could not be abolished, because no power to abolish it was thus expressly given. Neither was slavery abolished by the articles themselves. The fourth article reads thus: "The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the *free* inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of *free* citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitantsthere of respectively."

By this article inhabitants are divided into two classes, those who are free and those who are not free; consequently the article recognizes the slavery of some of them. The word "free" is not used in its technical sense. Without relying in the least upon the rule as stated by Judge Story, which obliges

us to take the common meaning of the word unless the context points clearly to the technical meaning, it is evident that the word is not used as synonymous with citizen, because in the same sentence it is used in connection with citizen. If we treat it as denoting a person possessing certain franchises, what these franchises are the articles of confederation nowhere tell us. If, as before, we surmise "the right of suffrage and the right of being elected to office" as franchises, the possession of one or both of which made a man free, then inasmuch as "paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice" by words of exception are classed with the free inhabitants, we are forced to the extraordinary but untrue conclusion that they enjoyed these rights. The articles of confederation, therefore, simply recognize the existence of slavery, without giving Congress the power either to control or abolish it.

This brings our examination to its last stage. We find that negro slavery legally existed in the Southern states at the time of the adoption of the federal constitution. How far, if at all, does this instrument support or countenance the institution?

Art. 1, Sect. 2. "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of *free* persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of *all other* persons."

By this section persons are divided into those who are free and those who are slaves; for to the whole number of *free* persons are to be added three fifths of *all other* persons, that is persons not free, or *slaves*. If we adopt the plain, obvious, and common meaning of the words as their true meaning, this conclusion is incontrovertible. The rule of interpretation just alluded to obliges us to adopt the common meaning. We will not, however, rely in the least on this rule, for the word "free" cannot be taken in its technical sense. Under the expression "free persons" are *included* those bound to service for a term of years, and therefore from it are excluded those bound to service for life. But slaves, as we shall see, are persons bound to service for life. Consequently, slaves are excluded from the class of free persons, and come under the designation "all other persons." By adopting the common meaning of the word *free* we can see a good reason for *expressly* including

among the free persons those bound to service for a term of years, because we may well say that such are not wholly free persons, and therefore, if not expressly included they might be excluded from the class of free persons. But if by free persons we understand "the native and naturalized citizens of the United States," we can see no reason whatever for saying any thing about persons bound to service, for nobody would imagine that a citizen became any less a citizen by being bound to service for a term of years. It is, however, objected, that "Indians not taxed," though not slaves, are excluded from the class of free persons, and therefore the word *free* is not used as opposed to *slave*. But the truth of our construction is confirmed rather than weakened by this circumstance. As Indians not taxed were not considered as citizens, (*Story's Comm.*, § 635) if by free persons we understand citizens, the express exclusion of Indians becomes mere waste of words, it being an express exclusion of them from a position they never occupied. On our construction, however, this express exclusion is necessary, because without it they would clearly have been deemed free persons. Though really free within the meaning of this clause, they were excluded because they were not regarded as citizens, or even as aliens, but rather as persons under a kind of guardianship, (5 *Pet. Rep.*, 17, 18) who would have nothing to do with the administration of the government.

This article, therefore, recognizes slavery as explicitly as if the word *slave* itself had been used, and gives, and was intended to give, to the free persons in a slave state, *solely because they are slave-holders*, a larger representation, and consequently greater political power than the same number of free persons in a free state.

Art. 1, Sect. 9: "The migration or *importation* of such *persons* as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten dollars for each person."

It is clear that this section recognizes a difference between the meaning of migration and importation, since, if both words mean the same thing, no reason whatever can be assigned why a tax is not permitted in both cases. This difference, what-

ever it is, must afford a good reason why persons imported may be taxed, and persons migrating not.

It is said that *migration* here means "simply the *going out* of persons from one of our own states or territories into another," and that *importation* is the "only word in the clause that applies to persons that were to *come into* the country from foreign nations." But this definition of migration is incorrect. Emigrants and immigrants are persons who migrate, and these expressions are and always have been applied to foreigners coming here by sea. The Declaration of Independence, when speaking of foreigners, charges the king with refusing to pass laws "to encourage their migration thither." The only definitions contained in Johnson and Walker's Dictionary (our edition is of 1834,) are "act of changing residence," "change of place," "removal;" all which expressions are equally appropriate in cases of arrivals here by sea or land. If this is the true meaning of the word, then no difference exists between it and importation as above defined. The latter is included in the former. Every case of importation of foreigners is necessarily a case of migration of foreigners. Accordingly, this section gives power to Congress to tax foreigners as persons imported, and at the same time takes the power away because the foreigner migrated hither. It is evident, therefore, that the meaning above given to importation (even if philologically allowable) is not that made use of in this section, because it inevitably leads to the conclusion that Congress has and does not have the power to tax the same individuals. The true meaning of the section seems obvious. A person who migrates does so of his own accord; he cannot be said to be migrated by any other person. He is wholly a free agent. A person who is imported does not import himself, but is imported by some other person. He is passive. The importer is the free agent, the person imported is not a free agent. Thus the slave laws of Virginia of 1748 and 1753, before quoted, begin — "all *persons* who have been or shall be *imported*," &c., &c., "*shall be* accounted and be *slaves*." Whenever we hear an importation spoken of, we instantly infer an importer, an *owner*, and *property* imported. This distinction between the meaning of the two words is then real. It affords a good reason for the restriction on the right to tax. Therefore, we say, it is the true distinction. On our construction, Congress had power to lay a tax on persons imported as property, or slaves, but had no right to tax free persons migrating.

By this clause, therefore, Congress was prevented during twenty years from prohibiting the foreign slave-trade with any state that pleased to allow it. But by Art. 1, Sect. 8, Congress had the general power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." Consequently the slave-trade was excepted from the operation of the general power, with a view to place the slave-trade, during twenty years, solely under the control of the slave states. It could not be wholly stopped so long as one state wished to continue it. It is a clear compromise in favor of slavery. True, the compromise was a temporary one, but it will be noticed that Congress, even after 1808, was not obliged to prohibit the trade, and in point of fact, until 1819 the laws of Congress authorized the states to sell into slavery, for their own benefit, negroes imported contrary to the laws of the United States! (*Act Congr.* 1807, c. 77, § 4, 6; 1818, c. 86, § 5 and 7; 10 *Wheat. Rep.*, 321, 322.) So difficult does it always become to stop when once we have disregarded our clearest notions of justice, when once we have declared that to be lawful which we felt to be morally wrong!

The same writer says, (p. 284,) "there is not the slightest implication that the Constitution assented in any way that any of the persons so introduced into the states should be held in a state of slavery." But by assenting to the trade in men wherever such trade was permitted by state laws, it assented to the trade in slaves, and also assented to that end, object, and purpose without which no trade can possibly exist; namely, the subsequent barter and sale of its objects; that is, it assented to the subsequent barter and sale of the slaves, and, consequently, their continuance in slavery.

Art. 4, Sect. 2: "No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof escaping into another shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

The time of holding not being limited, the expression here used must include not only persons held to service or labor for a term of years, but also those held to service or labor for life; consequently it includes those who are free persons within the meaning of Art. 1, Sect. 2, and slaves or persons held to service or labor for life.

That the expression "person held to service or labor" was

a correct definition of the condition of a slave at the time the Constitution was adopted, is evident. The sixth article of the Northwestern ordinance reads thus: "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; provided always, that any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original states, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid." In other words, the expression "a person from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed" so correctly described the condition of a slave, that Congress deemed it necessary to except such persons from the operation of an article relating only to slaves. In less than three months after the passage of this ordinance, this clause in the Constitution was drafted. It needs no argument to show that the expression in the Constitution means the same as that in the ordinance. "A person from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original states" means the same as "a person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof." If the former correctly described the condition of a slave, the latter did also. We can, however, see that the expression does properly describe the legal condition of a slave. A slave, though an article of property, has always and in every state been recognized as a person by being held criminally responsible for his acts. Thus the preamble to the act of South Carolina, (May 10th, 1740, 1 *Grimke's Laws*, 165,) which provides for the trial of *slaves*, recites that "natural justice forbids that any *person* of what condition soever should be condemned unheard;" and the act of Georgia of 1770, before quoted, provides for the trial of "slaves and *other persons*." The act of Virginia (1748, Sect. 15,) and North Carolina, (1741, Sect. 29,) before quoted, call runaway slaves *persons* in so many words. Similar laws might be cited if deemed necessary. A slave is also held to labor and service for life by law. Labor and service are the lot of every slave. "To *slave*" means "to toil." It is sometimes denied, but nevertheless it is true, that the law recognizes that labor and service are legally due from the slave to his master. Thus the act of North Carolina, (1741, Sect. 27,) before quoted, makes it a criminal offence to tempt or persuade a slave to leave his master's "service." "Service" is recognized as being legally due from a slave in Virginia. (Act 1691, 3 *Hen. Stat.*, 86, 87.)

The provincial assembly of South Carolina (Act 1740, Sect. 22,) provides "that if any person in this province shall on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, employ any slave in any work or labor, (works of absolute necessity and the necessary occasions of the family only excepted,) every person in such case offending shall forfeit the sum of five pounds current money for every slave they shall so work or labor." A similar law was passed in Georgia. (Act May 10th, 1770, Sect. 41.) These and similar laws, by providing that work and labor shall not be demanded of a slave on Sunday, recognize that on other days a master may legally demand them. That which may be legally demanded is legally due. Therefore work and labor, or service, are legally due from the slave to his master. To this labor and service the slave is held by the law. If he refuses to work, his master may coerce him. If he runs away, his master may pursue and retake him legally. He is held for life or until emancipated according to law. Consequently, the expression in the Constitution correctly describes the condition of a slave. Indeed, it more correctly describes this condition than "chattel personal" would, because it is the almost universal practice to treat a slave in many important particulars, such as dower, &c., like real property, and in some states slaves are declared by statute to be real estate.

By this section, therefore, it is provided that no person held as a slave in one state under the laws thereof escaping into another shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein be discharged from his slavery, but shall be delivered up on claim of his owner. The laws of one state, whether they support slavery or any other institution, have no power in another state. Consequently, if a slave escapes into a free state he becomes free. This is the general rule of law. In virtue of it thousands of slaves are now free on the soil of Canada. In virtue of it a fugitive slave from South Carolina would be free in this state were it not for this section in the Constitution. But this section declares that he shall not thereby become free, but shall be delivered up. Again, the Constitution makes an exception from a general rule of law in favor of slavery. It gives to slave-holders and slave laws a power which the general rule of law does not give. It enables a South Carolina slave-holder to drag from the soil of Massachusetts a person whom the general rule of law pronounces free, solely because South Carolina laws declare the contrary. It makes the whole Union a vast hunting-ground for slaves! There is not a single

spot from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the St. John's to the Rio Del Norte, or "wheresoever may be the fleeting boundary of this Republic," on which a fugitive slave may rest, and his owner may not in virtue of this clause claim and retake him as his slave!

The same writer suggests (p. 285,) that upon the "question whether there is any lawful slavery in any of the states, . . . this clause expresses no opinion." But the mere adoption of any clause evidently amounts to the assertion of the existence of every thing necessary to render the clause operative; otherwise we must admit that the people adopted a clause with the knowledge that it was to be wholly inoperative; consequently, the mere adoption of this clause amounts to the assertion that slavery legally existed in one or more of the states, because unless slavery did legally exist this clause would be inoperative. That negro slavery did thus legally exist in the Southern states we have already seen. On this legal slavery (if no other existed,) this clause operated, and what before the Constitution was adopted was merely state slavery, under the influence of this clause, to the extent just stated, became national slavery.

Act 1, Sect. 8: "Congress shall have power . . . to provide for calling forth the militia . . . to suppress *insurrections*."

Act 4, Sect. 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government; and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature or of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened,) against *domestic violence*."

All insurrections and *all* cases of domestic violence are here provided for. To constitute an insurrection within the meaning of the Constitution, there must be a rising against those laws which are recognized as such by the Constitution; and to make out a case of domestic violence the violence must be exerted against that right or power which is recognized by the Constitution as lawful. But we have seen that the Constitution admits that some persons are legally slaves; consequently, if these persons rise in rebellion or commit acts of violence contrary to the laws which hold them in slavery, their rising constitutes an insurrection. Such acts are acts of violence within the meaning of the Constitution, and consequently must be

suppressed by the national power. And what insurrections were more likely to happen and more to be dreaded than slave insurrections, and therefore more likely to have been provided for?

Slave *owners* are not the only slave *holders*. All persons who voluntarily assist or pledge themselves to assist in *holding* persons in slavery are slave *holders*. IN SOBER TRUTH, THEN, WE ARE A NATION OF SLAVE-HOLDERS! for we have bound our whole national strength to the slave-owners, to aid them, if necessary, in holding their slaves in subjection!

It is, however, urged that the Constitution requires all the states "to be republican," and that the existence of slavery is inconsistent with republicanism. By providing that "the United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government," the Constitution admits that every state in the Union then had a republican form of government, for to guarantee a certain form of government supposes an existing government of the form which is guaranteed. But four of these states (if no more) were slave states, consequently slavery may exist in a republic within the meaning given to that word by the Constitution.

It is also argued that the Constitution made citizens of all the people, and thereby annihilated slavery, for no citizen can be a slave. But the Constitution treats the Indian tribes as distinct independent political communities, and not as citizens. Congress entered into treaties with some of them before the adoption of the Constitution. By declaring (Act 6,) that "all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land," the Constitution adopts these treaties, and thereby declares the Indian tribes not to be citizens, for no government enters into a treaty with its citizens. (See, also, Art. 1, Sect. 8.) In like manner, by recognizing the existence of legal slavery the Constitution excludes those who are legally slaves from the class of citizens.

We here bring our examination to a close. We think we have proved *from the Constitution itself*, that the Constitution supports slavery. We might prove that its framers intended to make it just what we have described it to be, — that it was discussed and adopted as such in the conventions of the people, so far as the records of the doings of the conventions exist, — that our interpretation has been that uniformly ad-

hered to by all officers of the government, both executive and legislative, from the time the government came into being until now, — and finally, that such it has been adjudged to mean by that body which it has itself pointed out as the final arbiter of its meaning. But we prefer to pass these over wholly in silence, because it is constantly urged that we are obliged to go out of the Constitution to prove its support of slavery.

The result of "the compromises of the Constitution" has been such as might be expected. There is now less real love of freedom, not only in the nation at large but even in the free states, than there was before the Constitution was adopted.

The committee who reported to Congress "a plan for a temporary government of the Western Territory" was composed of three persons, of whom the majority, consisting of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Chase, were from Virginia and Maryland. This plan extended to all "the territory ceded or to be ceded by individual states to the United States." The following proviso was reported by the committee as applicable to all the territory: "that after the year 1800 of the Christian æra, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been convicted to have been personally guilty." Though involving a compromise in point of time, still this was a truly noble position. The entire extinction of slavery in all the Western Territory after 1800 was the object aimed at. Not even the recapture of runaway slaves was contemplated. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania (April 19th, 1784,) voted in favor of retaining the clause, Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina voted against it, and North Carolina was divided. Of the twenty-three delegates present, sixteen, including Mr. Jefferson, voted in favor, seven only against it. Thus two thirds of the states and delegates present, or two thirds of the entire nation, were desirous wholly to extinguish slavery in all the Western Territory after 1800. Such was the state of public opinion in 1784.*

* In 1785 it was the same. On the 16th of March it was moved and seconded that the following proposition be committed: — "That there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the states described in the resolve of Congress of the 23d of April, 1784, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been personally guilty; and that this regulation shall be an article of compact, and remain a fundamental principle of

The ordinance of 1787 was reported by a committee of five members, of whom the majority were from Virginia and South Carolina, and was adopted *unanimously* by the states present, including Delaware, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia. With the exception of Mr. Yates of New York, every delegate present voted in favor of its adoption. Unlike the resolve of 1784, the ordinance prohibited slavery *immediately*. This was an advance. But unlike that resolve *it provided for the return of runaway slaves*. This was a great compromise — the first great step in the downward path. It was the deliberate abandonment of a general rule of law in order to give greater security to slave property. True, the entire nation was united in favor of excluding slavery from what, *literally* speaking, was "the only territory to which at that time the confederacy had a joint title;" but only upon the condition that fugitive slaves should remain slaves and be delivered up. When afterwards the cessions of territory south of the Ohio were made, Congress not only did not take even this ground, but in 1790 actually accepted the cession made by North Carolina, upon this express condition, "that no regulations made or to be made by Congress shall *tend to emancipate slaves*." Where then was the spirit of liberty which in 1784 was ready to abolish slavery after 1800 in all the Western Territory. If in 1790 two thirds of the entire nation had been (as in 1784,) willing to extinguish slavery in the territory south of the Ohio, the act would have been done, and the condition proposed by North Carolina would have been rejected, because under the Constitution, unlike the Articles of Confederation, only two thirds of the Senate and Representatives are required in order to pass a law, even against the veto of the President.

But let us take the principle of the ordinance of 1787, and see how far it has been adhered to. Do we as a nation take the same stand which was taken in 1787? Do even the people of the free states take the same stand? We answer, no! In 1819 and 1820 the question of extending slavery into the new territory west of the Mississippi came up, and instead of the nation uniting in wholly excluding it or in excluding it upon the condition of the ordinance of 1787, another compromise was made. Though the people of the free states had a

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the constitutions between the thirteen original states, and each of the states described in the said resolve of the 23d of April, 1784." On the question of commitment, 8 states voted in favor and 4 against it. Of the 26 delegates present, 18 voted in favor to 8 against it.

decided majority in the House of Representatives, Congress, (March 2, 1820,) owing to the recreancy of *Massachusetts* men, refused to require Missouri to interdict slavery in its limits, by a vote of 27 to 15 in the Senate and 90 to 87 in the House of Representatives, and finally adopted what is called the Missouri Compromise line, without even a division in the Senate, and in the House by a vote of 134 to 42. Even this compromise seems not to have been adhered to, for by act of Congress, 1836, c. 86, the western boundary of Missouri was extended over what by the compromise was to be *for ever* considered *free territory*, and *not a word is said in the act about restricting slavery*, though in the act admitting Arkansas, passed at the same session, and approved only eight days after, the Missouri compromise is referred to. It may be said that it was not necessary to *expressly* exclude slavery or to refer to the compromise act. Not so did Congress think in 1802, in 1816, and in 1818—for the people of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, as a condition of admission into the Union, were *expressly* required to make constitutions so as to exclude slavery. Congress did not think it safe to rely upon the provision of the ordinance of 1787, although declared to be unalterable.

The *preservation of slavery* in Texas was openly avowed by our government as a prominent reason for annexation. The joint resolution for annexation disregards even the Missouri compromise, and simply excludes slavery from such new states as may with "the consent" of Texas be formed out of its territory north of the compromise line. But without the consent of Texas thus to create new states, slavery was not to be interdicted anywhere. This resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 27 to 25, and the House by a vote of 120 to 98.* A constitution was accordingly framed establishing slavery without any limitation, and Texas was admitted as a slave state by a vote of 31 to 13 in the Senate, and 141 to 56 in the House.

The Wilmot Proviso is copied from the ordinance of 1787, and not only is it evident that the slave states repudiate it, but as yet not even the representatives from the free states have been willing to support it as a fundamental principle not to be departed from. They have never shown themselves to be so thoroughly convinced that slavery is a curse as to be op-

* The joint resolution passed the House by a vote of 120 to 98. An amendment was adopted in the Senate, and, as amended, the resolution was ordered to a third reading by a vote of 27 to 25, and was finally passed without a division. The House concurred in the Senate amendment by a vote of 132 to 76.

posed under all circumstances to its extension. Even whilst we are writing it is a matter of serious debate in the Senate — not whether the ordinance of '87 shall be extended to the territory of Oregon, — not whether the existence of slavery shall be left to be decided by the people there, — *but whether the people shall not be explicitly prevented from excluding slavery!*

Delegates from every state represented in the Continental Congress (including all but Georgia) signed the non-importation agreement of 1774, by which they bound their constituents from and after Dec. 1st, 1774, wholly to discontinue the slave-trade, and neither to be concerned in it themselves nor hire their vessels nor sell their commodities or manufactures to those who were concerned in it. Their successors, the Congress of the United States, by the acts of 1807 and 1818, (and others might be cited,) permitted the sale of freemen into slavery, and seventy years afterwards admitted Florida into the Union with a constitution which provides that the general assembly shall have *no power to pass laws for "the emancipation of slaves,"* the House, by a vote of 87 to 76, *refusing* to require this clause to be stricken out!

Not one of these acts of national degradation could have been accomplished if only the people of the free states had remained loyal to the principle of freedom. That these acts have been consummated is evidence that the spirit of freedom has decayed even in the free states. We do not hesitate to attribute this decay to the demoralizing influence of the compromises of the Constitution. Our fathers thought that they might establish justice for themselves and injustice for the slaves; that they might secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity, and at the same time hold in slavery a portion of their fellow men. They did not see that to require an oath to support these compromises from members of Congress, the state legislatures and all the executive and judicial officers of the United States and the states would either prevent real lovers of liberty from holding all these offices, or would cause the love of liberty to lessen and in time to die out. How can a man whose whole soul is filled with abhorrence of slavery conscientiously take the oath to support the return of runaway slaves? He must either at the outset disregard his clear sense of right, or his standard of right must gradually become corrupted. If he takes the oath meaning to keep it, he means to do that which from his very soul he knows to be morally wrong. If he takes it meaning to disregard it, he simply commits per-

jury. The Constitution, therefore, requires a lover of liberty to act *immorally* as a qualification for all the offices of honor and trust — state and national! Is it to be wondered at that the result is what we have described? Would it not be a cause of surprise if the nation did not have less love of liberty now than it had sixty years ago?

In order that this love may not wholly die, it is necessary to put an end to the compromises which have caused it thus to languish. It is time for all those who really wish to establish justice and to secure the blessings of liberty to their posterity, to refuse on all occasions to take this oath, and openly to declare that they ought not and will not any longer support these compromises. We may and should yield a ready support to all clauses really intended "to establish justice," but to clauses intended to countenance or support slavery our answer and unalterable resolve should be, we will yield no support whatever, but will use all just and pacific means completely to nullify them. This advice may seem to some persons as no-governmentism. Such persons cannot see that almost every right of value is supported now by state laws. Neither can they see any power beyond the ballot-box, though the votes of the people are nothing but the expression of the sentiments of the people. They do not see that this popular sentiment may be regenerated by free and continual discussion, and as effectually, perhaps, by individual repudiation of these compromises. They smile when we assure them that "truth next unto God is almighty." But we are thankful that we have faith in Milton's words. If not abolished in blood, and we trust it never will be, we believe that slavery will be ended by means of a public sentiment which will disregard all dead paper barriers in its peaceful advance towards the accomplishment of its noble end — the freedom of millions! There *is* a good time coming. Tokens of its approach are visible in the rending of churches and parties. A determination to overthrow slavery, as unyielding as can be wished, is thoroughly aroused in a large minority of the people, and it needs not the gift of prophecy to foretell what must be the result. When this result is attained, universal annexation will be truly equivalent to universal good will and peace. Nations will ask admission into our confederacy, not as now for the sake of protecting the dying institution of slavery, but to add another to the band of states which will urge each other towards the most perfect practical development of the great principles of freedom.

Art. V. — APOLOGETICAL AND EXPLANATORY.

Some remarks in our last number in an article upon the "Causes and Prevention of Idiocy" seem to have been misunderstood, and to have been construed into a reproach of men whom we deem to be worthier than ourselves. We said, —

"There is yet another institution, by which the rich man uses the whip and spur of necessity, to make the poor always ready to work for him. He gathers together hundreds and thousands of men, women, and children, and matching their living muscles against his tireless machines, from the rising to the setting sun, and even far into the night, exacts of them an amount of physical labor, which, while it barely feeds and clothes their bodies, starves their souls."

Again, —

"We are not dealing with single cases of total idiocy, but with causes which lead to the moral idiocy of whole classes of men; and doubtless slavery as practised in this country, and the factory system as practised in England and elsewhere, do tend to brutalize and to make moral idiots of whole classes. The deep and damp gorges of the Alps do not more certainly produce goitres, cretinism, and idiocy, than do the factories and plantations of some refined and Christian gentlemen produce depravity, imbecility, and crime."

After stating some of the most cruel effects "of all work and no play" upon children, we said, —

"It is very probable that these and other like abuses have ceased since the evidences of them were obtained, for such monstrosities perish when dragged into the light of day; nevertheless, it is unquestionably true that even now, in Christian countries, a few men, for the unnecessary increase of their own wealth and luxury, do hold hundreds and thousands of operatives to such severe and ceaseless labor all day that their souls are virtually stunted, blighted, and killed."

Now, since some suppose we meant to say that such inhuman scenes as were brought to light in England and France a few years ago, do exist, or ever have existed in the factories of New England, we hasten to deny it. We have taken some pains, in our day, to ascertain by personal inquiries the moral and intellectual condition of the workmen and women in our factories. We undertook the task soon after seeing the wretched, starved, and degraded helots who toil on after the tireless steam-engine, in England, France, Germany, and whose sweat and blood, whose hunger and nakedness, whose ignorance and vice, were brought vividly to mind by every piece of silk or linen, of cotton or woollen goods that met our sight. Every beautiful dress of calico or *de laine* recalled the squalid creatures whose lean fingers had worked at its texture; the polish of cutlery was dimmed by the sweat of the boys who had handled it at the furnace; the genial warmth of coal could not dispel a shudder at the thought of the begrimed girls who had dragged it along from its bed; and the

beauty and the usefulness, the abundance and cheapness of all manufactured articles seemed overpaid a thousand fold by the cost to the moral nature of whole classes which the *system* seemed necessarily to involve.

Great was our comfort upon finding how different was the bodily and mental condition of the youth in our factories from that of the overworked and underfed operatives in Europe; greater was our joy at learning how much the tidiness, the comfort, the enjoyment, the virtues even of the operatives were owing to the humanity and the care of their employers. Verily they deserve much and they get much; — far more than the increased *profit* derived from virtuous and intelligent agents; they get the satisfaction of believing they are doing good unto others while they are increasing their own stores. All honor to them for their motives; all credit to them for their partial success.

Thus much for apology — now for the explanation. The *system* is as bad here as it is abroad; the tendencies are the same; and the results are only less evil because of the character of the persons who started the enterprise, and the character of the workmen whom they were able to enlist. The upas tree planted in a virgin soil, and carefully watched, seems, as yet, fair to the eye, but the poison is still in its sap.

We hold that the existence in any community of a *working class*, — a class whose sole business is to do all the manual labor of society, — a class who must of necessity spend so much time in hewing wood and drawing water for those who will do neither, that none is left for the culture and exercise of their truly human nature, and for the development of their affections, tastes, and sentiments, — the existence of such a class is a great wrong and a crying sin.

He who, having already enough and to spare, exempts himself and his household from all *manual* labor whatever, and, in order to increase his store, employs his capital in the system of *competition*, and keeps hundreds of his fellow-men so hard at work from the rising to the setting sun that they cannot have a tithe or a hundredth of the mental culture which he prizes above all things for his own children, — he who does this, be whatever else he may, is not a Christian — loves not his neighbour as himself — does not as he would be done by.

All the talk about the employer working as hard as the laborers is worse than twaddle. He works with his brain, does he? — he has care, anxiety, forecast? Yes! truly, and too much of it! He may indeed be as tired as his workmen, because they have both worked awry, and both pay the penalty, one by an infirm body, the other by an infirm mind, and society is all out of joint in consequence. The master should have a little bodily toil, the workmen a little mental exercise, and the wear and tear to

mind and body would be less. As for the supposed necessity of division of labor, the one taking all the head work and no hand work, the other all hand work and no head work, it is entirely assumed; there is no authority for it in the constitution of man. Even if there were nothing to do in this world but to make material gain, the increased intelligence and virtue of workmen would more than counteract the withdrawal of part of the mental energy of the employer. Besides, with a fair share of hand work, the amount of head work that can be done is always greater.

There is a certain amount of hand work to be done in society, and if it were fairly distributed among all the members all would be healthier, happier, and richer. Until there is greater equality in this distribution there will be no peace on earth, that is certain. Every man who is doomed by necessity to labor at hard hand work the livelong day and every day, suffers a grievous and double wrong, — a wrong by that which he is made to do, and a wrong by that which he is prevented from doing. Every man who, to increase what is a sufficiency, so employs others, inflicts upon his brother a wrong — does not as he would be done by. Now it will be seen by this, that we mean that not only the rich manufacturer, but every one who needlessly makes others drudge their lives out upon scanty wages, does not live up to the doctrines of Christianity. We, all of us, all who are employers, are apt to sin this way.

This leads us to notice another complaint about what we said in our last respecting "*domestic servitude.*"

Perhaps we described extreme cases, perhaps we dealt too much in generalities, and did not make allowance enough for the many kind and generous employers. But, extreme cases illustrate the *tendencies* of the system, and though we are inclind to think that a pretty large class of employers are not open to the charge of heartlessness in the treatment of their domestics, further reflection convinces us that there is too much ground for our remarks.

If we look at the condition and relation of masters and mistresses and servants in what may be called two extremes of society in the North, it will appear that the term "domestic servitude" is a fitting one, and that the picture we drew of it is not too high colored. We mean those who have attained to what they consider the summit of fashion and social grandeur, and those who are just emerged from the condition of hand laborers themselves and have a hand laborer or two under them.

Catch, as by a daguerreotype, a view of one of each class. See an ultra fashionable lady, kneeling upon a velvet cushion in an ultra fashionable church, or partaking the holy sacrament of Him who washed his disciples' feet, — where are her servants? — beside her, or in the gallery even? No! the cook is at home preparing a luxurious dinner; the coachman, and the footman too,

it may be, are waiting in the street, waiting by the hour, in sunshine or storm, though the distance from home be but a furlong or two. Now look at that coachman or footman, and see peeping out in his dress the unchristian attempt to introduce into this land the cast-off trumpery of an old aristocracy; to mark and degrade the man as a menial, a serving man, by putting upon him a *livery!* It is true that only a few brainless asses or selfish egoists are thus sowing the wind for their children to reap the whirlwind, but those few are in a position, in some of our cities, to make weak people wish to imitate even their follies and sins.

Take, in the other extreme, the keeper of a small house, it may be a boarding house, for instance. Look at the lot of her woman of all work; see her toil and sweat, early and late, week in and week out; poorly fed; hardly lodged; miserably paid; as poor in purse at the end of the ten years of toil which have broken down her once vigorous frame as she was at the beginning of them;—remember that there are thousands and thousands of such, and say, were we wrong in asserting that *domestic servitude* exists among us in a dreadful form?

Art. VI.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

1.—*A Plea for Peasant Proprietors, &c.* By Wm. Thomas Thornton. London: J. Murray. 1848.

This is a good book, so far as it goes, upon a great question, written by a man of clear sight and right purpose, but of faint heart.

The subject is, the distribution of the face of the earth among the children of men, to whom God gave it to possess; and the timid and winding way in which the author approaches it, shows his lack of courage to grapple with the great wrong which prevails in all civilized countries. The very title contains matter for a sermon. "A Plea!"—that is, a *pleading*, an *apology;*—and for what?—for the right of the sons of God to possess, during their lives, enough of the surface of the earth to till and live upon; and for their right to their share in "the dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." A Plea! and for whom?—for the Peasants, the laborers, that is; not men wholly and entirely, but only a *plebes rustica*, whose business it is to hew the wood and draw the water of society; men set apart and appointed to do those things which the true homo, the *gentle man*, does not deign to do.

Looked upon from the highest *stand point* of humanity, regarded as a question of pure right and wrong, the subject matter of this book is not worth a moment's notice. There should be no *plea* for peasant proprietors, but a stern demand for the rights of man wherever, as in Ireland, for instance, they have been manifestly and grossly violated, and where men lie down and starve to death upon the bosom of that earth which is full of nourishment for them, if other men, full to fatness, would only let them draw that nourishment freely. We should not, in such extremities, stand hesitating about disturbing "vested rights," but maintain the prior right of humanity, vested in man at the creation; we should not bow reverently before a criminal institution because it is old, but denounce it as more wicked in proportion to the length of day that it has cumbered the earth and oppressed the race.

But this may not do, some will say; and Mr. Thornton is perhaps right after all. Nothing is done in nature by starts; there is a *vis inertiæ* which must be respected, even in a criminal institution. We must hit it gently at first, not break our heads against it; we must push steadily, until we get it fairly into motion, when we may knock and kick it down to perdition with all our might and main.

The author begins his PLEA by striving to show that small farms may be made more *productive* in proportion to their size than large ones; and this he does, we think even to the satisfaction of those matter-of-fact souls who will not esteem any thing as valuable products of agriculture except material and tangible corn and potatoes; who look into the barn and the cellar to count the gain of the peasant laborer; and who consider that by bread alone a man liveth. To such persons the attempt to show that men of any knowledge, working for themselves and their children upon their own little garden will make the aggregate material products of those gardens greater than they would if working as hirelings upon the grounds of a taskmaster, is very well; though to others it may seem like proving that three and two are more than two and two.

His chapter upon the effects of peasant proprietorship in France is very interesting; and his comparison of the condition of the agricultural class in the Channel Islands with that of the same class in England, Ireland, and Scotland, is most striking. Indeed, it would be conclusive of the whole argument if one could draw any certain conclusions upon these subjects from *facts* now or heretofore existing. The truth is, in the solution of a question of this kind, we must go back to first principles, because in no country are the people in such a condition as to show fairly what would be the result of giving to every head of a family his own vine and his own fig-tree. Most of the facts and circumstances which have been brought forward as arguments against the policy

of having a country divided into small farms, grow out of the ignorance of small farmers. When you remove this ignorance you remove the whole evil; and until you do remove it you will have the world bearing, as it does now, more of tares than wheat, more of hate than love, more of strife than mutual help. But surely the way to remove it is not to disfranchise men socially; to make of them tenants at will — hired laborers — hewers of wood and drawers of water.

That condition of life is best for man (for the whole nature of man,) which calls into action the greatest variety of faculties, affections, and sentiments that may be consistent with obtaining sufficiency of food and raiment; and that condition is worst for men which narrows down the exercise of their nature to a single point, and keeps them grinding needles, or sticking handles on to teacups, or hoeing corn, all their lives. He who takes from grown men all care and forethought, all cause of anxiety and responsibility, who feeds them, clothes them, houses them, and provides them with every thing they wish, requiring only in return that they work on thoughtlessly under his sole guidance, robs them of their birthright, dwarfs their natures, and makes of them slaves.

What said Jesus about him who went and buried his talent in a napkin? How much more indignantly would he condemn to outer darkness those who strive to wrap in napkins, to bury in the earth, to stifle and destroy, all the talent, all the energy, all the ambition, and all the emulation of whole classes of men?

In our view those European statesmen who, looking with single eye to the material productiveness of the earth, strive to centralize farming, to create great proprietors, and to keep the workmen in the condition of thoughtless, careless, and irresponsible hired laborers, differ only in degree, not in kind, from those who strive to perpetuate the doomed institution of negro slavery in our own land.

Where was the spiritual adviser of the Duchess of Sutherland when her legal adviser told her she might drive away thousands of small farmers from her broad lands, and cover them with flocks and herds whom a few stupid shepherds, their talents buried in napkins, could watch? Why did he not open to her Grace the laws of God, written everlastingly in man's nature, while the lawyer opened the laws of the land, written on paper that perisheth? Why did he not oppose to Blackstone, Christ; and to Political Economy, Christian Charity?

But the thought of the absolute necessity which man has for the whips and spurs of care, forethought, anxiety, and even necessity, in order to develop his nature and his capacities, and the peculiar fitness of agriculture, — of the ownership of a little land, to furnish all these, and likewise the noble spiritual harvest which follows them, — the thought of these things, we say, would

lead us into an essay longer than the book we were to notice. We close, therefore, abruptly, by introducing Mr. Thornton to our readers, as a most interesting and intelligent writer, and recommending his book to their notice. We take the liberty, also, to counsel him to write another book and follow up the same subject; not, however, to take his stand upon the loose sands of artificial society and tottering institutions, but to plant his feet upon the rock of truth, and thence proclaim Christ's doctrine of human brotherhood.

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2. — *Essays and Tales by John Sterling: with a Memoir of his Life.* By JULIUS CHARLES HARE. London. 1848.

JOHN STERLING, during his short life, was a valued ornament of the best literary circle, and the friend of Coleridge, Arnold, Carlyle, Mill, Hare, Tennyson, French, Maurice, and other noted scholars. He was the son of Edward Sterling, well known to politicians as "the thunderer of the Times," on account of certain powerful contributions to that newspaper. He was educated at Cambridge. To a fine literary talent he added extraordinary powers of conversation, a scholar devoted to the best books, a reader of Plato, of Æschylus, of Simonides; of Dante, Calderon, Montaigne, Leibnitz; and of Goethe, Schiller, and the criticism of modern Germany. He had also, what is rare in the brilliant society in which he lived, a military love of action, which carried him over that bound which a scholar can rarely pass without ridicule or ruin, and drew him into various resolutions of charity and patriotism; mixed him up with anti-slavery in St. Vincent's in the West Indies; made him the strenuous friend of public education; put him forward in a disastrous Spanish insurrection in 1830, which ended in the death of his friend, General Torrijos. The same conscience and desire to serve men led him to take orders in the church, though the progress of his mind, more than the state of his health, withdrew him from it afterwards. His hospitable mind was continually exploring books most distasteful to his countrymen, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Strauss, and the neology of Germany and the socialism of France. He had a great range of friends and correspondents. Whatever belonged to thought or religion was sure of his sympathy, and he loudly complained of the torpor of the English mind, whilst the real strength of the nation seemed to him to be all of the brute mechanic sort. "Think," he says, "if we had a dozen men to stand up for ideas, as Cobden and his friends do for machinery!"

The Essays indicate the ardor and activity of his mind; they embrace a range of interesting topics, and furnish often the best insight into the spiritual condition of England. Ill health made

him a traveller, and he learned, at least, from his journeys in other countries, to look at his own with some advantage. Of the Tales, "The Onyx Ring," from Blackwood, long since well known in this country, is the best.

In his last illness, Sterling appointed Mr. Carlyle and Mr. Hare his literary executors. Mr. Hare, in writing his biography, has wisely drawn it in great part from his letters. From Mr. Hare's commentary, it is easy to see how distasteful was the task, and how much praise he deserves for printing what he did. We must not be ungrateful for good meaning; but the heroic Sterling shows so ill in these faint and deprecating paragraphs, that every one will wonder at the silence of Mr. Hare's colleague, and regret that the greatest portraying hand of this age did not draw the picture.

> "For Lycidas is dead, — dead ere his prime,
> Young Lycidas, and hath not left his peer.
> Who would not sing for Lycidas? he knew
> Himself to sing, and build the lofty rhyme.
> — How well could I have spared for thee, young swain,
> Enough of such as for their bellies' sake
> Creep, and intrude, and climb into the fold."

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3. — *The Artist's Married Life, being that of Albert Dürer. Translated from the German of Leopold Schefer.* By Mrs. J. R. Stoddart. London. John Chapman. 1848. 16mo. pp. xx. and 226.

Albert Dürer is one of the most interesting artists that lived in an age full of vigorous life. The moral purity delineated in his numerous works attracts the student towards the man, while the wealth of ideas and exuberance of his fancy compel one to acknowledge in him a man of extraordinary powers. But he had not the most favorable opportunity for their development; Nuremburg was not Florence. The little that is known of his private life only excites a desire to know more. Frederick Campe published a little volume of Relics of Albert Dürer,* a few years ago, at a time when long deserved honors were paid him in his native city; several books have been printed treating of him or his works.†

It appears that at the age of twenty-four he was made the victim of a marriage got up between his own parents and those of a young woman of Nuremburg. Agnes, for that was the name

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* *Reliquien von Dürer.* Nürnb. 1828.

† Heller, *Leben und die Werke Dürers.* Vol. II. Leipzig, 1831: Vol. I. and III. have been announced. Roth, *Dürers* Leben. Leipzig. 1791.

of the unlucky wife, "gnawed into his heart," gave him no peace night or day, "and he accordingly wasted away to a skeleton,"— at least so writes Pirkheimer to the widow after Albert's death. This little volume paints the life of the ill-matched pair. Neither could understand the other, and they led a sad life of it. The novelist, of course, makes the blame rest mainly on poor Agnes, while all the suffering falls upon Albert. He also takes occasional liberties with facts, adapting them to his purpose. We know not how much of the tale is historical, but it is by no means certain that Albert's journey to the Netherlands was undertaken to escape from his wife, or without her knowledge.

Albert had studied in Italy four years, "and yet Whitsunday of the year 1494 he heard again the strike of the Nüremburg clock." His father takes him to the house of "the lively harp-player Hanns Frei, who also was an optician." "But among the most bewitching works in the heavenly workshops of the heathen god Sephästus" (we suppose our old *He*phästus (Ἡφαστος) is intended), "could no such living Miracle have stood as was to be seen in the house of *Hanns Frei* in the person of his daughter Agnes, a young Nüremburg Maiden of fifteen, who was playing on the Harp."

A marriage is agreed upon by the old folks:—

"*Albert* could not think of saying No to such a beautiful Creature as *Agnes*, nor yet could *Agnes* to him. She should have given him her Hand, but stood still like an immoveable Work of *Sephästus*. grave Bashfulness depicted in her nobly-formed Countenance. Her Father made a Sign to her;—without moving, she allowed the Youth of twenty-three to take her Hand, but she pressed his so suddenly and so vehemently, that he started, and gazed into the Eyes of the inexplicable Child. She sighed, her youthful Bosom stood upheaved from suppressed breathing, Tears streamed from her dark Eyelids; she disengaged herself and hastened away."

The marriage takes place on the festival of "the Seven Brothers," and in the church of St. Sebaldus; but during the hymn, Albert looked at the carved work of the altar, and the old stained glass in the windows, and greeted here and there some old friend of his youth. The minister preached a sermon from the text, "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers, for thereby some have entertained angels unawares." "The Bride gazed at her husband whom she ought to entertain *like* an angel; he smiled upon her whom he was to entertain *as* an angel, and the looks of both sank to the ground before each other."

After six weeks the father visits the son and says:—

"Now, my dear Son, how goes it? Well? Thou hast now become quite another Man; thou art now a Husband. Oh the Honeymoon! the Honeymoon! on it depends for ever the Happiness of Wedlock. If a *Jacob* serve seven Years for a *Rachel*, and again seven Years, still he only serves, still he only comes to know the Bride, but not the Wife. The Bride shows herself only as she would like to be seen, and so does the Bridegroom: there is

nothing then but soft talking, smiling, complaisance, feeling and giving Delight — a dreamlike Condition. Happy are they who thus die! yet it shall not so be, for they must live. But the Husband and Wife have dwelt and been educated in different Houses; they have acquired different habits and even many peculiarities, which have taken such deep root within them that they cannot be eradicated, and which they will carry about with them through Life. And now the Wife must learn the peculiarities of her Husband, and bear with him; and he in like manner with those of his Wife. And how is this effected? Nature places them in the School of Love, and in the midst of glowing Feelings and blissful Fascination she gently displays to each the habits and merits and manner of Existence of the other, accustoms him smilingly and imperceptibly to the Occupations, and even to taste and praise the favorite Dishes of the other, and to consider that which is foreign to his habits, and even repulsive to him, not only endurable but pleasant, for the sake of the Beloved. Each comes to the knowledge of all this during the blissful Dream of Love, takes it kindly, and blends himself therewith in that rosy time when all is forgiven — all, even if he were the child of a murderer. And this happy Fascination, this bewitching Captivity, lasts long enough to stamp the Nature of the one upon the other, half unconsciously, but to entire Satisfaction. Thus then they live placidly together and with a perfect Understanding, and love each other for their Faults as well as for their Virtues. Is it not so, my son? for Marriage is a beautiful Union, in which the Husband and Wife, having been joined for ever by Heaven, turn to the noblest Ends of humanity whatever there may be that is peculiar in the Heart and Mind of each, all finely blended together by Love.

. . . . . .

"But it was not so! Now was *the Artist's Married Life* begun; and the question arises, whether even the most loving Maiden can thoroughly understand him. She has a Lifetime in which to study him, as he has also to study himself and Life. All other Men are conceivable and penetrable in their Bearing, in their Mind; the Artist is a Flower which blooms from one Development into another as long as he lives. And if he shut up his blooming Heart, then he is dead. And his Works are stamina of the Flower evolved into Seed, which the Wind sows over the Earth, and bloweth — where it listeth. Therefore to be the Wife of such a one, Patience is needed, and nothing can nurse the Plant but the heavenly Patience of a faithful fostering Hand."

Then there was another maiden, Clara Pirkheimer, sister of Albert's friend Wilibald, one of those lovely, pensive maidens that steal away young hearts, but only to bless them. Albert and Clara loved one another, with a calm and holy affection which they dared not speak of, perhaps did not dare think of. But Clara goes to a nunnery, not till Albert had finished her portrait. Then the world became darker to the young artist. Then was nothing left for him but his art, and the sadness of his home cast a sullen shade even on that. They were poor, and Agnes grumbled at their poverty. She looked to his art to redeem all.

"But if he reckoned up all his prospects to *Agnes*, she only cast down her Eyes, or looked at him with doubting Looks, which made his whole Heart tumultuous within him. He was as certain of the thing as he was of his Life, and yet his own Wife discouraged him by her Doubts! His Mind revolted; all his future Works rose up within his Bosom like fiery Spirits; he felt himself raised by them above the Evils of this Life; he glowed, his Lips quivered, Tears flowed down his Cheeks — and *Agnes* stole away from him speechless but not convinced — and, as he also plainly saw, not to be convinced; she was

quite horror-struck, for she had never before so seen her gentle Husband so full of noble Power! so full of inward holy Wrath!

. . . . . .

"Master *Albert* now often dreamed and delayed whole Days; sat down, rose up, spoke to himself, drew with his Stick on the Sand, or began to make an Eye or a Nose with black Chalk; and then *Agnes* called him a Child, or thought that, dissatisfied with her, he held Converse with his own Soul. Or he walked up and down in the Garden, stood for a quarter of an hour at a time before the trunk of a Tree, and studied its wonderfully-bursting Bark. looked up to the Heavens and imprinted on his memory the forms of the Clouds; or he sat before the door, and called hither handsome Children, placed one quite in the Shade of the Roof, another only half, and made a third stand in the full Sunshine, that he might adjust for himself the colors of the dresses in Light and Shade; or he accosted old Men and Women, who came to him just as if they had been sent by God. Then *Agnes* called to him, and said peevishly: My God! why not rather work! thou knowest well, we need it.

"I do work, said *Albert*. My picture is ready.

. . . . . .

"Internal Images now appeared to his Mind, as if induced by constant Devotion, and disclosed to his sight how the Crocus appearing out of the Earth, tears its little delicate white Child's Shirt; and then the Master glowed like a vessel full of molten Gold, liquified and pure for the casting; so that he trembled, knew nothing more of the World, and what was revealed to him he transferred to the tablet with inspired haste: — then came *Agnes* and called to him two or three times, always louder and louder, about some Trifle. He then sprang up, neither knowing where he had been or where he now was; the portals of the Spiritual Kingdom closed suddenly, and the only half conjured-up Images sank back into Night, and into Spiritual Death, and perhaps never returned to him, — ah! never thus again. Then he recognized *Agnes*. who angry at his demeanour, stood before him and scolded him deaf and blind. Then his blood was like to a Spring Flood; he seized the Charm-dispelling Disturber violently by the arm — and held her thus till he awoke. Then he said, ashamed, Is it thou my Wife? I was not here just now! not with thee! Forgive me! To vex even a Child is more inhuman than to see and paint all the Angels, and to hear them and one's self praised, is desirable. Thou also livest in a beautiful World — and that the Sun and Moon shine upon it, that makes it none the worse! Where thou art, where I am, with Soul and Feeling yea with Fancy and her Works, that is to me the true, the holy World! And now he smiled and asked her mildly: What dost thou want with me then, my Child? But his Eyes flashed.

"She, however, believed that she had looked upon a Demon! a Conjuror of Spirits! She examined the red mark on her arm, where he had seized her; Tears gushed from her Eyes; she bowed down and lamented: Ah! I know it, I have it always in my mind — thou wilt certainly one day murder me! Every time I go to bed, I pray that I may not perish in my Sins, when thou again art as thou art now! when I am nothing to thee!"

With such a spirit in the house nothing went well.

"The faithful modest *Susanna* ate with them at Table. First of all, that was an Offence. But *Albert* also spoke with her when he was alone. There was nothing more painful to him, than, in a House where only two or three live together, to force one's self to be silent out of mere Haughtiness, and to treat the Servants, whether male or female, as Mutes, who are yet Human Beings like ourselves; for nothing makes us more contemptible in the eyes of others, than when they dare not talk to us because we seem to despise them, and do really despise them. Now *Agnes* suspected, when he broke off a Conversation with *Susanna* whenever she entered, that it had been about her: therefore she

must be dismissed from the House. He would not agree to it. Then came still more evil times; and at last he was obliged to let her go, because a Wretch seduced the poor young Creature. And secretly to protect her from want — that was dangerous: therefore he must see the poor Girl with her Child go about begging — and he actually saw it — but with secret Tears and Sighs."

Once Albert warned a young artist against marriage.

"From this Warning *Agnes* concluded that *Albert* was dissatisfied with his own Marriage, and she remained whole days in the house of her Parents. He went for her in the evenings — to avoid the risk of her not returning at all! When Husband and Wife weigh every word before it is uttered, then there is scarcely any more free Intercourse, and the Restraint must be doubled."

But in due time,

"*A little Agnes*, who now appeared, gave to *Albert's* Wife the Radiance, yea the Glory of the Mother. Thus the Deity continued to bless her! *Agnes* was the sacred Instrument in His Hands, and the most mysterious, the most divine Powers of old Nature were thus granted to her as it were in Fief. *Albert* being now filled with Reverence, Rapture, Satisfaction, and Thankfulness, all was well, better than ever, and his Love was now nobly founded, and hers *justified*, if not more.

. . . . . .

"Therefore *Albert* prized the little creature as a rich Blessing from his Heavenly Father. Be ye hospitable, said he to himself, as thereby some have entertained Angels. And by these words he was transported back in thought to the day when he stood in the Church, and the Maiden *Agnes* stood beside him, and now in fancy he put the little *Agnes* into her arms, and the Bride stood — as a Mother! All that had afterwards taken place seemed to him then as a thing of the Past; and the Softness with which his heart overflowed was reflected backwards, and warmed the long days, in which in strange lands he had languished in vain for such Happiness — also those in which he had been so cool to the Mother of his little Daughter. From this time forth he determined always to look upon her as the Mother, even if the Child ——

"He did not finish the Thought, but silently supplicated Heaven to spare its Life.

. . . . . .

"The Child was as like her Father as if he had become little again, and a Girl; and he remarked to *Agnes* in thoughtless sport, how much trouble she had with him, how much she loved and kissed and caressed *him*, and took pleasure in toying with him.

"Therefore the Child got no more Kisses from her in his presence, and at last *Susanna* had it always in her lap.

. . . . . .

"But the Feelings of Children are inconceivably delicate and just. Little *Agnes* soon saw how unhappy her Father was in his Home, how little he was valued. *Albert* had perceived and learnt, from her own Mouth, how much it grieved the loving little One to see him so ill used. He saw it also in her soft blue Eyes. But he saw it meekly and silently.

"When *Albert* visited a Friend one day, against the inclinations of *Agnes*, who feared that he might perhaps complain of her, and thereby make public what appeared to her quite allowable in private — and came home late, that she might not be awake, and yet found her keeping watch with the Child, who had waited for her Father that she might go to bed with him — then the Mother scolded him and called him a Waster of Time and Money — a Man addicted to worldly Pleasures, while she toiled away for ever in secret at Home, and had never had a single happy Hour with him.

"Thereupon he sat down, and closed his Eyes; but Tears may have secretly

gushed from under his Eyelids. Then the Child sighed, pressed him and kissed him, but said at the same time to her Mother in childish Anger: Thou wilt one day bring down my Father to the Grave! then thou wilt repent it. Everybody says so.

"The Mother wished to tear her from his arms. But he hindered her, wishing to punish *his* Child himself. These were the first blows he had ever given her. The Child stood trembling and motionless. — Do not beat her on my account! certainly not on my account! exclaimed *Agnes*, thus indirectly irritating him still more. The Father however struck. But in the midst of the Sadness and at the same time of the Anger which his Sufferings caused him, he observed at length for the first time that his little Daughter had turned round between his knees, and that he had struck her with a rough hand on the stomach! He was horror-struck: he staggered away, threw himself upon his Bed and wept — wept quite inconsolably. But the Child came after him, stood for a long time in silence, then seized his hand, and besought him thus: My Father, do not be angry! I shall so soon be well again. My Mother says thou hast done right. Come, let me pray and go to bed. I have only waited for thee. Now the little Sand-man comes to close my Eyes. Come, take me to thee; I will certainly for the future remain silent, as thou dost! Hearest thou? art thou asleep? dear Father!"

The child was not long spared them.

"The Father laid all the Child's Playthings into the Coffin with her — that he and her Mother might never more be reminded of her by them — the little Gods, the Angels, the little Lamb, the little Coat for the Snow-king, and the little golden Pots and Plates. Over the whole, Moss and Rose-leaves. Thereon was she now bedded. Thus she lay, her Countenance white and pure, for the mark, the purple Cross, had disappeared with the Blood from her Cheeks. And now for the first time she had on the white Frock, and the golden Hood encircled her little Head, but not so close as to prevent a Lock of her Hair escaping from beneath."

Matters became worse and worse.

"An unamiable Wife does infinite harm, when by her conduct she makes all other Women distasteful to her husband. For the Wife is the Husband's Glass, through which he contemplates the World; she is the Tuning-hammer of his Soul. But she does him still greater harm when she makes others dear to him; that is to say, when we learn to feel and observe as it were to the Glory of God, that He has made a fair and excellent Work when he created Eve out of a rib of her Husband, and now freely repeats the Work, as countlessly as the Sand of the Sea."

Albert was called to paint the deceased wife of his friend Pirkheimer. "He desired to have a picture of her thus: himself weeping at the foot of the Bed, — Crescenzia his wife, receiving extreme Unction, and holding a wax Taper and the Crucifix. At the Bed was to be standing also his Sister, the Nun of Santa Clara."

"*Clara* was sitting in the Parlour. She was unveiled, patiently awaiting him, and greeted him softly with a smile, and a delicate Blush — for Virgin Modesty *why* she was there — was only perceptible because she looked so very pale. When she saw however how — *Years* had gnawed on him — and a Woman sees at a Glance, as the Gardener sees by the Fruit how the tree is flourishing, the Fruit of his past Life, yea the Soul of Man in his Countenance — then her features assumed the sadness which he needed for the Scene! A

difficult Picture! But his Soul held the Colours. He thought not: If this sweet form, this gentle *Clara* were thy *Agnes!* — Ah no! he scarcely thought, If thy *Agnes* were like her! For his Father's Will was sacred to him, and sacred — her he loved; for it was because he loved, that he now suffered! and because she *would* not love him that she suffered!

"He finished the Tablet, which was destined for the Church of *St. Sebaldus*, in his own house, and wrote thereon the Latin Inscription in gilt letters. *Agnes* stood and looked at it, and made out the beginning: *Mulieri incomparabili* — then asked what all the rest of the words meant? *Albert* wished to be silent; but, after composing himself, he said to her, They are — "To the incomparable Woman and Wife, my *Clara Crescenzia*, I, *Wilibald Pirkheimer*, her Husband, whom she never disturbed but by her Death, erect this Monument."

Albert now leaves his home. He goes to Venice — his works had reached even to that city, "and it appeared strange to the *Italians* that every thing good and beautiful was no longer to come from Rome and Byzantium." "What he had desired amidst Sufferings and Sorrow, lying on his couch in Silence and in Darkness, and afterwards accomplished in his lonely Chamber, as if for no one but himself, now shone in the Sunshine of the Distance and gave Delight to Man. Thus he looked upon his own Works with Thankfulness and stood before them with folded hands." "For the mind of man is wonderfully and almost laughably formed; and it is also modestly limited in its desires. For all his lifelong Difficulties and Vexations he desires only Recognition, not so much as Praise." "And therefore is the small satisfaction not contemptible; for the Work which the Lord has dealt out to the Human Race is performed everywhere with fidelity, but in truth through *Recognition* alone — and without Reward, for it yields *only Consciousness*, and that is enough for such a noble creature as Man. He labors in his Father's Vineyard and is his Child."

Great honors awaited Albert in Italy. Bellino wanted his pencil, Marc Antonio Raimondi counterfeited his engravings, Mantegna wrote on his death-bed to see him, and the young Raphael admired him. When he returned home to his wife, "he gave her an account — of his Expenses." By and by through his success he grew rich. But wealth and honors brought no satisfaction to Albert.

"He who has known a deep and bitter Grief, need no longer strive after Happiness, but only after Peace, after inward Composure and Forgetfulness; else he heaps up to himself Sorrow on Sorrow; and even if he should attain to what seems the Crown of Happiness, yet the Jewel is wanting thereto, the ornamental Stone — in the Cross! Therefore lifelong Meekness must be the Portion of him whose Heart is broken! also reverential Resignation to Him who has ordained it for him. In Piety alone is constant satisfaction to be found. And it is God who has given him this also, and with it all things."

At length Albert's mother died.

"She had lived nine years in her Son's House, and he missed her sadly; for he had only to look into her Eyes, only to hear an encouraging Word from

her — 'My Son!' — and he was refreshed and meek as before. Her Eyes were now closed — what could he have done? A Man is no Judge between his Mother and his Wife; and where Love does not reconcile, all other attempts only increase the Evil."

He journeyed to the low countries and his wife went with him, yet wondered why her husband was everywhere so much honored. Margaret, the consort of Charles V. and daughter of the Emperor Maximilian, sends for Agnes to see her.

"You are our dear Mistress *Agnes*, said she to her, for you know how to value an Artist, so as to benefit him and the World. An Artist's Marriage is, it is true, only that of a Man, and the Wife is the Husband's Help and Comfort, whatever be his calling or station. And every Husband stands in need of Encouragement, of Cheerfulness, of Peace in his Home, to enable him to bear what Life brings with it, and still to preserve the power of working for the benefit of Mankind. Cheerfulness gives the highest Power to do, and to endure, my beautiful Angel. But if he find a gloomy Countenance at Home, where formerly his smiling Wife sat; if he hear nothing, or a Murmur, from whence formerly sweet Words penetrated his Heart; if he feel better and happier elsewhere than in his own Home, then Good-night to Peace, Good-night to Marriage. When Husbands remain out of their own Houses as often as possible during the Day, and as long as possible during the Evening, seeking for Happiness elsewhere, then that is a sign that Marriage is good for nothing to the Man, or to the Wife, or to both together. For had one of them been mild and reasonable, patient and firm; and the other only yielding and willing to receive instruction; then both might have found Happiness and held it fast. Friendship, even with the Friends of our Youth, must be very much limited in Marriage — for the Wife is the Husband's best Friend. And to every one his own. Only the disappointed have recourse to their old Friends again. But your *Albert*, dear, beautiful *Agnes*, remains kindly at Home, as I hear, and throws no false colour on you, but the true one — on himself."

Albert embraced the reformed religion — at least he praised the new creed in general, and Agnes thought he adhered to it "in order that divorce might be open to him," for Luther had excluded marriage from the sacraments. At length Albert resolves to go away from his wife and leave her utterly — but to go away "magnanimously, yea, prodigally."

"Love likes to boast great things, likes to play the Queen, to appear rich, all-sacrificing, divinely joyful — and yet weeps quite humanly. And this justly. Love is sufficient to itself: what it gives, it receives again a thousand-fold as if from God; what it must do without, it enjoys a thousand-fold, by having a dreamy, soulful, sympathetic perception of the Enjoyment of the beloved object. Rare Power! Miracle of Nature — so natural to him who bears it in his Heart! The World is worth nothing to him who has this Power; but he who has it not, cannot attain it if he would give the whole World for it — not for his own Existence; — or rather, he does not believe that he could purchase it therewith, because he dare not venture to throw his Existence away for such unwonted Gain. Yet let it be understood: *Albert* left everything to his beloved *Agnes;* he counted the Gold — there were six thousand Florins; he looked over the Engravings, the Pictures — he left them to her. But he left to her also, a more precious than all — namely, herself; and, in her, his Existence, his Mind, his Love, which he regarded as nothing, just because she regarded them as nothing.

. . . . . .

"As the young Branches of the Vine with their green Tendrils often attain no Object around which to entwine themselves, and so bend back: thus many of *Albert's* Feelings had not reached *Agnes*: as however in Autumn the Vine-dresser breaks off also the firmly fixed and now dried up Tendrils of the Branch, so he intended to tear himself loose. *His separation had already lasted so long!* But it was only after many Years and with Pain, that his Thoughts and Feelings could be severed from her. For that which appears visibly in the World as a Work, or as a Deed, must all — long, long before — have existed and been ripening; and what in like manner the World sees of Undertakings are all Fruits which have fallen from the Tree of Life: — for the rest, the World perceives nothing but Leaves, and hears the rustling thereof! Things bloom concealed — covered over, like the Fig, with its own leaf. Thus the Past comes to maturity only in the Present, and in the Present is sown the Seed of the Future. We often lose our Health for Years on account of a thousand little Errors; we die in consequence of living. Sickness is an exertion of Nature to heal us, to restore to its natural Proportion all that has been endured or done amiss, and to allow us to expiate it by Suffering, in order that we may become wise for the years that yet remain to us."

But though absent he was not satisfied.

"And thus to know how to live requires perpetual Genius — for Life is the highest of all Arts. Only no one believes this, because he fancies he knows how to live, as every one fancies he knows how to love, when he looks deep into the Eye of a beautiful Maiden. Alas! Love also is an Art — but it consists not in Raptures and Enthusiasm; it is not to wander in the Moonlight, to listen to the Song of the Nightingale, to kneel before the Beloved, to languish and pine for her Kiss! No; *this* is the Art of Love: — to preserve its Fire, its godly Treasure; to carry about its Riches through Life as if in pure Gold; to spend it for him alone to whom the Heart is devoted; to be always ready to sympathize, to smile, to weep, to assist, to counsel, to alleviate; in short, to live with the Beloved as he lives, and thus, by virtue of an indwelling Heavenly Power, to preserve invariably a Heavenward direction. And this Art is the highest, the tenderest Love. He who possesses it knows what Love is. The greater part of Men can sacrifice Hours and Days and Wealth; but to bear and to suffer patiently for Years, never to consider one's own Life and Wellbeing, to pine away gradually, to suffer Death in the Heart, and yet to hasten to the Arms of the Beloved as soon as they are again opened to us, and then to be happy, yea blest, as if nothing had been amiss, as if no time had elapsed between that moment and the first embrace, — all this Love can do. It now appeared to *Albert* that he and *Agnes* had only been fettered by some inconceivable Power. This conviction gave him Courage. He arrived at it now for the first time — alas! almost too late for *this* Life, and therefore he wished there had been a Life for Man *before* this, in order that he might again live peacefully, wisely, and happily; since every thing in the World and in the human Heart springs from Love — and no Man has thus any cause truly to grieve. For a noble Heart cares for nothing else than to be worthy of the Love of those whom he loves — and also worthy in general; and no one can tell him this so well as his own Heart, judging even from a thousand Actions. Thus *Albert* saw that even he ought now to be satisfied! and concluding, by his own Feelings, how his *Agnes* also must feel in her Heart, he attained to the Knowledge, that every thing is ordered by Love, and that we must improve the divinely-granted Time, by bestowing it one on another. This *Albert* now intended honestly to do towards *Agnes!*"

He went to visit Lucas of Leyden.

"He had thought it would be with him as with a shipwrecked Mariner, who, after having been long tossed about on the cold Waves till he is benumbed,

finds himself at last washed ashore on the flowery Bank of a lonely Island. But he now felt as if he had been washed by the Waves from the Shore out into the cold Sea! Nothing was awanting; every thing was arranged for him in a comfortable and friendly manner. Clean Linen lay every Morning spread out on his chair; his Clothes were brushed and free from every Speck of Dust; he rose, and went to sleep, whenever he liked; he looked at the People out of the Window; he went wherever he pleased. Oppressive Freedom! To every thing he was indifferent, all within him was so still and so monotonous! What was there here for him to love? To whom had he here every hour something to forgive? Who was there here to make him sorry? He felt the sweet Power of Custom even in what is most bitter! He felt that Words are nothing, however mild and reverential they may sound, if the Soul of Love does not glow and breathe upon us through them. And in *Agnes's* Words — which he now missed in his solitary condition — there was the Soul of a faithful Love, which was never weary in busying itself with him, in being angry at herself and at him, during the whole course of an irritable Existence! Ah! it was impossible for an indifferent Heart so to do — for it has neither the Will nor the Power to injure! And he loved her — therefore he could not be injured by her! And thus the feeling of *his* Love to her was quite enough for him, and Life without *her* difficult, much more difficult to bear! Ah! we love perhaps a lively Child, and think it impossible that our Love for it can increase! But it becomes sick — and we then know, for the first time, how much more intensely and also painfully we can love it! Then do new and more delicate Tendrils unfold themselves as it were in our Hearts, with which we encompass it as Ivy does a half-fallen Statue. And if *Agnes's* Love for him was of the most extraordinary kind, still she loved him for all that! That was the chief point. Her Love was like the warm Sunbeam, shining in the Window of a Dome through a fiery-red Ruby Glass, which, corroded by damp, reflects with its own also the varied hues of the Rainbow. And — Caprice is never without a Cause, and may not that cause be Disease? And does not Disease call for pity? Alas! this, then, was what he could no longer endure! And was that just? It is the greatest, the most injurious Wrong, not to believe in Nature?

"Here, far away from her, he had intended to work — at so many things, and so busily! But his Thoughts were far away with her — banished to her! Yet when he was with her, when she was wandering around him, then they could rove in the distance, could dwell where Thoughts and Images appear as in a Heavenly Dome full of Music and Incense, from which the Artist steals them as it were for the Earth. Here, dwelling in *Leyden*, his Sadness increased; he felt he could not be so happy anywhere as near his Wife; yea, that it was only when he was with her that he was truly happy. There are Conditions in which the Endurable, the Imperfect is the best possible for us; and the Human Race is continually subjected to such a Condition. Do we desire a better or happier Fate? God forbid! Every thing that is *ours* is the best for us; for we choose perhaps our own Lot; but what we have chosen keeps us enclosed as in Walls of Steel all our lives — and for as much better as the Untried appears to us, still we can never attain to it, because we ourselves are already become Property. Let us therefore endure! let us be faithful!

"He was now in a condition to perceive wherein he also had erred! And Man never attains Tranquillity, as long as he believes that he is right in all his Thoughts and Actions towards all the World! But as soon as he begins to doubt, as soon as he once admits the pre-supposition that he may have gone astray — that he must take himself to task — then come Reconciliation with the World, Contentment and Peace, and with recognition of the Truth, and acknowledgment of his own Error, come also at last by degrees Satisfaction and Happiness to his Heart, which always speaks Truth to the Upright."

So Albert journeys homeward. "It was on the evening of *St. John's* day that *Albert* arrived at the fruitful fields near Nüremberg."

"*Albert* intended to wait for the Twilight. His Thoughts swarmed forth, like Bees out of a Hive, when borne home from a strange Pasturage; they hovered around Flowers, blooming Linden-Trees, and golden Clouds, and his Soul began to muse, as in the first bright season of Youth. He ascended a Hill close by, from which he had a View of the Road. The Lindens towered aloft; the well-known Stone-bench was concealed by the waving Corn, in which the note of the Quail was heard. He now advanced. His Heart beat; he saw two Females sitting, one leaning to the right and the other to the left. He approached softly — they slept! The one in the golden Hood and the blue Dress was — his *Agnes!* The other, in the simple white Dress and Veil, on which shone the rosy lustre of the setting Sun — was *Clara!*

"Both had come out to meet him. *Agnes* wished, perhaps, by the presence of the other, to moderate *Albert's* Tears, or her own Words, and to shew him at the same time that she was reconciled, that she was tolerant, that she would endure and love, what he did not hate!

"He stood, and gazed upon them both in silence. What a Sight! What Thoughts!

"They did not awake, nor did he wish to wake them. He sat down at last between them, looked and mused, and, wearied as he was, he also fell into a Slumber.

"When he awoke, he perceived that his Head was resting gently on *Clara's* Shoulder — for the golden Hood to the left was gone. *Agnes* had waked first; she had seen him then in that position, in which he had found himself, resting — on her Friend, not on her — she had thought — Ah! she was gone! The saffron haze of Evening was now broad and faint on the Horizon — therefore she must have been long gone — Poor Soul! said he aloud!

"*Clara* awoke. Poor Soul? asked she, rising; was it not *Albert's* voice that spoke thus? — He took her Hand. She missed *Agnes*, then held her Hand before her Eyes, and again leaning back, said for the second time with a low voice: Poor Soul! And yet this also is a holy Evening, for here is an Angel! thought he, looking up thankfully towards Heaven. *Albert's* House was closed. They now went silently wandering side by side towards the City. *Clara* did not raise her Eyes. He accompanied her home to *Pirkheimer's* House; the door was opened, and she entered in silence. For the poor Soul could not say Good-night to him *now;* the words died upon her lips. But the old sad Smile was again seen upon his Countenance.

"He then returned to his own House, and looked for a time at some Children, who were catching Glow-worms. The door then opened. *Susanna*, who did not observe him sitting on the seat, went past to draw water. He then stole away to his own room, and went quietly to bed with an Evening Hymn on his lips.

"Art thou still asleep? said *Agnes* to him in the Morning on entering. She sat down near him on the bed, and held his hand, Indifference in her Features, but he felt that in reality her agitation was extreme. Breakfast is ready, she then said to him, with a faint smile. She contemplated her pale, emaciated Husband — then was heard the sound of the Death-worm picking in the wood of the bed; she became deadly pale, put her hand on her Heart, and scarcely breathed — the Worm went on picking. She then gravely arose, and went from him with an averted Countenance."

But the end of sufferings and expectations drew on. Albert waned slowly away, and the poor Nun of *Santa Clara*, who had been the one star of his life — though, alas, such a lone and distant star, grew pale from sympathy, and went down to her home. Albert lay on his death-bed.

"*Agnes* scarcely ventured to approach him: she shewed as much forbearance as to allow him to die in Peace, instead of grieving him once more by the

remembrance of all his Sufferings, which the sight of her would have called forth. She knelt at his Bed, concealing her Head. He, however, lifted his Hand, laid it on her Head, and said with a faltering Voice: Follow thou me! thou wert good — I have entertained an Angel.

"No! I have! sobbed *Agnes*, and I knew it not, I believed it not!

"There thou wilt see into my Heart! said he; how I always told thee; I was not gentle, not good enough — for I suffered, for I was full of Love. . .

"He expired with the word 'Love' upon his Lips. The Flutes sounded on, and it seemed as if their Tones accompanied his Soul to Heaven. In the Churchyard of *St. John* rests all that was mortal of him.

"Strew Flowers over him, oh Wanderer!"

New Translation of Dante.

Dr. John Carlyle is publishing, in London and in New York, a translation of Dante's *Inferno* into English prose. Dr. Carlyle brings rare qualifications to the task, and having, in a residence of six or seven years in Italy, devoted himself to the study of Dante, is probably better acquainted with the *Divine Comedy* than any man living. He has collated with great care his text from all the best editions. The Italian text stands above, the version below, with a few indispensable notes at the bottom of the page. We are not ungrateful to Cary, who has been our English helper so long, and whom we esteem for spirit, conciseness, and accuracy, the best of metrical translators; but it is very certain that all the tribe of English metrical versions of the great poets, the miserable Potters and Franklins and Wests, who have lulled their dulness by the august names of Æschylus, and Sophocles, and Pindar, must give place to exact versions word for word, without rhyme or metre. So only can the real curiosity of the student be satisfied. Dr. Carlyle is no careless workman, but has executed his task with a biblical fidelity, selecting his phrase with scrupulous judgment, and italicizing every word added in English to complete the abstemious sentence of the author.

We assure the book a warm welcome in this country, where we have long observed, as a good sign of the times, the increasing study of Dante.

THE EDITORS' NOTE TO THE READERS.

In completing our first volume we wish to say to the Public at large and our Readers in special, that our work has found more readers and more favor than we anticipated; but, at the same time, we confess that we have labored under some difficulties not likely to continue, or even recur. Only a small number of persons were certainly pledged to contribute to the journal, — and some of them failed us, — for we trusted that readable and noteworthy matter would flow in to us in sufficient quantity. In this case we have been a little disappointed, and so the labor of writing has fallen upon few hands, and

accordingly our pages have presented less variety than we wished, and even promised. Besides this, which is the fortune of most journals at their commencement, the Senior Editor has been absent from America ever since the work began. He has now returned, and will of course contribute to its columns. Other and competent persons have also promised us their aid. We think that we have seen our worst times, and shall commence the new volume with better hopes, and, we trust, with more strength.

LIST OF NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

Lectures on Shakespeare. By H. N. Hudson. In two volumes. New York: 1848. 12mo.

On the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age; being four Lectures delivered at Edinburgh and Glasgow in January, 1848. By J. D. Morell, A. M. 1 vol. 8vo. London: 1848. pp. VIII and 193.

Modern French Literature, by L. Raymond de Vericour, &c., &c. Revised, with notes. By William Staughton Chase, A. M. Boston: 1848. 12mo. pp. XVI and 448.

Proceedings of the Anti-Sabbath Convention held in the Melodeon, March 23rd and 24th. [Reported by Henry M. Parkhurst.] Boston: 1848. 12mo. pp. 168.

Guide through Mount Auburn. Second Edition, enlarged and improved for the benefit of strangers desirous of seeing the clusters of monuments with the least trouble. With an engraved plan of the cemetery. By Nathaniel Dearborn. Boston: 1848. 12mo. pp. 28.

The Ministerial Office, its Permanency and Ends: a Sermon preached at the Installation of Rev. George E. Day as Pastor of the Edwards Church in Northampton, Jan. 12, 1848. By Theodore D. Wooley, President of Yale College. Northampton: 1848.

A Discourse delivered in the First Congregational Church in Harvard, Worcester Co., Mass., by Henry B. Pearson, on the day of the Annual Fast, April 6, 1848. Boston: 1848.

Thoughts on some important Points relating to the System of the World. By J. P. Nichol, LL. D., &c. First American Edition, revised and enlarged. Boston and Cambridge. 1848. 1 vol. 12mo. pp. XVIII and 261.

The Writings of Cassius Marcellus Clay, including Speeches and Addresses. Edited, with a Preface and Memoir, by Horace Greeley. New York: 1848. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. XVI and 536.

Christian Songs. By the Rev. James Gisborne Lyons, LL. D. "The Service of Song." Third edition with additions. Philadelphia: 1848. 8vo. pp. 72.

The Principles of the Chrono-thermal System of Medicine, with the Fallacies of the Faculty, &c. By Samuel Dickinson, M. D., &c., &c. Containing also an Introduction and Notes by William Turner, M. D., &c., &c. London. pp. XV and 194.

Triumph of "Young Physic," or Chronothermal Facts. By William Turner, M. D., &c., &c. New York. 8vo. pp. 29.

Endymion. A Tale of Greece. By Henry B. Hirst, &c. Boston. 12mo. 1848.

A Book of Hymns for public and private devotion. 3d edition. Boston. 1848. 12mo.

An Abridgment of the Law of Nisi Prius, in two volumes, by Wm. Selwyn, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn. With notes and references to the decisions of the courts of this country, by Henry Wheaton, Thomas I. Wharton, and Edward E. Law. Sixth American Edition, with a supplement containing notes of recent English and American authorities. By T. G. Marvin. 2 vols. pp. 775, 902. Philadelphia. 1848.

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